29/4

2/60
S.B.

Politics of the Indian Ocean


THE INDIAN OCEAN
UMM AL QASR
BANDAR ABBAS
BAHRAIN
GWADAR
KARACHI
CALCUTTA
CHITTAGONG
BOMBAY
MASIRAH
VISHAKHAPATNAM
RANGOON
HODEIDA
ASMARA
ADEN
SOCOTRA
LACCADIVE IS.
ANDAMAN IS
BANGKOK
SAIGON
TRINCOMALI
NICOBAR IS
DJIBUTI
BERBERA
COLOMBO
PENANG
MOGADISHU
MALDIVE IS.
MALACCA
SINGAPORE
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY
SEYCHELLES
CHAGOS ARCH.
DIEGO GARCIA
MOMBASA
AMIRANTES
ZANZIBAR
JAKARTA
DAR ES SALAAM
ALDABARA
FARQUHAR
COCOS IS AUS
CHRISTMAS IS AUS
COMORO
DIEGO SUAREZ
TROMELIN FR.
RODRIGUES IS.
MAURITIUS
BEIRA
REUNION FR.
NORTH WEST CAPE
AMSTERDAM IS. FR.
PERTH
FREMANTLE
ST. PAUL FR.
DURBAN
PORT ELIZABETH
CAPETOWN
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
CROZET FR.
KERGULEN FR.
PRINCE EDWARD IS. S.AFR.
HEARD AUS.
0 500 1000 1500 2000
KILOMETRES
ANTARCTICA

Politics of the Indian Ocean

K. Rajendra Singh

1974

Thomson Press (India) Limited

Publication Division

Jx 1393 I6
15 MAR 1977
MJC/PMA

First Published March 1974

© K. Rajendra Singh

Published by :
Thomson Press (India) Limited
29, Netaji Subhas Marg
Delhi 110006

Printed by :
Ekta Press
B-62/13 Naraina Industrial Area Phase II
New Delhi 110028

To the memory of
my father

Contents

	Page
Preface	
INTRODUCTION	1
Naval Activities in the Indian Ocean Area	1
Pre-European Era	1
Entry of European Powers	4
Sea-Power Concept and Cold War Rivalry	9
1	
THE ERA OF LAND CONFRONTATION 1945—1965	14
The Impact of Land Confrontation 1945—1955	14
Anglo-American Rivalry	14
The Ring Around the Communist World	18
SEATO and Baghdad Pact	18
The Changing Weapon Systems	23
Continuing the Land Confrontation : The First Phase : 1955—1959	26
Decline in the Presence of Traditional Western Powers	27
Great Britain and France	27
Filling the Vacuum, 1957	32
The Growing Soviet Involvement	37
Strengthening American Presence	43
Other Non-aligned States on the Littoral : India, Yemen and Indonesia	46
Continuing the Land Confrontation : The Second Phase : 1959—1965	49
Weapon Systems, the Period of Transition and its Political Implications	49

2

THE NEW OCEAN STRATEGY 57

Evolution of the New Weapon System 57

American Navy and the Indian Ocean 61

Entry of the US Task Force 61

US policy—Post-1964 Period 64

The British Imperial Rule 72

The Last Post 72

The East of the Suez Policy 79

The Soviets and the Indian Ocean 84

Soviet Naval Capacity 84

Growth of the Soviet Presence in the Littoral 88

French Entry 96

The Chinese Presence 101

Thd Japanese Interest 115

Foreign Interests and their Protection 121

3

CONFLICT SITUATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA AND BIG POWER INVOLVEMENTS 125

South and South-East Asia 126

Persion Gulf and the South Arabian Coast 129

Iran-Iraq Disputes 131

Problems of the Gulf 133

Future of the Trucial Coast 135

The Liberation Movements 138

Local Military Capabilities and Iran's Place in the Gulf 140

The Bab al-Mandeb Area 146

The Asian Littoral : 'Radicals', Past and Present 146

The African Littoral 149

Greater Somalia Plan 149

The Eritrean Problem 152

Southern Africa 154

Power and Politics of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency 154

Big Power Involvement and Conflict-Resolution 163

4

FUTURE CONFRONTATIONS 171

Strategic Importance of the Indian Ocean 171

Emergence of an Indian Ocean Community Consciousness 179

The Desire for a Nuclear-Free Peace Zone 179

Can the Desire be Fulfilled ? 185

Possibilities of a Community Approach 189

Resources of the Indian Ocean and the Need for a Community Approach 198

International Control over the Resources of the Sea-bed : the Pardo Plan 198

Deep-sea Research and the Possibilities of the Exploitation of the Sea-bed Resources 200

Limits of the State Jurisdiction over the Sea-bed 204

Fishery Rights 209

The 'Security Zone' Concept 213

Naval Capabilities of the Indian Ocean States 217

Possibilities of Regional Cooperation 220

5

THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF DIEGO GARCIA 225

APPENDICES

I The Evolution of the SLBM and Related Weapons Capabilities of Big Powers 233

II The interventionist Capabilities of the Big and Medium Powers Interested in the Indian Ocean Area 234

III Surveillance of the Security Zones : Naval Capabilities of the Indian Ocean States 235

IV Oil Resources of the Persian Gulf Area 236

REFERENCES 237

BIBLIOGRAPHY 240

Preface

THIS BOOK IS an attempt to explain the big power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, as far as it relates to the impact of the weapon system on international relations. The following four factors have been interlinked :

The weapon systems capable of posing strategic deterrence;

Military strategy based upon such a system;

Political and diplomatic moves made by each interested power to accommodate the weapon system, and the global strategy based upon that systems in a particular part of the Indian ocean;

The reaction of local Powers to the political and military implications of the foreign presence in any area of the Indian Ocean.

It is widely accepted that within the last 25 years, three weapon systems of global significance have been perfected : the manned bomber carrying nuclear weapons, the land-based IRBMs and ICBMs, and the SLBM, or *Polaris* submarine as it is commonly known. As and when a new system was perfected, it superseded the old one. Since no single strategy could be applicable to different weapon systems, a new one was evolved to enable a Super Power to make the best use of the new system. That necessitated a new orientation of its global strategy and often gave rise to a new set of political considerations. Naturally, the local response also varied with the changes in the weapon system, the global strategy and the Supper Power strategic interests in a given area.

If we study the politics of the Indian Ocean area based upon these four factors, we come to the following conclusions : Firstly, the Indian Ocean area, till recently, was a low-priority area in the Super Power military confrontation. As long as manned bombers or land-based missiles carrying nuclear weapons dominated the strategic weapon system, or, in other words, as long as the concept of land and air confrontation dominated the Super Power strategic considerations, Europe, the North Pole, the North

Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans remained the areas of intense Super Power conflict. Consequently, during that period the Indian Ocean area did not witness any serious Cold War confrontations comparable to those reflected in the crises in Berlin and Cuba or the shooting wars in Korea or Indochina.

It is interesting to note that during that phase the Americans had shown only a lukewarm interest in exploiting the military potentials of this area. Undoubtedly, the Americans were responsible for the formation of the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (the CENTO). But, it should be noted that active American participation in the SEATO activities was mostly confined to the east of Singapore, and the USA did not provide any active help to Britain—an active member of the SEATO—in its confrontation with Indonesia. The SEATO also did not involve itself deeply with the problems of the Bay of Bengal, though Pakistan, as a link between the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, was playing an important role in the American policy of containment of communism. Lack of sufficient military interest in the area was also one of the reasons why the USA, the sponsor of the northern-tier scheme, did not become a *de jure* member of the Baghdad Pact (the CENTO). Another fact which should be noted is that though the USA was a member of the Military Committee of the CENTO, the CENTO did not have any standing army. Nor did the CENTO Command have any local troops assigned to it on a permanent basis. The CENTO even today cannot be compared to the NATO or the SEATO either organizationally or as a military deterrence. There are no missile or SAC bases in the Indian Ocean area.

During that period the Western interest in the area was primarily political and the USA did try to win over 'friends', and retain their friendship. The USA also tried to ease out the traditional Western Powers from the area and to fill the so-called 'vacuum' with its own presence. One wonders, whether the Eisenhower Doctrine was aimed primarily against the Arabs, the communists, or the residuary British and French presence in West Asia and North Africa, which were the *status quo* powers. Both, the USA as well as the USSR wanted changes in the *status que* so that they might step in.

The strategic significance of the Indian Ocean area increased significantly following the introduction of the SLBM system, especially after the perfection of the *Polaris* (*A-3*) missile with a range of 2,500 nautical miles. The introduction of the *Poseidon* missile, which has the MIRV capability, has made the new weapon system much more effective.

Under the new weapon system the USA enjoys a few extra advantages while operating in the Indian Ocean area. Firstly, the *Polaris* (*Poseidon*) submarines, operating from there can cover a deeper arc of the Soviet Central Asia than is possible from other areas. Secondly, by operating from the *Bab al-mandeb* area or from near the Iranian or the Pakistani coast targets as far away as Moscow can be brought within the

range of the missile. Thirdly, the Indian Ocean area, though very near the Soviet mainland, is thousands of miles away from the Soviet coast. The closure of the Suez Canal has increased the distance considerably. Hence, the Soviet Union finds it difficult to maintain an adequate anti-SLBM system capability in the Indian Ocean area. Lastly, the Indian Ocean has only a negative importance for the Soviet Union because it cannot use that area to threaten the USA with its own SLBM system. Hence, the USSR would hesitate to concentrate its military potentials here and would rather increase its offensive-defensive capabilities, which are often complementary, in the Pacific and the Atlantic, rather than in the Indian Ocean. Thus, USA enjoys several strategic advantages *vis-a-vis* the USSR, if it consolidates its SLBM capability in the Indian Ocean.

The *Polaris* submarines began to operate in the Indian Ocean by 1965. The change in the weapon system also witnessed an organized effort on the part of the USA to consolidate its influence in place from where it could operate its *Polaris* fleet and contain the Soviet counter-presence in this area. Thus, the USA came closer to Australia. The USA has already constructed a low-frequency communication base at North-West Cape on the western coast of Australia. It also operates a similar base in Asmara. The USA is also seeking facilities to operate its *Polaris* submarines from the Cockburn Sound naval base in Australia.

The introduction of the US naval presence in the Indian Ocean also coincided with the realization in Great Britain that they could no longer play the role of a Super Power. The East of the Suez policy was the affirmation of that realisation. But it is interesting to note that the British withdrawal coincided not only with the carving out of the British Indian Ocean territory, but also with the agreement to establish a joint Anglo-American base at Diego Garcia. The new base with its communication facilities and its strategic location would become the hub of the Western naval activities in the area. The limited British second-strike capability and the partial British withdrawal has made the USA the dominant power in the area. Today, the USA enjoys direct base facilities in Australia, Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa and indirect support in several other states and in the British bases in the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union, at least for some time to come, would not be in a position to neutralize the SLBM threat from this area. It does not have a sufficient naval capacity for that purpose. Though the US task-force officially steamed into the area in 1964, it took four years for the Soviets to send a small task-force of their own. Over a period of four years the Soviet naval presence in the area has grown to about twenty vessels, but the number is quite inadequate to cope with the task assigned to it. Also, unlike the USA, the USSR enjoys limited base facilities which are confined to the area around the *Bab al-Mandeb*. Though that corner has its strategic advantages, the Soviets cannot hope to fully neutralize the American

presence in the Indian Ocean from there.

The SLBM system would dominate the Super Power strategy for some time to come. There are no chances that a new system for the delivery of the nuclear weapon would replace the *Polaris-Poseidon* system. On the contrary, the *Polaris* itself should be considered only as a first step in the final evolution of that system. The *Poseidon*, with MIRV capability, is an improvement. Further sophistications are planned. Plans are under way to increase the range of the SLBM to 6,000 miles and to further deep-submerge the delivery vessel. Though the UN may prohibit the use of the ocean-bed for weapon installation, one does not know if it would be able to extend the ban to the continental-shelf also, or if it can lay down an acceptable formula to differentiate between an offensive and a defensive capability.

The SALT Agreement has put a ceiling not only on the ABMs but also on the ICBMs and SLBMs. Neither the UAS nor the USSR can go beyond the maximum number of missiles agreed to in that agreement. Hence, both the Super Powers, if they have to improve their strategic deterrence, would have to improve the quality of the missiles by reducing their CEP (circular error probable), by giving them a bigger punch, by increasing their MIRV capability and by granting them some protection against the first strike. At the same time the second-strike capability would have to be kept on a constant alert to pose the maximum deterrence to the enemy.

Though the manned bombers, whether carrying traditional nuclear bombs or SRAMs (short-range attack missiles), the IRBMs and the ICBMs would retain the first-strike capability, a reliable strategic deterrence based upon the second-strike capability can come only from the SLBM system. The limitation on ABM system, under the SALT Agreement, has made the IRBM and ICBM sites and the SAC bases practically defenceless against the enemy first strike. On the other hand, deterrence based upon the SLBM would be hard to trace and to neutralize. Hence, the Super Powers, as well as those who aspire to play a Super Power role, would prefer to put their second-strike capability under the sea where it can be relatively safe.

Undoubtedly anti-submarine warfare has made rapid advances but water still remains a difficult medium to penetrate with the devices available today. A fast nuclear submarine, capable of deep-submerged operation for a considerable length of time, therefore, enjoys a great advantage as a weapon platform against those sited on the land. There is no doubt that at least for some time to come, the strategic deterrence of the Super Powers would be sea-based.

In the context of the present weapons system and the Super Power strategy, the Indian Ocean area would retain its strategic significance not only for the two Super Powers but also for Japan, China, France and Britain who might like to develop even a modest second-strike capability.

There is no doubt that these Powers would like to maintain and promote their respective influences in the area at the cost of others. The littoral states would, therefore, have to sustain high pressures from these foreign Powers, if they wish to prevent the Indian Ocean area from becoming a hot bed of Cold War rivalry and an arena of future nuclear confrontation.

An effort has been made in the book to study the moves made by the states in the Indian Ocean area to safeguard themselves from the Cold War rivalry, which might any day be converted into a hot war over which they would have no control. The policy of non-alignment, neutralization, denuclearization of the Indian Ocean, Asian collective security etc. have been suggested. An analysis has been made of these alternatives which are open before the littoral states.

It is difficult to visualize the prospects of the Indian Ocean free from the Super Power nuclear presence unless a new weapon system makes the present strategy redundant. Such a new system is not in sight at the movement. Laser has great potentials in the anti-missile role but not as a weapon delivery system. The other alternative is to evolve the spirit of the Indian Ocean community consciousness. Such a spirit would hinder the foreign Powers playing the classical game of divide and rule. The evolution of such a consciousness may seem a remote possibility today, but one can work for it. The *detente* among the traditional enemies in Europe, or the talks about the evolution of a Mediterranean consciousness, are examples which should encourage us and make us confident that the emergence of an Indian Ocean community may after all not remain a dream.

I am very thankful to the staff of the Sapru House Library, New Delhi, for providing me with all the facilities at their disposal. Their personalized service was most touching. I am also thankful to all my friends who encouraged me to venture into this relatively unexplored field of study. In this connection I would like to mention specifically the names of Dr. Mahendra Kumar, Reader, Department of Political Science, Delhi University, Shri Deshinkar from the Department of Chinese Studies, Delhi University and, Dr. M.S. Venkatarmani, Dr. Rahmatualla Khan, Dr. M.S. Agwani and Professor Sisir Gupta of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. I am specifically grateful to Dr. S.C. Gangal, also from the School of International Studies, for going through the whole manuscript and making some valuable suggestions.

Introduction

EVER SINCE MAN tied together a few pieces of wood and used them as a raft to float on water, he has been striving to improve upon the contraption to exploit the resources now available to him. The history of man's struggle to dominate the waters is long and chequered. Until a hundred years ago, man was able to perfect only such devices as could traverse just the surface of the water ; the depths were still out of his reach. With the invention of the submarine, he could probe deep oceans and stay under water for long periods of time. A new chapter thus opened in the history of mankind. Man's conquest of the waters has provided him with new opportunities not only to improve his standard of living, enlarge his trade and spread his culture, but also to vanquish his enemies. The devices which earlier enabled him to transport goods and men across water were perfected to carry war machinery. Navy emerged as a powerful factor in international relations and the control of the high seas began to dominate the minds of military experts.

The importance of navy was felt even in the ancient and medieval times. The Mediterranean, a land-locked sea, witnessed the rise and fall of several civilizations—the Phoenician, the Roman, the Byzantine, the Arab and the Turkish—in the history of which navy played an important role. The rise and growth of the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean could be traced to the Punic Wars. It was only when the Romans crushed the Phoenician navy that they could extend their hold over North Africa. Nearer home, the Indian Ocean also witnessed great sea-borne activities both in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal.

NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA

Pre-European Era

Like the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean area also has a long maritime and naval history going back to ancient times. The Indus

Valley, the Nile Valley and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley civilizations had maintained maritime contacts. Recently, the remnants of a large dockyard, about 710 feet by 210 feet, were excavated at Lothal in Gujarat (India). Another such site was found at Sutkagen, 300 miles west of Karachi. During the pre-Christian era the Nanda and the Maurya dynasties were in close contact with the Greco-Roman Empires. It has been recorded that Alexander the Great built a harbour at Patala on the Indus, where it splits into two main branches, and that with the assistance of local pilots he sailed from there towards the Persian Gulf. Half of his army was transported by ships. The rest marched over land. The 1500-mile long sea-voyage of Nearchus, Alexander's admiral, in 323 B.C., was probably the first case when such a huge army was transported by sea in the Indian Ocean area.

Maritime activities were well-regulated at that time in India. *Arthashastra*, the Indian treatise of the fourth century B.C. on the art of government, mentions admiralty as one of the administrative divisions. Kautilya, its author, also made a distinction between the inland waterways and the overseas maritime activities. Different sets of laws governed these activities. Maritime activities were not confined to northern India alone. In the south, the Satavahan dynasty in Andhra was maintaining maritime contacts even with the Romans in the second century B.C.. Roman gold coins of that period have been discovered in south India.

During that period three discoveries made navigation in the Indian Ocean more regular and also easier. It is claimed that the regularity of the monsoon was discovered as early as A.D. 45 by Hippalus. That meant a change-over from ships with oars to sailing ships. Gradually, the size and the sailing capacity of these ships improved and vessels with two or three masts were common. The ancient Indian treatise on ship-building, *Yukti Kalpataru*, lists ten basic designs for ocean-going ships. With the advances made in astronomy, guidance by stars during the night became possible for ocean navigation. It is also said that *matsya yantra*, probably a crude form of magnetic compass, was invented by the Indians at that time. "Ages before the races of Europe had emerged from the primitive barbarism in their cloudy climate, where the study of the stars is always comparatively difficult, the orientals knew quite enough about these permanent finger posts of nature to use them with confidence for crossing the sea."[1]

Maritime contacts between the people of the Arabian Sea area and of the Mediterranean region grew with improvements in the construction of bigger ships and in the ways of navigation. Under Chandragupta II (also known as Vikramaditya) maritime activities on the Gujarat coast were boosted still further. Several ports like Dwarika (meaning the Gateway), Veraval and Ghogha were flourishing in that area. Socotra *(Dwipa Sukhdwara* or *Dwipa Sukhadhara)* was known to the Indians and was a junction of the maritime trade of the Arabian coast, the African coast

and the Red Sea. The famous *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (A.D. first century) mentions that Indians, Arabs and Greeks used to live in Socotra. The Arabs, however, suffered a temporary eclipse after the third century A.D., when they were replaced by the Sassanids of Persia as the maritime power in the Arabian Sea. The Sassanids gradually expanded their sphere of activities and even travelled up to China via the Straits of Malacca. The Arabs, however, regained their maritime position after the advent of Islam. During all these years the Arabian Sea area was, more or less, a zone of peaceful maritime trade and no serious naval activities took place there, except for the minor abortive attempts of the Arabs to attack Sind from the west, during the seventh and eighth centuries.

While the maritime activities were flourishing in the west the eastern zone too was not dormant. The Bay of Bengal was also busy with naval and maritime activities from the first century A.D. onwards. It is reported that the people of Kalinga (modern Orissa) reached Java as early as A.D. 75. The Kalinga, Pallava, Chalukya, Pala and Chola Empires in India had very intimate maritime contacts with the Srivijaya and the Shailendra Empires, which flourished in South-East Asia. The Srivijaya dynasty was founded in Sumatra in the fourth century A.D. It gradually expanded into a great maritime empire which was also a connecting link between India and China in those days. The Shailendra dynasty, which wrested power from the Srivijaya, was established in Java in A.D. 782. Both, the Srivijaya and the Shailendra dynasties, had hostile relations with the Chola dynasty in South India, which was also a naval power. The naval confrontation between the two lasted for about a century. In the thirteenth century, the Shailendra Empire transported thousands of troops across the Bay of Bengal to conquer Ceylon but failed to attain its objective. The long conflict between the two local naval Powers in the Bay of Bengal weakened both of them. The result was that the maritime trade was cornered by the Arabs, who were neutral in the conflict. Also, the area became weak and disunited and could not oppose foreign Powers when they came to that area in the subsequent period.

Vijayanagar was the last of the local maritime empires in the Indian Ocean. It flourished in the fourteenth century and maintained links both with the east and the west. At that time ship-building was a flourishing trade. There was a great stress upon maritime trade and commerce though not upon naval activities. No doubt some precaution was taken against local pirates but warships, capable of conducting naval operations on the high seas, were not constructed. At that time, the littoral states were dominated by land-powers, and even they were weak and divided. The Arab world was being gradually occupied by the Turks. The Iranians were recovering from the Mongol onslaught and were busy containing the Turks. India was fragmented into several small states, which were

fighting amongst themselves. The Vijayanagar Empire in India was busy defending itself against the pressure from the local Muslim states in south India. Conditions in South-East Asia were no better. None of these littoral states could, therefore, oppose any foreign maritime penetration. Thus, when a new naval Power, Portugal, entered the Indian Ocean it did not have to face any strong local naval opposition.

Entry of European Powers

The European naval Powers, once they came to the Indian Ocean, did not have to make any special effort to acquire naval superiority in that area. Their naval superiority was, in fact, the result of their involvement in the European power politics. At that time, with the advent of gun-powder and larger ships, high seas had become a contested area. European ships—merchant ships as well as fighting ships—regularly sailed into the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans, and fought with their naval rivals. Gradually, the naval supremacy of some European Powers enabled them to dominate the high seas and deny opportunities to their European and local rivals in these areas. Gradually, these European Powers, because of their command over the high seas, also began to dominate the littoral and thus heralded the era of European imperialism in the Afro-Asian world.

When the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean, the littoral Powers had practically lost their naval tradition, though maritime trade was still being carried on by them. Their small naval vessels, which were armed with outmoded weapon system, could not face the European ships which mounted heavier guns and were more sea-worthy. The Europeans had another advantage. In their quest for the control of the Atlantic to ensure their hold over the Americas, they had evolved an ocean strategy to which the local Indian Ocean Powers, which were land-oriented at that time, had no effective answer. Also, the local rivalries had not only weakened them but also made it possible for the foreign Powers to play one local Power against the other, and thus secure footholds on the littoral. It would not be wrong to say that with their tradition of free maritime trade and commerce, these local states looked upon the European Powers, when they reached the main trading outposts in the Indian Ocean area, as trading nations and not as conquerors. In the initial stages they even welcomed them. The Arabian Sea littoral where they reached first had never before been subjected to a determined naval attack. So these foreign Powers also enjoyed an element of surprise.

Vasco da Gama reached Calicut on 11 May, 1498. It is said that he was piloted across the Arabian Sea from Malindi, north of Mombasa, to Calicut, by a local pilot within a short period of twenty-two days. Some claim that he was an Arab by the name of Ahmed ibn Majid, while others like K. M. Panikkar claim him to be a Hindu. When Vasco da Gama reached Calicut he was welcomed by Zamorin, the local ruler,

as a new trading partner. But very soon it became clear, that the Portuguese had other ideas besides free trade and commerce. They not only wanted a trade monopoly which would have harmed the established local traders, both Indian as well as Arab, but they also indulged in piracy and naval intimidation on the high seas and the blockade of the ports. Calicut was blockaded in 1503 and the first naval clash took place between the ships of the Zamorin and the Portuguese ships. Though the local fleet suffered great losses the Portuguese also had to withdraw, and the first round ended in a draw. In the subsequent decades the Portuguese, led by Albuquerque, persisted in their attacks and succeeded in establishing their foot holds.

The conflict for supremacy over the trade routes, between the Portuguese and the local Powers, in the Arabian Sea, lasted for about eighty years. The Zamorin sought the help of the Sultan of Egypt who sent some ships to fight the Portuguese. They were led by Mir Hussein. The combined fleet saw some action against the Portuguese during 1507-9, but without reaching any decisive conclusion. The Turks also sent a large fleet under Sulaiman Pasha in 1538, but when a powerful Portuguese fleet appeared, the Turkish fleet, under the cover of darkness, conducted a strategic retreat and returned to its ports. It was left to the local Powers to challenge the Portuguese and thwart their attempts to occupy the Indian coast. The Kunjalis of the Malabar coast, who were the Mopla admirals of the Zamorin, were in charge of the naval activities against the Portuguese. They harassed them continuously but their ships were small, lightly armed and not capable of long-distance operations on the high seas and, hence, they were not able to contain the Portuguese naval power in the Indian Ocean.

The Portuguese were able to occupy Goa in 1510. They already had control over some points on the East African coast. They occupied and fortified Hormuz in 1508, Socotra in 1507 and Malacca in 1513. The Portuguese were the first to have understood the concept of sea-power and to have evolved a naval strategy to suit their requirements in the context of the Indian Ocean. Though their basic aim was to acquire trade monopoly, they occupied the strategic areas which commanded the entrance to the Indian Ocean : Socotra near the *Bab-al-Mandeb*, Hormuz, which commands the entrance to the Persian Gulf, and Malacca which commands the outlet to China. They had bases also in East Africa as in Mogadishu, Mombasa and Zanzibar. It is interesting to note that the naval Powers which appeared on the scene after them, including the Super Powers of today, have more or less followed the naval strategy as initiated by the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. After the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French adopted it, but it was Britain, which, by dominating the Indian Ocean during the nineteenth century and the first half of the present century, perfected it.

Several European Powers followed in the footsteps of the Portu-

guese and reached the Indian Ocean. Their presence in the area was influenced partly by trade considerations and partly by the religious and political controversy between the Catholics and the Protestants. The Protestants opposed the Papal grant of trade monopoly to the Portuguese in the East and to the Spaniards in the West. The economic and religious rivalry was also influenced by the inter-state rivalry in Europe and very often the rise and fall of a European Power in the Indian Ocean was determined, not by its position here but by the fortunes of war in the European theatre.

The Dutch were the next European Power to enter the Indian Ocean. The Dutch United Company was formed to trade in this area. It had the government's backing and the Dutch vessels were escorted by the Dutch fleet. Even though the Dutch were more interested in the spice trade and had concentrated their attention on the spice islands like Java and Ceylon, the Dutch and the Portuguese rivalries in Europe were reflected in this area also. Portugal, therefore, came to a clash with the Dutch who had a working alliance with Britain at that time.

By 1660s the Portuguese power in the Indian Ocean had been contained and they had practically been driven out of their strongholds in that area except for a few pockets like Goa, Daman and Diu in India. The Portuguese decline can be explained as partly due to their involvement in the European politics. The destruction of the Spanish Armada by the English not only meant a setback to the naval supremacy of Spain, a close ally of Portugal, but also the rise of a new naval power which was hostile to Portugal. Finding themselves unable to protect their hold in the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese turned their attention to Brazil where they coulds till hope to gain some naval support from the Spanish fleet operating in the Atlantic Ocean. England was emerging as a strong naval power not only in the Atlantic but also in the Indian Ocean. The Dutch did not survive the naval competition and were finally forced to relinquish their hold over most of their trading posts and to be content only with Indonesia.

The intense naval activity in the Indian Ocean area during that period was largely confined to foreign Powers. The littoral states were only like onlookers of the grim struggle, not even knowing its implication for them. Even the Mughal Empire in India, which was probably the strongest local power in the Indian Ocean at that time, had hardly any navy. Some small naval craft were in use but naval activity was confined to the inland waterways and the coastal waters around Bengal. Though the Mughals had conquered Gujarat, which was the centre of maritime trade with West Asia and Europe, they did not develop a strong navy to protect their coast or their sea-borne trade. It cannot be said that the Mughal Empire was poor and incapable, financially or militarily, of maintaining a navy. The real reason was that it was too land-oriented to think in terms of an ocean strategy. As long as there was a strong central

authority on the mainland the land power could prevent foreign penetration but the moment it disintegrated, sea-power enabled the Europeans to conquer and subjugate it.

But, it cannot be said that Indians were totally unaware of the threat from the sea. The Arabian Sea littoral states had witnessed, over a number of decades, the gradual expansion of foreign naval activities in the area, and had taken whatever action was possible under the circumstances. The Zamorin had fought a protracted naval campaign against the Portuguese. The rising Maratha Power fought against the growing British presence in the Arabian Sea coast of the Indian sub-continent.

Shivaji, the great Maratha leader, laid the foundation of the Maratha Navy in 1659. Naval activities were initiated which led to the construction of a series of naval forts on the Konkan coast, as well as a modest ship-building programme. In 1679, the Maratha fleet occupied the Island of Khanderi which even today commands the entrance to Bombay. British efforts to dislodge the Marathas from there failed even though they were assisted by the Sidis of Janjira, who were the local naval rivals of the Marathas. The Maratha naval power continued to expand even after the death of Shivaji. Several strategic naval bases, like Swarnadurg and Vijaydurg, were constructed. The Maratha fleet, at its glory, was led by the renowned admiral, Kanhoji Angre, who took over its command in 1699.

The Marathas had to face a very adverse combination of forces. On land they were opposed by the Mughal Empire and on the high seas they were challenged by the Europeans, who were often supported by the Sidis. The Mughals also supported the Sidis against the Marathas. Despite these handicaps, the Marathas challenged the foreign Powers and made their naval presence felt in the Konkan area. The foreign Powers tried to destroy the Maratha naval base at Vijaydurg. Repeated attempts were made by England in 1717, 1718, 1720 and 1722, but it failed to dislodge the Marathas, despite the fact that in the 1722 attempt, the English were also helped by the Portuguese. The Maratha threat had brought the two rivals together. In 1724, a large Dutch fleet also attacked Vijaydurg but had to retreat. The Marathas, under Kanhoji Angre, were proving a hard nut to crack.

The Maratha ships were small, mostly shallow draft vessels, lightly armed, but fast. The Marathas used the element of surprise and their numerical superiority against the bigger ocean-going and heavily armed European vessels. The weapon system used by the Marathas influenced their naval strategy. The type of ships that were available to them forced them to adopt a shore-based naval strategy and the Europeans were left to command the ocean. The result was that whereas the Marathas could deny the Konkan coast to the foreigners, they could neither attack them on the high seas nor destroy their bases in other parts of the Indian Ocean area. The death of Kanhoji Angre in 1728 (some claim that he died in 1731)

was a big blow to the Maratha Navy. His successors continued the fight and did challenge the Europeans for some time. Vijaydurg was captured by the English Navy in 1755. That marked the end of the Maratha Navy and also the end of Indian naval resistance to European penetration.

Besides the Marathas, the people of Muscat and Oman were also active in opposing the Portuguese and other foreign naval presence in the area. These people were the traditional sea-farers, who for centuries had conducted maritime trade in the Arabian Sea area. The Portuguese tried to break their monopoly. Socotra was occupied by the Portuguese in 1507. They also occupied Hormuz in 1508, and continued to occupy it, off and on, till the local people and the English navy combined to drive them away, by the middle of the seventeenth century. The power of the rulers of Muscat increased gradually and they began to dislodge the Portuguese even from their African outposts like Mogadishu, Mombasa and the islands of Zanzibar and Mafia. But that local naval renaissance in the Persian Gulf area was short-lived. The English, who succeeded the Portuguese, maintained their naval predominance and reinforced their political position by signing protectorate agreements with the small sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf area.

But, before the British could claim absolute command over the Indian Ocean, they had to neutralize one more European power, i.e. France. It was the last European Power to enter the Indian Ocean before the Second World War. The French India Company was formed in 1664 and the French ships began to operate in this area by 1667. In 1693, following the war in Europe between the Dutch and the French, the Dutch bombarded Pondicherry, the French possession in India. Again, in 1744, following the Austrian War of Succession in which France and England were enemies, naval engagements took place between these two European Powers in the Indian Ocean area. Some local bases were also captured. The Treaty of Aix-les-Chapelle of 1748 not only brought a temporary peace to Europe but also restored the *status quo ante* in the Indian Ocean area. More clashes occurred between the English and the French during the next three decades, but every time peace restored the *status quo*. Finally, after the famous naval battle of Trafalgar, in which the French suffered serious setbacks, their naval activities were curtailed, and they began to lose ground to the English in the East. Except for their presence in Indochina and a few small pockets in India and Somalia and islands like Reunion and Komoro, the French practically lost all their influence in the Indian Ocean area. Napoleon's attempts to confront the British naval power with a French land power conveyed to Asia via Egypt also proved futile because the French could not even secure the passage to Egypt across the Mediterranean. Once again sea power had demonstrated its superiority over land power, especially when the target of the conflict was situated in a far away place.

The emergence of British naval power in the Indian Ocean area went

hand in hand with the acquisition of bases and the control of several strategic islands on the littoral. The British had already established their presence in the Persian Gulf, after they had defeated the Portuguese in 1622. Gradually they began to expand their sphere of influence and by the end of the nineteenth century they were able to control the whole of that region. They occupied Aden in 1839 and thus neutralized Socotra, which dominated the entrance to the Red Sea. Further south they acquired valuable bases in East Africa and South Africa. Mauritius was acquired from the French in 1810. Several other islands in the Indian Ocean were also occupied by them. Malacca and Singapore were occupied in 1759 and 1824, respectively. Australia became a British preserve. The British position in the Indian Ocean area was made secure by the establishment of bases at strategic points like the Suez, Aden, Bahrain, Singapore, Cape Town, etc. Also, British control over the Indian sub-continent made available to it sufficient economic resources as well as manpower, not only to defend but also to expand its rule in the area.

The British dominance over the area was also facilitated on account of the Industrial Revolution, as Britain could make rapid improvements in its weapon system and the means of communication. These advances made it possible for its military planners to evolve naval strategies suitable for their national requirements. Thus Britain was able to dominate the Indian Ocean, not only because it had made extra efforts to conquer the area, but also, because its efforts to contain the European rivals had led to the creation of a strong navy, which could be used either in the Indian Ocean or in other theatres, in support of the British global policy. Very often, the naval actions elsewhere decided the fate of the Indian Ocean area. That lesson of history is valid even today.

Since the Second World War Britain has lagged behind. Its war losses crippled its economy and sapped its national strength, thus leading to a gradual withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent, South-East Asia, West Asia and Africa. It will be difficult to halt this tide, and sooner or later, Britain will have to relinquish its hold over the Indian Ocean islands also. Following the decline of the British power, the earlier British position in the area is being contested by the local Afro-Asian states and by new Super Powers. The old order has not been replaced by a new one as yet.

SEA-POWER CONCEPT AND COLD WAR RIVALRY

A power which dominates the sea has decisive advantages over its rivals. It can control the maritime trade, which is becoming more and more important. It can easily transport its army to fight in any area and thus dominate even the littoral, because the means of communication over the high seas, even today, are much superior to, and faster than, those available overland. It can use its navy for blockade, for shore bombardment and for landing troops and material at a given point and thus threaten its rivals. If pressed, it can even retreat into the high seas and

be sure that its forces would not be totally annihilated. These advantages, which are valid even today when sea power has to compete with air power, were even more valuable two centuries ago, when the military strategists were studying the concept of sea power and its place in the global or regional strategy.

Several theories were propounded on the need to dominate the oceans. One of the first persons who popularized the concept of sea power was Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914). He wrote several books to highlight the need to control the high seas.[2] There is no doubt that Mahan's theory had a great influence upon the evolution of naval strategy. Even today his basic presumptions are valid, despite the fact that the navy has to face a serious challenge from the air force and from the missile system. Control of the waves, and the waters beneath them, is all the more important today, in the context of the sophisticated weapon system, like the nuclear-powered submarine capable of launching a *Polaris*-type missile. This new weapon system, in combination with the traditional vessels, permits the navy of a Big Power not only to command the waves and the seas beneath, but also increases the range of its armament from the shore to any place on the earth. Thus, navy can play a strategic role which is 'global' in the real sense.

But, the significance of the ocean strategy alone is not sufficient to understand fully the present-day Cold War confrontation and its effects upon a given area. The whole thing has to be studied in the context of four basic points : evolution of the weapon system, strategy based upon the available weapon system, diplomatic moves made by the Big Powers to accommodate their weapon system and their global strategy in a given area, and the local responses to the Big Power presence.

Till the Second World War, oceans played a limited role in the strategic considerations of the Big Powers. The conventional naval weapon system, then available to the military planners, made it possible for a marine Power to deny the use of the high seas to its rival, but a true land power could still survive and fight back. The evolution of the air power (long-range strategic bombers and fighters which have the capacity to dominate the air-space) posed serious challenges to the concept of naval supremacy. The concept of air power gained pre-eminence during the Second World War. It seemed that air power, in coordination with nuclear weapons, would make the concept of sea power redundant. For some time, even a strong marine Power like the USA, began to rely more and more upon its Strategic Air Command (SAC) and ground forces, to deter its potential enemy, the Soviet Union. That was due to two main factors : firstly, the strategic lessons drawn from the Second World War, when atom bombs dropped from aircraft had a decisive influence in forcing Japan to surrender quickly and, secondly, the fact that the USSR was a land power and could not be contained by using the conventional naval strategy. Thus, during the first few years of the Cold

War, the new strategic weapon system which had evolved during the Second World War — atom bomb dropped from an aircraft — was relied upon to provide the main strategic deterrence. The navy was assigned the traditional task of maintaining control over the high seas, and thus providing facilities for the deployment of the western forces on the periphery of the Soviet Union (and China). It should be remembered that neither the Soviet Union nor China had global naval capabilities during the first decade of the Cold War. China does not have it even today.

During that period, the Big Powers made several modifications in their weapon systems, available at that time, to attain greater sophistication. Aircraft were made faster by the use of jet engines, atom bombs were replaced by hydrogen bombs, radars were improved to detect the approaching enemy bombers, fast supersonic fighters were deployed to destroy them and superior counter-electronic devices were perfected to enable the bomber to penetrate the enemy defences and reach the targets. This system had been more or less perfected by the middle of the 1950s. But simultaneously, experiments were being conducted to replace the manned bombers with medium and long-range missiles (IRBM and ICBM) which became operational towards the end of the 1950s. But these weapon systems which employed a combination of fixed ground bases and air-space, were considered risky because of the advancements made in similar systems by the Soviet Union. The CEP (circular error probable) of these missiles was less than a mile, and hence, the nuclear weapon exploding even near the target could devastate the strategic strike force stationed there. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) programme was not proving very satisfactory either.

The USA was busy devising ways and means which would retain the advantage of the new weapon system based upon long-range missiles armed with nuclear weapons, and yet evade counter-attacks by hiding the weapon platform. The sea which had been more or less neglected for over a decade became important once again. A new weapon system was devised, which would enable those missiles to be launched from platforms which could be fixed on naval vessels. Attempts were made to enable the conventional surface ships to launch these missiles, but even they were not considered safe enough. Finally, they were placed in submarines which could hide deep under the waves. Nuclear-powered submarines capable of firing, even when submerged, long-range missiles armed with nuclear weapons [the Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) System] heralded the optimum point in the weapon system which could be used as a major strategic deterrent. The control of the high seas became, once again, a matter of crucial importance in the context of the strategy of the Big Powers.

The weapon systems, which evolved during the two decades of the Cold War, had their impact upon the Big Power strategy, which had to change in the light of the new equipments made available to it. During

the first phase of the Cold War strategic considerations were guided by the weapon system based upon manned bombers carrying nuclear weapons and ground forces stationed at the most likely points of land confrontation. Therefore, the SAC bases, and the stationing of troops in Europe and Asia, had top priority in the strategic considerations of the Western Bloc. To unify the anti-communist countries, defence pacts like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact were formed, which more or less put a ring around the Communist World. The USA also signed bilateral Mutual Defence Agreements with several countries, which enabled the USA to maintain its bases there. With the perfection of the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and the threat of massive nuclear deterrence, the emphasis upon the SAC bomber bases was gradually reduced. Several of these bases were closed. Also, there was a comparative reduction in the number of ground forces stationed in Europe. During that period the navy played only a limited strategic role.

With the introduction of the new weapon system based upon the SLBM (*Polaris*-type submarine), navy has been assigned the most important strategic role. It is the ultimate deterrent which could retain the second strike-capacity after the ground-based ICBMs have been blasted. Protection of nuclear submarines, the problem of their communication and counter-measures against a similar weapon system, employed by the enemy, govern the strategic considerations of the Super Powers now, and would continue to govern them till a new weapon system replaces the present one. Needless to say that the perfection of this new weapon system had an adverse impact upon the earlier systems and the strategy based upon them. Now, the Super Powers need not rely solely upon the bombers or the ICBM or the SAC to pose the strategic deterrence.

The weapon systems which have developed, and the Super Power strategy which has changed to suit them, have had an impact upon the Indian Ocean area also. In the first phase of the Cold War confrontation, the danger point was located in Europe, where the land-based forces were already confronting each other. The threat in Europe led to the creation of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Asia, and especially the Indian Ocean area, was considered to be a low priority area. Neither the Soviet Union nor the USA had the capacity to start a major confrontation in that area at the time. By 1955, the European confrontation had been more or less stratified. The USA, therefore, decided to extend its system of bases to the Afro-Asian world also. The SEATO and the Baghdad Pact were created in 1954-55. But the area, especially West Asia, remained a low priority area from the point of view of Super Power global strategy. The USA was not a member of the Baghdad Pact though it had joined the SEATO. The USA had no SAC bases either in Iran or in Pakistan. The change over to the ICBM system also did not make the area more important. Short-range IRBMs were placed in Turkey

under the NATO but no missiles were placed in Iran or Pakistan.

The importance of the area, however, increased greatly after the deployment of the *Polaris* submarines in the Indian Ocean by the USA. That did not mean that the littoral became important as a land-base against the Soviet Union. It had only a limited value as a land-base. But the control of the littoral became important to ensure a trouble-free functioning of the new weapon system which was being deployed in the Indian Ocean. In the new context it means that the Indian Ocean area should be kept free for the American submarines, should provide communication facilities without which these submarines cannot operate properly and should be free from any hostile Power which would seek to limit the American activities in the area.

The confrontation between the Super Powers on the land and in the sea also involved them in the regional politics, with the result that the fall-out of the Cold War affected the littoral states in the Indian Ocean area as well. The policy of non-alignment, which sought a way out of that dilemma, failed to win support from many of the littoral states. The USA, in its bid to win over local Powers, pumped economic and military aid in the areas of its influence thus creating mini-Cold Wars in the region. The Soviet Union, taking advantage of them, also improved its position. Thus, the Indian Ocean area which was free from the Cold War rivalries in the first half of the 1950s, is now dominated by it. Since the regional tensions are linked with the Super-Power rivalry in the area, which in turn is influenced by the weapon systems and the strategy based upon them, their crisis-management would become increasingly difficult, since the area is going to be more and more important for the Super Powers in their future global strategy.

The change-over, from the land-based strategy to an ocean-based strategy, brought about a *detente* on the land, especially in Europe, and to some extent in Asia. But whereas the European *detente* might be more lasting the *detente* in Asia has proved to be illusory. Europe is getting united and is strong economically and militarily to pose as a third force. The Indian Ocean littoral is weak and divided. Thanks to the new weapon system, the Cold War confrontation has moved from the land to the sea, an area which is still a no-man's land, and, therefore, is likely to pose more problems to those who are situated on its littoral. The Indian Ocean area thus becomes involved in the Super-Power confrontation, based upon a weapon system which *ipso facto* demands control of the high seas for its effective utilization. The confrontation which started after the system was perfected would continue until a new system is evolved which would make the control of the high seas redundant, unless the littoral states work for an effective denuclearization of the area and succeed in making the Indian Ocean area a peace zone. Both of them, at the moment, seem remote possibilities.

1

The Era of Land Confrontation 1945—1965

LAND CONFRONTATION MARKED the first phase of the Cold War rivalry in the Indian Ocean area. This phase can best be studied in the light of the weapon systems, like the nuclear-bomber and the ICBM, which influenced the global strategy of the Big Powers at that time. That period can be broadly divided into two parts, the formation of the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact being a convenient watershed to demarcate the two. In the first half, the politics of the area was influenced largely by Great Britain, though the USA was trying to make its influence felt. There was no appreciable Soviet influence in the area during that period. The second half saw a gradual erosion of the British influence, partly because of the local opposition, and partly because of the rising American and Soviet presence in the area.

THE IMPACT OF LAND CONFRONTATION 1945–1955

Anglo-American Rivalry

Till the first half of the 1950s the Indian Ocean area was considered a British preserve, even though the Britishers were retreating from there. India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon were independent. The British were fighting a losing battle in Malaya and were being openly challenged in the Arab world and in East Africa. But, Great Britain was the traditional power and, in the absence of any open competition, was recognized as the vanguard of the Western Bloc in the area. It had vital stakes, political, economic and strategic, in the region, which made it an active participant in the pro-Western regional defence pacts.

It is, however, interesting to note that it was the USA and not the USSR, which contributed, to a great extent, to the final decline of the British power in the area. "It has been American activities far more than Russian ones which have contributed to the undermining and downfall of British influence in the Middle East. This is a very serious accusation indeed, but a careful study of the plain facts of 1945–1957 points inevitably to this unpleasant conclusion. It is not only an unpleasant conclusion, it is rather strange and disquieting one."[1]

There is a lot of substance in this accusation. Firstly, the state of Israel could not have been created without the active help of the USA. Secondly, it could not have survived without American financial support. One can even argue that the creation of the state of Israel hurt the British security interests near its Suez base. The US Government took other steps, which also seriously affected the British security interests in that region. The British-sponsored Middle East Defence Command, based around the British base in the Suez zone, was rejected by the Americans. Instead, John Foster Dulles compelled Britain to come to terms with the Egyptians on the question of the evacuation of the Suez base, and suggested the creation of the northern tier scheme, which subsequently developed as the Baghdad Pact and the CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation). The Baghdad Pact was primarily an American plan even though America did not join it. The Britishers were playing only a secondary role in it. The teeth of the Pact, the weapons and the funds, were provided mostly by the USA under the Mutual Security Aid Programme.

It is also true that the Americans, instead of supporting Great Britain during the Anglo-Iranian Oil crisis of 1951-1954, kept aloof and, subsequently, helped themselves to 40 per cent of the earlier British oil interests in Iran, through the oil consortium, which was created to replace the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The British were able to rescue only 40 per cent shares. The American reaction, during the 1956 Suez crisis, also showed that the Americans did not hesitate to sacrifice the interests of their ally, if that boosted their presence and brightened their image in the area. The American denunciation of the Anglo-French-Isreali attack, upon Egypt, was morally very correct and justifiable, but two things must not be forgotten while evaluating the American diplomacy. Firstly, the Suez Canal Company was nationalized by President Nasser, following the brusque cancellation of the proposed High Dam loan, by the Americans. Secondly, the Americans used the decline in the British prestige to further their own presence in the area. The Eisenhower doctrine of 1957 was propounded to fill the so-called vacuum, created by the decline in the British presence in the area. There is, therefore, a great deal of truth in the British accusation, that the Americans were not fair to their friends, and sacrificed them to achieve temporary gains in the area.

The post-World War II period, which marked a gradual decline in the presence of the traditional powers, like Great Britain and France, also

saw a steady growth in the American presence in the Indian Ocean area. The Americans had hardly any vital economic or political interests in the area till the Second World War. But, the American presence in the area during the Second World War, the decline in the presence of the traditional Powers, the Cold War confrontations and the vigorous forward policy of a rich Super Power, projected the Americans as the most important Western Bloc country in the area. The vacuum, created by the decline in the presence of the European Powers, was filled either by the local people, as in India or Indonesia, or by the USA in the Baghdad Pact and the SEATO countries. This process continues even today. The final phase of British withdrawal, from the east of the Suez, is being gradually filled, in some places, by the USA. The tragedy is that Great Britain, knowing fully well the way in which it has been treated in the past by its 'allies', still insists upon handing over its obligations to them rather than to the local people, who are its legitimate recipients, and who are in a better position to guarantee the legitimate British interests in the area.

The USA was able to occupy the position vacated by the traditional European Powers, not only because it had the material capacity to fill their place but also because it was following a forward policy, designed under the phase--containment of communism. As the most powerful state after the Second World War, it had certain unique advantages. Its homeland was untouched, its industrial base had expanded greatly under the pressure of the war efforts, and its war machine and the industry supporting it were working at an optimum level. Therefore, whereas Great Britain and France had to withdraw within themselves under a programme of gradual decolonization, the USA could appear on the scene as a new Power, which had the capacity to offer not only economic but also military aid to the newly emerging countries in the Third World.

The *raison d'etre* of this new American interest in the area, was economic as well as strategic. The rapidly expanding US economy needed more raw material, as well as investment opportunities, which could be acquired from the Third World's immense untapped potentials. The post-war period, therefore, saw a sudden spurt in the US investments in this part of the world, as well as in Europe. But more important than the dollar diplomacy was the strategic consideration. The area assumed great strategic importance for the USA, in view of its proximity to the Soviet Union and China.

The USA had emerged as the most powerful state after the Second World War. It had acquired the nuclear weapon, which permitted it to threaten others with total devastation. The post-war period saw the mounting tension between the Western bloc countries and the Soviet Union. The Cold War rivalry took various forms, but the policies pursued by the USA can best be summed up under the broad heading—containment of communism —which meant political and economic isolation of the Eastern Bloc, and putting a military cordon around it. The first step in that direction was

the propounding of the Truman Doctrine. It was contained in a message from President Truman to the US Congress on 12 March 1947. Assistance to Greece and Turkey was provided under it. This was followed by grouping the West European and the Atlantic Powers under the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed on 4 April 1949. Turkey and Greece were included in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 17 October 1951.

Once the European frontiers of the Soviet Union were sealed, attention was given to sealing its southern flank also. Britain, which still retained a considerable interest in that region, suggested the Allied Middle East Command proposals. These were presented to Egypt by the Governments of the USA, UK, France and Turkey on 13 October 1951, that is, immediately after the extension of the NATO influence to Turkey. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa also showed interest in these proposals. Egypt was invited to participate as a founder member in that command, in partnership with other founder members. There were also plans to interlink the Allied Middle East Command with the NATO.

The British proposal failed due to three main reasons. First, the proposals were mooted as a substitute for the Egyptian demand for the termination of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and also for the evacuation of the British base in the Suez Canal zone. In fact, Point VI of the Allied Middle East Command proposals, specifically mentioned that in case Egypt agreed to accept these proposals, Great Britain would be willing to agree to the supersession of the 1936 Treaty, and would also be willing to agree to withdraw from Egypt such British forces, as were not allocated to the Allied Middle East Command, by agreement between the Egyptian Government and the governments of other countries, participating as founder members. No wonder, the Egyptian Government rejected these proposals, because accepting them would have amounted to putting Egypt under an international protectorate. As it was, it was difficult for Egypt to compel Great Britain to evacuate the Suez base. It would have been infinitely more difficult for Egypt to regain control over the Suez base, if it had become the headquarters of a Western defence pact, with international troops manning the installations there.

The second reason why the Allied Middle East Command proposals failed, was the lack of interest shown by the USA. Undoubtedly, the USA was a signatory to these proposals, but such proposals would have served the British rather than the American interests. First, it would have helped Great Britain in consolidating its position with active US involvement, not only in Egypt but also in the whole of the Arab east up to Libya. Secondly, such a defence pact with a greater emphasis upon the British interests, in the Arab east, would not have suited the American strategic interests, which demanded a pact which included the immediate neighbours of the Soviet Union in that area. Thirdly, the Americans must have thought it a strategic risk, especially in view of the potential danger from

an atomic retaliation, to concentrate most of their resources in a single base at the Suez.

The influential US Council on Foreign Relations summed up the US position thus :

> Although Washington displayed considerable interest in minimizing the discord between Britain and the Moslem states, American action was hampered by a disinclination to assume further direct responsibilities in this part of the world and also by differences of opinion with the British concerning the proper form of an over-all Middle East Defence Organization and its relationship to NATO. Thus, although the United States joined with Britain, France and Turkey in putting forward the proposal for a Middle East Command, its principal efforts were devoted to bringing Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic alliance and developing a chain of strategic air bases under American control to supplement those already in existence at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia and Wheelus Field in Libya.[2]

The US was, therefore, not willing to pull Great Britain's chestnuts out of the fire in the Arab east. It even rejected the British proposal, as suggested by Churchill in the beginning of 1952, that the USA, France and Turkey should send token forces to the Suez zone, thus symbolizing the unity of the countries sponsoring the Allied Middle East Command. "The Middle East might be an area of common concern, most Americans reasoned, but the immediate responsibility was better left to the country concerned."[3] So, instead of supporting their NATO partner the USA was actively encouraging Great Britain to come to terms with Egypt, so that Egypt could be won over to the Western bloc, i.e. to the American side, in its Cold War confrontation.

THE RING AROUND THE COMMUNIST WORLD

SEATO and Baghdad Pact

The Dulles era, in American diplomacy, saw a rapid escalation of American involvement in the Indian Ocean area. Soon after assuming office, John Foster Dulles along with Stassen, Director of Mutual Security, toured the area in May 1953. They visited the Arab world, Turkey, Pakistan and India. Iran was not included in that visit, because of the tense anti-Western atmosphere, following the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute of 1951. In his report on 1 June 1953, Dulles summed up his views on the US strategic interests in the following terms :

> A Middle East Defence Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general, the northern tier of the nations shows an awareness of the danger. There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no

such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger. While awaiting the formal creation of a security association, the United States can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defence of those countries which want strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common threat to all free people.[4]

Even the northern tier was not a safe area, as far as the US strategic interests were concerned. Premier Mosaddeq was totally opposed to the entry of Iran in any pro-Western pact. But, within one year, the situation in Iran altered radically. Premier Mosaddeq was overthrown. General Fazurullah Zahedi, the new Premier, showed great enthusiasm for the pro-Western pact. It was claimed by some, that the agents of the Central Intelligence Agency, also had a hand in the change of regime in Iran, and that the United States itself had hand-picked General Zahedi as Mosaddeq's successor.[5]

The *coup d'etat*, which ousted Mosaddeq, brought into power a regime, which was not only willing to join the Western bloc but also, was in a mood to settle the long-drawn oil dispute. The main beneficiary of the altered circumstances was the United States of America, which not only benefited from the new pro-American regime in Iran, but also acquired substantial oil interests in the newly-formed Oil Consortium. The Anglo-Iranian oil dispute was finally solved in September 1954. But before that, the Shah of Iran had ordered new elections to enable the government in power to obtain a legal mandate for the new arrangements. Even the US Council on Foreign Relations, which cannot be accused of anti-Iranian attitude, admitted that the elections were not free. "A tight lid was kept on public demonstrations, and the army, police, and strong arm squads were conspicuously helpful in ensuring that the parliamentary elections held in February and March resulted favourably for the new government."[6] One of the results of these rigged elections was, that the new oil agreement was passed by the *Majlis* (the lower house) by 113 votes. Only five voted against it and one deputy abstained. The Senate (the upper house) passed it by 41 votes. Four deputies voted against it and four abstained. With the oil hurdle crossed and with a docile parliament at hand, the Shah of Iran was fully prepared to join the Western defence pact.

Iraq had also shown its willingness to join the defence alliance. As early as March 1953, Iraq had filed a request for the US military aid though that request was kept secret at that time. Dr Muhammad Fadhil al-Jamali openly announced Iraq's intention of joining the northern-tier scheme in February 1954. Turkey and Iraq drew closer following the visit of Premier Nuri-as-Said to Turkey, in October, where he also met the Pakistani delegation, which had come to finalize the implementation programme of the Turco-Pak Treaty, which had been signed on 2 April 1954.

Pakistan, too, slowly gravitated from a policy of non-alignment to pro-Westernism. Its dispute with India was the main motive for such a change-

over, and when the USA offered Pakistan both economic and military aid under the Mutual Security Aid Programme, Pakistan was not unwilling to accept it. That shift had its repercussions upon the internal power-structure of Pakistan. Khwaja Nazimuddin, who was the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, was dismissed by the Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad. Instead, Mohammad Ali, who was Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington, was made the new Prime Minister. The change was effected before the visit of Dulles and Stassen to Karachi, in 1953. The stage was thus set for Pakistan to draw closer to the American bloc, and in turn to receive American economic and military aid.

Pakistan's formal links with the Western bloc developed via Turkey. There were reports, in 1953, that Turkey and Pakistan would enter into a pact. Such an intention was announced on 19 February 1954. Soon after that, on 22 February 1954, Pakistan placed a formal request with the USA for military assistance under the Mutual Security Programme. Its request was acquiesced to, by President Eisenhower, on 25 February. The quick response suggested that Pakistan was in imminent danger of communist aggression. The Mutual Defence Agreement was signed on 19 May 1954. Following Pakistan's adherence to the Manila Pact, 3 September 1954, the quantum of the US aid was substantially increased.

These foreign policy moves were followed by more internal changes in Pakistan. In October 1954, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali, who was visiting Washington, had to rush back to face a virtual *coup d'etat* when the Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad, dismissed the Constituent Assembly and saddled the Cabinet with General Iskandar Mirza, as the Minister of Interior and, General Mohammad Ayub Khan as the Defence Minister. A decisive blow was struck at the democratic structure of Pakistan and a way was cleared for the army rule which plagued Pakistani politics till recently. Both the Generals, and their successors, were also known for their anti-Indian, anti-democratic and pro-Western leanings. The US-Pak collaboration in the post-1954 period was, therefore, greatly facilitated by that shift in the internal power structure of Pakistan.

India, since 1952, had been apprehensive of such a development and had warned the USA, that it would consider any move, which would change the power equation in the Indian sub-continent as an unfriendly act. India was concerned with the developments in Pakistan on three counts. Firstly, it felt that a substantial foreign military aid would adversely affect the military balance in the Indian sub-continent and would compel India to divert her national resources for arms purchase, so as to maintain the arms balance; resources which would have been otherwise fruitfully employed in the economic regeneration of the country. Secondly, India feared that the direct US involvement in Pakistan would bring the Cold War within the Indian sub-continent, and force India to adjust its foreign policy accordingly. There was also another reason why India objected to Pakistan's deviation from its earlier policy of non-alignment. Pakistan's membership

of the Baghdad Pact divided the Indian sub-continent into two parts, just as Iraq's membership of the same pact was a blow to the concept of Arab unity. It was feared that such actions, which created balancing forces within the region, would prevent the states in the Indian Ocean area from playing a constructive role in international relations. The Indian sub-continent, divided within itself even now, is still incapable of playing a constructive role in international relations.

Turkey, the third partner in the northern-tier scheme of Dulles, had already developed very close links with the Western bloc countries. It joined the NATO in 1951 and showed enthusiasm for the Allied Middle East Command proposals. It was announced on 17 March 1953 that Turkey would receive American military aid from the Mutual Security Agency Defence Support Fund to modernize its communication net-work, airfields and transportation system. It should not be forgotten that Turkey was being strengthened, not only as the southern bastion of the NATO but also as the link between the NATO and the proposed Baghdad Pact.

The Baghdad Pact took the final shape following a series of agreements among its members in 1955.[7] Turkey and Iraq signed the pact of mutual cooperation, on 24 February 1955. Great Britain joined it on 5 April, Pakistan on 23 September and Iran on 25 October. The USA did not join the Pact, though it maintained close links with it. The Baghdad Pact, or the northern-tier defence system, which had been evolved under American inspiration, has to be studied in the context of America's global strategy. At that time there was hardly any Soviet involvement in the area. The Russian presence in northern Iran, which had created some tension immediately after the Second World War, had been withdrawn. Europe was still the area of intense Cold War rivalry, though South-East Asia was developing as a future crisis area. West Asia, or the Arabian Sea littoral, was the quietest of the three areas. And, therefore, whereas the USA was directly involved in the NATO and the SEATO, it was not even a full-fledged member of the Baghdad Pact. Also, the USA had no SAC bases in the area except in Turkey, where they were established as a part of the NATO defence.

The Baghdad Pact was a very weak link in the American policy of containment of communism in West Asia. It was, as it were, a link joining the NATO with the SEATO—Iran being the joining link. The USA was not an active member of that pact, though it had links with three of its members, which were also members of other American-sponsored defence pacts. Turkey and Great Britain were its NATO partners. Pakistan and Great Britain had links with the USA through the Manila Pact, commonly known as the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), which was signed earlier on 8 September 1954. Though Pakistan, a major state in the Indian Ocean littoral, was a member of the SEATO, the pact was essentially Pacific rather than Indian-Ocean-oriented. The Straits of Malacca, the dividing line, was controlled by Britain. The USA and

Britain had more or less, defined their respective spheres of influence in the region and the Indian Ocean littoral of South-East Asia was left to Britain. The USA, for a long time, did not interfere in it. Anyway, it was already too deeply involved in Vietnam to covet more of such spheres of influence in that region.

The Baghdad Pact did not show enough promise to contain the Soviet Union militarily. Iran, the joining link, was a very weak state at that time, both militarily and politically. Iran and Pakistan were absorbed in regional problems and could hardly contribute to the Western defence. One reason why the USA did not join the Baghdad Pact could be that the minor military gains, which it might have obtained in Iran under that pact, which it could obtain otherwise under the Mutual Security Programme, would have been off set by political set-backs it might have suffered. India, which was all along opposing the pact, would have been hurt still further, and Indian opinion carried weight in the American circles at that time. Israel and the Israeli lobby in America, would not have looked with favour upon America joining a pact with predominantly Muslim members. Even Egypt, which was searching for means to maintain links with the West, and had asked for loans to finance the High Dam at Aswan, would have been further alienated. The USA, therefore, probably thought it politically advisable to keep out of the Baghdad Pact and to project Great Britain as the leader of Baghdad Pact. The arrangement had the added advantage that the regional anti-Baghdad Pact criticisms, especially in the Arab world, were absorbed by Great Britain, thus saving the US image in the area.

It should be of interest to note, that during that period, the USA had also acquired base rights in Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Libya. The US-Saudi Arabian agreement on the Dhahran air-base was signed in June 1951. The USA signed a Mutual Defence Assistance programme with Ethiopia, on 22 May 1953, under which it agreed to provide military aid and training to the Ethiopian Armed Forces. In return Ethiopia permitted the USA to operate the communication base at Asmara. The federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, in September 1952, had not only given a coast-line to Ethiopia, but had also put the US communication base at Asmara within its sphere of influence. The US-Libyan agreement of September 1954 enabled the USA to maintain a big SAC base at the Wheelus airfield, near Tripoli. The three American bases, the air bases at Dhahran, the Wheelus base and the communication base at Asmara, date back to the Second World War, and were under the US control. These agreements legalized the US presence there. Whereas the air bases gave a strategic mobility to the USA, the base in Ethiopia was important for the USA to maintain contact with the SAC aircraft, as well as, with the submarines operating in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. It should not be forgotten, that the northern-tier scheme, which came to be known as the Baghdad Pact in 1955, had its rear facing the sea. It was, therefore, important for the West to keep

its sea-lanes open if the Baghdad Pact was to have any meaning.

It was in the interest of the maintenance of Western supremacy in the Indian Ocean area, that the USA had to rely, to a large extent, upon British support and project Great Britain as the main Western Power in the region. Great Britain, apart from being the dominant naval Power in this area, controlled the strategic points and maintained bases in the Indian Ocean as in Singapore, the Maldive, the Persian Gulf, Aden and on the East African coast. It had great political leverage, in view of the Commonwealth links with the Indian Ocean states, including Australia (and New Zealand), India and South Africa. Great Britain was also a member of the SEATO and controlled the Straits of Malacca from its base at Singapore. It also enjoyed base facilities at Simons Town, which dominated the sea-route via the Cape of Good Hope. Its relations with Iraq, the only Arab State to join the Baghdad Pact, dated back to the post-World War I period. Great Britain also retained its bases and military presence in Jordan through the Arab Legion which was created, financed and officered largely by the Britishers. Thus, at least for some time, the USA could not ignore the British presence and had to adjust with it in the Indian Ocean area.

A brief review of the American policy in this area, therefore, leads to the following conclusions : First, the USA was not interested in helping its European allies in maintaining their supremacy in the area, which would hamper in projecting the image of the USA as the dominant power in the region. Secondly, it was not interested in maintaining internal stability in the region, if such a stability was detrimental to the US strategic objectives. The USA was not even averse to creating instability in the Indian sub-continent or in West Asia, if it could get Iran, Pakistan or Iraq to join a pro-Western Pact against the USSR. Thirdly, the USA, while trying to project a land confrontation by advocating a northern-tier system was also aware of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. It should not be forgotten that, except for Turkey, which is a Mediterranean state, all the other local Baghdad Pact countries are also the Indian Ocean states. Lastly, even though the USA had not emerged as an Indian Ocean Power in the 1950s, it did maintain a presence in Asmara, Dhahran and Bahrain, and was developing close political and military ties with some of the pro-Western regimes in the area. In fact, the USA was gradually competing with Great Britain for naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean.

THE CHANGING WEAPON SYSTEMS

The weapon system employed by the Big Powers during the first half of 1950s influenced their strategic consideration during that period. The weapon system had not undergone any basic change since the Second World War. Apart from the conventional armaments, the strategic

deterrence was provided by long-range strategic bombers carrying nuclear bombs. Though the destructive capacity of the bomb had increased and the bombers had been modernized, there was no basic change in the weapon system as such. Such a system did not require bases in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet Union. This fact also partially explains, why the USA did not join the Baghdad Pact. Its physical presence in Iran was not essential to prevent the Soviet troops from over-running it. The US SAC bombers, armed with nuclear weapons, could retaliate, in case of emergency, from the SAC bases spread all over the world. In the context of the weapon system, based upon land and air-space control, it was also not necessary for the USA to control the Indian Ocean. First, the Soviet Navy was not strong enough to challenge the Western naval presence in the area. Secondly, the British naval presence was deemed to be sufficient to take care of any contingency which might arise.

The main strategic deterrents, available to the USA, till 1955, were *B-47* and *B-52* bombers, armed with nuclear weapons, and capable of conducting deep-penetration raids from far-off SAC bases. *B-47 Boeing Stratojet*, a long-range bomber, powered by six jet engines, became operational in January 1950. Its final version could carry a 20,000 lb. bombload with a maximum speed of 630 mph, over a range of 3,200 miles. *B-52 Boeing Stratofortress*, also a long-range bomber, became operational in 1954. It is powered by eight jet engines. Its longer range (9,000 miles), heavier load carrying capacity and superior counter-electronic capabilities, permits it to undertake a multi-strike role. Both these bombers can also carry conventional bomb-loads. *B-47* is being phased out, but *B-52* is still being used for conventional air attacks in South-East Asia. The SAC bases from where *B-47* and *B-52* operated, were buttressed by military bases on the frontiers of the USSR as in Turkey and in Europe, where conventional armed forces were stationed to deter the Soviet Union with conventional weapons. During the earlier phase of the Cold War, these bases also provided adequate communication and espionage facilities. The *U-2* flights, over the Soviet Union and China, were arranged from these bases before satellites took over that job.

It is interesting to note that during the two-year period, 1953-1955, when the USA was trying to create pro-Western groups, and defence pacts in the Indian Ocean area, the Soviet Union was gradually filling the gap in its weapon system vis-a-vis the USA. Its first experimental hydrogen bomb was successfully detonated on 19 August 1953. Gradually, the USSR was also gaining experience in the missile technology, and had acquired a limited Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) capacity by 1955. It already operated a bomber fleet which could use nuclear stalemate. Though the USA did retain a substantial edge over the USSR in the total number of bombers and bombs, yet it was feared that the USSR was fast catching up. And, what if the USA retained the capacity to destroy the USSR ten times, before it was destroyed even once ? The prospect of a nuclear

stalemate negatived the advantages of one-way atomic deterrence enjoyed by the USA till 1955, and consequently an added emphasis was placed upon the strengthening of the cordon around the USSR to resist the possible Soviet penetration by the use of conventional weapons.

The Western military strategy which, in 1950s, depended upon manned bombers for its strategic attack role, had placed great reliance upon the SAC bases and the forward defence bases. The introduction of a new weapon system, based upon the IRBM and ICBM, and experiments which were being conducted in connection with SLBM. however, revolutionized the whole concept of military strategy and, consequently, its defence system.

The break-through in the missile programme began to show results during the second half of the 1950s. The USSR had a slight edge over the USA in the missile technology. It had launched its *Sputnik* in 1957, long before the USA could do so. It would not be wrong to say that for a while the USSR retained the edge, especially in the field of IRBMs and ICBMs. The USA was, however, not far behind. *Jupiter*, the intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), with a range of about 1,500 miles, was successfully fired in 1957. Some of these missiles were installed in Turkey under the NATO programme. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) with a range over 6.000 miles, like the *Atlas* or the *Titan I* (*Titan II* has a range of 13,000 miles), were successfully fired in 1658-59. But those missiles used liquid propellent and were not considered very satisfactory. Work on the *Minuteman*, which used solid fuel, began in 1958. It became operational in 1962. All these missiles could carry nuclear war-heads. The successful ICBM programme made the manned bombers of the SAC rather obsolete. Since the USA had no monopoly over the IRBMs and ICBMs, and since both the Super Powers were busy reducing the CEP of their missiles, the USA did not consider its missiles as a reliable deterrent. The quest for more sophistication led to the new weapon system; the SLBM fired from a nuclear-powered submarine.

The USA had started taking a deep interest in the nuclear propulsion programme as early as in 1952. The nuclear-powered submarine, *Nautilus*, was laid down in 1952 and completed in 1955. The success of the *Nautilus* opened a new vista for the naval propulsion programme, and attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines, as well as surface vessels powered by nuclear energy, were launched in 1956-57 and completed by 1962-63. During that period the USA constructed an aircraft-carrier, the *Enterprise*, a cruiser, the *Long Beach* and a frigate, the *Bainbridge*. Also, the ballistic missile submarine, of the *George Washington* class, successfully fired the first *Polaris* missile on 20 July 1960. That missile had a range of 1,200 miles only. Soon the newly constructed *Lafayette*-class nuclear submarine, fired the improved version of the *Polaris* missile in 1963. The new missile had a range of 2,875 miles. The new weapon system had come of age by 1964. The same year the US ships, belonging

to the Seventh Fleet, sailed in the Indian Ocean. The nuclear-powered surface vessels, like the *Enterprise,* the *Long Beach* and the *Bainbridge,* enabled the USA as early as 1963, to protect its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines on the high seas, including the Indian Ocean. The gap between the capability and the capacity had been filled, and the USA was in a position to use the Indian Ocean to launch a nuclear attack against China and the Soviet Union.

This change-over from manned bombers to ICBM, and then to the SLBM, though initiated in 1958, could be perfected only by the middle of the 1960s. The gap between the capability and the capacity in the weapon system posed several problems for the Western diplomacy in the Indian Ocean area. The gradual decline of the British presence, to some extent due to American actions, led to a more intense American involvement in the area. The USA also became alarmed because the USSR, even as early as 1955, had been able to break through the Western cordon erected around it and penetrate it in several places by political, economic and military aid programmes of its own. Thus, the decade following the creation of the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact saw a greater Super Power involvement in the area.

CONTINUING THE LAND CONFRONTATION THE FIRST PHASE: 1955–1959

The decade 1955–65 which witnessed a great revolution in the weapon system also saw a marked decline in the Western prestige and, consequently of its presence in the Indian Ocean area. Conversely, during that decade tremendous political gains were achieved by the Soviet Union and, to some extent, by China, in that part of the world. That decade began with the land confrontation between the Super Powers, i.e. with the formation of the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, and ended with the entry of the US task-force in the Indian Ocean, thus heralding the naval confrontation between the Super Powers in that part of the world.

During the intervening period between the land confrontation and the naval confrontation, the Super Power strategy was based upon IRBMs and ICBMs. The IRBM/ICBM system became operational around 1959, when the *Jupiter* missiles were sited in Turkey. The year 1959 also marked a decisive change in the American interests in the area. The USA was already a member of the SEATO. But the American commitments in West Asia were limited to the agreements signed under the Mutual Security Act, the UN Charter and the Eisenhower Doctrine. The USA was not even a member of the Baghdad Pact. It however, came closer to the Baghdad Pact countries in 1959. In March 1959, the USA signed bilateral agreements with individual CENTO members, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. The year 1959 was also important, because of the marked expansion of the Soviet influence in the Arab World, espe-

cially in Iraq, which led to the Nasser-Khrushchev controversy. The decade 1955–1965, therefore, can best be studied in two phases, with the year 1959, which witnessed major changes in the weapon system as well as in the politics of the region, as the dividing line.

DECLINE IN THE PRESENCE OF TRADITIONAL WESTERN POWERS

Great Britain and France

During the first phase (1955–1959), the traditional Western Powers in the Indian Ocean area suffered serious set-backs. France had to leave South-East Asia, following the Geneva Agreement of July 1954. Great Britain also had to agree upon the evacuation of its base in the Suez zone by 1956, under an agreement signed on 19 October 1954. The Suez Canal Company was nationalized in 1956, and the tripartite aggression against Egypt, aimed at dislodging Nasser, failed. The Eisenhower Doctrine, propounded in January 1957 by the USA, to buttress the Western presence, was rejected by several of the countries of the region. The Iraqi *coup d'etat*, of 14 July 1958, was a blow to the Baghdad Pact and indirectly reduced British presence in it. Anglo-American interventions in Jordan and in Lebanon immediately after the Iraqi *coup d'etat*, though brilliant as military manoeuvres, were only partial political successes. Undoubtedly, King Hussein of Jordan got a new lease but President Chamoun of Lebanon had to quit.

The period 1955–1959 marked the gradual replacement of Great Britain and France by the USA. The Military Aid Programme, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the US membership of the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact (and the CENTO) were the logical steps leading to bilateral agreements signed between the USA and the northern-tier states in March 1959. By 1959, the USA had fully replaced Great Britain in the area of immediate Super Power land confrontation in West Asia. Great Britain retained some presence in the Persian Gulf, Aden and East Africa, but those areas were not important from the point of view of the land confrontation, which was guiding the Super Power strategy before the advent of the *Polaris* submarines. Great Britain, therefore, could retain its presence there for a few years more.

Whereas the traditional Western presence was being eroded gradually during 1955–1959, the period witnessed an astonishing increase in the Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean area. Following their internal adjustments after the death of Stalin, the Soviets launched a 'peace offensive' in 1955, which penetrated the Western cordon on the southern flank of the Soviet Union in several places.

The Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, visited the USSR in June 1955. The joint statement, issued on 22 June, emphasized the *Panch Sheel*, called for a ban on the production of nuclear weapons, for a simultaneous and substantial reduction in conventional armaments

and for disarmament through effective international control. U Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma, also paid a visit to the USSR, in October-November 1955. The Soviet leaders reciprocated these visits. Premier Bulganin and the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, together visited India and Burma in November-December 1955. The joint statements issued after the visits to both the countries upheld, among other things, the *Panch Sheel*, condemned the policy of creating blocs and demanded an unconditional prohibition of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. During the same period the Soviet leaders also paid a visit to Afghanistan. The Soviet-Afghan treaty of neutrality and non-aggression was extended for another ten years. The visit brought the Soviet Union closer to these three countries in the political and economic fields.

Whereas the Soviet Union was only interested in promoting better political and economic ties in South Asia, it had higher stakes in West Asia. The region was close to the Soviet mainland, and the Baghdad Pact was posing a direct threat to the security of its southern border. The Arab-Israeli conflict had created a crisis situation, which was leading to a regional imbalance. Also Egypt, the most powerful Arab state, which had rejected the offer to join the Western bloc was being subjected to various economic, political and military pressures designed either to squeeze it out of its policy of non-alignment, or to change the leadership which persisted in following an independent policy.

The Arab-Israeli dispute came in handy to pressurize Egypt into following a more pro-Western policy. The Egyptian demands for modern arms were being side-tracked by the Western countries, which were the traditional source of arms procurement for Egypt. The Tripartite Declaration of 25 May 1950 was used by Great Britain, France and the USA to deny arms to Egypt. The argument used was, that any substantial arms delivered to Egypt would disturb the Arab-Israeli military balance and would, therefore, amount to a contravention of the 1950 Declaration. That was for public consumption. The question of arms delivery was used as a bait to induce Egypt to follow a more pro-Western policy. President Eisenhower had written as early as 15 July 1953 to President Neguib of Egypt, that the USA was ready to provide economic and military aid to Egypt once the Suez base agreement was signed. Washington announced on 21 October 1954, that is, two days after the signing of that agreement, that it would fulfil the pledge. But the Egyptian leaders were not willing to accept the conditions laid down under the Mutual Security Aid Programme. The Egyptian view on the subject was clearly laid down in a 'background paper', circulated to the foreign Press by the Revolutionary Command Council, in September 1954. It said that cooperation based on trust and friendship, even though it was not specified by any written agreement, was better than a treaty that was regarded suspiciously by the average Egyptian.[8]

The Egyptians felt the urgency to obtain modern arms, following the

massive Israeli raid on Gaza, on 28 February 1955, as a result of the mounting tension on the Arab-Israeli frontier and the rise of Ben Gurion to power in Israel. The Lavon Affair, which led to the fall of a 'dove', Premier Moshe Sharett, and brought the 'hawks' to power in Israel, has not been fully exposed as yet. Nasser told *The Times* (London) on 2 October 1955, that he had informed the American and British representatives, as early as June 1955, that if Egypt was not provided with adequate weapons by the West, it might have to seek them from the Eastern bloc countries. The Western response, though not negative, was evasive. On 4 September, news of the Czech arms deal was leaked by the Egyptians. On 26 September, the US State Department announced that it had agreed, in principle, to the Egyptian demand for arms, but the specific items were under study, in the light of the 1950 Declaration. Subsequently, it was found that the Western offer was inadequate. On 27 September, Nasser publicly announced the barter deal with Czechoslovakia, under which Egypt obtained heavy arms in exchange for cotton. The Western sources, at that time, commented that the deal was worth $200 million. A similar deal was also made by Syria. Simultaneously, it was announced that Egypt and Syria had signed a defence treaty on 20 October. Another defence treaty between Egypt and Saudi Arabia was signed on 27 October. Thus, when the West was congratulating itself on the formation of the Baghdad Pact, the USSR had already succeeded in penetrating the region by the offer of arms aid to two important countries in the region, which were aiming at creating a loose defence pact of their own in the region.

The cumulative effect of these developments could be seen in the Soviet statement, on 13 February 1956, which followed the Eisenhower-Eden talks in January-February 1956. The Czech arms deal was one of the items discussed by them. Following those talks, it was rumoured that the three Western powers—Great Britain, France and the USA—which were parties to the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, might dispatch troops to the area in case a crisis situation developed there. It should not be forgotten that Great Britain, under the October 1954 agreement dealing with the evacuation of the Suez base, had retained the right to return to the base under the 'threat to peace' formula. A Soviet spokesman, commenting upon such an eventuality warned that any such act, as the dispatch of foreign troops to the countries of the Near and Middle East, without the consent of the interested states and without the sanction of the UN Security Council, would be a gross violation of the UN Charter and of the sovereignty of a number of countries.[9]

Though the US State Department spokesman, Mr Lincoln White, described the Soviet statement as 'propaganda', it should not be forgotten that the Soviet Union, for the first time, had come out openly as a champion of the local powers against the West. It shows that the USSR was developing stakes in the area, and was trying to project its presence there. Soon the West had to reckon with the gradually rising Soviet

status in that part of the world. The Soviet statement of 13 February 1956 is, therefore, important because it sought to break the then existing unipolar system and create a bipolar system which proved beneficial to the small states in Asia and Africa.

Not unconnected with the increasing Cold War rivalry in the area, was the dismissal of the British Commander of the Arab Legion in Jordan. Lieut General John Bagot Glubb, commonly known as Glubb Pasha, was summarily dismissed from his post by King Hussein on 2 March 1956, and asked to leave Jordan immediately. Along with him Col. Sir Patrick Coghill, Head of the Intelligence Service of the Arab Legion, and Brigadier Hutton, an infantry commander of the Arab Legion, were also dismissed. The dismissal of Glubb Pasha, who had been with the Arab Legion since 1930, and who had commanded it since 1939, was treated as a great blow to British prestige in the Arab world. The Arab Legion, created, financed, equipped and officered by Britishers, was a prized pawn on the chess-board of the politics of the Arab east, and was used by Great Britain to maintain its military presence in the area. The total strength of the Legion in 1956 was 20,000 and it was financed by a £9 million British subsidy. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria promised to help Jordan to maintain the Legion in case the British subsidy was withdrawn. Though British influence in Jordan was weakened by the dismissal of Glubb Pasha, it had not been wiped out altogether, and King Hussein continued to lean on the West for support. In July 1958, following the *coup d'etat* in Iraq, he requested Great Britain to send troops to Jordan to protect the only remaining Hashemite throne in the Arab world.

Though Egypt had obtained arms from the Eastern bloc countries, it had no desire to break away from the West. It sought, or rather preferred, to have economic links with Great Britain and America. This was generally reflected in its economic policy, and more particularly in its desire to obtain economic aid for the construction of the High Dam at Aswan. The Egyptian Government was interested in the construction of that dam to help the economic recovery plan of the country and, despite the offer by the USSR to help in its construction, had approached the West for the necessary technical and economic assistance. In fact, the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington had informed the US Government, as early as 17 October 1955, that the USSR was willing to offer $200 million to Egypt. The loan was repayable in 30 years, and the rate of interest was only 2 per cent per year. The USA, Great Britain and the World Bank, after conducting a feasibility survey, announced on 17 December 1955, that they would help Egypt in the project. Eugene Black, the President of the World Bank, visited Cairo in January-February 1956. It was announced on 6 February that talks had resulted in a substantial agreement, on the basis on which the Bank would, when requested, take part in the financing of the High Dam scheme with an amount equal to $200 million of the total foreign currency needed. On 17 July 1956, the Egyptian Ambassador, Dr

Ahmed Hussein, after his visit to Cairo, made it known in Washington that Egypt had finally decided to accept the Western offer.

But these high hopes were dashed to the ground on 19 July when Dulles informed Egypt's Ambassador about the withdrawal of the US offer. It came as a bombshell. The hasty action of Dulles, who had not even cared to consult the then American Ambassador in Cairo, Mr Byroade, was treated as a calculated insult by the Egyptians. The British and the World Bank offers, which were conditional upon the US acceptance, were also withdrawn on 20 July. To make matters worse the Soviet Foreign Minister, M Shepilov, was reported to have withdrawn the earlier Soviet offer on the High Dam. He was reported to have said at the Belgian Embassy reception in Moscow, on 22 July, that industrialization rather than the construction of the High Dam would be more useful for Egypt.

The main reason given by the USA, for the withdrawal of the High Dam offer, was that the Egyptian cotton resources had been mortgaged to the Eastern bloc countries, and that Egypt did not have the necessary local resources to finance the project. It is surprising that Dulles could use that argument even after the World Bank had been satisfied with the project. The American action was a calculated snub to Nasser and was designed primarily to humiliate him in the eyes of the non-aligned nations in general and the Egyptian and the Arab masses in particular. It should not be forgotten that three important non-aligned leaders, Tito, Nasser and Nehru, were meeting at Brioni when Dulles brusquely rejected the whole High Dam aid programme. The calculated snub received a fitting rejoinder when Nasser told a public meeting on 24 July: "We Egyptians will not allow any colonizer or despot to dominate us politically, economically or militarily. We shall yield neither to force nor to the dollar."

The next move, the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, was a logical and a brave step in view of the political, economic and psychological compulsions involved. The moves to nationalize the Company were undertaken in great secrecy. This was probably as great an achievement for Egypt as the nationalization of the company itself, because of the presence of the overlapping foreign spy net-works in the Arab world. Nasser, while addressing a public meeting on 26 July, announced his decision to nationalize the company. He said that profits, estimated at about $100 million per year from the Canal, would be utilized to finance the High Dam. Egypt also promised to pay compensation to the shareholders in accordance with the last closing price at the Paris Bourse. It also promised that the 1881 Constantinople Convention, dealing with the freedom of navigation through the canal, would be observed by Egypt.

Whereas the Third World rejoiced in this dramatic reversal of the game of politics by an Afro-Asian nation, the West was furious at this 'affront' and began to discuss the 'wider question' involved in it. Great Britain felt that it had been out-manoeuvred by the Egyptians, who not only removed the British presence from the Suez base on 13 June but also nationa-

lized the Company itself which was a symbol of European presence not only in the canal zone but also in the Arab world. Several abortive efforts were made to re-establish the Western presence in the canal zone at the London conference and elsewhere. When all political and economic means were exhausted the European powers, in collusion with Israel, resorted to gun-boat diplomacy to intimidate the Arabs and their leaders.

The tripartite aggression upon Egypt, which started with the Israeli attack on 29 October 1956, and was followed by the Anglo-French invasion the next day, was designed to overthrow Nasser, who was by then looked upon as the mosl dangerous person in the whole region, and to reoccupy the canal zone by the Anglo-French forces. The aggressors succeeded in their military achievements but had to withdraw in the face of Afro-Asian, Soviet and even American opposition.

FILLING THE VACUUM, 1957

The failure of the French and British troops to dislodge Nasser from power was the biggest defeat suffered by the traditional Western Powers in the area. It expedited their exit from West Asia and North Africa. Though it was a logical culmination of the process of decolonization, which had begun since the end of the Second World War, the Super Powers felt that a vacuum had been created by their exit, which could not be left unfilled. Three ways were suggested to fill that alleged vacuum. First, the Americans said that the USA should fill it lest the Soviets step in. The Eisenhower Doctrine was the outcome of that policy. The non-aligned states in the area wanted the regional states alone to fill whatever vacuum was created. The Soviets, under the Shepilov Plan, wanted Soviet participation along with that of the Western Powers, in the crisis-management in the area, i.e. they wanted at least a partial Soviet presence among the forces filling the vacuum in the region. Neither the USA nor the USSR accepted the idea of the non-aligned states, that the regional states should fill the vacuum on their own.

The Americans were the first to propagate the vacuum theory, which emerged as the Eisenhower Doctrine. On 5 January 1957, President Eisenhower delivered a special message to the US Congress, defining the new policy of the USA in West Asia and North Africa. He based his policy on three assumptions : firstly, the area had always been coveted by Russia, secondly, the Soviets were interested in penetrating it by all possible means and lastly, the 'free nations' in the area needed and wanted added strength to ensure their continued independence. He argued that since Great Britain and France had been discredited, the USA was the only Western Power which could help the pro-Western states in the region. The American President not only sought the authorization of the Congress for economic and military aid to those countries which accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine, but also the authorization to employ the US Armed Forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political

independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism. The US Congress approved it in March 1957.

Even before the Congress had approved of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Vice-President Richard Nixon had been preaching it during his African tour in February-March 1957. Nixon got Ethiopia and Libya lined up in favour of the new US policy of direct participation in the affairs of the region. Both Ethiopia and Libya had base agreements with the USA. The Libyan King, Idris I, was disturbed by the 'radical' leadership in Egypt. Haile Selassie of Ethiopia too, was perturbed by regional problems like the Ethiopia-Somalia border dispute, the future of the Nile waters and the closure of the Suez Canal, which affected Ethiopia's trade with Europe. He was prepared to come closer to the USA, and also to Israel, to counter, what he thought, the growing Arab-Islamic threat to Ethiopia. It was stated in Washington during the period of Nixon's visit to Africa, that the USA had requested permission to establish an air force communication base in Ethiopia, and also, facilities to make use of the anchorage at Massawa on the Red Sea coast of Ethiopia. Ethiopia, was thus, gradually assuming importance in the American Indian Ocean strategy as early as in 1957.

The Special Assistant to President Eisenhower on Middle Eastern Affairs, Mr. Richards, was sent on a long tour to West Asia and North Africa, to explain the Eisenhower Doctrine and to solicit support for the same. His mission was welcomed by all the regional powers of the Baghdad Pact. Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya and Ethiopia also welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine. There were some borderline cases. In Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco, the regimes, though pro-Western, publicly refrained from endorsing the US policy, due to local and regional pressures. Other states, like Afghanistan and Sudan, welcomed the economic aid programme but refused to support the political and military implications of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Yemen also refused to accept it. Countries like Egypt, Syria and India were boycotted by the Richards Mission because of their open opposition to that doctrine and the theory upon which it was based.

The Eisenhower Doctrine, in fact, evoked three different responses. One was of total support to the US. The other two can be broadly described as the regional-power alternative and the Soviet plan, which underlined the fact that the Soviet Union must, in future, be included among the big Powers, in any discussion on the problems of the area.

The regional-power alternative, as advocated by India and Egypt, and supported by Syria, emphasized, that the decline in the Anglo-French presence in the area was a historical process, and the so-called vacuum created had to be filled by the local Powers, which had fought the foreigners and ousted them. They suggested that if that natural process was disturbed by the entry of a Super Power, it would only encourage the other Super Power to compete with it, and thus convert the area from a peace

zone to a Cold War zone. Nehru had been advocating this idea for a long time and it was, indirectly, an extension of the policy of non-alignment which was followed by many of the Afro-Asian states at that time.

In the Arab world there were several political forces which thought on similar lines. King Saud, King Hussein, President Nasser and Sabri Assali, the Syrian Premier, met in Cairo in January 1957, to discuss the regional power balance after the Suez episode. On 19 January, it was announced that the Cairo Conference had rejected the vaccum theory. The three states, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, even promised King Hussein that they would contribute £12.8 million per year for ten years, to maintain the Arab Legion, so that King Hussein could be freed from British control. The British prestige in Jordan had already suffered a serious setback due to the expulsion of Glubb Pasha. The new wave of non-alignment had brought into power the Nabulsi government, which was more sympathetic to Nasser. Amman even asked London, on 27 November 1956, to wind up its bases in Jordan, which had been established under the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948. A treaty was subsequently signed on 18 March 1957, under which the British bases were evacuated by July 1957.

But the Arab solidarity, which was achieved in Cairo in January 1957, began to develop cracks. King Saud visited America after the Cairo Conference and was convinced of the continuing need for the preservation and enlargement of the American presence in West Asia. He agreed to extend the 1951 lease on the Dhahran air-base for another five years. In return, he was promised military aid by the USA. The joint communique issued on 8 February mentioned, among other items, that President Eisenhower had explained to him the purposes of his proposals to the Congress, and that King Saud received that exposition with satisfaction. King Saud's enthusiasm, for the Eisenhower doctrine, was not affected by the insult meted out to him by the Mayor of New York, Robert Wagner, who publicly stated on 27 January, that King Saud was 'not wanted' in the city because of his anti-Jewish policies. On 28 January he added: "King Saud is a fellow who says slavery is legal, that in the air force (Dhahran) you can't have any Jewish boys and that a Catholic priest cannot say Mass." King Saud not only listened with interest to the US plans, but also, on his return trip, explained the Eisenhower Doctrine to King Mohammad V of Morocco, President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and King Idris of Libya. He was successful in his mission.

If it was the American intention to project King Saud as an alternative to Nasser, they failed. In the second Cairo Conference in February 1957, King Saud tried to project the American point of view. The Arab heads of state, President Nasser, King Hussain, and President Kuwatly of Syria rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine and upheld the policy of non-alignment. They affirmed that the defence of the Arab world should emanate from the Arab nations themselves and should be outside the scope of foreign pacts.

Not only Saudi Arabia but Jordan also was gradually detached from the Cairo group. On 10 April, King Hussein dismissed the Nabulsi Cabinet, which wanted to oppose the Eisenhower Doctrine and have close ties with the Soviet Union. General Ali Abu Nuwar, another supporter of the policy of non-alignment, also escaped to Syria on 14 April. The internal crisis led to public demonstrations, and some fighting among the army units. Both were quickly controlled by the King. Jordan accused Egypt of inciting trouble in Jordan. These developments took place on the eve of Richard's visit to Jordan. The US also took the opportunity of parading the Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. On 29 April, the American Secretary of Army, Mr Brucker, announced in a television interview, that the American troops were ready to be parachuted into Jordan in a matter of days. The Soviets also duly warned the Americans, on 29 April, against the movement of the Sixth Fleet. But the Jordanian crisis of 1957 was basically the result of maladjustments in inter-Arab power politics and not the result of Cold War rivalries. Peace was restored between Jordan on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria on the other, thanks to the Saudi mediation. Also, the Israeli announcement, that it reserved the right to intervene in Jordan in case of a change of regime there, a potent threat, probably helped in the maintenance of the Hashimite throne.

The Soviets rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine on grounds which were different from those of the regional states. The Eisenhower Doctrine meant that the USA would gradually replace Great Britain and France, and that the USSR would have to confront and compete with an incoming Super Power as against the outgoing big Powers. The Soviets thought that such a change, which would keep the USSR isolated in the area, would be detrimental to their future interests. To break the Western monopoly, Mr Shepilov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, suggested a plan, during his speech in the Supreme Soviet on 11 February 1957.[10]

The Soviet proposal, commonly known as the Shepilov Plan, envisaged a joint declaration by the four Powers—France, UK, USA and USSR—on the maintenance of peace in West Asia. Shepilov said that such a declaration should be based upon the following six principles :

(*1*) Settlement of outstanding issues solely through peaceful negotiations.

(*2*) Non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the Middle-East countries, and respect for their sovereignty and independence.

(*3*) Dropping of all attempts to involve the Middle-East in Great Power military blocs.

(*4*) Abolition of foreign bases and withdrawal of foreign troops from the Middle Eastern countries.

(*5*) Mutual agreement not to deliver arms to these countries.

(*6*) Economic assistance to the Middle-East countries without political, military, or other terms incompatible with their sovereignty.

The Soviet proposals were presented to the USA, Great Britain and

France on the same day. They were unanimously rejected by all of them, on 11 March 1957. The futile dialogue between the East and the West continued till June, but it was obvious to everybody that the West would neither voluntarily liquidate its bases in the region nor terminate the Baghdad Pact, especially on a proposal made by the Soviet Foreign Minister. Some Western writers even commented, that Shepilov deliberately included that item knowing full well that it would be rejected by the West, and accused him of using propaganda tactics. The Shepilov Plan was, however, a good manifestation of the Soviet desire to be recognized as a force in the West Asian affairs by the Western Powers, as well as by the Afro-Asian states. It was natural that the Western Powers should refuse to give the USSR that status, especially when it had not established itself as a viable and competitive force in the region which could seriously threaten the Western presence there.

The Afro-Asian Powers also were rather unhappy about the Shepilov Plan. Undoubtedly, the plan referred to non-interference in the domestic affairs of the West Asian countries, supported their demand for the abolition of foreign bases and liquidation of the Baghdad Pact and thus obliquely supported non-alignment. Yet, the Soviet demand that it should, along with the Western Powers, be allowed to settle the local problem, had the implication that the Soviet Union was willing to bypass the local supporters and have a dialogue directly with the West. Such a detente would have seriously upset the game which the regional Powers were playing. Neither Nasser nor Nehru supported the Shepilov Plan with any marked enthusiasm. The Soviet Union had committed a grave mistake by ignoring the local leaders. Nasser, at least, did not forget it. It was Egypt under Nasser rather than the Western Bloc countries, which, during the period 1957–1959, opposed the growing Soviet influence in the area. During the same period Nasser was also opposing the Western Powers. He was indeed busy.

Even though the Eisenhower Doctrine was rejected by the non-aligned countries, the USA followed it up. A massive economic and military aid programme was undertaken. It was announced by Mr Richards at a Press conference on 10 May 1957, that $120 million out of $200 million earmarked under the Eisenhower Doctrine, had already been committed. Half of it was given as economic aid and the rest as military aid. There was an increased US participation in the Baghdad Pact and the USA was, for the first time, represented in its military committee in June 1957. During the same month, the USA helped in the creation of a telecommunication network and road and railway projects of strategic importance in the northern-tier area. A survey was conducted for a road, along the Arabian Sea, connecting Karachi with Bandar Abbas and Basra. Also, a survey was undertaken for a railway link, connecting Zahidan in Iran, where the Pakistan railway terminates, and some suitable point on the railway network in Iran. Moreover, intra-regional trade promotion schemes were suggested to develop lasting

economic ties between the northern-tier countries. Subsequently, the scheme emerged as the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD).

THE GROWING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

The year 1957 was important not only because it witnessed a direct US involvement in West Asian affairs but also because it marked the beginning of the Soviet involvement in the local politics of the region. Syria, the intermittently exploding political volcano in West Asia, was the country selected for the Soviet debut on the West Asian stage.

The Syrians have always been, politically speaking, the most active, often volatile, among the Arabs. They were the pioneers of Arab nationalism, Arab socialism and of the idea of the 'immortal mission' of Arab civilization. Lacking the resources of the oil kingdoms or the large population and the relative strength of Egypt, the Syrians exploited the next best thing available to them, ideology, to project their image in the Arab world. During 1957, the Syrians were staunch supporters of non-alignment and were vigorously opposing the Eisenhower Doctrine. They had already come closer to the Soviet Union following the Czech arms deal. The Syrian Communist Party, under the leadership of Khaled Bagdash, was the most influential communist party in the whole of the Arab world. Thus, Syria in 1957, had the necessary requisites, to become an arena of the Cold War confrontation in West Asia.

The Syrian crisis of 1957 started with the statements by Loy Henderson and Dulles to the effect that the massive Soviet infiltration in Syria had created an explosive situation which posed a threat to the pro-Western countries in the region. The USA began air-lifting arms to Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In the meantime, it was alleged by Syria and its supporters, that Syria was being threatened by Turkey, that Turkish troops had begun concentrating on the Syrian border and that the US Sixth Fleet was cruising off Latakia. On 9 September Nasser expressed Egypt's unconditional support to Syria. On 10 September the Soviet Premier, Marshal Bulganin, wrote a threatening letter to the Turkish Premier, Adnan Menderes, in which he expressed concern at the movements of the Turkish troops and asked Turkey to refrain from taking any aggressive action against Syria. The Turkish Defence Minister, in his statement on 14 September, said that the Turkish troops' movements were a part of the annual manoeuvres. He said that Turkey had no aggressive intent against Syria. On 21 September a Soviet naval squadron arrived at Latakia. That was the first juxtapositioning of the Soviet Fleet between the US Sixth Fleet and an Arab state.

Tension continued to mount steadily. On 9 October Khrushchev, in an interview with James Reston of the *New York Times*, accused Dulles of inciting Turkey to attack Syria and warned that Turkey would not last for a day, in the event of a war. On 10 October, Dulles duly warned the USSR against making any aggression against Turkey. To lend weight

to the American threat an American task force composed of the cruiser, *Canberra,* and other smaller vessels was sent to Izmir on 18 October. In the meantime, a small Egyptian force had also landed at Latakia, on 13 October. War hysteria was built up in Syria. Arms were distributed to people's resistance movements and youth organizations in cities like Aleppo, Homs and Hama.

On 16 October, the Syrians took the matter to the United Nations. The debate in the General Assembly was bitter and acrimonious—an exercise in showmanship. The Soviet Union appeared to champion the cause of Syria and used the occasion to attack the NATO, the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. The USA stoutly defended its position in the area, and accused the Soviet Union of fomenting trouble in West Asia. The whole debate, which was anyway futile, ended when both Syria and Turkey agreed, on 30 October, to drop the matter.

The Syrian crisis of 1957 was important because it was the first major skirmish between the two Super Powers in the area. The growing Soviet influence in Syria, not only alarmed the West but also President Nasser, the Baath party and other non-communists in Syria and paved the way for the union between Syria and Egypt. The question of forming the union was approved as early as 18 November 1957, though the formalities were completed only by 1 February 1958 when the new state, the United Arab Republic (UAR), came into being.

The union of these two states was projected as a step in the direction of Arab unity. It satisfied Syrian ideological pretensions and also brought Syrian politics under a political pattern which preferred a single-party system. The National Union, the basis of the single party system of Egypt, was declared as the only legal political organization of the new state. In accordance with Egyptian laws, which became applicable to Syria also, the Syrian Communist Party was banned. General Bizri, the Syrian Commander-in-Chief, who was considered to be pro-Soviet, was removed. The union between Syria and Egypt thus indirectly checked the growing Soviet influence in Syria. The union between these two countries also meant that the Soviets could not develop an alternative base of power in West Asia. The Soviet leaders did not favour a development which went against Soviet interests in West Asia. They were also unhappy with Nasser and his idea of Arab unity, which was putting a hurdle in the way of the communists.

Arab unity was considered by many as a myth, or at best, a premature idea. But the myth had several advantages. It created a sense of Arab solidarity, and enabled President Nasser to check the growing communist influence in the Arab world in 1957-59, just as he had used it earlier to prevent the Western Bloc from enlarging the scope of the Baghdad Pact in the Arab world. The idea of Arab unity permitted Nasser to project himself as the leader of the Arab world and thus enabled him to steer the Arab world clear of the two Super Powers.

The events of 1958 put into sharp focus the triangular confrontation between Nasser, the USSR and Western Powers. The Lebanese crisis of 1958 was, in fact, a continuation of the series of disturbances in Syria and Jordan in 1957. Undoubtedly the Lebanese crisis got a big coverage in the newspapers and in the records of the United Nations, but it was not the real or decisive event of 1958 in West Asia. The main event was the military *coup d'etat* of 14 July 1958, which by overthrowing the regime of Nuri es-Said and Abul Ilah, not only forced Iraq out of the Baghdad Pact, but also made it an unpredictable factor in the regional and international power politics. Curiously enough, the West was not unduly perturbed by the events in Iraq proper. Of course, they were sorry for the death of their old friends, but no serious attempt was made to intervene in Iraq. Instead, the Western Powers intervened in Jordan and Lebanon.

The pattern of new Iraq was yet to emerge clearly. Colonel Abdel Karim Kassem had been assuring the West that the Iraqi *coup d'etat* was aimed at freeing the people from tyranny and corruption in its domestic affairs, and was not directed against the Western Powers as such. In fact, in his interview with *The Times* (London) on 22 July, he said that Iraq would not oppose the Western Powers out of a feeling of resentment, but, on the contrary, would cooperate with them. He said that he would not only endeavour to maintain good relations between Iraq and the West but would also increase the extent of their cooperation, especially in oil production. Iraq also did not withdraw from the Baghdad Pact immediately after the *coup d'etat,* but on 24 March 1959. Thus, the West was not unduly disturbed by the events in Iraq though it was apprehensive of the effects of the military *coup d'etat,* in other pro-Western Arab States, where political conditions were unstable. A precipitate action was, therefore, taken by the USA and Great Britain. The American marines were landed in Lebanon on 15 July and the British troops were dispatched to Jordan on 17 July.

The Lebanese crisis had been brewing since May 1957, and was directly connected with the acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine by the Government of President Chamoun. Serious insurrectionary activities against the Chamoun regime started in early May 1958. The Lebanese Government accused the UAR (Syria) of supporting that movement. The matter was debated in the United Nations, and the United Nations' Observation Group in Lebanon was dispatched to ascertain the facts. In the meantime the US State Department announced that it would supply small arms (for riot control) to Lebanon. These arms were flown to Lebanon on the urgent request of the Labanese Government. On 17 May, the State Department announced that the US troops would be dispatched to Lebanon on the request of President Chamoun to protect the lives of the Americans in Lebanon. Promptly, the same day, the USSR warned the USA against intervening in the internal affairs of Lebanon. But, the Sixth Fleet, disregarding the Soviet threat, began concentrating in the eastern

Mediterranean, and was fully prepared to take instantaneous action. On 14 July, following the Iraqi *coup d'etat*, President Chamoun formally requested the USA to intervene in Lebanon. The first batch of the US marines landed in Lebanon on 15 July. By 20 July the number of American troops had increased to 10,000. King Hussein also requested Great Britain, on 16 July, to send paratroopers to Jordan. The British troops began landing in Jordan the next day ; air protection was provided by aircraft of the US Sixth Fleet.

Fear was probably the most important factor, which prompted the West to take such preemptive actions. The Anglo-American troops, however, withdrew following a better understanding of the forces working in the Arab east. The success of the Iraqi *coup d'etat* and the fear that the pro-Nasser and pro-communist forces may combine to overthrow the pro-Western regimes in the Arab east were partly responsible for the Western intervention in Jordan and Lebanon. But that was a faulty understanding of the situation. In fact, the events in Lebanon and Jordan had hardly any effect upon the future political trends in the region. The Arab east, immediately after the Iraqi *coup d'etat,* was affected by three factors : Arab unity, Arab communists and the Soviet desire to steer a middle course between them.

Arab nationalism and Arab unity *ipso facto*, meant that an Arab state or a group of Arab states should not be allowed to bipolarize the Arab world especially in its relations with Super Powers. The West had tried to use Iraq earlier for such a purpose, but had failed when faced with the 'myth' of Arab unity. It was expected, that after July 1958, a unified Arab world would be able to bargain from the position of unity and therefore, of strength, with either of the Power blocs. It was in Nasser's interest. A divided Arab world, would not only have lost such an advantage, but also would have jeopardized whatever leverage Nasser had gained *vis-a-vis* the two blocs. Thus Nasser and the Syrian Baath Party, which was supporting him, wanted some sort of unity between Iraq and the UAR, so that the Iraqi leadership might not be tempted to play the game of the Syrian communists, or of Nuri es-Said. Any form of unity which would have maintained even the myth of Arab unity and prevented Iraq from bi-polarizing the Arab world, would have suited Nasser.

But what suited Nasser did not necessarily suit Premier Kassem, the Arab communists or the Soviet leaders. The Soviets got interested in Iraq because they thought that it offered two opportunities. First, Kassem offered a new leadership which could be an alternative to Nasser. In other words, the Soviets were also trying to play the same old game that the West had been playing, as long as Iraq was under Nuri es-Said. Just as the West supported pre-1958 Iraq against Nasser similarly the Soviets too supported Premier Kassem against Nasser. The Soviets were supported by the Arab communists. The Baath Party and Nasser did not like that alignment, and the period 1958–59 witnessed one of the most bitter political

controversies between Nasser and the communist world.

The Soviets also saw the possibility of achieving important strategic objectives by cultivating Iraq. Iraq is not only the fulcrum of the northern-tier system but also commands the Persian Gulf and hence can inuflence the Arabian Sea. Any Super Power which dominates Iraq can, therefore, have a direct influence in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf and finally, in the Indian Ocean. In 1958–59 the Soviets were offered an opportunity to influence Iraq, and they grasped it. On 4 August 1958, the Soviets sent to Iraq one of their top Arab experts, Gregori Zaiter, who was the then head of the Middle-East section in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Probably the Soviets thought that if they could control Iraq and somehow gain a decisive presence in Syria, they would be in a position, not only to threaten the rear of the Baghdad Pact, but also to ignore Nasser to a great extent. It was natural that Nasser reacted violently, even to the remote possibility of such an eventuality. Probably Nasser genuinely feared the so-called 'Red Fertile Crescent Plan'.

When the Iraqi *coup d'etat* freed Iraq from the rule of Nuri es-Said, many thought that Iraq too would join the UAR and thus strengthen the regional power system *vis-a-vis* the Super Powers. But that did not happen. Several factors prevented such a link-up. First, the old liberal democratic groups in Iraq, which had been curbed by the previous regime, saw a chance of establishing a multi-party democracy in Iraq, something which would not have been permitted under the single-party system practised in the UAR. They thought, that they would enjoy greater political freedom in Iraq under Kassem, who had permitted political parties to function freely. The Arab communists also, were against such a union, because they too hoped to emerge as a political force in Iraq, something which they could never dream under Nasser. Kassem too thought that he could play a better game in the Arab world and in world politics by competing, rather than by cooperating with Nasser. Only the Baath Party of Iraq was in favour of the union and worked for it with the help of the Syrian Baath Party.

Nasser, who would not have cared very much for an organic unity between Iraq and the UAR, could not but oppose the Iraqi moves, which were not only designed to crush the Baath Party in Iraq but were also, simultaneously designed to project Baghdad as an independent Arab power centre and as an alternative to Cairo. He became furious when the Arab communists began to use Iraq to undermine his influence in the rest of the Arab world. The roots of the Nasser-Communist controversy go back to 1958, when Nasser began curbing the influence of the Communist Party of Syria. Nasser had brought Syria under more effective control after a reorganization in October 1958, which was designed to control the internal affairs of Syria. The rivalry between Nasser and the communists, which took an acute turn in March 1959, was due to the cumulative effect of three factors : the abortive Mosul Revolt of 9 March, the growing

communist strength in Iraq and the presence of the Marxist Iraqi Minister of Economy, Dr Ibrahim Kubba, in Moscow, in connection with the signing of an important economic aid agreement.

The Mosul Revolt, which started on 7 March, was supposed to have been inspired by the *Baath* Party, and supported by the UAR. But that short-lived revolt collapsed on 9 March, when the Iraqi aircraft attacked Mosul. It was also reported that the 'Partisans of Peace', who had been gathering at Mosul, obtained firearms and attacked the landlords, merchants and others who were suspected of having supported the revolt. Hundreds were reported to have been killed. The killing stopped when regular troops entered Mosul. The Mosul Revolt greatly strengthened the 'Partisans of Peace' and the 'People's Resistance Movement'. Those groups demanded Iraq's immediate withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, breaking off of diplomatic relations with the UAR and the arming of the civilian population. It was during that period when the pro-communists were gathering strength in Iraq that the Iraqi economic delegation, headed by Ibrahim Kubbah, was present in Moscow for finalizing the details of a long-term economic aid agreement. The agreement was announced on 16 March. The USSR agreed to provide credit worth £50 million at 2.5 per cent interest.

Nasser, bitter at the emergence of an anti-UAR Iraq, accused the Iraqi Government on 11 March of being communist-controlled and of attempting to detach Syria from the UAR. On 13 March he accused the Iraqis of trying to form a communist-dominated 'Red Fertile Crescent'. There was an increase in anti-Iraqi and anti-communist propaganda from Cairo and Damascus.

Premier Khrushchev intervened in the local inter-Arab dispute by siding with Iraq. On 16 March, at a reception given on the occasion of the signing of the Soviet-Iraqi economic agreement, he said that the Iraqis should have the right to decide whether they want to unite with the UAR or remain separate. He also said that he was 'grieved' by President Nasser's attacks on communism. Despite those attacks the Soviet-UAR relations, as far as he was concerned, remained unchanged. Nasser disliked the patronizing attitude of Khrushchev and, on 22 March, rejected the view, that the timely Soviet aid had saved Egypt from defeat and occupation in 1956. He asserted that the Soviet aid to Egypt came only after the Suez campaign was over.

Those controversies, however, were seasonal and Nasser's fear that Kassem would replace him was found to be incorrect. There were several reasons. Kassem himself got frightened of the communist strength and tried to curb it, especially after the Kirkuk incident of 14 July 1959. The Western Powers regrouped themselves after March 1959. The USA began to take an enhanced interest in the CENTO, thereby compelling the USSR to devote more attention to the northern-tier countries. Nasser continued to dominate Syria during that crucial period. And, most important of them

all, the Soviets did not have an adequate naval power, or even a viable presence in the Indian Ocean, which could exploit the strategic importance of Iraq in 1959.

It is doubtful if the USSR had developed a full-fledged Indian Ocean strategy by that time. It should be remembered that all those moves were made within the framework of the traditional weapon systems, and the concept of land confrontation. The SLBM system had not been introduced till then. Thus, the southern side of the Soviet Union was not threatened at that time by an ocean-based weapon system. There was no naval confrontation between the two Super Powers in the Indian Ocean at that time. Also Iraq under Kassem was developing as an unreliable ally. The Soviets, therefore, dropped it and came close to Nasser who had not only retained his position in the Arab world, but had also been able to consolidate it still further. It is doubtful if the Soviets would have dropped Iraq that easily in 1970. But in 1960 Iraq, strategically, was not of primary importance for USSR.

STRENGTHENING AMERICAN PRESENCE

The decline in British presence and the growing Soviet influence in West Asia, led to an enhanced American participation in the Baghdad Pact. In January 1958, Dulles made a statement at the Ankara session of the Baghdad Pact that the USA would co-operate whole-heartedly in the security and defence commitments of that Pact. Elaborating on the question of the US participation, he said that under the American constitutional process the government acted in such matters, either by a treaty process, or in pursuance of a Congressional resolution. In the case of West Asia, he said that the USA would act under the Congressional resolution, commonly known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, especially when the US commitments in the area coincided with those of the Baghdad Pact.

Efforts had already been made to improve the military coordination among the Baghdad Pact countries. A combined Military Planning Staff had been set-up in Autumn 1957. It was headed by Major-General Habibullah Khan of Pakistan. He was replaced by Lieut-General Ekrem Akalin of Turkey in 1958. Major-General Davids Campbell of the US Forces was the Deputy-Director of the Combined Military Planning Staff since 1957. During that period, the military strength of the Baghdad Pact countries was also increased. Pakistan and Iran were supplied with large quantities of *Sabre* jets and tanks. Also, during that period Pakistan acquired some naval vessels. The Cruiser, *Babur*, was modernized, refitted and handed over to Pakistan on 5 July 1957. Two destroyers, *Khaibar* and *Badr*, were also acquired by Pakistan between January and February 1957. Two more destroyers, *Jehangir* and *Alamgir*, were acquired in March–June 1958. *Shah Jahan*, another destroyer, was gifted by the USA to Pakistan on 16 December 1958 after extensive refitting and modernization. Iran did not acquire any major naval vessel during this period,

except a small landing ship which was transferred to it from the USA in 1957 under the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme. Another one of the same type was loaned to Iran by the USA in 1959. Two small patrol boats were also transferred to Iran in 1957.

During those years Pakistan acquired sophisticated weapons in substantial quantities, but Iran was not supplied with similar weapons. The defence of the Persian Gulf was still considered to be a British responsibility. There was no appreciable American naval presence in the Persian Gulf, except for a small naval base in Bahrain. The Mediterranean coast, where the Soviet navy had begun to make its presence felt, was dominated by the Sixth Fleet. The Seventh Fleet was operating in the South Pacific. The Indian Ocean had not assumed any great strategic importance till then. The weapon systems, like the strategic bombers and the missiles armed with nuclear weapons, which had been developed till 1958, were in the nature of air and ground-control type rather than the ocean-control type (SLBM), which became operational only by 1963.

The Iraqi *coup d' etat* of 14 July 1958 took place during that transitional stage. The weakening of the Baghdad Pact necessitated an increased American presence to prop up the sagging defence line in the southern flank of the USSR. The pressure for greater American participation came not only from the American side, but also from the local members of the Baghdad Pact as well as from Great Britain. Talks on those lines had already been initiated at London on 28 July 1958.[11] The headquarters of the Baghdad Pact were removed to Ankara on 17 October 1958. Though Iraq formally withdrew from the Pact as late as 24 March 1959, it was a foregone conclusion that Iraq would not retain its membership of that organization.

The Soviet Union was perturbed by the new trends, both in the political field and in the field of new weapons, especially in that of the missiles. Premier Khrushchev, as early as 22 January 1958, spoke about the Soviet lead in the missile technology and offered to discuss with the USA topics like a ban on the ICBM, nuclear weapons, and the question of foreign bases.[12] The indirect entry of the USA in the Baghdad Pact after 1958 posed an additional threat to the southern flank of the USSR. Therefore, the Soviet Union issued a stern warning to the northern-tier countries in October 1958 against entering into a military agreement with the USA. In a strongly worded note to Iran on 31 October 1958,[13] which also announced the cancellation of President Voroshilov's Iran visit, the Soviet Union said, that any military agreement with the USA would, not only directly endanger the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union but would also be in contravention of the principles of good-neighbourly relations and Iran's commitments under the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality of 1927. Article 3 of that treaty said :

> Each of the Contracting Parties agrees to take no part, whether *de facto* or *de jure*, in political alliances or agreements directed against the

safety of the territory or territorial waters of the other Contracting Party or against its integrity, independence or sovereignty.

The Iranian reply, handed over on 6 November was brief. It accused the Soviet Union of violating the 1927 Treaty several times, and said that Iran reserved the right to enter into any defensive agreement to protect its national interests.

On 19 January 1959 the Soviets presented a note[14] to Iran, which pointed out that the serious deterioration in Soviet-Iranian relations would place Iran among the enemies of the Soviet Union. It also said that the Soviet Government expressed its readiness to join with other Powers in guaranteeing the security and integrity of the West Asian countries, and desired to exchange views on that question with the Iranian Government. A Soviet delegation led by the Deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir Semyonov, also reached Tehran, on 29 January, to discuss a non-aggression pact with Iran. It returned empty-handed on 11 February. In a sharply-worded communique issued the next day, the Soviets accused that Iran had agreed to sign a non-aggression pact but had backed out at the last moment. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Asghar Hakmat, in a statement in the Iranian Parliament on 15 February, said that the USSR had proposed that Iran should renounce the Baghdad Pact, refuse to sign the bilateral agreement with the USA and refuse to permit the USA to instal anti-Soviet bases in Iran, before signing the non-aggression pact. He said that Iran had agreed that it would not permit the installation of anti-Soviet bases in Iran but it would neither break-off with the Baghdad Pact nor agree not to sign the bilateral military agreement with the USA.

Iran occupied a geopolitical position of great significance. It was not only a southern neighbour of the USSR but was also the link between the SEATO and the NATO. Pakistan, as a member of the SEATO, and Turkey, as a member of the NATO, were directly aligned by treaty relations with the USA. Iran was not. Therefore, both Iran and the USA were interested in closing the gap in the iron curtain around the Soviet Union. The result was the bilateral military pact signed between the USA and Iran and the USA and other northern-tier countries at Ankara on 5 March 1959.[15]

Under these bilateral defence agreements, the USA promised to resist aggression and towards that end take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon. It also stipulated that the northern-tier countries would continue to get military and economic assistance under the Mutual Security Act of 1954. The signatories agreed to prepare and participate in such defensive arrangements as might be mutually agreed to be desirable. The Preamble mentioned that the USA regarded the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the northern-tier states as vital both to its national interest and to world peace. The agreement was to continue to be in force until one

year after the receipt by either Government, of a notice of the intention of the other government to terminate it.

Whereas the USSR was disturbed by the bilateral agreement between Iran and the USA, the US-Pak agreement of 5 March 1959 evoked strong reactions in India. India felt that such an agreement would pose a direct threat to India, and would prompt Pakistan to adopt a more aggressive posture in the subcontinent. The USA tried to explain that the 5 March 1959 agreement was governed by the Eisenhower Doctrine, and was limited in its implications, to an attack by a communist state. The Pakistani interpretation, however, was that it was not a restrictive agreement but a general agreement directed against all including India. Nehru explained the implications of the agreement to the Indian Parliament on 13 March 1959.

Iraq was not a party to these bilateral agreements. It formally withdrew from the Baghdad Pact on 24 March, the day following the Iraqi ratification of the technical and economic co-operation agreement with the USSR. Iraq explained that its membership of the Baghdad Pact was not in tune with the policy of non-alignment that it wanted to pursue. Following the Iraqi withdrawal, the name of the Baghdad Pact was changed on 21 August 1959 to Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

OTHER NON-ALIGNED STATES ON THE LITTORAL: INDIA, YEMEN AND INDONESIA

Whereas 1955-59 was a period of intense political activity in West Asia, it was marked by relative calm in the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan had joined the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact and the Government of India had lodged strong protests against it. To ensure military security from any threat from Pakistan, India had initiated an arms procurement and modernization programme. On the international level, India continued to champion non-alignment and friendship with both the blocs. In the regional context, the weapon systems and the Super Power strategies, which at that time were land-oriented, left enough room for India to manoeuvre out of any direct commitment to any of the Super Powers. In a way, India drifted into a sort of isolationist policy till 1959, when it was suddenly awakened by the fear of an open confrontation with China. The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, which profoundly affected India's foreign and defence policy, also coincided with the shift in the Super Power strategy from a land-based to a sea-based deterrence (SLBM). India which commands the central arc of the Indian Ocean, became important to both the Super Powers, in the context of the new naval strategy, which influenced the Super Power confrontation since the perfection of the *Polaris* submarine.

During that period, the Soviet Union also became interested in two other countries which occupied strategic places in the Indian Ocean : Yemen and Indonesia. Yemen commanded the entrance to the Indian

Ocean from the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and was opposite the American communication base at Asmara in Ethiopia. Indonesia commanded the Straits of Malacca which was another point of entry into the Indian Ocean. Both these points were also commanded by Britain from its bases in Aden and Singapore. It is interesting to note that the Soviet entry, in both these places, was facilitated by local clashes, involving the local rulers and the Western Bloc countries, like the border clashes between Yemen and Aden, the West Irian issue and the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation.

Yemen had already signed a Peace Treaty with the USSR as early as 1927. But the Soviet-Yemeni relations had remained suspended till they were revived in 1957. The renewal of border clashes on the frontiers of Yemen and the Aden Protectorate, the growing collaboration between Yemen and Egypt and the presence of the Crown Prince of Yemen, Seif al-Islam al-Badr, who was considered to be 'enlightened' till the 1962 *coup d'etat*, projected the backward Yemen, where the ruler and the ruled had continued to live under the conditions of the Middle Ages, in the twentieth century and into the Super Power conflicts.

The border conflict between Yemen and Aden had started afresh in December 1956. The matter was discussed in the Security Council, but no fruitful decision was reached. The Imam of Yemen, in a historic Press conference on 30 January 1957, declared that Yemen did not recognize any boundary between Yemen and the Aden Protectorate, and claimed that the whole of the Aden Protectorate belonged to Yemen. Yemen had been refusing to recognize the British authority in Aden since 1918, though the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty of Friendship, signed in 1934, had guaranteed a *status quo* on the frontier question. The Press conference was historic in another sense also. It was the first Press conference in the history of Yemen, and thus can claim to be one of the first steps towards the socio-political modernization of that country.

Al-Badr, the Crown Prince of Yemen, an active Arab politician, developed close ties with the UAR, and subsequently with the USSR, so as to strengthen Yemen's position *vis-a-vis* Great Britain. British sources claimed in August 1957 that Yemen had been receiving Soviet arms. About six or seven ship-loads of arms were alleged to have been unloaded. They included some old *T-34* tanks and a number of piston-driven aircraft as well as small arms. About 50 Soviet instructors were also sent to Yemen. The Crown Prince of Yemen officially acknowledged that arms deal, on 2 July 1959. It was also reported in April 1958, from Aden, that the Soviets had begun the construction of a commercial port at Mina al-Hamadani and had decided to put new installations at Hodeida, to convert that port into a naval and submarine base. If those reports were true, then Yemen became the first country in the Indian Ocean area to come under the Soviet influence. It should be remembered that the events in Yemen preceded the Iraqi *coup d'etat* and the massive Soviet

arms aid to Indonesia.

Indonesia, during the period 1957–59 was facing three problems : widespread local rebellion, dispute over the Dutch New Guinea and the question of Chinese minorities in Indonesia. The local rebellion, which the Indonesians claimed, had been supported by Taiwan and by the Americans, was entering a crucial stage. Indonesians were busy searching for arms to counter that threat, but were unable to procure them in sufficient quantities. Though President Sukarno had visited the Soviet Union in 1956 and a massive Soviet economic aid, amounting to 100 million, had been announced in 1958, no Soviet arms had reached Indonesia till 1958.

On 3 April 1958, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, hinted that Indonesia might obtain Soviet arms, especially aircraft. Simultaneously, the Chinese also announced that they would extend full support to Indonesia and would even send "volunteers" to fight there. That offer must have been very embarrassing for the Indonesians, in view of the problems connected with the Chinese minorities in Indonesia. Agreements were reached in 1958, between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, under which the Soviet supplied a limited number of *MiG-15* fighter-bombers in 1958. Eight *Ilyushin* bombers were also delivered in January 1959. These aircraft served the limited purpose of discouraging rebel air-raids. In 1958, Indonesia also entered into an agreement with the USA, under which enough light arms were supplied to equip twenty infantry battalions. Indonesia also purchased two frigates and two corvettes from Italy, in October 1958, to patrol the islands. When Khrushchev visited Indonesia in February 1959 he denounced the SEATO, supported the Indonesian claims on West Irian (Dutch New Guinea) and offered an additional economic aid of $250 million. But the Soviets as yet had not poured a massive dose of heavy arms in Indonesia.

Indonesia began to get the Soviet arms in bulk only after 1961. A delegation led by Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, General Nasution, Defence Minister and Chief of the Army Staff, and Air Marshal Suryadarma, the Air Force Chief, visited Moscow in the first week of January 1961 on an arms purchase mission. The background of that arms purchase was the need to confront the Dutch presence, in West Irian, with superior and massive weapons, so as to force them out of that area. The Soviet Union was willing to support the Indonesian claims on West Irian and that support was reiterated in the joint communique issued on 6 January, when the arms deal was concluded. Under it Indonesia was to obtain jet bombers and fighters, submarines and motor torpedo boats.

These arms began to reach Indonesia by October 1961. In December 1961 a general mobilization was ordered in Indonesia. An anti-Dutch war hysteria was unleashed. On 3 January 1962. West Irian was officially declared a province of Indonesia and renamed, Irian Barat. On 7

January, President Sukarno, in a public speech, warned that Indonesia was ready to invade West Irian, irrespective of world opinion, unless the Dutch handed it over quickly. "If this arouses the world—we don't care, we don't care, we don't care ! We want West Irian." That was a bad tactic, especially when Indonesia had plans to invade West Irian.

There was a naval clash between Indonesian motor torpedo boats and Dutch frigates, in which the Indonesians suffered some losses. Attempts were also made to paradrop Indonesian troops in West Irian. They were foiled due to a superior Dutch military presence in the area. Fresh arms from the Soviet Union were obtained under an agreement reached in May 1962, and the Indonesian Navy was strengthened by the addition of a cruiser, several destroyers, frigates, submarines and PT boats. The West Irian problem, however, was solved through the efforts of the UN and through the good offices and third-party mediation of the United States, which was represented by Mr Ellsworth Bunker. The massive naval build-up, however, came in handy in the subsequent confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia in 1964–65.

CONTINUING THE LAND CONFRONTATION THE SECOND PHASE 1959—1965

Weapon Systems, the Period of Transition and its Political Implications

With the perfection of the ICBM system based upon *Titan* and *Minuteman* missiles, and the gradual introduction of the *Polaris* submarines, the focus of the US global strategy was shifting from the periphery of the USSR either to the American land-mass or into the depths of the Ocean. The strategy of control of the high seas replaced the old strategy based upon the control of the land frontiers of the Soviet Union. The Indian Ocean continued to remain an area of low priority during the transition period in the weapon systems because firstly, the USA had not been able to perfect its *Polaris A-3* missile till 1963 and secondly, the USSR had no naval presence in the Indian Ocean and, therefore, could not pose any naval threat to the West. The conventional naval defence of the area was under British supervision in the western Indian Ocean. The British and the American fleets controlled South-East Asia and South the Pacific. Therefore, during the period 1960–63, when the *Polaris* submarine was still being perfected and the ICBMs had taken over the task of strategic deterrence from manned nuclear bombers, the CENTO, whose southern side commanded the Arabian Sea and consequently the western Indian Ocean, remained in a state of animated suspension. The apathy of the USA, to maintain even air installations in the area, was also reflected in its announcement on 16 March 1961 that the USA would evacuate its air-base in Daharan in Saudi Arabia when the lease expired in April 1962. It may be a mere coincidence, but it is interesting to note that the US announcement followed the successful launching of the

Minuteman solid-fuel ICBM on 1 February that year.

The shift, from the ICBM system to the SLBM system, had its impact on the political and diplomatic interests and activities of the Super Powers in the Indian Ocean area. The change-over from land confrontation to naval confrontation meant that the countries of the northern tier were losing their strategic importance as the beach-head against the Soviet land-mass, and were assuming a new significance as littoral powers which could help America in dominating the Indian Ocean itself. The shift in the weapon system also meant that during the transition period the USA would like to retain, at the most, a symoblic presence in the CENTO. To that end it joined the Military Committee of the CENTO, even talked about the formation of a CENTO Command and gave generous arms aid to the CENTO partners, but refrained from joining the pact as such. During that period, the USA did not wish the pro-Western regimes in the area to feel that it was withdrawing. But it was a fact, that under the changing weapon system the USA did not need the northern-tier states as badly in 1964, as it needed them in 1954.

The political and military implications of the change in the weapon system were felt by the local pro-Western regimes. By 1962 the CENTO members began to complain of 'neglect' by the USA and began to think in terms of a detente with the USSR. The USA was not against such a policy as long as it did not harm its interests in the Indian Ocean. Thus, the period 1959–1964 witnessed dramatic 'victories' of Soviet diplomacy as reflected in the detente between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Pakistan, Iran and Turkey on the other. The USA also put greater emphasis upon economic cooperation in the region. The Economic Committee of the CENTO assumed great importance. Finally, in 1964, the scheme for Regional Cooperation for Development was launched. In short, that phase was marked by a high-intensity diplomatic and low military activity in the Indian Ocean area. None of the Super Powers had gained any spectacular military advantages, though the USSR appeared to have made substantial political gains.

Though the CENTO was strengthened with bilateral agreements between the USA and the local Powers, it never attained the status of a significant strategic deterrence, as compared to the NATO or even the SEATO. Undoubtedly, the USA gave some sophisticated weapons like the *F-104 (Starfighters)* to Pakistan in August 1961. Pakistan also received a large number of *Patton* tanks and its naval strength also increased considerably. But Iran did not receive any appreciable war material. It got the *F-84* jet fighters which were inferior to the *F-86 (Sabre jets)*. Though Pakistan received its *F-104 (Starfighter)* squadron as early as in August 1961, Iran had to wait till 1964 to get the *F-5*. Iran did not get even *Patton* tanks till 1962 and had to remain content with old *Sherman* tanks. Iran, therefore, remained the weakest link, militarily speaking, in the CENTO, despite the fact that it was constantly being threatened by the Soviet Union. Both,

Iran and Pakistan complained that they were being given a step-motherly treatment by the USA which was partial to Turkey. One squadron of *Jupiter* IRBM missiles had been installed in Turkey. The Turkish air force, navy and the armour were the strongest in the area. Turkey, however, got those weapons not under the CENTO but under the NATO arrangements.

Lack of American interest, in Iran and Pakistan, was not solely due to lack of confidence in these CENTO Powers, but was also governed by the American strategic and military interests in the area, as seen in the context of the newly developing weapon system. Thus, whereas the USA went slow in its military commitment programmes in Iran and Pakistan, it continued to give full military support to Turkey. Turkey not only commanded the Turkish Straits and the Black Sea, but also played a crucial role in the American naval strategy in the eastern Mediterranean. It should not be forgotten that the US *Polaris* submarines had become active in the Mediterranean in 1963, and the growing Soviet naval power had begun to make its presence felt there by 1964.

Militarily, the CENTO did not have any teeth of its own. There were no missile bases in Iran or Pakistan. The *Jupiter* base in Turkey was under NATO's control. Neither were there any SAC bases in Iran or Pakistan. The strategic deterrence was supplied by the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the SAC bases in Turkey, Libya, Europe and from the British bases in Cyprus. Organizationally also, the CENTO did not have an international command structure like that of the NATO. No troops were attached to it permanently. The only organizational link of a permanent nature was the Combined Military Planning Organization which was rather ineffective. The Americans very often complained that the greatest drawback of the region, from the military point of view, was the lack of communication facilities. Some half-hearted measures were undertaken to improve them but there was no crash programme. The USA was not interested in pouring money in the area beyond a certain minimum because, under the newly developing weapon system the land frontier was going to lose much of its strategic importance. During that period of transition from one weapon system to another, only one major air-exercise, the *Shahbaz*, was conducted by the CENTO. It was held in April 1961 and lasted for three days. Aircraft from Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, UK and USA, operating from airbases in Turkey and Pakistan tried to intercept 'enemy bombers'. Conduct of an air exercise by the CENTO against 'enemy bomber raids', was itself an outmoded thing, in the context of Super Power strategy and the new weapon systems based on the ICBM and the SLBM.

There were reports of dissatisfaction in the Iranian and the Pakistani circles, about shortcomings in the command structure of the CENTO. Those two countries were demanding a CENTO Command, with forces allotted to it as was the case in the NATO. Neither the USA nor

Turkey seemed to favour such an organization. The demand was shelved on the ground that the area did not possess adequate facilities, particularly communication facilities, for a proper functioning of such a complicated command structure. However, deferring to the wishes of these two CENTO partners, especially under Pakistani pressure, a Commander of the Military Staff was appointed. That appointment was, more or less, a paper arrangement since no troops were allotted to him. It was also suggested that the Military Staff would direct its attention primarily against the possible threats from the Soviet Union and not against local threats.

Such an arrangement was a poor consolation for Pakistan, which wanted full CENTO backing in its confrontation with India. Nor did the arrangement satisfy Iran which was becoming more and more apprehensive of the growing threat from Iraq. The dispute over the Shatt al-Arab had erupted in 1959. In July 1960, Iran was at logger heads with the Arab world over the question of *de facto* recognition of Israel. Egypt broke off its diplomatic relations with Iran, and the Arab League passed a resolution of 'unanimous condemnation' of Iran. At that time Iran was militarily weak and politically unstable and, therefore, was afraid of the Arab threats. The threat was not only from "Nasserism" but also, from the growing communist presence in Iraq and the revival of Kurdish nationalism. Mustafa Birzani, the noted Kurdish leader, who had been in exile in the Soviet Union, had come back to Iraqi Kurdistan after the Iraqi *coup d'etat* of 1958. Iran was afraid that the Kurdish revolt, backed by pro-Soviet elements in the area, might pose a threat to the security of Iran. Thus, the threat from Iraq, as well as the disillusionment with the CENTO, went a long way in bringing about a detente between Iran and the Soviet Union.

A thinking on the question, whether total dependence upon the USA was sufficient to safeguard Iran's national interest, had started as early as March 1961. Jafar Sharif Emami, who had formed the Cabinet in March 1961, had emphasized the need to improve relations with the Soviet Union in his programme. Amini, who replaced him in May, also lost confidence in the USA. It is interesting to note that Amini did not have an anti-American record. Rather, as the Finance Minister of Iran, after the fall of the Mosaddeq regime he had conducted negotiations which had led to the final settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. 'Amini', following his resignation on 17 July 1962, accused the USA of 'tardiness' in sending both economic and military aid to Iran. He felt that the USA had abandoned Iran. The new Premier, Assadollah Alam, also followed the same line.

Efforts were made to neutralize the enmity of the Soviet Union. The immediate object was to put a stop to violent propaganda directed against the Iranian regime. On 15 September 1962, Iran reassured the USSR that it would not allow any foreign Power to establish rocket launching

sites of any kind on the Iranian territory and declared that it would never be a party to any aggression against the Soviet Union. The Soviets were apparently satisfied. There was a marked reduction in the communist-inspired propaganda. Gradually, Soviet-Iranian relations improved in economic and military fields, and finally led to the establishment of several joint projects and the sale of Soviet arms to Iran.

Pakistan was a different case. It did not have a common frontier with the Soviet Union and had never felt threatened by it. All along, the Pakistani leaders were evaluating their position in the CENTO and the SEATO, from the point of view of its utility, in the context of Pakistan's objectives in the Indian subcontinent. If the Western bloc countries derived any fringe benefits from Pakistan's membership of these pacts they were welcome to it. Till 1959 Pakistan had been able to utilize its position to some advantage but after that Pakistan began to have serious doubts if it could continue to derive the same advantage in the future.

The growing Sino-Indian tension, and the border conflict after 1959, had a marked influence in the realignment of Super Power politics in the Indian subcontinent. The immediate reaction of the two Super Powers, to the Sino-Indian dispute, was of caution. Khrushchev, while addressing a reception in the Kremlin, on 7 November, not only talked about the need to settle the Sino-Indian dispute amicably, but also suggested that the Ladakhi area was uninhabited and not of any particular significance. On the American side, the Secretary of State, Herter, in a news conference on 12 November, said that the USA did not have enough evidence upon which it could base its opinion. He also said that the USA had never officially endorsed the McMahon Line. The USA was trying to follow the line adopted by the KMT regime in Taiwan, which had declared that it did not recognize the McMahon Line. Subsequently, Herter issued a statement deploring the use of force by China to settle the boundary dispute.

The disenchantment in India with China, the awareness of the military weakness of India, and the slow Russian response to India's needs forced the informed circles in the USA, to discuss the possibilities of a fresh look on the problems of the subcontinent. That was especially true after President Eisenhower visited India, from 9 to 14 December 1959, as a part of his world tour. One manifestation of such a thinking was the suggestion that the Mutual Security Act of 1954 be amended so as to permit the US authorities to grant military aid to non-aligned countries also. Pakistan was perturbed at the possibility of such a shift in the American policy in the Indian subcontinent.

Pakistani diplomacy devoted itself to the task of keeping India and the USA isolated. But Pakistan's capacity to influence the USA was limited. It was limited, first by Pakistan's overall position in the Indian subcontinent, and, secondly, by the position it occupied in the broader context of the global strategy of America. Pakistan was

important for the Western Bloc as long as it was willing to join their military pacts and as long as India was opposing such a system. Pakistan was also important as a connecting link between the CENTO and the SEATO. That position was crucial in the early phase of the Cold War rivalry and the policy of containment of communism. Though the ICBM system had made such a policy outdated yet Pakistan retained a sufficient leverage, at last to bargain for more aid. But it could not prevent the USA from coming closer to India. Pakistan's political, socio-economic and military position in the subcontinent had always reduced it to the level of the second choice. The growing Sino-Indian confrontation after 1959, and efforts made by India to strengthen its position *vis-a-vis* China, offered a unique opportunity to the Western Bloc countries to try and influence India. Pakistan, afraid that India might align itself with the West against China, used all its resources to prevent such an alignment. It could have saved itself the botheration because India at that time was not interested in giving up its policy of non-alignment and believed that it could contain the Chinese threat through its own efforts.

Pakistan, however, utilized the Sino-Indian conflict, and the subsequent rethinking in America, to obtain more American military aid. To pressurize the Americans, it began to threaten that it would re-examine its membership of the SEATO and CENTO. Such a threat was repeated by President Ayub Khan, on 6 July 1961, on the eve of his visit to UK and USA. While in America, President Ayub Khan had long discussions with President Kennedy. In the joint *communique* issued on 13 July, the bilateral pact of 5 March 1959, was reiterated. The USA assured Pakistan, that it regarded the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan as vital to American national interest and to world peace. Pakistan reaffirmed the value of the then existing collective security arrangements. Pakistan also obtained more American arms. The *Starfighters* arrived on board an American aircraft carrier in September 1961.

But the Pakistani leadership was not totally satisfied with the new alignment of forces. While retaining its links with the West it also tried to come closer to the USSR and China. In the initial phase Pakistan began to cultivate economic ties with the USSR. An agreement was signed between them, on 4 March 1961, under which the Soviet Union agreed to loan $ 30 million for oil survey, exploration and development projects in Pakistan. The agreement was signed by Mr Bhutto who was the then Pakistani Minister for Oil, Gas and Natural Resources. The repayment of the Soviet loan was to be made in Pakistani rupees which were to be utilized by the Soviet Union for the purchase of Pakistani goods.

Even though Soviet-Pakistan relations showed a steady progress, it did not compare with the marked rapprochement between Pakistan and China. The two came very close to each other, especially after the Sino-Indian border clashes in 1962. Pakistan even went ahead and agreed to the demarcation of the Sino-Indian boundary in the Pakistan-occupied

Kashmir, for which it had no legal rights. A trade agreement was signed between the two on 4 January 1963. On 29 August 1963, it signed an air-agreement with China. Though the Americans were deeply hurt with that 'unfortunate breach in the free-world solidarity' Pakistan continued to follow a pro-Peking policy. Chou En-lai visited Pakistan in February 1964. Chinese also began to support the Pakistani stand on the Kashmir issue.

President Ayub Khan, in a Press conference on 21 February 1964, commented that the CENTO had not been able to ensure Pakistan's security (*vis-a-vis* India).[16] But the multi-lateral approach to foreign policy which was initiated by Pakistan in 1961–62 did not mean that it was planning to leave either the CENTO or the SEATO. For one thing, till that time, Pakistan was totally dependent upon the USA for its war material. Pakistan was also useful to the Americans in view of the change-over to the new system (SLBM) based upon *Polaris* missiles and the nuclear powered submarines. Karachi harbour assumed great strategic significance. It was probably the best harbour open to the Americans in the Arabian Sea at that time. The rest were either closed to the West or were under partial or total British control. No wonder the biggest CENTO naval exercise was held near Karachi in November 1963.

Pakistan's anger and the disenchantment with the West, which had begun in 1959, was accentuated still further, following the spontaneous pro-Indian reactions in the West, after the Sino-Indian border conflict of October 1962. The Indian request for military equipment was met with a round-the-clock air-lift. Indians had promised that those equipments would be used only against Chinese and had even offered facilities to observe and review the use to which they were being put. Such an assurance should have satisfied the Pakistanis if they were interested in a friendly India.

Apart from the equipment suitable for mountain warfare the other important item supplied by the West was the mobile radar system which was requested by India in view of the threat from the superior Chinese air force. Such mobile radar units were essential till India's permanent radar network, covering that area became fully operational. It was estimated to take two years. The West also agreed to train Indians in operating the radars. A combined air exercise (*Shiksha*) was successfully completed by the end of 1963. Rumours that India was seeking an 'air umbrella' or that India had agreed to the establishment of foreign air-bases in India, were firmly denied by Prime Minister Nehru in the Lok Sabha on 21 February 1963.

Western military aid to India after 1962 was discussed in the CENTO. Mr Bhutto, who was the Chairman of the CENTO Foreign Ministers' Council Meeting, held in Karachi from 30 April to 1 May 1963, tried to raise the issue. Dean Rusk, who was present as an observer, intervened to say that Pakistan ought not to object to it, because the USA had paid more than $9 billion to the three CENTO members during the period 1954–1963,

and Pakistan had received $3 billion out of it. It is said that the US aid to Pakistan declined to some extent after 1963. Not the growing US interest in India, but Pakistan's flirtation with China, which, during that period, had emerged as a potential threat to America, was mainly responsible for it. However, India's partial dependence upon Western aid, during those crucial years, did influence Indian reactions to the entry of the American task force in the Indian Ocean in 1964.

2

The New Ocean Strategy

EVOLUTION OF THE NEW WEAPON SYSTEM

THE NEW WEAPON system, based upon nuclear propulsion and SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile), which influenced the global strategy of the Super Powers in 1960s, and which would continue to influence it till a new weapon system replaces it, took almost a decade to attain the necessary perfection and sophistication. The need to hide the missiles and the launching platform in the wide ocean was felt, following the stalemate in the manned bombers and the land-based ICBM weapon systems. But the new programme faced challenges, both of a technical nature and those arising from inter-services rivalries. In the earlier phase, *ad hoc* arrangements were made and the then existing weapons were modified and geared to suit the new strategy. It was only by the middle of the 1960s that the new weapon system was perfected.

The USA, in order to attain naval superiority, went ahead with the programme of nuclear propulsion for surface vessels, as well as for submarines, and simultaneously began to experiment with guided missiles fired from naval vessels. By 1954 the USA was able to arm a few cruisers and destroyers with surface-to-air guided missiles (*Terrier* and *Tartar* missiles). A few cruisers were also armed with the *Regulus*, a surface-to-surface guided missile. The *Regulus* was a cruise missile with a sub-sonic speed of Mach 0.87 and a range of about 575 miles. It could be armed with a nuclear warhead. Other vessels were equipped with the *Talos*, an anti-aircraft missile which had a range of 65 miles and could carry a nuclear warhead. The Soviets had not as yet started a programme of naval modernization.

The USA also went ahead with the nuclear propulsion programme. The first nuclear-powered submarine, the *Nautilus*, was ready by 1955. It,

however, carried conventional armaments like torpedo-tubes. The 1956 naval appropriation provided for a nuclear-powered submarine which could launch the *Regulus* missile. The *Regulus* had the big disadvantage that it could not be submerged-launched. They were stored in water-tight steel hangars on the deck of the submarine and could be launched from the ramp fitted on the deck only after the submarine had surfaced. It was not very satisfactory but served as a stop-gap arrangement till the submerged-launched *Polaris* missile could be perfected. The early version of the *Polaris* missile (*A-1*) became operational by July 1960. During those five years, the USA maintained the lead over the USSR not only in the missile-firing surface vessels and submarines, but also in the nuclear propulsion programme.

The Soviet navy was not equipped with guided missiles in 1954–55, even though the Soviet vessels were newly constructed and carried modern electronic equipments. By 1960-61 the Soviet navy had entered the missile age on a modest scale. Some of its cruisers and destroyers were equipped with surface-to-air and surface-to-surface guided missiles. Also, some of its conventionally-powered submarines were converted to launch cruise missiles similar to the American *Regulus*. Others carried a limited number of missiles, from three to six, in the enlarged coning towers of the modified conventional *G-class* and *Z-class* submarines. There were no indications that the Soviets had many nuclear-powered submarines by that time, though it was reported that three or four were ready and two more were being completed.

The Soviets were also experimenting with nuclear propulsion for surface vessels. The Soviet ice-breaker, *Lenin*, launched in 1957, and completed in September 1959, was the world's first nuclear-powered surface vessel. But the Soviet navy has not used the principle of nuclear propulsion for its surface vessels as yet. It is rather surprising, because such a change-over would greatly help the Soviets in maintaining ocean-fleets in far-away corners without depending upon shore facilities.

During the first half of the 1960s, the USA had maintained its lead in all the three systems : nuclear propulsion, guided missiles, and submerged-launching of these missiles. It was able to launch the *Polaris* missile in July 1960. During the next five years, it accelerated its efforts to manufacture nuclear-powered submarines, to equip them with the SLBMs (the *Polaris* missiles) and to create a nucleus of nuclear-powered task force of surface vessels. Experiments were also conducted to improve the performance of the *Polaris* missile. Spectacular results were obtained within a short span of two to three years. The range of the *Polaris A-1* was 1200 nautical miles, that of *A-2* was 1725 nautical miles, and of *A-3*; 2500 nautical miles.[1] All of them were capable of submerged-launching and carried nuclear warheads.

These SLBMs were fitted into three different classes of nuclear submarines. *Polaris A-1* was installed in the *George Washington* class nuclear

submarines, which were laid in 1957 and were completed by 1960. *Polaris A-2* was installed in the *Ethan Allen* class. They were laid in 1959 and completed by 1962. Five submarines of each of these classes were constructed. *Polaris A-2* and *A-3* were installed in the *Lafayette* class submarines. Construction of this class of submarine began in 1961, and nineteen of these were ready by 1964. About thirty-one submarines of this class were ordered, thus taking the total of the *Polaris* submarines to forty-one. Each of these submarines carried sixteen missiles. One can only shudder at the dangerous lethality represented in the weapon system represented by the *Polaris* submarines. These submarines had started operating in the Atlantic by 1961–62. It was announced on 10 September 1962, that a *Polaris* submarine base would be established in the Guam islands in the Pacific. By 1964–65, these submarines began to operate all over the world.

By 1964–65, the Soviet Union too had embarked on the nuclear-powered submarine and SLBM programme. It had been able to construct more than thirty of these submarines. It also modified many of its conventional submarines to carry *Polaris* or *Regulus* type guided missiles. The Soviet Union had also equipped many of its surface vessels with guided missiles. But these were lop-sided developments. The Soviet navy had not attained the capability to operate on the high seas independently. Till 1960, the Soviet naval strategy was shore-based. It is rather interesting that during the period 1960–61 the Soviet Union which had more than 400 submarines, 28 cruisers, and about 500 destroyers and frigates, had only a few supply ships and only about 17 oilers. It was a good indication of the shore-based naval strategy of the Soviet Union. By 1964–65 one could perceive a notable change. The threat from the *Polaris* missiles and soviet Union's increasing global commitments, commensurate with its Super Power status, brought about a change in the Soviet naval strategy. It was no longer shore-based. The Soviet navy began to think in terms of operating ocean fleets, capable of being maintained in far-away places without depending upon base facilities, either at home or abroad. The Soviets were taking a leaf from American naval strategy. One indication of such a change was the sudden increase, within a period of five years, of the number of supply ships to 20 and of the oilers to 50. The Soviet Navy increased its capacity to operate ocean fleets still further with the passage of time.

But in this respect the Americans were one step ahead of the Soviets. While the Soviets were busy increasing the number of their traditional logistic vessels, like oilers and supply vessels, which are necessary for the maintenance of an ocean fleet, Americans were experimenting with nuclear propulsion for their surface vessels also. Such a change would make nuclear-powered surface vessels, as also nuclear-powered submarines, independent of supply-base restrictions, whether the base be in a port, or a rendezvous on the high seas. It would also do away with the need to depend

upon oilers, a serious restriction for the conventionally-powered vessels.

The USA began the construction of nuclear-powered surface vessels in December 1957 when the keel of the cruiser *Long Beach* was laid. The ship was completed in September 1961. The *Long Beach* was equipped to carry *Regulus* missiles. There were also plans to equip it with six *Polaris* missiles. Work on the aircraft-carrier *Enterprise* started in February 1958. It was completed by the end of December 1961. Construction of the destroyer-leader (frigate) *Bainbridge* began in May 1959. It was ready by November 1962. The same year, work on another frigate, *Truxton*, was started. It was completed by June 1967. These nuclear-powered surface vessels, armed with the most modern weapons and having an unlimited range even at high speeds, made the surface vessels also independent of base facilities. These new ships could now operate independently or in cooperation with the nuclear-powered *Polaris* submarines or hunter-killer submarines in any place, at any time and without depending upon the logistic vessels like oil-tankers.

Their mobility was demonstrated very clearly during the *Operation Sea Orbit* of 1964. On 31 July 1964, the three nuclear-powered surface vessels, *Enterprise*, *Long Beach* and *Bainbridge* (it was not revealed if they were accompanied by nuclear submarines which can also maintain a continuous high speed even when submerged) started on a long cruise of 30,500 miles from the Mediterranean to the USA. They circled Africa via the Cape of Good Hope, touched Karachi briefly while crossing the Indian Ocean, proceeded to Australia, and went around the Cape Horn in South America to reach Norfolk, USA, after 57 days. The US task force had maintained a continuous high speed, in excess of twenty knots, and had completed the entire cruise without any logistic support. The navy had demonstrated that it had attained near-perfection in independence, mobility and striking power.

The entry of the US navy into the Indian Ocean in 1964 coincided with the perfection of the new weapon system based upon nuclear propulsion and submerged-launched ballistic missile. The Arabian Sea littoral, which till then had the strategic advantage of being a beach-head on the southern-flank of the Soviet Union, now became the shore-line whose control became important to dominate not only the beach-head but, what was more important than that, the ocean itself which had become the base of operations of the *Polaris* submarines. Also, the USSR had to be denied the means whereby it could neutralize the US naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Thus, the whole East-West conflict changed its basic character. The control of the sea became more important than the control of the southern-flank of the USSR. A whole new set of diplomatic moves were initiated to implement the new naval strategy which had been made possible, thanks to the perfection of the new weapon system that permitted the navy to pose the new strategic deterrence.

AMERICAN NAVY AND THE INDIAN OCEAN

Entry of the US Task Force

It was reported in December 1963, that the USA had decided to send a part of its Seventh Fleet operating in the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. The US task force was supposed to move into these waters in March 1964, the avowed aim being to confront China. Earlier, during the Sino-Indian conflict of October 1962, a part of the US Seventh Fleet had been ordered to move into the Bay of Bengal, but before it could cross the Straits of Malacca, the conflict had ended and the Fleet was recalled. The decision to form a separate Indian Ocean Command was taken during October-November 1963, following the successful tests of the long-range *Polaris A-3* missiles in October 1963. General Maxwell Taylor (the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of the Staff) who was visiting India told newsmen at the Palam airport, New Delhi, on 19 December 1963, that the US task force might comprise one aircraft carrier, two or three destroyers and one oil tanker. He also told them that the task force would be independent and would not need any port facilities.

The official entry of the US fleet in the Indian Ocean, caused anxiety among some circles in India. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, in a statement in the Lok Sabha, on 19 December 1963, said, "All that we need to say today is that outside the territorial waters of India, the Ocean is naturally open to them as to the naval vessels of any other country." When asked by a Member of Parliament whether or not the Government would protest against the American presence in the Indian Ocean, Nehru laconically replied, "If the thing is obviously to our detriment, we protest. If it is not, we do not." On 13 April 1964, when the US task force was cruising in the area, Nehru, while speaking in the Indian Parliament, expressed regret, that ships armed with nuclear weapons should "wander about in the Indian Ocean". But he did not agree with some members that India should lodge a protest against it. At the same time, he told Parliament that India would not allow the ships of the US fleet to enter its territorial waters.

The US task force, named the 'Concord Squadron', entered the Indian Ocean on 5 April 1964. It was composed of the aircraft-carrier *Bon Homme Richard,* four destroyers and one fleet tanker. *Bon Homme Richard,* an improved *Essex* class aircraft-carrier, was of 33,100 tons standard displacement. Apart from the aircraft operating from its flight deck, it also carried long-range *Regulus* guided missiles, armed with nuclear warhead. It is not known whether the task force was accompanied by nuclear-powered submarines.

The task force spent about six weeks in the area. The first port of call was Diego Suarez in Madagascar. The force, subsequently, steamed north along the East African coast and then eastward towards the Gulf of Oman. While the US task force was steaming in the East African coast, the USA was carrying on military manoeuvres in cooperation with Iran. *Operation*

Dilawar, which lasted three days, began on 13 April 1964. It included the landing of 2,300 US troops of the 101st Airborne Division who came all the way from the USA and were parachuted from big transport aircraft into the Dezful area in south-west Iran. Simultaneously, two US destroyers and a converted sea-plane tender, based in Bahrain and representing the American naval presence in the Persian Gulf, launched an amphibious landing on the strategic Kharg island on the Persian Gulf coast, which is also a vital oil-port for Iran. In all, 6,800 US armed forces personnel and 124 aircraft took part in these exercises. Earlier, in November 1963, the CENTO naval exercise, Midlink, had been held off Karachi in which the US aircraft-carrier, *USS Essex*, submarines and other vessels had taken part. The aim of that exercise was to defend a ship convoy against submarine and air attacks. The US submarine, *Ghazi*, was loaned to Pakistan after that.

The entry of the US fleet as a permanent feature in the Indian Ocean, radically altered the balance of power in this otherwise quiet area. Till then, the British Navy was the most powerful naval force in the area. But, the British presence was gradually declining and local Powers like India, Indonesia and Pakistan were straining their resources to have a viable naval presence. There was practically no Soviet naval presence in the area till 1964. One major factor which prompted the USA to send its naval fleet in the Indian Ocean in 1964, was to secure that area for the use of its *Polaris* submarines. These submarines operating from the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal could cover a substantial part of the Soviet Union and the whole of China. Thus, under these circumstances, the entry of the US fleet only helped in increasing the Cold War tensions in the Indian Ocean area.

It is still not known whether the entry of the American fleet was an independent decision, or was related to the British policy of partial withdrawal from the east of the Suez. There are, however, reasons to believe that Great Britain, USA and Australia had chalked out a long-term strategy to regroup their forces from the littoral into the depth of the Indian Ocean, a retreat necessary in the light of the changing weapon systems and the nature of the strategic deterrence posed by it.

The British influence in Australia had continued to decline since the Second World War, when Australia and New Zealand had come closer to another Pacific Power, the USA. It had led to the creation of the ANZUS group. With the growing importance of the Indian Ocean area in the American global strategy, the unique position of Australia, as the connecting link between the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean, became obvious. It offered another advantage. Australia helped the USA in circumventing the trouble-spots in South-East Asia. The construction of a US radio communication station costing $75 million in north-western Australia, at a point 700 miles north of Perth, began in 1963. It was scheduled to operate from 1966. This American base has proved useful for the American sub-

marines operating in eastern Indian Ocean and provides a link with the American communication base at Asmara in Ethiopia which was useful to direct submarine operations in the western Indian Ocean and in the Arabian Sea. The proposed communication base, at Diego Garcia, would strengthen the American capacity for submarine operations in the Indian Ocean still further and may even reduce America's dependence upon its base at Asmara.

During the same period, Great Britain and USA helped in modernizing and augmenting the military strength and capability of Australia. During the 1960s the Australian Navy was strengthened by the addition of four submarines, three guided-missile destroyers armed with *Tartar* anti-aircraft guided missiles and *Ikara* anti-submarine missiles, fleet oiler and supply ship. The aircraft-carrier *Melbourne* was also fitted with better anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters. The other aircraft-carrier *Sydney* was modernised to act as a fast transport. It could also double up as a commando ship and its helicopters could be used for anti-submarine operations. Thus, within a short period, the Australian naval strength was increased beyond all proportions. During that period, Australia also modernized its Air Force with the purchase and, subsequently, local construction of the French *Mirage III* fighter-bomber and the Italian *Macchi MB-326* jet trainers, which can be easily modified for ground attack role.

While the USA was busy consolidating its position in Australia, it also went ahead with negotiations with Great Britain for the establishment of the strategic communication bases in the middle of Indian Ocean. An agreement to that effect was reached between Great Britain and America in 1965.[2] The British Secretary of State for Colonies, Anthony Greenwood, had hinted at that arrangement in the British Parliament on 10 November 1965. The British Government had already taken the precaution of isolating the group of under-populated Indian Ocean islands, by carving out a new colony called the British Indian Ocean Territory. The new colony consists of the Chagos Archipelago, earlier administered from Mauritius, and the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches. These islands were previously under the control of the Seychelles Administration. Mauritius and the Seychelles were paid nominal compensation of about $63 million, when these islands were taken away from them. That, however, did not mitigate criticism of British imperial highhandedness either in those islands or elsewhere. The 24-Nation UN Committee on Colonial Affairs condemned the British policy in Diego Garcia in March 1966.

The strategic importance of Diego Garcia was crucial for the West, in the light of the new Ocean strategy, and the international opposition was too mild to thwart the establishment of the Anglo-American base there. It was reported that the base would cost approximately $19 million and would be manned by 250 naval personnel.[3] The cost as well as the personnel have been underestimated. The old bases at Asmara or the one in

Australia had cost much more and are manned by personnel whose numbers run into thousands. If Diego Garcia has to replace the Asmara base it would require more money and personnel than suggested by the Western experts. The construction of the base was delayed by about five years, and it was expected to be ready by 1973. There were also plans to construct a staging base at Aldabra island but financial difficulties came in the way and the decision was postponed in 1967. It was subsequently announced on 14 August 1971, that the island was leased to the British Royal Society till 1985, to conduct research and to preserve the unique wild life in that island.

As things stand today, Diego Garcia would remain the main Anglo-American base in the Indian Ocean area for some time to come. It is the largest island in the Chagos Archipelago. A V-shaped island, 13 miles long and 5 miles wide, it has landing facilities for aircraft. It also possesses a good natural harbour. In fact, the island was used as a naval base during the Second World War. It commands the Indian Ocean area from Australia in the east to Madagascar in the west and India in the north. It would be the natural hub of the subsidiary Western bases in the Indian Ocean area like Asmara in Ethiopia, Masirah in the Arabian Sea, Gan in the Maldive islands, Vacoas base in Mauritius, Mahe in the Seychelles group of islands, the Simons Town in South Africa, and the Cockburn Sound and other bases in Australia. The new regrouping of the naval bases in the deep seas and on the littoral of the Indian Ocean, reflects the new political and military moves to implement the new naval strategy of the Western bloc in the area.

US Policy—Post-1964 Period

The American involvement in the Indian Ocean area after 1964 was in keeping with its increasing strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and the diminishing interests in its littoral. The American strategic interests in the area underwent a significant qualitative change. Earlier, during the first and the second phase of the Cold War confrontation, which was based upon the weapon systems demanding control of the land frontier and the air-space, the littoral was a beach-head against the land-mass of the Communist bloc. Since 1964, with the introduction of the *Polaris* submarines, the littoral became a base to control the sea and to preserve American naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean.

For the earlier objective it was necessary for the USA, that the USSR did not establish its presence in areas from where it could out-flank the land-based Western defence system. That partly explained the American anxiety at the growing Soviet influence in countries like Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Indonesia. But, after 1964, the USA was not deeply perturbed, even about the detente between the USSR and the CENTO Powers, as long as the American naval presence in the Indian Ocean was not threatened. Though the USA continued to maintain its interests in Ethiopia, Iran and

Pakistan, it was not depending primarily upon these local states for its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. It had already evolved an alternative system in collaboration with Australia and Great Britain, and was relying more upon its capability to maintain an independent ocean fleet and upon its island bases deep in the Indian Ocean to maintain a naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

The new strategy did not mean that the USA had given up its interests in the region. Far from it. The USA was too deeply committed economically and politically to leave the area to the Soviet Union. It had its oil interests and also a string of pro-US regimes to protect. Consequently a new policy was evolved, which was designed to limit the American commitments in the area and at the same time to protect its local interests. The new policy can be broadly studied under two headings : the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), and the Islamic Alliance system.

The RCD was created in July 1964. Its creation on the eve of the debut of the US Fleet in the Indian Ocean, may be an interesting coincidence, but the emphasis upon economic collaboration rather than upon military alliance and America's persuasion for such a shift, can be explained in terms of the lessening American dependence upon the northern tier for its policy of military containment of the Soviet Union. The RCD was a tripartite arrangement, formalized at the meeting of the heads of the state of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan at Ankara in July 1964. The RCD's Ministerial Council, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries, is the highest decision-making body. Recommendations are made by the Regional Planning Council and the day-to-day administration is entrust- to the RCD Secretariat which has its headquarters at Tehran. The RCD aims at pooling the resources of these three countries, under a regional economic development programme, as well as bringing about a greater solidarity among its members by initiating projects which have a long-term impact.

Such a policy would have proved very fruitful if the RCD would have expanded to include other local powers also. But, instead of being a force designed to bring about a better regional understanding, the RCD has further isolated the three CENTO members from other countries of the region. No Arab state is a member of that organization. The result is that the RCD scheme has led to a permanent division of the West Asian countries into two blocs; Arab and non-Arab. Such a division may suit some foreign powers, but surely it cannot be in the interest of the political and socio-economic regional integration of West Asia.

The RCD has initiated several projects in the sphere of transport and communication, insurance, joint industrial ventures, technical assistance and cultural cooperation. Joint shipping services have been established, and an air-agreement between the international air companies of Pakistan and Iran (PIA and IRANAIR) has been reached. Road and railway links between the three countries have been improved. Fifty-two joint industrial

projects were approved and some of them have already been established. Efforts are being made to promote inter-regional trade and to plan a cultural integration. But one doubts whether efforts at integration by these three countries which have different political, economic and cultural backgrounds would really lead to worthwhile results especially if they choose to isolate themselves from their close neighbours. It is common knowledge that Iran's trade with India is much more than its combined trade with its RCD partners. Also, Iran, as an oil producing and exporting country, has interest more in common with the oil producing Arab countries of West Asia than with Pakistan. Turkey, with its European orientation, has hardly anything in common with a South Asian state like Pakistan. Maybe Pakistan, after 1971, would like to merge its identity with the RCD countries but it is doubtful if it would prove an asset and not a liability to them. It still remains to be seen how the RCD reacts to the new change in the sub-Himalayan region.

The other move sponsored by the USA in West Asia and North Africa, and designed to diffuse the political implication of the CENTO, was to bring all the pro-US regimes under one grouping. An effort in that direction had been made earlier in 1957, when the Eisenhower Doctrine was propounded. Several non-CENTO states in the region had shown their willingness to accept the new US lead. But the Eisenhower Doctrine suffered from a serious drawback. It carried the stigma of being 'foreign-sponsored'. An attempt was, therefore, made to give a local colour to the new regrouping. By 1965-66 it had become popular under the name of the Islamic Alliance. In fact, it was not an alliance in the strict sense of the term, but only a grouping of the pro-Western and the conservative states in the region which also happen to be Islamic.

The regrouping included all the local CENTO members as well as the pro-American Arab states. Saudi Arabia is credited with the initiative in forming such an alliance, which probably explains the emphasis upon the word 'Islamic'. King Faisal, in his Press conference in Amman, on 1 February 1966, is reported to have urged upon the Arabs to declare themselves against atheism. As the custodian of the Holy Places, he probably had every right to safeguard the religious interests of the Islamic people. But the new alliance was designed not so much to protect Islam from atheism, as to regroup the local conservative as well as pro-Western states against the immediate threat from the 'radical' Arab states like Egypt, Syria and Iraq and from the growing Soviet influence in the area. The Saudi-Egyptian confrontation in Yemen was another reason which prompted King Faisal to create that group to isolate Nasser in West Asia.

The new grouping can be said to have been established after Faisal's visit to Iran, in December 1965. A communique was issued, which invited all Moslem countries to a conference in order to further the unity of views and the defence of the common interests of the countries concerned. Earlier, in September 1965, King Hussein of Jordan had visited Tehran.

King Faisal visited Jordan in January-February 1966, for further discussions on the formation of the new group. He also visited Pakistan in April 1966 and Turkey, Morocco, Guinea, Mali and Tunisia in August-September 1966. In June 1966, the Shah of Iran visited Morocco, and King Hasan II returned the visit in August of the same year. Most of these countries enthusiastically supported the idea of the Islamic Alliance. Mali was probably an exception. President Sekou Toure, while welcoming King Faisal on 12 September, said, "In the present phase of world history a good Moslem can only be a revolutionary." One wonders if that definition of a good Moslem was appreciated by King Faisal.

The Islamic Alliance was designed, neither as a military alliance nor as a permanent political forum. It was conceived of as a group of Islamic countries, especially those countries which were pro-Western and anti-Communist, who could use the slogan of Islamic solidarity to check the growing influence of the local 'radical' leaders as well as the growing Soviet presence in the area. It was also used as a rallying ground by the Arabs against Israel and by Pakistan against India. Though the USA was not directly involved in it and could even detach itself from direct political participation in the affairs of the region, it could depend upon the Alliance to preserve its interests in West Asia—interests which revolved around two themes: first, the safeguard of the oil investments and secondly, the political containment of the growing Soviet and, to some extent, Chinese influence in the region.

The USA was never deeply involved in African affairs and it was easy for it to maintain its isolation. The USA did not have great stakes in the Indian Ocean littoral of Africa, at any rate, nothing to compare with its interests in West Asia or in Australia. Africa, was treated by the USA as a low-priority area till the end of the 1950s. Undoubtedly, there were isolated American interests in the area but

> ...the United States had thus far failed to develop any overall policy which could compare in breadth and dynamism with those it had devised in other parts of the world. Africa had been regarded in Washington as essentially a responsibility of the European Powers, to whom the United States might give advice on occasions but whom it could not and did not wish to supplant.[4]

The USA did not have any serious economic or military aid programme in Africa in the 1950s. The total US aid programme for the sub-Saharan area for the year 1960, was only $25 million, which was about 1.5 per cent of the total US economic aid programme of $2,175 million. Even that little amount was distributed mostly among three countries; Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia. These aid programmes benefited Ethiopia most. The American aid to Ethiopia started in 1953, following the agreement on the communication base. Somalia was covered in 1954 and Sudan in 1958. Small American aid to East Africa was directed through the British Colonial Office.

A new look at Africa was attempted during the Kennedy Administration. Assistant Secretary of State, G. Mennen Williams, while on a visit to Africa, commented in a dinner speech in Addis Ababa, on 17 February 1961 : "The verdict of history in Africa, if it is not yet fully spelled out, is unmistakable and irrevocable. The old colonial era is dead, and with it the old power relationship by which the world was formerly shaped."[5] He was also reported to have endorsed at a Press conference at Nairobi on 20 February, American support for the policy of 'Africa for the Africans'. The British and other 'white' settlers in Africa protested against such a statement and subsequently Williams had to modify his definition of Africans to include all those who live in Africa.

During that period, the USA also reacted sharply to the policy of apartheid pursued by South Africa. The American representative in the UN, Adlai Stevenson, declared on 2 August 1963, during the Security Council debate on the South African question, that the USA would impose a ban on arms shipment to South Africa. The ban was subsequently put into effect and hardly any US war material was directly sold to South Africa. But, in dealing with the race-conscious Africans, the United States faced a special difficulty in the fact that its own racial practices fell considerably short of the ideal of human equality proclaimed in its foreign relations. In other fields also, the USA, because of its close links with European Powers, could not compete with its rivals, the Communist countries, in denouncing colonialism, racial discrimination and exploitation of every kind. It was most unfortunate for the American policy-makers that the Africans demanded such total commitments from their 'friends' !

Till 1960, the Indian Ocean littoral of Africa had not emerged as a crisis area where the Super Powers could compete for their influence. The situation, however, has changed since then. During the first half of the 1960s the north-eastern corner known as the Horn of Africa which includes Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya became involved in border troubles. By the middle of the 1960s, the southern African coast also became a crisis area. The complex intermixing of the Rhodesian crisis, the policy of apartheid, national liberation movements in southern African States, the radical regime in Tanzania and the growing Chinese influence there, created a highly explosive situation.

In that area South Africa has the capacity as well as the capability to play a leading pro-Western part. The USA, caught between the need to have some sort of western presence in southern Africa and the difficulty of reconciling it with its pan-African policy, is faced with a very difficult situation. South Africa plays a very important role in the Western naval strategy. It commands the South Atlantic Ocean and the Western Indian Ocean. Australia and South Africa are the two most powerful local supporters of the Western bloc in the Indian Ocean. The strategic advantages offered by South Africa and the political disadvantages flowing from an open pro-South African policy were discussed by the US Assistant

Secretary of State for Africa, G. Mennen Williams, on 1 March 1966, before the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on South Africa. The balance sheet as suggested by him was: "In scientific, economic and strategic respects our bilateral relationship with South Africa are useful to us—even in some fields important—but they are not essential to our national security."[6]

American interests in South Africa can be broadly divided into two parts : strategic and economic. The sea-route via the Cape of Good Hope is of vital strategic importance for America, more so after the closure of the Suez Canal since June 1967. The route is used not only by American naval vessels but also by its maritime vessels, including bulk carriers and huge oil tankers. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for the African Region, William E. Lang, testifying before the Sub-Committee of the House of Representatives on 8 March 1966,[7] said that the harbour facilities, where major naval vessels could dock and undergo repairs in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, were available only in South Africa. Also, the port facilities in Cape Town permitted the US vessels, moving from the Atlantic to the Pacific or to the Indian Ocean, to operate without depending upon American oil tankers or supply vessels. A situation did arise in May 1965, when the US aircraft carrier, *Independence*, had to rely upon an oil tanker when it was denied port facilities in Cape Town. The South African Government at that time took the position that only the white crew could land at the port. The USA rejected it and sent the oil tanker to refuel *Independence*. But, according to Lang, US vessels have been docking at the South African ports, even when they carry a mixed crew, and no objections are raised by either side. Lang even suggested that it was in the mutual interests of the USA, as well as of South Africa that those "strategic facilities be available to the free world."

Another reason why the USA would like to maintain friendship with South Africa is that it is the most powerful local state in the region. The South African naval capacity has been greatly strengthened recently by the addition of three *Daphne* class submarines and three *Whitby* class anti-submarine frigates, carrying *Wasp* anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters. Two *W*-class destroyers have also been modernized for anti-submarine warfare and are equipped to carry two *Wasp* ASW helicopters each. One squadron of *Buccaneer* light jet bombers has been added for long-range strikes on the high seas. South Africa also possesses seven *Shackleton* maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The South African Government continues to add to its military capacity by purchasing and even manufacturing jet aircraft like the *Mirage III* and the *Macchi* jet trainer, which can be modified to carry weapons. South Africa, thus possesses a sizable navy and airforce which, it claims, is ready to support the West against the communist threat. It is also true, that the new weapons enhance the South African capability to carry out anti-insurrectionary campaign in and around

Southern Africa and to intimidate its African neighbours.

South Africa is also a major source of raw materials for the Western bloc. Some of these, like industrial diamond, chrome, asbestos, platinum, and uranium oxide, have great strategic significance. The USA was getting the South African uranium under an agreement signed in 1950. The contract was to end in 1966. The USA found an alternative source of uranium supply and it is believed that the contract was not renewed. South Africa also produces gold in large quantities. It is reported that almost 60 per cent of the gold sold in the non-communist world, is mined in South Africa. The total world production of gold in 1964 was reported to be worth $1,406 million. Out of that about $1,018 million worth of gold was produced in South Africa. As long as gold remains the basis of the American dollar, the South African gold would continue to influence the US-South African relations.

The USA has also substantial business investments and trade relations with South Africa. It was reported that by 1964, the USA had invested about $650 million in South Africa. This was almost 28 per cent of its total investments in Africa which, at that time, amounted to about $2 billion. It should, however, be noted that though the US investments in South Africa did form such a large part of its African investment, it amounted to only one percent of its total world investments. Also, the US investments in South Africa were only 11 per cent of the total foreign investments in that country, which amounted to about $4.3 billion. Great Britain, with an investment of about $2.7 billion, had greater stake in South Africa than the USA. The USA also benefits from its trade with South Africa and enjoys a favourable annual balance of payment amounting to about $200 million. There is also a large American investment in Portuguese Africa.[8]

These are various strategic, political and economic considerations which restrain America from pursing an active anti-South Africa policy. No doubt, the US Government has condemned the policy of apartheid and has stopped the sale of military hardware to South Africa, but it is reluctant to go any further. It has not applied any economic sanctions despite great pressure from the Afro-Asian world. The US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, G. Mennen Williams, explaining the US stand before the Sub-Committee of the House of Representatives, on 1 March 1966, said :

> While cessation of investment might increase our credibility and influence with African countries in our efforts to encourage a non-violent solution, it would seriously handicap our ability to carry on a dialogue with South Africa. It would cause some damage to our own economic, scientific and strategic interests.[9]

The idea of a 'dialogue', however, does not carry much weight in the Afro-Asian countries, which tend to believe that the dialogue between the 'whites' should stop, and that a real dialogue should begin between the 'white regimes' in Southern Africa and the rest of the world. Till the

USA agrees to such a dialogue it might continue to gain strategic and economic benefits in South Africa, but would lose the political advantages in the rest of the Afro-Asian world.

The American position deteriorated, in South and South-East Asia, after 1964. The guarded pro-American sentiments which had developed in India, following the Anglo-American support to India during the Chinese attack, were overshadowed by the anti-American feelings following the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965. The failure of the Americans to check Pakistan from launching an attack on India with the help of American arms, and the subsequent American connivance, at diverting surplus American arms to Pakistan via Turkey and Iran, to make good the losses suffered by Pakistan, convinced many Indians that the USA, despite the growing pro-Peking and pro-Moscow trends in Pakistan, would continue to support that country against India. India in desperation began to develop its military strength with Soviet help. The Soviet presence began to be felt, not only in India but also in Pakistan, especially after the Tashkent Agreement. The Pakistanis began to get arms, not only from the Chinese but also from the Soviets. It was during that period, that Pakistan closed the American communication base at Peshawar.

The American image in the Indian subcontinent continued to deteriorate. It suffered another major setback in 1971, when the American Government supported Pakistan's genocide in Bangladesh, and attempted to rescue the Pakistani troops which had been trapped there, following the Indo-Pakistani conflict of December 1971. The USA not only lost the support of India, but also lost face in Pakistan because of its failure to help maintain the integrity of Pakistan, under the terms of March 1959 bi-lateral agreement. The American support was far less than what the Pakistanis had expected in the light of the US commitments under that treaty which stipulated that the USA would help in maintaining the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Once again, the Pakistani leaders are searching for friends among the Chinese and the Soviets, who would rescue them from the consequences of the 1971 debacle. The 1971 crisis in the Indian subcontinent has, however, offered two lessons—firstly, that the US Fleet can be used to intimidate the Indian Ocean littoral and, secondly, that it can be ineffective if the littoral states are determined to oppose such a revival of gun-boat diplomacy.

American presence in the South-East Asian littoral of the Indian Ocean remained low. The Americans were too deeply involved in the Pacific coast of Asia, as in China, Japan, Korea in the Far East and Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia in South-East Asia to get involved in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore also. Malaysia and Singapore were traditionally British preserves and it was Britain, with the help of Australia and New Zealand, that buttressed them against Indonesia during the confrontation. The decline in the power of President Sukarno and the emergence of a new leadership not only ended that artificially

created confrontation but also helped in bringing Malaysia and Indonesia closer. Indonesia is also not following the same anti-Western policy that it was pursuing during the days of President Sukarno. Indonesia today is much nearer to the Western bloc, than most of the non-aligned nations. This may indirectly help the USA in the coming decades. The USA has already started a massive economic aid programme to Indonesia.

Thus, the American regrouping in the Indian Ocean area in the post-1964 era, has not brought it extra advantages on land, but it has enabled it to spread its influence in the ocean. Today the USA has bases in Australia, Diego Garcia, Bahrain and Asmara and can seek base facilities in Pakistan Iran, South Africa, Mozambique and the chain of British island bases in the Indian Ocean. These facilities enable it to maintain its *Polaris* submarines in the Indian Ocean as a part of its global strategy. Such an American presence would *ipso facto* lead to the Soviet counter-presence. The Soviet fleet, in fact, entered the Indian Ocean in 1968.

THE BRITISH IMPERIAL RULE

The Last Post

The entry of the regular American naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and the new regrouping of the pro-Western powers in the area, manifested the final decline of the British Power in the area. Britain had lost a part of its empire in the first wave of decolonization in the 1940s. It lost practically all its colonies, except a few spots here and there, in the second wave in the 1960s. During that decade it withdrew, in one form or the other, from the Persian Gulf, Aden, East Africa and South Africa. Maladive and Mauritius also attained their independence. That process of decolonization, while it lasted, posed problems for Britain and, when it was over, started a rethinking, which finally led to the formulation of the 'East of the Suez' policy in the second half of the 1960s.

The first half of the sixties put serious strains on the already depleted economic and consequently military resources of Great Britain. The period witnessed successive bush-fire episodes in areas of British interest; and Great Britain, either as a self-appointed policeman or as a supporter of the ruling elite, had to intervene militarily in them. The first such major intervention was in Kuwait.

Anglo-Kuwaiti relations, which were governed by the Protectorate Treaty of 1899, were modified in 1961. The modification permitted Kuwait to have independent foreign and defence policies. However, under the new agreement, which was in the shape of an exchange of letters and was disclosed by the Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, on 19 June 1961, in the British Parliament, Britain continued to offer military protection to Kuwait. The new agreement could be terminated by either party after giving three years' notice. Following the signing of that agreement, Kuwait was recognized as an independent state by several countries. But Premier Abdel Karim Kassem of Iraq, refused to recognize Kuwaiti independence and, on

25 June claimed that historically Kuwait had been a part of the Ottoman Province of Basra, and Iraq, as the successor state, considered it as a part of Iraq. Iraqi troop movements were reported on 30 June, and the Sheikh of Kuwait invited Great Britain to intervene under the terms of the newly-signed agreement. Kuwait also requested Saudi Arabia to intervene on its behalf.

The British Government, which already maintained a substantial presence in the Persian Gulf and in the Arabian Sea, intervened on 1 July. The commando-cum-aircraft carrier, *Bulwark*, supported by smaller vessels and aircraft from Bahrain, helped in the landing of about six thousand British troops along with armour, artillery and aircraft in Kuwait. A small contingent from Saudi Arabia also joined to maintain the Arab presence. Beside *Bulwark*, two more aircraft-carrier, *Victorious* and *Centaur*, also joined in the show. British naval units from the Mediterranean and the Far East were rushed to the Persian Gulf. The show of strength was staged, not only to protect the Western oil interests in Kuwait but also to reassure other sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf of the British ability to come to their rescue. It had its effect upon Iraq also. Though Premier Kassem did not give up Iraq's claims, he began talking about using peaceful means to attain Iraq's objectives.

It was unfortunate for Iraq that no other Arab state supported its claims. Instead, Kuwait was admitted to the Arab League on 20 July despite the presence of British troops in that country. The Arab League States decided in August to send an Arab contingent to replace the British troops. Such a decision was in keeping the with the Arab League's Collective Security Pact. Saudi Arabia, UAR, Jordan, Sudan and Tunisia agreed to send troops to Kuwait. By September, a 3,300-strong Arab force was operating in Kuwait under the command of a Saudi Arabian. The Arab Force was composed of 1,200 troops each from Saudi Arabia and the UAR, 400 from Sudan, 300 from Jordan and 200 from Tunisia. Following the agreement with the Arab League, Kuwait requested the British Political Agent in the Persian Gulf, Sir William Luce, on 13 August, to withdraw the British troops from Kuwait. The replacement programme began on 19 September. British naval vessels also began to leave the area. British troops were withdrawn from Kuwait by 19 October. The UAR troops also withdrew during the same period. The Saudi Arabian and the Jordanian troops continued to be stationed in Kuwait till February 1963. With the passage of time the Iraqi regime gave up its claims over Kuwait. The overthrow of Kassem eased the matter considerably. The new Iraqi regime recognized Kuwait on 4 October 1963. Kuwait offered the new regime a loan of £ 30 million.

The British intervention in Kuwait was not only an effective military exercise, but also a successful political operation. Its success, military as well as political, depended upon two factors : an overwhelming military presence in the area, and lack of political opposition in the Arab world.

Such a situation was in marked contrast to the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958. The Soviet Union did try to condemn the British action in Kuwait during the debate in the Security Council but even the UAR, the most important Arab state and a close supporter of the USSR, did not support the Soviet stand. The UAR-Iraq rivalry and the huge oil royalties obtained by Kuwait, were the two factors which had guided the UAR policy, as also the over-all Arab policy during the Kuwaiti crisis. Projecting an Arab intervention to oust the British presence was also a useful experiment in filling the vacuum by local powers.

The British intervention in Kuwait and the lack of effective American help to Britain at that time came up for discussion in the British Parliament. It was pointed out by some Members of Parliament, that though American oil interests controlled 50 per cent of the Kuwaiti oil, the USA refrained from sharing the political and military responsibilities of the British intervention. They said that it was Great Britain which had to share all the blame, apart from the financial burden of the intervention. The feeling that Great Britain had to go single-handed to save even the non-British (American and Afro-Asian) interests, was one of the factors which subsequently strengthened the British arguments for initiating the East of the Suez policy in 1965-1966.

The British were very conscious of their role in the Indian Ocean in the first half of the 1960s. The British Defence White Paper of February 1962, emphasized the need for a British military presence in the oil-rich Persian Gulf so as to provide assistance to the local sheikhdoms with whom it had treaty relations. The White Paper emphasized the need not only to station land forces permanently in Aden and in the Gulf area, but also to maintain the capability of reinforcing and deploying them by air and an amphibious joint services task force. Earlier, Aden and the Persian Gulf area could be reinforced from the East African bases, but with the policy of decolonization of East Africa that support could not be relied upon. Hence, Aden had to be strengthened not only to support operations in the Persian Gulf, but also in East Africa, subsequent to the British withdrawal from there. Probably, such a contingency was foreseen. Britain had to directly intervene several times in East Africa, and indirectly in Rhodesia, after 1964. Aden was one of the bases from where those operations were launched. Aden was, therefore, strengthened militarily. Aircraft-carriers, commando ships and smaller escort vessels operating from Aden, proved very useful in the subsequent British naval operations in the Indian Ocean area till 1968, when the Aden base itself had to be relinquished.

To fulfil the new strategic role it was planned that Aden, which was a British colony, should be merged in the Aden protectorate. Such a policy had two apparent advantages. First, it was thought that if Aden could be included in the larger complex, its radical nationalists and the trade unionists could be submerged in the broad base of pro-British skeikhs

and sultans, who, not only had everything to fear from those radicals, but who depended upon Britain for their very survival. Secondly, Aden and two important strategic island groups, the Perim island in the Bab al-Mandeb and the Kuria Muria islands off the shores of Muscat and Oman, would be retained for use by Britain. Though the planning was far-sighted, it failed in its execution. Aden, instead of being submerged in the bigger protectorate, dominated it. The nationalist violence finally forced Great Britain, to vacate not only Aden but also the whole of the South Arabian coast-line.

In the context of the defence of the Indian Ocean, the British White Paper of 1962 also emphasized the British presence in South-East Asia. Its treaty commitments there were reinforced by the joint efforts of Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Great Britain had a defence treaty with Malaya. Singapore was its major naval base in South-East Asia. The British presence in that part of the Indian Ocean, was also strengthened by British presence in Hongkong. British presence in Malaya was further reinforced after December 1962, following the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. The 'Crush Malaysia' campaign of President Sukarno and attempts at infiltration kept the British and Australian forces busy till the confrontation ended in 1966.

While the British were busy in South-East Asia, they also had to intervene in East Africa. They were already maintaining troops in East Africa but it was announced by the East African Command Head quarters at Nairobi, on 11 November 1963, that the British troops would be withdrawn from the area within one year of the independence of those countries. It was announced that about 4,500 British troops would return to Britain, and three battalions of King's African Rifles, totalling about 3,000 officers and men, would be renamed the Military Forces of Kenya, and these would become the nucleus of the armed forces of independent Kenya. But before the British forces could be fully withdrawn or before those countries became fully independent, the British troops were invited to intervene there.

The trouble started in Tanganyika, when the soldiers of the First Battalion of Tanganyika Rifles stationed at Colito near Dar as-Salaam, revolted against their British and Tanganyikan officers on 20 January 1964. About thirty British officers and NCOs were taken to the airport and sent to Nairobi. It was also reported that the local soldiers went on a rampage in the city. The British frigate, *Rhyl*, was ordered to move from Zanzibar to Dar as-Salaam. The aircraft carrier *Centaur* left Aden with 21 aircraft and 1400 troops. Dr Nyerere asked his people to be calm. On 24 January, he formally requested the British Government to intervene. The *Centaur* landed troops the same day. Resistance was overcome swiftly and Dr Nyerere acknowledged, with deep gratitude, the help rendered by Britain.

The British Government was also asked to intervene in Uganda and

Kenya, during the same period. Following an unrest among the troops of Uganda Rifles at Jinja barracks near Lake Victoria, Dr Milton Obote requested Britain to intervene to help maintain law and order. About 450 British troops were air-lifted to Jinja and the local troops were disarmed the next day. In Kenya, the Eleventh Battalion of Kenya African Rifles revolted at Lenet. On 23 January, Kenyatta requested for help. British troops intervened and put down the local mutiny within a short time.

Those three interventions were successful because of three factors: the British naval presence in the area, support of the governments in power to such an intervention, and the local nature of the revolts. Though these revolts did not have a popular backing, they posed problems of law and order not only for the British Government, but also for the local rulers. Kenya and Uganda, which wanted a continuation of the British presence, signed defence agreements with Britain. Tanganyika, which was against it, sought the help of another African power to replace the British troops. Nigeria sent a battalion of its troops to Tanganyika. British air force planes, which air-lifted the Nigerian troops to Tanganyika, evacuated the British troops from there.

Though Britain had to leave Tanganyika or Tanzania, as it was called subsequently, it retained its influence in Kenya and Uganda. New defence agreements, signed between these two states and Great Britain in March 1964, stipulated that Britain would continue to train the local armed forces. In return, Britain acquired the overflying and staging rights and port facilities at Mombasa where the British Navy maintained a naval establishment. Britain also promised to give logistic support and technical aid to Kenya against the *shifta* raiders operating from Somalia in the Northern Frontier Area of Kenya, which was and still remains a disputed area between Kenya and Somalia. The British commitments in Kenya were naturally not appreciated by Somalia or its supporters.

Whereas the British intervention in Kuwait and East Africa were approved and to an extent even appreciated by the ruling elite the British involvement in Rhodesia following the UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) on 11 November 1965, proved to be a thankless job. Great Britain did call the UDI an illegal act and attempted to impose an economic sanction against Rhodesia, but the limited action neither delivered the goods nor satisfied the Afro-Asian countries, including those states which were friendly towards Great Britain. Most of them clamoured for an armed intervention in Rhodesia by Britain. Apart from the fact that the Smith regime in Rhodesia was a 'white' regime, and despite the strong pro-Rhodesian and pro-South African lobby in Great Britain, the latter, even if it had wanted, would not have been able to intervene effectively in Rhodesia on its own. First, unlike other local powers, Rhodesia, which was supported by South Africa and Portugal, militarily speaking, was not a weak or an isolated state. Secondly, unlike other countries in the area where British armed forces had intervened on the invitation of the ruling

elite, the ruling elite in Rhodesia would have strongly resisted such an intervention. Moreover, no neighbouring African country was strong enough to support the British intervention effectively. Dr Hastings Banda of Malawi, while speaking in the National Assembly on 9 November 1965, bluntly summarized the military position as follows. He said that if the Rhodesian Army was pushed, it could conquer the whole of East and Central Africa in a week. He also said that he had told Nkrumah and Balewa that no African army could rescue those African States.

While some African countries like Ghana clamoured for armed intervention, there were others which tried to settle the question by peaceful means or by the use of economic sanctions Among the economic sanctions the embargo imposed on oil was the most effective. When it was disclosed that South Africa and Portugal might help Rhodesia to by-pass the oil embargo by permitting their territories to be used as transit routes and supply points for Rhodesia, the British blockade was extended even to those areas. The UN Resolution of 7 April 1966 empowered Great Britain to use force, if necessary, to enforce oil embargo on Rhodesia. The British aircraft carrier, *Ark Royal*, and supporting vessels blockaded the coast of Mozambique and effectively prevented two oil tankers from discharging their cargo at Baira.

Apart from imposing an oil embargo, which did make some impact upon Rhodesia, Britain also helped to air-lift oil and oil-products to Zambia. It is reported that about 3.5 million gallons of oil was air-lifted to Zambia by the *Britannias,* operated by the British RAF Transport Command. The air-lift ended when adequate facilities by the over-land routes were made available. Apart from air-lifting oil to Zambia, Britain also stationed a squadron of *Javelin* fighters, with radar equipments, at Ndola, to give protection to the Kariba Dam. That was done at the request of President Kenneth Kaunda who had asked for British air protection on 26 November 1965. Those aircraft were recalled in August 1966, when Zambia felt that they were no longer needed. The whole operation was a heavy financial burden for Great Britain. The oil embargo operation alone, it is said, cost Britain about £8.5 million.

The Rhodesian question lingers on. The decision, not to intervene militarily but only to apply economic sanctions, diminished British prestige not only in East Africa but throughout the Afro-Asian world. But that was the maximum that Britain could do or would have done. No other power did any better. Ghana, which represented the radical African state and was one of the African states which broke off diplomatic relations with Great Britain following the UDI, issued a statement on 9 January 1966 on the eve of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference which was held at Lagos on 11-12 January. It said that Ghana believed that Britain had lost all control over the situation and was unwilling to take any steps by which its authority might be reasserted. Ghana insisted that it was time for those more determined and more

capable than Britain to take charge. It also said that Britain could not be entrusted with the task of overthrowing the Smith regime by armed force, and suggested that force should be applied by the African states, under the authority of the UN, and with the assistance of 'friendly nations'. If the African states, with the help of 'friendly nations' would had reasserted the British rule over Rhodesia by overthrowing the illegal regime of Mr Smith, I am sure, Great Britain would have been grateful to them.

British interests in South Africa were also severely strained during that period, on the question of apartheid and the sale of British arms to that country. On 14 November 1964, Dr Verwoerd threatened to discontinue the Simons Town Agreement if Great Britain decided to ban the supply of arms to South Africa. Great Britain was the traditional source of military supply for South Africa. The South African Government threatened to purchase its military hardware from other sources. Despite that threat from Verwoerd, and the concern in some circles in Great Britain about the loss of market in South Africa, Wilson announced in the House of Commons, on 17 November, that Britain would in future impose an embargo on arms sales to South Africa. On 20 January 1965, it was reported from London, that Great Britain had refused the permission to supply *Blood-hound* surface-to-air anti-aircraft guided missiles to South Africa. The total order was reported to be of the value of £60 million. The South African Defence Minister, Fouche, disclosed subsequently, that South Africa was going to place a large order with Britain for submarines, long-distance reconnaissance aircraft and other items of the value of £150 million. Eventually South Africa ordered some of those items from France.

The Simons Town naval base near Cape Town was of great strategic significance for Great Britain in the context of its naval role in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. That base not only controlled the Cape route but also dominated both the oceans. The Simons Town Agreement of 1955,[10] under which Britain retained overflight rights in South Africa and communication and dockyard facilities in the Simons Town naval base was, therefore, of great political and military significance for Great Britain. But the controversy over the question of British arms embargo, finally led to the withdrawal of the British presence from the base. Britain withdrew its naval vessels and the office of that Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, which was based in South Africa. The withdrawal, following an agreement in January 1967, was completed by April, and the South African Navy was entrusted with the task of the defence of the Cape route. One British officer was, however, retained in Cape Town to maintain an effective liaison between the British Navy and the South African Navy. Though the British naval vessels continue to dock at the South African base, Britain now tends to rely more upon the alternative bases in Maldive and Mauritius (or the proposed base at Diego Garcia) to maintain its presence in the western Indian Ocean.

Maldive plays an important part in the regrouping of the British naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The Maldive Archipelago, hardly 400 miles south-west of Ceylon, consists of about 2,000 small coral islands. Of them only about 215 are inhabited. Male, the capital, is only one mile wide and one and a half mile long island. The Sultanate of Maldive had been under British protection for more than 80 years. An airfield was established at Gan island during the Second World War. It was reactivated in 1957, and an agreement was signed in 1960 with the Sultan, which reaffirmed British responsibility for the defence and foreign affairs of that island. Britain also retained the right to use the air base at Gan island, and a communication base at Addu Atol till 1986. In return for the use of those facilities Great Britain paid £850,000 to the Sultan. When Maldive attained its independence on 26 July 1965, those base rights were retained by the British Government.

The bases in Maldive assumed greater importance following the gradual withdrawal of the British naval and air presence from Ceylon. Under an agreement reached between the Governments of Ceylon and Great Britain in January 1957, the British naval base at Trincomalee and the air base at Katunayake were formally transferred to Ceylon in October-November 1957. It was decided at that time, that Britain would withdraw its establishments from there within three years within which time the British bases in Maldive would be ready to share the added load. Ceylon took over those ex-British bases and paid £1.05 million for the fixed assets there. Britain still retains her treaty rights, however obscure they may be, under the defence agreement with Ceylon, which formed a part of the broad Anglo-Ceylonese agreement of 1947, under which Ceylon obtained its independence.

A survey of the first half of the 1960s, thus, shows that the British were deeply involved in interventions in several places in the Indian Ocean area. Very often it was a thankless job as far as the Britishers were concerned, because either they were charged with neo-colonialism or with not doing enough to protect the Afro-Asian interests. Many British leaders complained that the USA had kept itself aloof, even when American interests were involved The British Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Healey, also commented on this in the House of Commons on 4 March 1965. Financial burden involved in maintaining even a limited military presence, inadequate military capability to act as the "policeman" of the Indian Ocean, and dissatisfaction over the lack of cooperation from the American Government, were some of the factors which were responsible for the new policy of withdrawal from the East of the Suez which was initiated by the British Labour Government in 1966.

The East of the Suez Policy

By 1966, the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia had been eased, East African countries had stabilized themselves and the Rhodesian

and the South African questions had assumed the shape of long-term issues. Aden, the Persian Gulf and Singapore, remained the zones of crucial importance. Britain finally decided to sacrifice its interests in Aden and to work out alternative arrangements, which would not only protect its specific interests like oil in the Persian Gulf, but also its general maritime trade and broad political and economic interests in the whole of the Indian Ocean area. Britain, therefore, sought to disengage itself from its earlier responsibilities, and tried to protect its strategic interests by withdrawing to the islands in the Indian Ocean, Such a policy suited the American strategic interests as well, in view of the new weapon system evolved by them. The new Indian Ocean policy thus began to take shape towards the middle of the 1960s.

The two facets of the Western policy as regards the Indian Ocean—the entry of the USA and the withdrawal of Great Britain—are interconnected. The British policy of withdrawal from the East of the Suez, was spelled out in the White Paper on Defence (Command Papers 2901 and 2902) which was released on 22 February 1966. The White Paper, while emphasizing British interests in the area and also the British capability to protect them, also mentioned the economic liabilities involved in pursuing a Super Power policy. It said that though Britain would retain in future a military capability outside Europe it would act only under the following conditions : Firstly, it said that Britain would not undertake any major military operations, except in cooperation with its allies. Secondly, it said that Britain would be under no obligation to provide military assistance to another country, unless that country was prepared to provide facilities needed to make such a help effective. In other words, unless Britain was offered bases, it refused to share the defence of a given country. Finally, it said that no attempt would be made to maintain defence facilities in an independent country against its wishes.

Apart from those general observations the White Paper also discussed the proposed British policy vis-a-vis specific regions in the Indian Ocean areas. It said that the British forces there, would be re-deployed in a more realistic manner. Great Britain would vacate South Arabia (Aden) after its independence in 1968. In other words, the strategic base at Aden would be given up. But the British commitments in the Arabian Sea region were to be protected by a limited increase in the military presence in the Persian Gulf. Whereas the British policy was, more or less, clearly spelled out in the Arabian Sea area it was still vague as far as South-East Asia was concerned. The White Paper said that the British military presence in Malaysia and Singapore would be retained as long as required by the governments there. There was to be no appreciable reduction in the British presence in Hongkong. There was no plan to maintain a military presence in South Africa. The British withdrawal was not limited to the East of the Suez area alone, but also covered the Mediterranean. The White Paper on Defence Policy for 1967-1968 (Command Paper 3202),

issued on 16 February, 1967, envisaged a gradual reduction in the British presence in Cyprus, which gave a strategic support to the CENTO, as well as from Malta and Libya. The withdrawal from the East of the Suez was initially planned to be completed by the mid-1970s. On 16 January 1968, Wilson announced that it would be completed even earlier—by the end of 1971.

It was also decided to trim the British naval capabilities in keeping with the policy of gradual withdrawal from the Indian Ocean area. It was announced that the aircraft-carriers, *Victorious* and *Hermes*, would be phased out by 1969 and 1971 respectively. After the devaluation of pound sterling, *Victorious* was phased out in 1968. *Hermes* was, however, refitted in 1969, and may be used for some more time. It was also decided at that time that the aircraft-carrier, *Ark Royal*, would be only partially refitted to fly both the *Phantom* and the *Buccaneer*. *Eagle* was also modernized to fly the *Phantoms*. Another aircraft-carrier, *Centaur*, which was used in 1964 as a Commando-carrier, may join the two other sister ships, *Albion* and *Bulwark*, in that role. It was also decided that the British navy would not acquire more aircraft-carriers, and air cover would in future be provided by land-based aircraft. Long-range *F-111* were ordered by Britain, from the USA, to fulfil that role but the order was cancelled in January 1968 due to financial reasons. Thus, Britain's capacity to maintain a naval presence and to intervene effectively in the 1970s would be drastically limited because of an inadequate air-cover provided, either by its aircraft-carrier or from the land bases. It is doubtful if the British aircraft-carriers, like *Eagle* and *Ark Royal*, would be useful even against medium Powers in the Indian Ocean area in the 1980s.

The British decision to withdraw from the East of the Suez was not appreciated by its allies. Australia, New Zealand and the sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf 'regretted' it. The USA also felt hurt, not only because the British Government had decided to withdraw from the area but also because it had cancelled orders for 50 *F-111* aircraft, which it had placed with an American firm. Mr McCloskey, the State Department spokesman, said on 16 January 1968 (the day when the decision to withdraw by 1971 was announced) that the USA had no plans to move in when the British forces pulled out. The American policy was spelled out in greater detail by President Nixon while on a tour in the South Pacific. On 25 July 1969, while addressing the Press conference at the US base at Guam, he said that though the USA would like to keep its treaty commitments, it would avoid the kind of policy which would make Asian countries "so dependent upon the USA that it was dragged into conflicts such as the one in Vietnam." He added that except for a threat by a major Power involving nuclear weapons, the USA had a right to expect that Asian countries would handle their own problems of defence.

Reaction in the South-East Asian region and in the Persian Gulf region to the British decision to withdraw from the area, showed the concern that

the pro-British elements felt at the new turn taken by the British policy. For them the British presence in the region was the most effective and possibly the cheapest way of safeguarding their local interests and maintaining the *status quo*. That is why the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zaid bin Sultan, even went to the extent of suggesting, that the Arab Sheikhs in the area should offer to pay the entire cost of maintaining British troops in the Persian Gulf area. It was estimated by *The Times* (London) that the cost would be around £25 million per year. Mr Healey, in a written reply on 15 November 1967, told the British Parliament that the cost would be much less, about £12 million in foreign exchange. The offer was, however, rejected by Mr Healey in a television interview on 22 January 1968. He also revealed that the British position had been explained to those rulers earlier by the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Goronwy Roberts.

In keeping with the new policy, the British Government informed the Sheikh of Kuwait that Britain would like to terminate the treaty of 19 June 1961, under which Britain had guaranteed to render military assistance to Kuwait. Subsequently, notes were exchanged between the two governments on 13 May 1968, annulling the 1961 treaty after three years. Thus, Great Britain was under no obligation to help Kuwait after 1971. British policy regarding the Trucial Coast was rather vague. Those seven states were isolated pockets and Britain had treaty relations with every one of them. Britain, therefore, suggested that they should come together and form a federation before it could formulate any long-term policy regarding them.

Persian Gulf area had assumed vital importance for Britain because of its oil interests. Also, following the British withdrawal from Aden after its independence, the Gulf had become an area of major British military interest in West Asia. In 1968, Britain was maintaining about 8,400 troops supported by naval vessels and aircraft in the Persian Gulf region. In view of the proposed evacuation from Aden, the British had already created a base in 1966 in Sharjah, where about 3,000 troops were stationed. Bahrain was another important base of great naval and air significance. The Trucial Oman Scouts, a 1600-strong local force, created, financed and officered by the British, operated in cooperation with the British forces in Sharjah. It was planned that after the British withdrawal the Trucial Oman Scouts would be incorporated in the federal force, which might be created in the area by the Trucial states. The combined force, which was trained, armed and possibly officered by British servicemen, was planned to take over the British responsibilities after 1971.

In fact, at the request of the local rulers, Major-General Sir John Willoughby, who was the G-O-C Middle East Land Forces 1965-67, was asked to plan the new force in the area. He was assisted by a team of military experts. A report was submitted by the team, but its contents have not been disclosed as yet. In the meantime individual states like

Abu Dhabi, have started creating their local forces and modernizing their existing tribal levies. It is, however, doubtful if Great Britain would withdraw totally from the Gulf, in view of its oil interests and also because of the counter-insurgency operations in Oman in which it is deeply involved.

South-East Asia, the other important corner of the Indian Ocean, was also perturbed by the British decision to withdraw. Singapore reacted very strongly and Lee Kuan Yew, at one time, even threatened to replace Great Britain with Japan in Singapore. He was, however, pacified. On 19 January 1968, following his London visit, he said that Great Britain would help Singapore in its air defence and for that purpose would maintain there radar installations and one squadron of *Lightning* fighters. He also said that Singapore might acquire surface-to-air guided missiles for air defence. Malaysia, however, suggested that Australia, Great Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore should form a joint defence plan. Such a plan, in fact, already existed during the period of Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation. The leaders of those five countries, which also happen to be Commonwealth members, approved of such a plan in London, on 15 April 1971. The new agreement terminated the British obligations to intervene unilaterally in the area. The new pact came into force on 1 November 1971. British presence was maintained through the contribution of one infantry battalion, one artillery battery, six frigates, one submarine, a fleet of helicopters and four or five *Nimrod* maritime reconnaissance aircraft. It is supposed to cost Britain about £6–7 million per year for its presence there.

In keeping with the policy of gradual withdrawal Great Britain decided to grant independence to Mauritius. But that did not mean a total withdrawal from that strategic island. Simultaneously with the signing of the independence agreement on 12 March 1968, Great Britain and Mauritius also signed a six-year defence agreement. It provided for joint consultation on any request for assistance by the Government of Mauritius in the event of threat to the internal security of the island. This has to be read in the context of the riots which rocked Mauritius in January and again in March 1968. It is said, that the gang rivalry between the Muslim-dominated *Istanbul* gang and the Careole-dominated *Texas* gang spilled over as a communal conflict, in which about 24 persons were killed and some 200 injured. British troops were flown from Singapore to help the local authorities to curb the riots. In return for the British help in the maintenance of internal security as stipulated in the defence agreement, the British Government was provided with facilities to use the airport and the naval base and communication centre at Vacoas. British Government also promised to help in the creation and modernisation of the Mauritian police and security forces.

Thus, by the end of the last decade, the British policy of withdrawal from the East of the Suez had been partly fulfilled. It was never the intention

of the Labour Government to withdraw totally from the area. But, the partial withdrawal did mean the evacuation of Aden and a very restricted commitment in the Persian Gulf, as reflected in the lack of British action following the occupation of Abu Musa and the two Tumb islands by Iran. It also meant a greater involvement of Australia and New Zealand in South East Asia. The new regrouping in the Indian Ocean suits British interests, because it leaves just enough British presence to make a political impact, and yet permits Britain to reduce its commitments and to redeploy its forces in the island bases in the Indian Ocean, where it can work alone or in co-ordination with the USA. The policy chalked out by Wilson was thus implemented substantially and though the Conservatives had objected to it initially, they too followed it in substance.

THE SOVIETS AND THE INDIAN OCEAN

Soviet Naval Capacity

It was suggested that the British withdrawal would open the flood gates to the Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean area. Such a thing did not happen; and the Soviet presence in the area can be explained as the cumulative result of the growing Super Power interests in the Third World, and the evolution of the Cold War strategy in the light of the newly emerging weapon systems. The Soviet Union had been trying, since 1955, to break through the Western cordon in the area, and by 1964, had succeeded in making its political presence felt in almost all the Indian Ocean states. But the Soviets did not have any naval presence in the area even on the eve of the entry of the US Navy in 1964. Probably the USSR, till that time, thought that the Indian Ocean did not pose a strategic threat to its security. And, even if the USSR was aware of that threat, inadequate naval capacity prevented the USSR from operating a naval fleet in the Indian Ocean till 1968.

The Soviet naval power began to develop substantially after 1960. The urgency was felt by the Soviet Union to enhance its naval capabilities, not only to maintain a balance between the three wings of its armed forces but also to counter the accelerated naval programme launched by the Americans. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when the Soviet decision-makers decided to change the focus of their naval strategy, from a land-based fleet to an ocean fleet, but it has been agreed by several scholars that the Soviet setback in Cuba in 1962, had a serious impact on the Soviet naval strategy and its enhanced naval capability. Undoubtedly the impact of the Cuban crisis was crucial, but it is doubtful if the USSR, even if it had a sufficiently powerful ocean fleet, would have succeeded in keeping the missiles in Cuba. The Cuban crisis was primarily of a political nature and was settled on that level. There was some horse-trading also. In return for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, the Americans agreed to withdraw their *Jupiter* IRBMs from Turkey. Still, the Cuban crisis did reveal the inability of the USSR to escort its cargo vessels

on distant oceans, and that fact might have prompted the Soviet naval experts to create conditions under which they could operate their navy in far away places in future.

But it should also be remembered, when evaluating the factors which brought about a change in the Soviet naval strategy, that the USA had perfected the *Polaris* submarine by 1962. The USSR, if it had to neutralize that new weapons system, or if it had to pose a similar threat to the West, had to control the oceans. A shift from the sea-denial to sea-control strategy was, therefore, made by the Soviet strategists. Earlier, the Soviet fleet was tailored to the task of the defence of the Soviet coast and the nearby areas. It did not have enough capacity to operate and maintain a fleet on the high seas away from the home base. It lacked sufficient logistic vessels at that time and, consequently, despite the large number of submarines and other fighting vessels, the Soviet Navy was home-bound. If the number of supply ships and oilers are an indication of the capacity of a navy to operate on the high seas, one finds a steady progress in the Soviet naval capacity in that direction in the subsequent years. In 1963–64 there was no increase in the number of supply vessels, but the number of oilers increased from 17 to 45. The number increased to 20 supply vessels and 45 oilers in 1965–66, and to 120 supply vessels and 50 oilers in 1970–71.

It is interesting to note that during that period there was no corresponding increase in the number of warships. The Soviet Navy already possessed an adequate number of warships. All that it needed was a greater mobility and increased fire-power. These new vessels, thus, enabled the Soviet Union to have a more balanced navy which could play a global role. During the same period, the Soviet submarine fleet also went through a modernization programme. The Soviet Union began to construct nuclear-powered submarines and to equip them, as well as the conventional submarines, with cruise and ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads (see the graph in Appendix). Such a development programme emphasized the frantic effort made by the Soviet Union, during that period, to neutralize the American naval threat posed by the surface vessels and the new fleet of *Polaris* submarines.

The effort can also be seen in the modernization of the Soviet naval programme in the field of surface vessels also. After 1962, there was an accelerated programme to arm cruisers and destroyers with guided missiles. By 1965-66 about 37 such vessels had been armed with surface-to-air or/and surface-to-surface missiles. They are armed with *Goa* or *Guideline* surface-to-air missiles and *Strela* or *Shaddock* surface-to-surface missiles. *Strela*, a subsonic missile, has a short range of about 100 miles. *Shaddock* has a range of about 400 miles. *Shaddock* is supersonic. Both are cruise-missiles and can carry nuclear war-heads. These ships pose a serious threat to the surface vessels of the USA which do not carry long-range surface-to-surface guided missiles but depend upon the aircraft-carrier for

protection against Soviet destroyers and frigates. The Soviet Union was, thus, fast catching up with the USA in the naval race.

The Soviet Union is facing a major deficiency in the naval field, lack of aircraft-carriers. It is being partly met by the construction of the helicopter-carriers. Two of them, *Moskva* and *Leningrad*, are ready. Both are armed with *S.A.N. 3* surface-to-air missiles, which have a range of more than 25 miles. There are reports that the Soviet Union is also planning to construct an aircraft-carrier in the near future. Thus, with the fleet of oilers and supply vessels, missile-carrying surface vessels and submarines, the Soviet Union, within a short period, has emerged as a serious naval Power capable of operating on the high seas, away from the home bases, and even independent of the overseas bases. The capacity to operate on the high seas, without the need to have local bases on the littoral, really makes the Soviet Union an independent naval Power capable of playing a global role.

Since the Soviet naval capacity increased gradually, the Soviet entry on the high seas was also gradual. The Soviets first began to operate in the Baltic, the North Sea and the Atlantic and then gradually made their presence felt in the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. They entered the Indian Ocean only in the first half of 1968, when a small task-force consisting of one *Sverdlov*-class cruiser, accompanied by one guided-missile destroyer, one nuclear submarine and one *Pevek* class oiler, visited ports in Aden, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf and Somdia.

The Soviet Union has maintained a naval presence in the Indian Ocean since 1968. The number of vessels of the Soviet fleet in the area varies between twelve to twenty. It includes surface vessels (fighting ships), submarines and logistic ships. With the closure of the Suez Canal, the Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean area cannot be supplied directly from the Black Sea ports. The distance from the Black Sea ports to the Indian Ocean, via the Suez Canal, is only 3,200 miles, but it is about 11,500 miles via the Cape of Good Hope. The Soviet bases on the Pacific coast are also too far away and suffer the added disadvantage of being ice-bound in winter. During the spring, they are covered with fog. The distance involved restricts the number of vessels that can be maintained in the area at a given time. In keeping with the latest techniques in the operation of the ocean-fleet, the Soviets have also established two fleet anchorages; one off Socotra and the other near the Seychelles Islands. These are the points of rendezvous where the Soviet fleet, operating in the Indian Ocean, are replenished by the logistic ships coming from their bases in the USSR. Such a technique limits the Soviet dependence upon port facilities in the area, and permits the fleet to operate at will in any place in the ocean, especially in emergencies.

But port facilities are an added advantage in normal times. The Soviets have sought to obtain such facilities in Egypt, Tanzania, Somalia, the two Yemens, Aden, Iraq, Pakistan, India and Singapore. It is difficult to find

out the extent to which they have been successful in their venture. It is reported that the Soviets have secured harbour facilities in some of these countries. They were constructing an oil tank farm in Mauritius, at a cost of $144,000, for supply to the growing Soviet fishing fleet in the Indian Ocean. It was also reported that the Soviets had acquired port facilities in Hodeida in Yemen, were constructing oil tanks in Somalia, and were active in the Island of Socotra near Aden, where they have reportedly constructed a runway and improved the harbour facilities. It is said that these activities have been confirmed by aerial photographs.[11] Aden has, however, denied any Soviet involvement there.

It was also reported on 29 June 1969, from Rawalpindi, that Pakistan was hoping to improve its naval base at Gwadar with Soviet assistance. That base, about 275 miles west of Karachi, was originally planned with the help of the CENTO allies in 1964. Thanks to the good offices of Great Britain, the 300-square-mile Gwadar penninsula was sold to Pakistan by Oman in 1958, for a sum of £3 million. The Western bloc support for the Gwadar naval base was withheld after 1965, probably because of Pakistan's growing friendship with China and the Soviet Union. Following the visit to Pakistan, of Vice-Admiral N.I. Smirnov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet Navy, it was speculated that the Soviet Union might strengthen the Pakistan Navy in return for port facilities in Gwadar. Those speculations were contradicted by the Soviet spokesman on 2 July 1969. But, the Indian Defence Minister, Swaran Singh, while discussing the Soviet military aid to Pakistan in the *Lok Sabha*, on 4 March 1970, said that the Government had seen reports that the Soviet Union was thinking of supplying missile boats to Pakistan, and that Pakistani officers were undergoing certain courses in that connection. But, he added, that there was no confirmation that these boats had reached Pakistan. Those reports were also denied by the Soviet Government.

The Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean area have been governed in the post-World War II period by strategic, as well as political and economic considerations. With the development of the new strategic weapons based upon nuclear-powered submarines capable of launching medium-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons, the Indian Ocean area has assumed great strategic significance for the Soviet Union. The threat from that area increased much more when the US task force began to operate regularly from there after 1964. The Soviets do not have enough naval capacity to deny the use of the area to the Western Powers. The only alternative for them, therefore, is to seek to neutralize the Western threat by maintaining a sufficient naval presence of their own. Even that is not an easy task, because the Soviet naval strength, especially as far as the surface vessels are concerned, is not at par with that of the Western Powers. This is especially true in the field of aircraft-carriers. That deficiency means that the Soviet Navy cannot offer adequate air-cover to its surface fleet or, at a pinch, to its submarine fleet in far away places. Even

the question of supplying the existing Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean from the home bases, entails a long haul as long as the Suez Canal remains closed. Thus, the Soviet Union is in a desperate need to have at least a few bases in the Indian Ocean, which would offer the Soviet Union port and communication facilities and which could, if possible, provide air-cover to the Soviet navy, if and when necessary. The task of maritime reconnaissance and air-surveillance, which are normally performed by naval aircraft operating from land bases, or from the aircraft-carriers of the Western Powers, are very often entrusted to the specially-equipped trawlers of the Soviet navy. They are of limited importance. Lack of such facilities leaves a big gap in the performance of the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean.

These strategic considerations have an important bearing upon Soviet interests, not only in the Indian Ocean but also upon its littoral. It is there that it can hope to obtain base facilities, which it needs desperately to contain the growing American threat from the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the political, economic and possible ideological interests of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area, are also influenced by strategic considerations.

Growth of the Soviet Presence in the Littoral

The Soviet Union did not have much of a political or economic presence in the Indian Ocean littoral before 1955. But, since then, the USSR has been able to make its influence felt in this area. It was possible because of several reasons. First, the change in the Soviet policy towards non-aligned states since 1955, enabled it to develop friendly ties with countries like India, Burma, Indonesia and Egypt. Growing Sino-Soviet rift also prompted the USSR, to compete with China for influence among the Afro-Asian states. Secondly, the phased withdrawal of the Western military presence from the CENTO, when it gave up the previous policy of maintaining a strategic deterrence based upon land confrontation, enabled the USSR to normalize its ties with the northern-tier states like Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Thirdly, sometimes local conditions and regional rivalries projected leaderships which tended to rely to some extent upon the Soviet support. The USSR benefited from that situation in Yemen, Aden, Somalia, Iraq, Pakistan, India and Indonesia. The cumulative effect of all those factors led to the growing Soviet involvement in the Indian Ocean area, after 1955.

By 1965 the Soviet Union was able to come very close to several countries in West Asia and North Africa. Of them, Syria, UAR and Algeria played an important role in the Soviet policy of containing American influence in the Mediterranean. Soviet rapprochement with Turkey, an important link between the NATO and the CENTO, followed the withdrawal of the *Jupiter* IRBMs from there in 1963. Also, the Soviet support to Turkey on the Cyprus question and the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun Cemal Erkin, to Moscow in November 1964, brought the two

countries together. Gromyko visited Turkey in May 1965. The visit was returned by Premier Urguplu in August the same year. The joint communique, issued on 16 August, emphasized peaceful co-existence and co-operation between the two countries and the need to work out the European security through mutual agreement. Turkey also received large Soviet economic aid for irrigation projects, steel plant, oil refinery, tractor plant and other development projects. The detente between Turkey and the Soviet Union not only helped in the partial neutralization of American influence in the vital spot connecting the NATO with the CENTO, but also facilitated an unrestricted movement of the Soviet naval vessels between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Even now the Turkish Straits are a vital link between the Soviet fleets in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

In keeping with its policy of neutralizing the Western influence in the northern tier, the USSR also came closer to Iran, the link between the NATO-CENTO group and the CENTO-SEATO group. Their relations had been improving since 1963, but the two countries came much closer after the Soviet visit of the Shah of Iran, in June-July 1965. The Iranian Premier, Hoveida, disclosed in the *Majlis* on 9 February 1967, that Iran had entered into a long-term arrangement for the sale of natural gas to the Soviet Union. He also disclosed that Iran would construct a steel mill complex and a machine-tool factory with Soviet help near Isfahan. It was also announced that Iran would obtain Soviet arms worth $ 110 million. The cost of the steel mill complex, the natural gas pipeline, as well as the Soviet arms, was to be paid in terms of the natural gas to be sold by Iran to the Soviet Union. As a result of the Soviet-Iranian rapprochement, the Soviet Union sold to Iran armoured personnel carriers (APC), trucks, anti-aircraft guns etc. One of the results of the Soviet-Iranian detente was, that Iran transferred its armour from the north to the south and deployed it near the *Shatt al-Arab* and the Persian Gulf region close to the Iraqi frontier.

The continuing Soviet support to Iran's policy of gradual detachment from the Western bloc, was once again manifest in the joint communique issued in April 1968, following the visit of Kosygin to Iran. The communique emphasized the need for all states in the area, to have the responsibility of developing freely and independently, without any pressure or interference whatsoever from external forces that might want to preserve colonial systems and their influence there. The Soviet-Iranian stand has to be studied in the context of the British policy of withdrawal from the East of the Suez. Both Iran and the Soviet Union were interested in such a withdrawal for reasons of their own. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, such a withdrawal would further weaken the Western presence in the Indian Ocean. For Iran, such a withdrawal offered opportunities to play a role, in the Persian Gulf area, more in keeping with Iran's own growing power and position.

Another possible reason why the Soviet Union wanted to cultivate Iran was, the slight decline in the Soviet-Iraqi relations at that time. The Soviet Union did come close to Iraq immediately after the July 1958 *coup d'etat*. Iraq was given military and economic aid but in 1967, especially after the Arab-Israeli War in June that year, their relations cooled off. Iraq, along with Algeria and Syria, was not happy about the limited Soviet support against Israel and especially about the Soviet reluctance to support the Fedayeen movement. Iraq began to cultivate other countries. It came closer to France, which began to take an interest in Iraqi oil. France also agreed to supply Iraq about 50 *Mirage* fighter-bombers, under an agreement signed on 6 April 1968. It was reported that these *Mirage* aircraft had been ordered earlier by Israel, but France had refused to sell to it after the June 1967 War.

Recently, the Soviet Union and Iraq have, once again, come closer. They signed a 15-year Friendship Treaty in Baghdad on 9 April 1972. That treaty is on the line of the treaties signed earlier by the USSR with Egypt and India. The new treaty enables the USSR to come closer to Iraq in the economic field, especially in the exploitation of the oil resources of Iraq. It also enables USSR to maintain a political and naval presence in the sensitive Gulf where US interests are represented by the American investments in the oil industry, by its political links with the conservative local regimes and by the presence of the US naval base at Bahrain. It still remains to be seen, in the light of the Iran-Iraq rivalry, how the Soviet Union would reconcile its presence in both these rival countries. It would indeed require all the skill of diplomatic tight-rope walking.

Yemen, Aden, Somalia and Sudan are four states in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea complex, which came closer to the USSR in the 1960s. The Soviet Union had been interested in Yemen even when it was under the rule of the Imam. A 10-year Treaty of Friendship had been signed between the two in 1955. Yemen came closer to the USSR following the *coup d'etat* of September 1962. The UAR was acting as the link between the two. In March 1964, President Sallal visited the Soviet Union. A new Treaty of Friendship was signed between the two states on 21 March, which guaranteed Soviet support for the maintenance of complete and absolute independence of the Arab Republic of Yemen and its sovereignty over the Yemeni territory. The Soviet guarantee was important because the Royalists were occupying a large part of Yemen at that time.

The years 1965–67 were crucial for Yemen. President Nasser, afraid that the indirect UAR-Saudi Arabian confrontation in Yemen might lead to a direct clash between them, proposed that the two countries might settle the Yemeni question by peaceful means. The Jedda Agreement of 24 August 1965 reached between Nasser and Faisal provided for an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of the UAR troops, end of the Saudi support to the Yemeni Royalists, establishment of a provisional government in Yemen and a plebiscite in November 1966 to enable the people of Yemen to decide

about their future. The representatives of the Republican and the Royalist factions were to be associated with the peace project. But, the political climate in the country and the crisis of confidence among the parties involved, did not permit such a peaceful evolution. The moves of the UAR, however, alarmed its Yemeni Republican supporters who feared that the UAR might sacrifice their interests in a bid to patch up its Arab image. The result was that they began to look more and more towards the Soviet Union for support. It could not only replace the UAR but was also seeking to develop vital stakes in the Indian Ocean area.

Following the June 1967 war, the UAR tried to disengage itself from Yemen. The Yemeni question was discussed at Khartoum, when the heads of the Arab states met to analyse the consequences of the Arab-Israeli War. An agreement was signed between the UAR and Saudi Arabia on 31 August, under which the UAR agreed to withdraw its troops from Yemen by December 1967. The new change also meant the exit of the pro-UAR President Sallal. Abdul Rahman al-Iriani became the new President. Muhsin al-Aini became the new Premier. The USSR replaced the UAR in Yemen. Following the threat of a Royalist attack, Soviet military equipment consisting of *MiG-19* and *Ilyushin* bombers and other arms were delivered to Yemen by November 1967. Soviet Union continued to build-up the armed forces of Yemen by giving tanks and heavy guns. The Soviet Union had been interested in the Yemeni port of Hodeida even earlier. On 7 February 1967, a Yemeni defector, Lieutenant Abdullah Qassim al-Udaini, reported from Aden that the Soviet Union was constructing a naval base at Mocha in Yemen.

Soviet presence in Yemen also enabled it to influence events in Aden. Close contacts between the Soviet and the Adeni leaders enabled the USSR to maintain its presence in Aden after its independence in 1967. Aden, the strategic gateway commanding Bab al-Mandeb, was evacuated by Great Britain in November 1967. The Federation of South Arabia, of which Aden was an important part, was declared independent on 27 November 1967. The new state also included the Kuria Muria islands near the coast of Muscat and Oman, Socotra and Perim which command the entrance to the Red Sea, and Kamaran near the Yemeni port of Hodeida. Thus, any power which can maintain a presence in Aden can influence the southern half of the Red Sea and the north-western part of the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet presence in and around Aden was facilitated by the close links which had developed between the Adeni nationalists and the Republicans in Yemen. Qahtan as-Shaabi, the first President of the new state and the founder-member of the National Liberation Front (NLF) of Aden, had been active in Cairo and in Yemen. During the period of the nationalist struggle the NLF was getting active help from Yemen, where it had its base. By 1967, the NLF was able to liquidate the rival nationalist group, Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY), which was supposed to be pro-UAR. The new leaders in Yemen as well as in Aden were

unhappy over the UAR's withdrawal from the area and both of them were interested in cultivating new friends. The USSR was the obvious choice, both in Aden as well as in Yemen. The Soviet Union gave military and economic aid to Aden. The economic aid was particularly necessary, because the withdrawal of the British bases and the closure of the Suez Canal, following the June 1967 war, had adversely affected the sources of state revenue. At this moment, the Soviets and the East European countries (and also the Chinese) are busy in the development schemes like fishing, canning and farming in Aden. The Soviets are also helping Aden to build up a 10,000-strong army, and Soviet military advisers are active down to the lowest level of command both in the army and the airforce. It is said that in return the Soviets have the freedom to use the air fields at Aden and Socotra. There is, however, no evidence as yet of any Soviet military base in Aden proper, though several sources indicate the Soviet presence in Socotra.

Sudan also became a centre of Soviet attraction, especially after the army *coup d'etat* on 25 May 1969, led by Colonel Jafar Mohammed al-Nemeiry who not only became the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council but also the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister of Sudan. He visited Moscow where he signed a trade agreement on 10 November 1969. It was subsequently reported that Sudan had also signed an arms deal worth $100 million with the Soviet Union. The Sudanese wanted the Soviet arms primarily for their military commitments in South Sudan, where a local rebellion had been active since the Sudanese independence. About 500 Soviet technicians and advisers were working in Sudan at that time. It was also reported that the Soviets were interested in acquiring port facilities in Port Sudan. The Soviet presence, however, suffered a sudden decline following the *coups* and counter-*coups* in 1971. Its place has now been taken by the Chinese.

The other state in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea complex, which came closer to the USSR during the last decade, was Somalia. The emergence of an independent Somali Republic created problems of frontier adjustment between Somalia on one hand and Ethiopia and Kenya on the other. The 'Greater Somalia Seheme' led to political tensions, tribal raids (*shiftas*), and even border skirmishes in the first half of 1960s. It was announced on 15 December 1960, that the UAR would provide military assistance to Somalia to equip 5,000 soldiers and would provide some armour and a few aircraft. Dr Shermarke, the President of Somalia, visited the Soviet Union in May-June 1961. A long-term credit amounting to 40 million roubles was offered to Somalia. It was also reported that the Soviets had offered military aid to Somalia. The Somalian Army was based on the ex-colonial police force. The new regime wanted to expand it to 20,000. The Western bloc was approached, but it failed to satisfy the Somali demands. The Soviet military aid began to reach Somalia by 1962. Soviets offered about 150 old *T-34* tanks, 60 APCs, some field guns, probably one squad-

ron of *MiG-15/17* and some patrol boats. It is also reported that the Soviets were interested in modernizing the port of Berbera in Somalia. In December 1971, the Soviets agreed to construct 33 oil tanks with a total capacity of 50,000 cubic metres in Somalia; 15 of them would be constructed in Berbera, 10 in Kismayu and eight in Mogadishu.

The Soviet Union does not have sufficient influence south of Somalia even though it does have some influence in Tanzania, and also in Mozambique where it supports the liberation movement organized by the FRELIMO. But in both places the Soviets have to compete with the growing Chinese influence and have not been able to make much of a headway. They do have an agreement with Mauritius, under which the Soviet trawlers can use the port facilities there. But the agreement does not cover the use of similar facilities by units of the Soviet naval fleet.

The Soviet Union did try to make its presence felt in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean also. Indonesia, during the period of the confrontation with Malaysia, came very close to Soviet Union. It received large quantities of Soviet economic and military aid. But Indonesia's growing ties with China during the last days of President Sukarno's rule, followed by a wave of anti-communism, must have come as a severe setback to the Soviet interests in South-East Asia. The Soviets also tried to normalize their relations with Pakistan. They did succeed to a large extent in achieving their objectives following the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 and the Tashkent Agreement of 1966. But Pakistan was more interested in using its detente with the Soviet Uuion, as a lever against its traditional ally the USA and its new friend, China. Pakistan also wanted the Soviet Union to equate Pakistan with India in the Indian sub-continent. Even though Pakistani diplomacy did pay some dividends, like the oil agreement and the arms deal with the USSR, it failed in the long run to achieve its main objective—to pursuade the Soviet Union to equate Pakistan with India.

Indo-Soviet relations, on the contrary, have improved slowly but steadily. India has improved its trade with the USSR and has been able to obtain substantial economic aid for development projects. During that period the Indian armed forces also acquired sophisticated Soviet arms. The 20-year Friendship Treaty, initialed in New Delhi on 9 August 1971 between India and the Soviet Union, was a logical step in the growing co-operation between the two countries since 1955 though the immediate background of the Bangladesh crisis and the growing Sino-American involvement in it tended to give it a very narrow look. There is no doubt that though the treaty did strengthen India's hand in supporting the people of Bangladesh to liberate themselves from the tyranny of Pakistani rulers, it will continue to have a long-term impact not only upon Indo-Soviet relations but also on the question of peace and stability in South Asia as a whole.

The growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area not only promotes

its strategic, political and economic interests but also enables it to obtain two more advantages. In co-operation with the Persian Gulf states, the Soviet Union is able to utilize the oil resources of the area. And, thanks to the detente between the USSR and Iran, it can hope to have an access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, which would open an alternative line of communication between the Indian Ocean states and the Soviet Union and would partly serve as a substitute for the Suez route, as long as the canal is closed, or supplement it when it opens.

At the moment, the Soviet Union is not only self-sufficient in oil production but it also exports oil to the East European countries. But many experts believe that the Soviet need for oil in the future would far surpass the local production. Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union is taking steps to increase its domestic oil production. The total oil production of the Soviet Union in 1970 was about 353 million tonnes (metric). Under the 1971–75 Five-Year Plan, the Soviet oil production is supposed to reach a target of 500 million tons. Some Western experts feel, that the target may not be achieved and the Soviet Union might have to import annually, between 100 to 200 million tons of oil in the coming decade.[12] It is argued, that even when the Soviet Union may be able to attain self-sufficiency in oil production, it can still use the West Asian oil for domestic need and export its surplus for hard currency. The Soviet Union has been giving loans to the West Asian countries and very often the repayment is in oil and oil products. Since oil is the major source of wealth there the barter arrangement suits both the parties.

The Soviet Union has entered into oil agreements with Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypt. It is assisting the Syrians in the oil fields in Jezera province and the Egyptians in the Servah oasis deposits, near the Libyan border. It has also entered into multi-million dollar oil-deals with Iran and Iraq.

The Soviet-Iranian oil talks (the emphasis is more on natural gas than on oil) began during the visit of the Shah of Iran to Moscow in 1965. The oil deal which was announced by the Iranian Premier, Mr. Hoveida, in the Iranian *Majlis* on 9 Februory 1967 involved the construction of a 1106 km-long main gas pipeline and 839 km. of sublines from the oil and natural gas fields in South Iran to Astara on the Soviet border. The pipeline is designed to pump 8,000-million cubic metres of gas annually. The completion of the pipe-line, which crosses about 157 rivers and mountains as high as 3,000 metres, in a short time, is itself a great tribute not only to the joint co-operation between Iran and the Soviet Union but also to the technical skill involved in its construction. The pipe line was opened on 28 October 1971, by the Shah of Iran and President Podgorny. The northern half of the pipe line was constructed by the Soviet Union and the southern half by the National Iranian Oil Company. The cost of the construction of the gas pipeline, the cost of the steel mill complex at Isfahan and the arms purchased by Iran from the USSR would be paid through a barter arrangement by the gas piped by Iran to the Soviet Union. The Iranians would also

be getting more revenue since, as has been reported, the rate of payment for natural gas is $6.60 per 1000 cubic metres. At that rate, if Iran is able to pump 6,000 million cubic metres of gas per year, as planned for the near future, Iran should be able to earn $396 million per year for the natural gas supplied to the USSR.

The Soviet oil interests in Iraq can be traced back to December 1967, when the Soviet Union agreed to aid and equip the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) to help it develop its oil industry. On 21 June 1969, an Economic and Technical Agreement was signed between the two countries for the development of Iraqi industry in the Halfaya area near Amara. The cost was estimated at about $72 million. On 5 July 1969, another agreement was signed under which the Soviet Union agreed, among other things, to help Iraq in the exploitation of Iraqi natural gas resources and in the development of oil fields in North Rumailah and Ratawi. The Soviet Union agreed to finance the scheme to the tune of $70 million. It was agreed that the repayment would be in crude oil.

It was also reported that the INOC and the Soviet Techno-export have signed another agreement to construct in the Rumailah oilfield complex, a gas separation plant, a main pumping station, 80 miles long pipe line between Rumailah and the port of Faw, and storage-tanks and loading facilities at Faw. That port, at present, can accommodate only small tankers (30,000 tons), but there are plans to construct a deep-water terminal at Basrah, or large-diameter pipe line to the Mediterranean, or both. The oil camplex, when completed by 1972, was reported to produce about five million tons of crude per year. There are plans to increase oil production to 18 million tons per year.

The Soviet-Iraqi oil interests were strengthened further, when another agreement was signed between them, on 8 April 1971. Under the new agreement Iraq obtained an additional loan of $222 million, repayable in crude oil produced by the INOC. The loan would finance the construction of an oil refinery at Mosul, and oil pipeline between Baghdad and Basrah. The result of the accelerated oil production in Iraq would not only benefit Iraq and the Soviet Union but it would also help other countries in the region. The INOC has shown a desire to establish an oil refinery in India which would process the Iraqi crude. India has welcomed such a move because it would not only fill the growing oil gap in India but also would help in diversifying its dependence upon the oil producing and exporting countries.

The growing Soviet oil interests in the region mean that the Soviet Union is increasing its stakes in the region. But a distinction must be made between the Soviet commercial interests in the West Asian oil and its strategic interests in the region. At the moment the Soviet oil interests in the region are limited and have not acquired any strategic value. Also, unlike the Western oil investments which represent a sizable sum, the Soviet investments are still marginal. It remains to be seen what shape the oil

policies of the two Super Powers would take in the region in future. At the moment, there is a peaceful co-existence between the two.

Apart from the growing oil and economic interests, the region is also valuable to the Soviet Union as an outlet to the warm-water ports. To secure warm-water ports has been the traditional objective of the Russians. Till recently they were thwarted by the Western Powers, especially by Great Britain. The end of the imperial rule over India in 1947, and the detente between Iran and the Soviet Union in 1965, has enabled the Soviet Union to seek some facilities in the Iranian ports. Iran is also interested in such ventures, especially after the closure of the Suez Canal following the June 1967 war.

The transit-trade pact between Iran and the USSR has opened a new trade route between Europe and the Afro-Asian countries via the Caspian Sea and the Volga Canal. Since this route also connects Iran to the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, it may develop as an alternative route for its trade not only with the Soviet Union but also with Europe and America. The Soviets have also shown an interest in the wider implications of the new route. Bandar Pahlavi and Bandar Naushahr on the Caspian Sea are being developed to handle the new trade. There is also a project to link Tehran with Bandar Pahlavi by railway. The Soviet Union has promised aid for that project.

It was reported in January 1969,[13] that Iran and the USSR planned to have a direct rail-link between the two countries. The main difficulty was that of adjustment between the different gauges used in the railway tracks in Iran and in the USSR. A conference was held in Tehran, on 25 April 1969, to solve that problem, and it was reported that the Soviets had agreed to render the necessary help to overcome that difficulty. Such a development—the over-land route and the waterways linking Iran to Europe via the Soviet Union—not only helps the Iranian economy but, when fully developed, might also prove useful to other Afro-Asian countries. It also helps the Soviet Union in having an alternative route to the Afro-Asian markets. The plan is still in the initial stages but if and when it is fully implemented it would fulfil the age-old longing of the Soviet people to have an access to the warm waters.

French Entry

Beside the USA, Britain and the USSR, there are three other foreign Powers who are showing a growing interest in the politics of the Indian Ocean. They are France, China and Japan. They are as yet not strong enough to play an independent Super Power role but their growing presence would influence the politics of the area in the coming years.

France has a historical link with this area. It was, even during the days of the old colonial system, a serious competitor of Great Britain. At one time France dominated a large part of South-East Asia and Africa. But

the French presence in the Indian Ocean declined considerably, following its withdrawal from Indo-China in 1954. Its African empire also did not dominate the Indian Ocean, which was mainly a British preserve. However, following the independence of the French colonies, France has been cultivating some African countries and is seeking to maintain a separate French identity in Africa as well as in western Indian Ocean. In the recent years, France, by coming closer to South Africa and Portugal, is also seeking to play an active part in the politics of the Indian Ocean.

Next to Great Britain, France was the most powerful colonial power in the Indian Ocean area. Today, after the partial withdrawal of the British presence from the Indian Ocean, France has emerged as one of the most important traditional colonial powers in the area, especially in the western Indian Ocean region. Portugal is also a traditional colonial power, but whereas Portugal is handicapped by its repressive colonial policy, France, either by granting independence to its colonies or by incorporating small territories within Metropolitan France, has not only escaped from the Afro-Asian anti-colonial campaigns but has also been able to create a strong pro-French lobby in Africa itself. Also, unlike Portugal, whose resources are stretched to maintain its colonial presence in Africa, France has been able to conserve its capability to intervene in a large number of ex-French colonies in Africa by withdrawing the bulk of its troops from Africa, and at the same time, by retaining the capacity to intervene by entering into defence arrangements with these countries and by maintaining a limited military presence in a few strategic places.

France also controls several islands situated in the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. The island of Reunion near Mauritius and the Comoro islands in the Straits of Madagascar are directly governed by France. The French presence there, in coordination with the major French bases in Madagascar, and the growing French interests in South Africa and Portuguese Africa, make France an important naval power in the western Indian Ocean. France commands the entrance to the Red Sea by its presence in the French territory of Afar and Issa, the new name for the French Somaliland. France also controls three island groups of great strategic significance in the South Pacific. They are : New Caledonia, which is situated east of Queensland in Australia, Wallis and Futuna islands and, the French Polynesia. Of them, New Caledonia is rich in strategic raw materials like nickel, iron and chrome. These islands in the Indian and Pacific Oceans provide France with potential bases, which would be very useful if France decides to pursue a naval policy in the Indian Ocean, either alone or in cooperation with other powers.

The French interests in the Indian Ocean are linked with its military commitments in Africa. France had signed bilateral defence pacts with Senegal, Mauritania, Madagascar (Malagasy) and Togo and a quadripartite pact with the Central African Republic, Congo and Chad, to which Gabon

acceded later on. A similar agreement was also signed between France, Ivory Coast, Niger and Dahomey. Under those treaties, the African states can request France to intervene on their behalf, in case they feel threatened from internal or foreign dangers. In 1964, the French maintained about 27,800 troops in sub-Saharan Africa as their force of intervention *(force d'intervention)*. In case of a greater threat, the main *force d'intervention*, based in Metropolitan France, can always be relied upon to come to the rescue of those African countries. It consists of two para-brigades and one airportable motorized brigade and about eight squadrons of transport aircraft like *DC-6*, *Transall* and *Noratlas*.

The French have, since then, carried on their own pattern of partial withdrawal and redeployment of forces in Africa. Under the plan announced on 24 July 1964, the number of French troops stationed in the African countries was reduced to about 6,000. Under the new deployment, France maintains about 2,500 troops in the Malagasy Republic under the defence agreement signed between the two countries on 27 June 1960. These French troops consist of about 1,250 personnel of the army, about 450 of the navy and about 800 of the air force. France also maintains a frigate and two or three support vessels, one squadron of ground-attack aircraft and several transport planes in its bases in Madagascar. Diego-Suarez and Ivato are the French naval and air bases there. Fort Dauphin and Tamatava are its army bases. France also maintains two battalions, supported by fighter-bombers and transport aircraft, in the French Somaliland and about two battalions in its Pacific Ocean territories.

Beside the existing French military presence in the Indian Ocean, which includes a few frigates and mine-sweepers, the French are also thinking of operating a stand-by naval task force in the Indian Ocean. It was reported that the French task force, consisting of three destroyers accompanied by support vessels, would start operating by the end of the first quarter of 1972. The task force would also hold joint exercises with the French forces in Malagasy Republic and in French Somaliland. This is probably the beginning of the entry of France as a naval power in the Indian Ocean.

Next to the USA and Great Britain, France is the most powerful naval power in the Western bloc. It has one *Polaris*-type submarine (powered by a conventional engine) 19 attack submarines, two aircraft carriers, one helicopter/aircraft carrier, one helicopter carrier, two assault landing ships, 16 destroyers of which four are armed with *Tartar* surface-to-air guided missiles, 30 frigates, and several mine-sweepers, landing ships and landing crafts. It also has about two hundred combat naval aircraft including *Etendard IV* and *Alize* and three squadrons of anti-submarine helicopters like *Super Frelon* and *Alouette*. All of them can operate from aircraft-carriers. The French navy has a limited capacity to supply its ships on the high seas, but that may not be necessary in view of close contacts between France on the one hand, and Portugal, South Africa and several pro-French African countries on the other, which facilitate opera-

tions of the French Navy in the western Indian Ocean without depending too much upon fleet oilers and supply and repair vessels.

Thus, the French, thanks to their naval presence and their bases in the area, would be able to control the Reunion and the Comoro islands, and to coordinate their policies with local powers like South Africa and Portugal. Except for providing limited landing facilities to the British aircraft during the oil blockade of Beria, during the Rhodesian crisis, there are no visible signs of cooperation between France, and the USA and Great Britain. In fact, France, taking advantage of the anti-Rhodesian, anti-South African and anti-Portuguese stance of those two Western powers, has come very close to these three discredited regimes in southern Africa.

Of late, France has been developing close contacts with South Africa and Portugal. Ever since the USA, and to some extent Great Britain, refused to sell military hardware to South Africa, France has stepped in to fill the gap. It has supplied to South Africa three *Daphne*-class submarines, and hundreds of *Mirage III* fighter-bombers, *Transall* transport aircraft and *Alouette* helicopters, as well as armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers. The value of the French war material supplied to South Africa amounts to about $200 million.

Besides the sale of these equipments, France has also agreed to permit South Africa to manufacture under licence *Mirage III* and *F-I* fighter-bombers and *Crotale* ground-to-air guided missiles, which are being manufactured under the name of *Cactus*. South Africa has also been producing transport aircraft of the French design for several years. The agreement for the manufacture of *F-I* jet aircraft was signed on 27 June 1971. They would be manufactured at the Atlas Aircraft Corporation's factory near Pretoria. *F-I* jet fighter-bomber is a single-seat plane with Mach 2 speed and a range of about 1,000 miles. It is reported that it can also operate from rough runways.

French Foreign Minister, M Debre, explaining the sale of French war material to South Africa, said on 9 August 1969, that the French arms sold to Africa could not be used for counter-insurgency operations. He tried to make a fundamental distinction between material used for 'classical warfare' and that for subversive or partisan warfare. M Debre pointed out that France was not supplying South Africa weapons like light mortars, automatic weapons, napalm bombs or low-level attack aircraft. The French explanation is not very convincing. Firstly, South Africa is self-sufficient in the manufacture of these basic weapons which are used in counter-insurgency warfare, and most of which, curiously enough, are of the French origin. But can one doubt that the *Transall* transport planes, the *Alouette* helicopters or the long-range jets like *Mirage III*, *Mirage V* and *F-I* (all these implying longer endurance over the target area) equip South Africa much better, not only to threaten its neighbouring countries in southern Africa, but also to carry out counter-insurgency operations?

Close contacts between France, Portugal and the 'white' regimes in

southern Africa have definite economic advantages for France. Apart from the profits due to the sale of sophisticated arms, France and its partner, West Germany, seek to dominate the rich economic potentials of that region, and consequently might even go to any length to buttress the colonial and racial regimes there. The proposed Cabora Basse Dam on the Zambezi River, one of the biggest dams in the world, which is being constructed in Mozambique with the active cooperation of these interested parties, is only one of the several joint projects designed to exploit the area and the people living there. The dam is supposed to generate 18,000 megawatt of electricity per year. It would also create a 150-mile lake in Zambezi valley which is rich in strategic mineral resources like iron, copper, manganese, nickel, chromium, coal etc. Part of the electricity produced by that project would be supplied to South Africa, but sufficient power and water supply would be left over to populate the valley with more white people. There are reports that about one million Portuguese and other Europeans would be settled in the area once the project is completed. Such a demographic imposition would link the 'white' regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia via Mozambique, and strengthen them still further.

Portugal, occupying two large colonies in southern Africa, Angola and Mozambique, controls the 'real estates' in which several Western powers are deeply interested, even to the extent of supplying arms and money to enable the dictatorial regime in Portugal to maintain its hold in southern Africa. France, as has been seen earlier, is a very valuable partner of Portugal. Another important partner is West Germany. West German investments in Africa are rising very fast, especially in southern Africa. To protect its economic interests West Germany has begun supplying arms to Portugal on a large scale. This has been true especially since 1961-62, when the Americans made a substantial reduction in their arms commitment to Portugal. According to one writer, the USA, between 1953 and 1961, granted military assistance to Portugal to the tune of $301.8 million. But only $40 million worth of military aid was offered to it during 1962-69.[14] The American military assistance to Portugal was given under the Mutual Security Aid Programme. It declined after 1961 mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, the USA was seeking to influence the newly-emerging African countries and was finding it very embarrassing to support the regime of Salazar. Secondly, the USA was no longer solely dependent upon the anti-submarine and communication base in the Azores, the Portuguese islands in the Atlantic, but had found alternative bases in Spain and Morocco. But there is no doubt that the arms supplied by the USA before 1962, and/or those manufactured in Portugal under the NATO specifications, helped in the creation of a war machine capable of maintaining the Portuguese stranglehold over its African colonies. There are reports that the USA is renewing its interests in the Azores base and might seek some facilities on the Mozambique coast also in return for large economic grants.

After the outbreak of large-scale insurgency in its colonies, Portugal depended more upon France and West Germany for new weapons. The two European powers seem to have replaced the USA and Great Britain in that field. France has supplied four *Daphne*-class submarines, four frigates, three patrol vessels, and an unspecified number of *Noratlas* transport aircraft and *Alouette* helicopters. The value of the French war material supplied to Portugal amounts to $100 million, West Germany has supplied Portugal with three corvettes, 13 small patrol launches and two squadrons of Italian *G-91* ground attack aircraft, manufactured under licence in West Germany. This is a very conservative estimate, since it is very difficult to find out the extent of the surplus war material sent to Portugal, either from the NATO stock or from the USA. It still remains unexplained as to how Portugal could acquire at a nominal price, several old *B-26 Invader* light bombers and *T-6* trainer aircraft, which have been modified for counter-insurgency operations. These outmoded and slow-moving planes, capable of loitering over the target for a long time, and possessing a good weapon-carrying capacity, are best suited for the type of counter-insurgency operations which are launched by Portugal in Africa. Any augmentation of this capacity would only strengthen Portugal's hands in suppressing the African population still further.

A new group composed of the 'white' regimes in southern Africa, and some Western powers like Great Britain, France, West Germany and the USA, is emerging as the powerful factor in the western Indian Ocean. In the context of the global power politics, as well as in African politics, this combination would pose serious challenges to African aspirations and to peace and security in the Indian Ocean area. There is no doubt that this confrontation between the African resurgence and the Western dominance would create an explosive situation, which would be exploited by the interested parties. The Chinese, who have a remarkable talent for fishing in troubled waters, have already shown an inclination to use this crisis situation to their advantage.

The Chinese Presence

The Chinese objectives in the Indian Ocean area were not clearly defined in the 1950s. It would not be wrong to say that the Chinese did not have an Indian Ocean strategy either at that time or in the subsequent decade. Their strategic interests, militarily speaking, were defined by their armed strength and national defence policy which was, and still is, land-based. Moreover, the Chinese were busy during the first half of the 1950s in consolidating their position internally and in fighting in Korea. They were also interested in acquiring recognition from as many countries as possible, and hence, wherever possible, they adopted the position of a good, peace-loving Asian power. That posture can best be illustrated by their effusive hospitality during the Bandung Conference, and also by propagating the *Panch Sheel* as the basis of inter-state relations.

It should be noted that China had started cultivating the Afro-Asian states even before the Russians revised their policy *vis-a-vis* the non-aligned states. The Chinese even went a step ahead and not only cultivated the non-aligned countries like India, Indonesia and Egypt, but also a country like Pakistan which was a member of the SEATO and the CENTO. Premier Suhrawardy visited Peking in October 1956, and Chou En-lai returned the visit in December. The joint *communique* issued in Karachi on 24 December emphasized Sino-Pak friendship despite the divergence of views on many problems, and it was stated that no real conflict of interests existed between the two countries. The Chinese, by equating Pakistan with India in the Indian subcontinent, were keeping their options open even when they were professing open friendship with India. But, that image of a peace-loving China was rudely shaken after 1958-59. Growing Sino-Soviet tensions, which came out in the open in the shape of ideological confrontation between the two communist countries, the Sino-Indian border conflict, the alleged involvement of China in the internal affairs of Indonesia and the Chinese support to Arab communists against Nasser showed the other side of Chinese diplomacy.

Sino-Soviet rivalry in the initial period remained confined primarily to ideological and political levels. It not only split the international communist movement, but also had its impact upon several Afro-Asian solidarity movements which were used by both the sides, sometimes to the utter disgust of the Afro-Asian countries, to maintain an ideological or political one-upmanship over the other. The third conference of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, held at Moshi in February 1963, was marked by such a clash. The result was that the next conference, which was held in Ghana in 1965, aroused much less enthusiasm on the part of the Afro-Asian members. The Second Conference of the Afro-Asian countries, which was to be held at Algiers in 1965, was also postponed, partly due to Chinese intransigence on the question of Soviet participation.

China's rift with the Soviet Union, and the open hostility from some of its erstwhile Afro-Asian friends, which isolated China still further, probably explains why China began following an 'aggressive' policy in the region. It did not have to compete with the Western powers only, but also with the Soviet Union and Asian states like India. In south Asia, China tried to come closer to Burma, Ceylon, Nepal and Pakistan, so as to isolate India. In the Arab world, China patched up its differences with the UAR. In Africa, it began to cultivate Ghana and Guinea. Nearer home it tried to settle the problem of the people of Chinese origin in Indonesia by agreeing to repatriate some of them. These moves not only enabled China to form an Afro-Asian group which was sympathetic to it, but also to neutralize, to some extent, the non-aligned countries when it attacked India in 1962.

By 1960, Chinese interests in the Asian littoral of the Indian Ocean,

were more or less defined. China also attempted to get some advantage by supporting one littoral state against another in the regional conflicts. It supported Indonesia in its confrontation with Malaysia, Pakistan against India, and Yemen against Saudi Arabia. It benefited from such tactical adjustments but, by and large, it had reached a saturation point in its involvement in the Asian littoral of the Indian Ocean. Extra efforts would not have brought spectacular gains. Africa, on the other hand, was still largely an unexplored field for many big powers, and China also concentrated in Africa in the 1960s.

China got an entry into Africa via Egypt. The two countries had come closer during the Bandung Conference. A three-year trade agreement was signed in October 1956. Egypt recognized Peking on 16 May 1956. The Chinese not only gave political support to Egypt during the Tripartite Aggression, but also offered £1.6 million as a gift. They also inaugurated with great fanfare, registration offices in China, where about 250,000 Chinese 'volunteers' registered themselves to fight for Egypt. Cairo also became a base from where the Chinese sought to influence the Algerian National Liberation Front. They were also interested in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, which had its head office in Cairo. Cairo had become an unofficial rendezvous for several African liberation movements, till their headquarters were shifted to other places like Algiers, Conakry and Dar as-Salaam.

The 1960s were the years of African independence, and the Chinese were interested in winning recognition from as many newly independent African countries as was possible. China had already come close to many north African countries. Among the sub-Saharan countries, Guinea was the first to grant recognition to China, which it did on 4 October 1959. Mali also recognized China in October 1960. Guinea was the major point of attraction for China at that time, because of the 'radical' orientation of its ruling elite. China offered economic and technical aid worth £25 million to Guinea. Chinese technicians were sent to work in Guinea. Similar agreement was also signed with Mali. There were plans in 1968 to link Guinea and Mali by a railway, which would also provide an outlet to the sea for Guinea which is a land-locked country. The plan is still under active consideration.

Ghana was another country with which China tried to develop good relations. Diplomatic relations were established between the two in July 1960. A cultural agreement and a friendship treaty were signed following the Peking visit of Nkrumah in August 1961. China tried to cultivate good relations with Somalia following its independence. £7.2 million were offered as a loan, and £1.05 million as a gift, by China to Somalia. China also supported the Greater Somalia Plan. China tried to come closer to the east African countries on the eve of their independence in 1964. Though it succeeded in winning over Tanzania, it had a hard time in convincing Kenya and Uganda of its good intentions.

Chinese presence in these two countries was badly tarnished by 1956. Their influence in Kenya suffered a set-back, following the expulsion of Oginga Odinga from the ruling party, KANU. The Chinese *Charge d'Affaires* was also expelled from Kenya in 1967. The island of Zanzibar, an important part of Tanzania, however, remains the spearhead of Chinese influence in the African littoral of the Indian Ocean. It is often called the 'Chinese Cuba'. From there the Chinese seek to influence local populations in Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, South Africa and Rhodesia. The Chinese have poured in massive economic aid in Tanzania and not only are supplying it military weapons but have also started there a very ambitious railway project which, when completed, would have an impact in Africa comparable to that of the Soviet-built High Dam at Aswan.

Chinese aid to Tanzania, amounting to $60 million was announced in Peking on 16 June 1964. The Chinese promised to construct a big textile mill near Dar as-Salaam. There were also plans to construct a 5,000-acre experimental farm and two high-powered transmitters in Tanzania with the Chinese assistance. A 10-year treaty of friendship was signed in Peking on 20 February 1965, when President Nyrere, along with the Zanzibar leader, Sheikh Mohammad Abdul Rahman, popularly known as Babu, visited Peking. Chou En-lai returned the visit in June the same year, and made a firm offer of Chinese aid for the construction of the Tanzam railway, linking Zambia to the Indian Ocean through Tanzania. A joint shipping line was also started in 1966 with Chinese aid.

Zambia, sandwiched between the two 'white' regimes and Portugal, and feeling dissatisfied with the Western policy on the southern African que tions, also decided to develop more friendly relations with China. A Zambian delegation, led by Vice-President Kamanga, visited Peking in August 1966 and an agreement on cultural cooperation was signed. President Kaunda disclosed on 20 October, that Zambia was considering an offer of Chinese economic aid to Zambia, an obvious reference to the Chinese offer on the Tanzam Railway.

The Chinese, lacking in economic resources and in military strength necessary to pursue a policy commensurate with their big power posture, and at times even Super Power pretensions, had to rely more upon political tight-rope-walking, ideological and political propaganda and a very judicious use of their economic aid and trade relations, to serve their national interests in the Afro-Asian world. Since China was competing, not only with the Western powers but also with the Soviet Union, it very often tried to project itself as a non-white power as opposed to 'white' powers. Another factor, which was widely used by China in projecting its image in the region, was that of a developing Afro-Asian country that had broken-off from the shackles of foreign imperialism and was rebuilding its socio-economic and political structure on a new basis, one that was distinct from that advocated by the developed countries. China, therefore,

offered its own model of national reconstruction, different, not only from the Western, but also from the Soviet and the East European models. It was suggested that, since the Afro-Asian countries had many things in common with China on the eve of its revolution, they could fruitfully employ the Chinese model and achieve the same rate of accelerated development as had been achieved by the Chinese.

Even though the Chinese thesis had several points to recommend itself to the Afro-Asian countries, it had a few practical difficulties. It presupposed that the urge to achieve an accelerated modernization would prompt the Africans to adopt the Chinese techniques like the communes. Undoubtedly, some Africans were impressed with Chinese experiments, yet they were politically too backward to adopt the rigid discipline of the communes. The Chinese were not successful in exporting their model to the Afro-Asian countries except in some isolated areas like Aden where local conditions are really backward, local resources grossly inadequate and the elite deeply steeped in leftist ideology. In other places they were content to start modernized farming, textile and cement factories and such ventures which were within the scope of both the parties to handle.

But whereas the Chinese failed to make much headway in selling their theory of economic growth, they were successful in propagating their doctrine of armed revolution and guerrilla warfare. The propaganda that Africa was ripe for revolution and that the revolutionary prospects were bright there, was repeatedly proclaimed by such senior Chinese leaders as Chou En-lai in Mogadishu during his first African tour on 3 February 1964, and again while addressing a mass rally at Dar as-Salaam on 5 June 1965. The Chinese thesis, arising out of the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy on the use of violence in anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle, not only gave the Chinese an opportunity to project themselves as better revolutionaries than the Soviets, but it also meant that the Chinese need not supply the insurgents with any large quantities of arms or heavy weapons that are not needed for the guerrilla-type warfare. Also, the theory of popular armed revolution permitted China to by-pass the established political groups in a given country and create nucleus groups, which would look towards China for political and ideological support as well as for material and military support. It was immaterial if the Chinese logic went against the *Panch Sheel*, split the revolutionary movement within a given country, or even endangered the position of the overseas Chinese in the area.

The Chinese have sponsored or supported several such movements in Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, India, Aden and the Persian Gulf, Palestine, southern Africa and elsewhere. Of them the movements in Burma, Malaysia, the Persian Gulf and in southern Africa are fairly strong and well established. Guerrillas operating under the direction of the pro-Peking White Flag party in Burma, who were active even earlier, began to get further support from Peking after 1967. They practically control the Kachin

area and the Shan State in north Burma, and are fairly active in central Burma. There were also border clashes between the Chinese and the Burmese troops in 1969. The National Liberation Front of Malaysia, though under control, also poses security problems for that country.

In West Asia, the Chinese have been active in supporting the armed struggle of the Palestinians. Though they support the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and *al-Fatah*, which is the dominant group, they also actively encourage the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, led by George Habash of the Arab National Movement (ANM), and its 'radical' wing, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is led by Neif Hawatameh. The Chinese involvement with the Palestinian guerrilla organizations not only gave it a legitimate entry into Arab politics, but also permitted it to pose as a more radical revolutionary country than the Soviet Union. The USSR had taken the stand that these guerrilla movements, instead of helping the solution of the Arab-Israeli problem, were complicating it still further. It, therefore, paid only lip-service to the PLO and *al-Fatah*. China thus scored a point, not so much in the UAR, which bore the brunt of the Israeli pressure, as in other Arab countries like Syria, Algeria, Sudan, Aden, Libya and Iraq which were demanding an intensified Arab-Israeli confrontation and full support to the Palestinian *fedayeen*.

The Chinese support to some Palestinian resistance groups had other advantages also. The ANM of George Habash, being a pan-Arab movement, had some links with the revolutionary movements in Aden. It is believed that through the ANM, the Chinese have been able to create a pro-Peking group among the guerrilla movements operating in south Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. The growing Chinese ideological influence in the People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf and the Democratic National Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf is causing concern even to the Soviet leaders. *New Times*, commenting upon it, said, "It is to be regretted that teachings of Marxism sometimes reach the PLF activists at second hand, in distorted versions."[15]

The Chinese have also sought to influence the liberation movements in Mozambique. It is well-known that the Chinese have links with the COREMO which is a small organization. They are trying to control the most powerful organization, the *Frente de Liberacaa de Mozambique* (FRELIMO), but have not succeeded so far. Dr Eduardo Mondlane, who organized the movement in 1962, was anti-Peking. Several efforts were made to eliminate him. He was finally killed when a time-bomb exploded in his house near Dar as-Salaam on 3 February 1969. Though there was no clue as to who was responsible for his death, it was alleged that he was killed by a pro-Peking worker in his organization. The person who claimed to be the successor of Dr Mondlane, Rev Uria Simango, was reported to be pro-Peking. Finally, it was announced that a three-member presidium, comprising Rev

Uria Simango, Senhor Marcelino dos Santos (former Political Secretary) and Senhor Samora Moises Machel (Commander of the Armed Forces) would replace Dr Mondlane. Thus, an attempt was made to prevent the pro-Peking group from dominating the FRELIMO. But the struggle for the leadership of the FRELIMO has just started. One does not know what shape it will take in the future. There is no doubt that the Chinese presence in Tanzania and Zambia and their support to the most powerful liberation movement in Mozambique, give them a great leverage in the politics of southern Africa.

Apart from the liberation movements active in the Afro-Asian countries, the Chinese also took advantage of several organizations to spread their influence in the area. They are a very important member of the Cairo-based Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, which began operating since 1957. The National Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of China and the Chinese Institute for African Affairs were both formed in 1960. The growing Chinese interests in Africa were reflected in the formation of the Chinese-African People's Friendship Association in 1961, and Asia-Africa Society in 1962. 'Friendship organizations' between China and several Afro-Asian countries were created. Islam was also used to serve the Chinese objective of penetrating areas with large Muslim populations. The China-Islam Association was formed as early as May 1953. Burhan Shahidi, who was its Chairman for a long time, was also Deputy Chairman of the Chinese-African People's Friendship Association and President of the Friendship Association of China and the UAR. Most of these fronts not only seek to further Chinese influence but are also used by the Chinese to undermine the influence of their local rivals and of the Soviet Union. No wonder some of these Afro-Asian organizations, which might have helped in bridging the gap between the Afro-Asian countries, have, partly because of the Chinese activities, widened the chasm among them.

Economic and technical aid and bilateral trade agreements also help China in spreading its influence in the area. A classical example of the Chinese policy of economic penetration of the area is its trade pattern *vis-a-vis* Ceylon (now called Sri Lanka). The Chinese went out of their way to gain a presence in Ceylon in the first half of the 1950s, even though the regime there was hostile to them. At that time Ceylon was faced with the problem of selling its rubber and of acquiring rice. The international price of rubber had declined in the Western market due to the cheaper production cost of synthetic rubber. Also, the international price of rice had gone up. China took advantage of Ceylon's economic difficulties and entered into a rice-rubber deal, which was economically advantageous to Ceylon. The deal was renewed every year. It was very useful for China too, because Ceylon was the only rubber-producing country which was prepared to sell that strategic raw material to China. At that time, Malayan rubber was denied to the Chinese. Thus, there was a mutuality of interest in the rice-rubber deal.

Besides the rice-rubber deal, there were offers of loans. In 1957, an agreement was signed under which China agreed to loan to Ceylon a sum of Rs. 75 million for rubber plantations. In return Ceylon agreed to encourage the sale of Chinese goods in Ceylon. Another loan amounting to about Rs. 50 million was offered in 1958. Repayment was to be made either in Ceylonese goods, or in the currency of a third country, to be agreed upon by the two countries. The Chinese also agreed to construct a textile factory as gift. They also offered Rs. 20 million worth of loan to import Chinese textiles in 1964. Another loan agreement was signed in June 1971. Chinese economic aid and the rice-rubber deal made Ceylon dependent upon the Chinese to some extent and put Ceylonese foreign policy, especially *vis-a-vis* the Sino-Indian dispute, under some constraints. Now, the Chinese are also trying to come closer to Malaya. They have supported the stand that the Straits of Malacca be considered as a closed sea. They might also like to purchase some rubber from Malaya. What possible effect this shift would have upon Sino-Ceylonese relations still remains to be seen.

Another Indian Ocean country where the Chinese have projected themselves as aid-givers, is Pakistan. Following the Pak-US estrangement over the Sino-Pak detente after 1963, the Chinese offered $60 million aid to Pakistan on 19 February 1965. It was subsequently increased to $67 million. Another large package of Chinese economic aid was offered on 26 December 1968. That loan of Rs. 200 million (over £17.5 million) was interest-free and repayable after 20 years. The new loan was for the purchase of Chinese goods by Pakistan. China also entered into barter trade with Pakistan. In addition to that, agreements on a shipping service and an air-link were signed. China also constructed the strategic Karakoram highway, which was opened for traffic in February 1971. Difficulties faced by Pakistan due to its actions in 1971 will make it lean even more upon China in future.

Further west, the Chinese have been active in developing economic ties with Yemen and Aden. Their aid to Yemen totals $44.5 million, but the emphasis shifted to Aden only after its independence in 1968. The 'radical' leadership, its acceptance of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology, and its support to the liberation movements in south Arabia and the Gulf have forged close ties between Aden and China. The Chinese are also competing with the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc countries in Aden and have poured in £23 million as loan in that small country. Even though the amount is not comparable to the Soviet aid, it permits them to send doctors, economists, agricultural experts and other technicians and to maintain their links with the liberation movements operating from Aden.

The Chinese also tried to develop contacts with Somalia. In 1963, they offered it £7.2 million as loan and £1.05 million as gift. A trade agreement was also signed between the two countries. Chou En-lai, during his visit to Somalia, supported the Greater Somalia Plan. But the Chinese

failed to obtain the same response in Somalia as they had obtained in Aden, Pakistan and Tanzania. Massive Soviet presence in Somalia was a great hindrance to them. They, however, continued to maintain their economic links with Somalia and waited for a better opportunity. In October 1969, it was reported that the Somalia Government was facing some difficulty as regards the Soviet aid programme and was making overtures to China. A Somali delegation visited China in June 1970 and an agreement was reached promising more Chinese aid to Somalia. The Chinese also succeeded in making an entry in Ethiopia, despite the fact that they were supporting Somali claims over Ethiopian territory. An economic agreement between the two was signed on 9 October 1971, during the Peking visit of the Ethiopian emperor. Under that agreement China agreed to give $35 million as loan for agricultural developments in Ethiopia. The loan is to be repaid in Ethiopian goods.

The Chinese have also come closer to Sudan. They have been maintaining fairly close trade contacts with that country since its independence, but they came even closer following the second army *coup d'etat* of 1969. General Nemery visited China in August 1970, and an agreement on economic cooperation was signed on 24 August. Under that agreement China agreed to help Sudan with a loan of $40 million, which was to be utilized for the construction of roads and bridges and for the construction of a textile factory. The Chinese have come still closer to the Sudanese regime after General Nemery re-established his power, following the *coup* and counter-*coup* in July 1971. A high-powered Sudanese delegation led by Major-General Khalid Hassan Abbas visited Peking in December 1971 and obtained an additional $40 million loan, thus raising the total amount to $80 million—a big figure in the Chinese aid programme. It is expected that Sino-Sudanese relations would improve still further because of the anti-Soviet bias of the new regime in Sudan.

The Chinese have deep commitments in Tanzania and Zambia. As early as in 1964, the Chinese offered Tanzania an interest-free loan amounting to $61 million. Again, in 1966 they offered a loan of $7.5 million to help Tanzania when that country broke off its relations with Great Britain on the Rhodesian question. Thus, as far as the Chinese aid programme was concerned, Tanzania was competing with Guinea, which had received about $70 million Chinese aid. But with the construction of the Tanzam railway, the Chinese economic interests in these two southern African countries would increase tremendously.

The offer for the Tanzam railway project was made in June 1964, when the first Chinese loan was offered to Tanzania. The offer was confirmed during the visit of Chou En-lai in June 1965. Zambia was still reluctant to agree to it because of the possible repercussion it might have upon its relations with the Western powers, who had a strategic interest in Zambian copper and who had invested heavily in the copper mines there. But, their attitude on the problems of southern Africa finally forced Zambia to

come closer to Tanzania and China. Even though no final agreement had been reached, the Chinese, under an agreement reached on 9 April 1968 in Dar as-Salaam, began conducting a survey for the proposed rail link. The equipment for the proposed construction began to reach Dar as-Salaam in October 1969. The final agreement on the construction of the railway was signed by the delegations from Tanzania and Zambia in Peking on 12 July 1970.

Under this agreement, the Chinese agreed to grant an interest-free loan of £170 million, repayable over a period of 30 years. It is also reported that Tanzania and Zambia have agreed to buy consumer goods from China to the value of the locally incurred cost of construction which would include local purchases and wages. This is supposed to be about half of the total cost of the construction. It would permit China to pour its consumer goods in the markets of these two countries. This single-track railway, which would connect Kapivi Mposhi, in the copper belt about 135 miles north of Lusaka, with Dar as-Salaam, would be about 1,000 miles long. When completed, it is expected to carry 1.75 million tons of freight per year, thus enabling Zambia to export all of its copper ore via Dar as-Salaam. The work is progressing very rapidly. Thousands of Chinese workers are busy trying to complete that line in record time. When completed the project not only would boost the Chinese image in Africa, but also might enable China to secure more road and railway communication projects in that part of the world. The Chinese hope to complete the project by 1974.

Military aid does not have the same prominence in Chinese strategy as it has in American or Soviet strategy, for the simple reason that China does not have the capacity to match their military aid programmes. But the Chinese do have a modest military aid programme which can be broadly divided into two categories : aid for insurgency operations and aid for conventional warfare. Pakistan is probably the only country where the Chinese have poured in substantial arms aid, amounting to more than $133 million. They have supplied about 225 *T-59* medium tanks, one squadron of *Il-28* light bombers, four squadrons of *MiG-19* fighter-bombers, several patrol boats (probably armed with surface-to-surface missiles) and an undisclosed but reportedly massive amount of light infantry weapons to Pakistan after 1965. More material was offered after 1971. There are also reports that the Chinese have supplied tanks, mortars, *MiG-19* aircraft, about six patrol torpedo boats along with an undisclosed amount of light infantry weapons to Tanzania. Ceylon also is receiving military aid from China, especially patrol boats.

The Chinese are reported to be active in supplying material for insurgency operations to several 'liberation movements' operating in the Indian Ocean area. They have openly accepted the fact that they not only supply weapons but also train guerrillas operating in south Arabia, the Persian Gulf and southern Africa. They supply weapons like rifles and light automatic weapons and possibly mortars and rockets. There are reports that

they have also supplied a few light anti-aircraft guns to the guerrillas in Dhofar region of south Arabia. The Chinese have become a major source of arms for the FRELIMO, through the contact points in Tanzania and Zambia. Other organizations like the African National Congress operating in South Africa, the South West African People's Organization and the Zimbabwe African People's Party (ZAPU) operating in Rhodesia also get some of their arms from China. Some of the Chinese arms are delivered directly, while others are routed through the African Liberation Committee which operates under the Organization of African Unity.

Thus, a brief survey of the Chinese presence in the area shows a very rapid development of the Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean littoral. Within a short period the Chinese have also been able to establish links with several countries like Ceylon, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Aden, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia and Mauritius where Chinese have offered an economic aid worth £14 million. There is no doubt that during the same period the Chinese suffered set-backs in countries like Indonesia, India and Kenya. Also, the Sino-Soviet rift posed some problems for them. But, the Chinese, despite these handicaps, have strengthened their position and have been able to establish themselves firmly in this area. They have developed some very strong and probably long-lasting links with important countries like Pakistan, Ceylon, Aden and Tanzania, which would enable them to operate more freely in the Indian Ocean in the future. There is no doubt that the Chinese have firmly established the basis of their presence in the Indian Ocean area.

The Indian Ocean area would gradually become more and more important for China for a variety of reasons. It has already developed serious economic interests in several littoral states. With the passage of time China's export potential would develop and it might like to have areas which are comparatively free from international competition which it can exploit. Its increased economic aid programme, which permits the recipient country to make the repayment in local goods, opens a valuable avenue for future economic penetration of the area, on the basis of barter trade. If the Tanzam project is an indication, it seems that the Chinese would use huge economic ventures to dominate some select areas of the region so as to maintain a dominant presence there.

Another interesting speculation about Chinese economic interests in the Indian Ocean area, especially in the Persian Gulf (also called the Arabian Gulf) region, deals with the growing Chinese oil requirements and the possible entry of China as an oil customer.[16] Till now the Chinese have not had friendly relations with the countries of this region, except with Iraq with which they developed political and economic ties after the 1958 *coup d'etat*. Now the Chinese are coming closer to other oil-producing countries like Kuwait and Iran. The new oil diplomacy has been effective, and it is believed that the Chinese have started receiving a modest amount of oil from this region.

Undoubtedly the Chinese have invested heavily in oil exploration in the

mainland, especially after their estrangement with the Soviet Union which was an important source of oil supply for them. Even during the period 1952-57, when Sino-Soviet relations were very good, the Chinese had been conducting oil explorations with the help of the Soviet Union. Considerable success had been achieved. Chinese oil production was reported to have reached six million tons by 1962. But China was still importing about three million tons of oil per year. After the Sino-Soviet rift, the Rumanians filled the oil-gap but only partly. An accelerated oil exploration programme raised the oil output in China in 1966 to somewhere between 10 to 12 million tons which was also the consumption limit under an austerity programme. The 'cultural revolution' had a temporary adverse effect, but by 1969 Chinese oil production was reported to have touched the 20-million ton mark.

But they would need much more oil in the future. Chinese economy is still largely coal-oriented and oil consumption is restrained. They cannot ignore the growing need for oil, not only for industrial modernization, but also for the army, air force and navy—especially for the navy. The Chinese have a considerable number of naval vessels, though not many of them have a capacity to operate on the high seas away from the home base. If they have to increase their naval presence in the Indian Ocean, in South-East Asia and in the Pacific, they will have to develop their naval capacity, especially in terms of large surface vessels. Any such programme would put a heavy demand on their oil resources. China's growing merchant marine, which has nearly doubled itself since 1960, would also need more oil. Modernization of the rural sector and of the urban transport system, by an enhanced use of tractors and motor transport, and the planned increase in commercial flights would also need more oil. All these new demands would compel China to procure more oil than it can hope to produce.

Undoubtedly China is reported to be rich in oil resources. Oil resources in the China Sea are supposed to be substantial. But China is not in a position to tap her off-shore oil potentials. At least for some time to come she will have to depend upon foreign oil resources to meet its national requirements in the late 1970s. These resources are limited. The Indonesian oil is under severe competition from Japan. The Rumanian oil supply is not only limited but also involves a long detour because of the closure of the Suez Canal. Only Persian Gulf oil thus offers the best possibility in terms of shorter distance and also lesser competition.

One possible reason given for China's support to the 'liberation movements' in south Arabia and the Persian Gulf region, was that China was hoping to have easy access to the oil there once the movement succeeded in 'liberating' a part of the area. But there seems to have been some rethinking in the matter. The prospects of these movements liberating the area are far from bright. The British withdrawal has taken the sting out of the 'anti-imperialist' propaganda and local Arab states and Iran have shown a willingness to use unlimited force to contain the

movement. It seems that the possible demand for the oil in future has compelled the Chinese leaders to modify their oil diplomacy. Instead of waiting for the 'liberation' of the Persian Gulf area they now seek to procure their oil as normal customers. It still remains to be seen what effect the new oil diplomacy would have upon the Chinese interests in the 'liberation movements' in the region. It is difficult to see how they can seek oil from Kuwait and Iran and yet continue to support these movements. Undoubtedly, Chinese pragmatism would find an ideological solution to that problem also.

Chinese oil diplomacy in the Persian Gulf region began in earnest in 1971. China signed an economic aid agreement with Iraq on 21 June 1971, under which it undertook to help Iraq in developing its oil resources and industries. There are possibilities of an independent Chinese oil exploration in Iraq, but it will not be easy since the Chinese would have to compete not only with the established Western oil companies but also with the growing Soviet oil interests in that country. In 1971, China also came very close to Iran, thanks to Pakistani mediation. On 16 August 1971, the ambassadors of these two countries in Pakistan signed a joint *communique* on the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Iran also said that it recognized the Peking regime as the sole legal government of China. Earlier, it had supported the Taiwan regime. In April 1971, Princess Fatemah, sister of the Shah of Iran, visited China as an official guest and paved the way for the Sino-Iranian detente. It is possible that China may enter into agreements with the national oil companies in Iraq and Iran for the supply of oil to China. Such a development would adversely affect the growing economic and oil collaboration between India and these two countries because both India and China would like to draw from the limited oil resources which are available to those national oil companies. The energy crisis and the reduction in oil production after the October 1973 war has complicated the situation still futher.

Beside economic penetration, China would also like to compete, not so much with the West as with the Soviet Union, for political support in the region. The Chinese have already achieved a fair amount of success in this field and have neutralized the earlier exclusive Soviet presence in many of the countries in the area. In some of these countries like Pakistan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia, they have even replaced the Soviet presence. As time moves, the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the area may become more intense and might pose problems for the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. The Indian subcontinent is at present feeling the side-effects of this rivalry. The Chinese, in their bid to neutralize the growing presence of the USSR, are busy inciting Pakistan against India and Bangladesh. It might hamper an early resolution of the conflict. The Persian Gulf, Horn of Africa and southern Africa, would also feel the effects of that rivalry in the near future. But, it is doubtful if China can successfully compete with a Super

Power like the Soviet Union, because of its limited economic and military capabilities.

It would take some time for China to be a naval power in the Indian Ocean. Chinese naval capacity to operate on the high seas is severely restricted by the lack of adequate surface vessels to balance its submarine fleet. China has no aircraft-carriers and no possibility of acquiring any in the near future. It has four destroyers and about eleven patrol escorts. But even this small number connot be maintained on the high seas due to the lack of adequate supply ships and oil tankers. In fact, the Chinese naval capacity is much less than that of Japan.

Till now Chinese naval strategy is subordinated to the concept of land warfare which means that the primary task of the Chinese navy is the defence of its coast-line. It is primarily equipped for that purpose. The Chinese navy has 35 submarines, four destroyers. 11 patrol escorts, 24 submarine chasers, 15 missile boats of the *Osa* and *Komar* class, 320 motor gunboats, 220 torpedo boats, 530 landing ships and craft, 75 mine-sweepers and 100 *Il-28* jet-bombers capable of launching torpedoes. Even though this is not adequate to defend about 14,000 miles of the Chinese coast-line in an area saturated with Super Power presence, such a combination of naval weapons clearly reflects the shore-based defence strategy of the Chinese. They are not even a Pacific power, as far as their navy is concerned. It will be difficult for them to suddenly modify their existing naval capacity to suit the new naval requirements in far-away areas in the Indian Ocean.

Yet it does not mean that the Chinese, if they so wish, have no means of maintaining a modest naval presence in the Indian Ocean. They have already developed very close links with Ceylon, Pakistan and Tanzania. They have constructed a naval dockyard in Dar as-Salaam and have supplied six patrol torpedo boats to Tanzania. It is reported that the Chinese may offer some submarines, and even missile boats to Pakistan in return for dockyard facilities in Karachi or Gwadar. If the Chinese really come close to Ceylon, Pakistan and Tanzania and succeed in developing closer links with them, they may even succeed in giving air support to their vessels in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan already flies *Il-28* light-bombers which are a gift from China. The *Il-28* has a radius of about 850 miles which would cover a good part of the Arabian Sea. If Pakistan had been able to keep Bangladesh under its occupation, the Chinese capacity to operate in the Bay of Bengal would also have been enhanced. But even without that facility, the Chinese have enough potential to cause some tension in the area. Any Sino-Pak collusion can create a state of danger for the littoral states including India and for the big powers in the Indian Ocean. How the big powers and the Indian Ocean powers would react to an eventual Chinese naval presence in the area still remains to be seen. It does create anxiety on the part of the littoral states, especially in view of the newly emerging axis comprising Pakistan, China and the USA. If

the two Super Powers neutralize each other, local powers like India will have to face the task of neutralizing the joint presence of China and Pakistan in the Arabian Sea. It will strain India's limited naval capabilities which, at the moment, are fully stretched. This, moreover, does not take into account the Chinese nuclear programme. At the moment the Chinese have an old Soviet submarine which is capable of launching three *Polaris*-type missiles. The Chinese do not have the missile as yet. But it is possible that they may decide to follow the new trend in the weapon system and follow the lead given by the big powers. In that case a Chinese nuclear presence in the Indian Ocean may complicate the problem still further, though the fact that the Chinese have voted for the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean in the UN General Assembly, in December 1971, is some consolation for the littoral states of the Indian Ocean.

The Japanese Interest

Japan is another power which can play a significant role in the politics of the Indian Ocean. It has vital economic stakes in the area and is capable of projecting a naval image to protect them. Several littoral states and all the big powers cannot forget those crucial days during the Second World War when Japan established its naval supremacy over the Western Pacific Ocean and dominated the Far East and South-East Asia. The post-war economic reconstruction of Japan and major advances made by it in the technological field have once again projected that country as a potential big power whose policies can affect the Indian Ocean area.

Japan has vital stakes in keeping its sea-lanes open. It depends upon foreign trade for its economic and, therefore, its national survival. Japan's annual imports exceed 300 million tons. These include about 200 million tons of oil, which feeds Japan's industries. Japan is also a very important maritime power. It does not depend upon foreign shipping for its maritime trade but operates the second largest maritime fleet in the world. Ships and oil tankers totalling 35 million tons dead-weight are registered in Japan. Liberia comes first with about 52 million tons dead-weight. But since the Liberian flag is flown mostly by foreign nationals and companies it would not be wrong to accord Japan the most important place in world shipping. Great Britain and Norway follow Japan. Japan's maritime position is also strengthened by the fact that it is the most important ship-building nation in the world. In 1969, Japan constructed 432 ships with 15.6 million ton dead-weight. West Germany, the second most important ship-building state, followed it with only 2.66 million tons ; Sweden was third with 1.97 million tons.

Japan imports all of its crude oil, iron ore, bauxite, nickel, wool and cotton and about 90 per cent of copper. Oil imports thus play an important part in Japan's economic strategy. About 91 per cent of the crude oil used in Japan is imported from West Asia and about eight per cent from South-East Asia. Thus, without the oil from the

Indian Ocean area, the Japanese economy would grind to a halt. Earlier, Japan was purchasing crude oil from the oil companies operating in the area, but since the 1950s it has entered into competition with the established oil firms for the prospecting and production of oil in West Asia. In 1958 Japan obtained oil concessions in the off-shore areas of the neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Oil production in these fields—the Khafji oil fields—started in 1961. Now, these fields supply about 11 per cent of Japan's crude oil. In 1967, Japanese firms gained concessions for 1,700 square miles of the off-shore area belonging to Dubai. Oil was found in 1969. In 1968, Japan won, against stiff competition from American and Italian firms, a concession for 2,510 square miles area in Abu Dhabi. It also obtained concessions in Qatar and Egypt in 1969. Japan is also trying hard to gain an access to Libyan oil. Thus, within a short time, the Japanese oil interests have established a firm foothold in West Asia, and have successfully competed with well-established Western oil companies in the difficult and more sophisticated task of off-shore oil exploration. The Japanese, by out-bidding the traditional oil companies, offered better terms to the local states and thus started a chain reaction which enabled the local oil producing and exporting states to acquire better terms from the established Western oil companies as well.

Japan's oil interests in the area have enabled it to further its economic links in other fields also. Kuwait has ordered several freighters and four sea-water distillation plants, each with two million gallons per day capacity. In 1968 Japan set up an oil refinery in Jeddah. Saudi Arabia has also asked Japan to develop its iron resources in the Red Sea coast. Japan's trade with the West Asian region has also shown a marked rise. Its exports as well as imports have more than doubled since 1963-64. Its export to the area increased from $ 213.3 million in 1963 to $ 503.2 million in 1968. During the same period its imports increased from $ 775.6 million to $1,802.6 million in 1968.[17] The closure of the Suez Canal has enabled Japan to forge better economic relations with countries east of the Suez and has boosted Japan's ship-building programme. Huge super-tankers and bulk carriers are being constructed in the Japanese shipyards to transport oil and other freight via the Cape of Good Hope at a competitive cost.

The Japanese have the dubious distinction of being accorded the status of 'white men' in South Africa, a country with which the Japanese have always maintained close economic ties. At present, South Africa and Japan are collaborating in the joint exploitation of copper ore in Angola, iron ore in Mozambique, and also in a joint fish-processing plant in Mozambique. Within a few years, Japanese bulk carriers of 150,000 tons would be calling at the new port at Richard's Bay, north of Durban, and hauling iron ore to Japan.

Oil from the Persian Gulf and South-East Asia, iron, copper, and

manganese from southern Africa and India, cotton, wheat and wool from India and Australia—all vital to Japan's economy—and the increasing trade mostly carried in ships flying the Japanese flag, all these make the Indian Ocean area a matter of vital national interest to Japan. At the moment, Japan has neither attempted to enter into the politics of the Indian Ocean area, nor tried to use its economic potential to browbeat the local powers into accepting a policy more favourable to Japan. But one doubts if Japan can continue to play for long the enviable role of an honest merchant, without using non-economic means to protect what it feels are its vital interests. Any move by Japan to protect and promote its interests would bring it into clash with local states, especially those which, during the Second World War, had come under Japanese occupation or had been threatened by it.

The fear of Japanese dominance has already begun to influence the policies of the South-East Asian states. In 1971, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore pooled their resources to conduct an oceanographic survey of the Straits of Malacca. Indonesian survey ships conducted the survey and the finances were made available by the Japanese. It was supposed to be a good experiment in regional cooperation, and everyone was happy till, Indonesia and Malaysia declared the Straits of Malacca a closed sea. Even that would not have bothered Japan if the Indonesian Government had not planned to restrict the passage of ships of more than 200,000 tons in the narrow strait which was also a part of the closed sea. Probably, the oceanographic survey had revealed possible dangers to bigger ships in that area. The Indonesian Government argued that any damage to the super-tankers in the strait would pose serious pollution problems.

Japan reacted violently to what it considered as the freedom of the high-seas. About thirty super-tankers of more than 200,000 tons use the strait to carry the Persian Gulf oil to Japan. In other words, more than 90 per cent of Japan's oil supply was threatened. Indonesia suggested a longer route which was rejected by Japan. Now, Japanese shipping interests are canvassing for the internationalization of the Straits of Malacca. They suggest that the marine powers should take-over the control of that waterway to regulate navigation through it by an international convention. Japan would naturally be represented in it.

The Soviet Union has also opposed the suggestion of Indonesia and Malaysia that the Straits of Malacca be considered a closed sea. On 25 March 1972, the Soviet roving ambassador, L.I. Mendelvitch, declared that the Straits of Malacca was an international waterway and not a closed sea. Though the Soviets had earlier supported the Malaysian proposal for the neutralization of South-East Asia, they now feel that the new proposal by Indonesia and Malaysia might be used to deny to the Soviet navy, the use of the shortest route from their Pacific ports to the Indian Ocean. The Soviets feel that Malaysia and Indonesia are drawing too close to

the Western bloc, to be trusted completely in an area which is vital to the USSR, in the context of its global strategy. Other marine powers have not reacted overtly as yet either to the Malaysian-Indonesian claim or to the suggestion of Japan to internationalize the strait. But, it is obvious that a new conflict-situation is fast developing in and around the Straits of Malacca.

The Japanese have not projected a naval or military presence in the Indian Ocean since the Second World War. The stigma of the Second World War has not only created a hatred of Japanese militarism in South-East Asia, but has also created an anti-war feeling in Japan itself, especially among the younger generation. The new generation in Japan grew under the profound psychological impact of the atomic explosions in Nagasaki and Hiroshima. There was a positive revulsion against militarism. Moreover, the 1946 Constitution had renounced war as an instrument of national policy. The Japanese armed forces were disbanded after the Japanese surrender and Japan was not allowed to maintain an army. Defence of Japan was guaranteed by the American Occupation Forces which were stationed in Japan. That arrangement was legalized through the Mutual Security Treaty of 1951. Japanese, partly because of their psychological revulsion to war, and partly because they were denied the right to have regular armed forces, channelled their energy into an economic reconstruction programme.

But no state can unilaterally renounce the use of force in international relations and hope that others would respect it. Earlier, when Japan was under American occupation, the US troops were stationed in Japan. When the Korean War started, Japan's security was guaranteed by the Americans. In 1951, Japan and the USA signed the Mutual Security Treaty. In 1954, they signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. American involvement in Korea, however, saw a phased militarization programme of Japan under the guise of the Japanese Self-Defence Force. The Self-Defence Force gradually began to expand, and acquire more and more sophisticated weapons. By 1969, it numbered in all about 250,000 and its defence expenditure amounted to $1.3 billion. Japanese army or the Land Self-Defence Force numbers about 180,000 and is equipped with modern weapons. Its navy, or the Maritime Self-Defence Force, as it is called, was created in 1952 with the help of American naval vessels and maritime aircraft. It has developed into a formidable force now. Its air force, established in 1954, operates more than 300 *Sabre-jets* and *Starfighters*, which are manufactured under licence in Japan. It has also about 360 jet trainers like *T-33*, *T-36* and *F-104 DJ*, which can be armed if necessary. Very soon Japan would not only acquire *Phantoms* but would even start assembling them in Japan. Its air-defence is also strengthened with *Nike-Ajex* surface-to-air missiles which, if reports are true, are going to be replaced with *Nike-Hercules* missiles.

Since Japan is a maritime nation, it is essential that Japan should strive

to safeguard its lines of communication. Navy, therefore, has an important place in Japanese military strategy. The Fourth Defence Programme of Japan for the years 1972-1976, which is estimated to cost $16 billion, would strengthen the Japanese navy still further. It is expected that the Japanese navy would be strengthened with the addition of 60 new vessels, mostly destroyers, submarines and also some new under-sea detection devices and 100 anti-submarine warfare-aircraft.[18]

At the moment, Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force is a compact and hard-hitting navy. It has 10 conventional submarines, 27 destroyers (one of them armed with surface-to-air *Tartar* guided missile), 13 frigates, 20 fast patrol vessels, 10 motor-torpedo boats, four landing ships, two mine-layers, 35 mine-sweepers and several other support vessels. Its coast-guard commands 87 patrol vessels, 42 patrol craft, 169 coastal craft, 26 survey vessels and 26 tenders. Except for a few old vessels which were handed over to Japan by the USA in the earlier period, almost all the naval vessels are new and have been built in Japan. They are equipped with advanced radar, electronic equipments and anti-submarine devices. The Japanese have also acquired modern weapons like the *Tartar* surface-to-air guided missile and ASROC anti-submarine guided missile. There is great emphasis upon anti-submarine warfare and the weapon systems are geared to it.

Japan is still searching for a role in the Indian Ocean. It has already projected itself in the economic field, but the moment it seeks to project a political or naval presence, it is bound to be confronted with local hostility and international pressure. Till now Japan was happy to play second fiddle to the USA in the Far East and South-East Asia, but the dramatic detente between China and the USA in 1971–72 will force Japan to project an independent policy. Japan, of late, has been trying to come closer to the South-East Asian states especially in the economic field. There is no overt attempt to develop political or military alignment with local powers. But one can see a new trend in Japan's Indian Ocean policy. In 1969, a Japanese naval squadron, comprising four destroyers, made a goodwill tour of New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, India, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Taiwan. This was the first entry of the Japanese navy in the Indian Ocean after the Second World War.

In 1971, the Japanese sponsored the survey of the Straits of Malacca hoping thereby to have a say in the navigation of these water-ways. But, contrary to Japanese expectations, Indonesia and Malaysia decided to close the straits to vessels of more than 200,000 tons. Since the Straits of Malacca connect the Japanese industry with the oil wells in Persian Gulf, Japan would be forced to take steps to defend what it considers its rights in the Straits of Malacca. Japan has already proposed internationalization of the straits. It should be interesting to see how Japan would react if Indonesia decides to implement its decision to close the

straits to ships of more than 200,000 tons. Japan has also been toying with the idea of using a pipe-line across the Kra isthmus—the narrow neck of Thailand which separates the Bay of Bengal from the waters of South-East Asia—to bypass the Straits of Malacca. No definite stand has been taken on the issue as yet, but Japan may consider it seriously if its huge oil tankers are denied passage via the Straits of Malacca.

Experts on Japan talk about Japanese military revivalism as if it is a unique thing. Japan not only suffered great losses during the Second World War, but was also occupied by the USA. The American occupation as well as the atomic explosions influenced the Japanese in renouncing the use of force in international politics. Japanese youth was especially eager to see that Japan was not dragged once more into an armed conflict. But Japan has not been declared a non-violent state. It is not even a neutral state like Switzerland or Austria. On the other hand, Japan has been remilitarized, thanks to the Americans who hoped to use it in the Pacific against China and the USSR. But after the Sino-US detente, the Japanese may feel the need to dissociate themselves from the Americans and evolve an independent policy. Such a policy would be conditioned, by and large, by the relations which might develop between the four Pacific Powers : the USA, the USSR, China and Japan. It should be noted in this connection that there are heavy Japanese investments in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Indonesia. Japan has declared that South Korea and Taiwan are 'essential to the security of Japan'. Above all, the old mutual defence agreement between Japan and Taiwan is still valid and has not been repudiated by either party. Thus, whatever new pattern of power relationship might emerge in the Pacific, Japan, by the very nature of its economic resources and naval potential, would be playing an important part in it.

One cannot ignore distinct possibilities of Japan acquiring the *Polaris*-type submarines in the coming decades. It has the capacity to construct an atomic reactor to power the submarine. It has already constructed a maritime trading vessel powered by a nuclear plant. Also, it is quite well advanced in submarine construction programme, in electronics and missile technology. In fact, it already has two long-range rockets which are being used for space research by the Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science of Tokyo University. *Lambda-45*, a three-stage rocket, is capable of putting a 40 lb. pay-load into a 250-mile earth orbit. *M-4*, a two-stage rocket, is able to put a 300 lb. pay-load into a 300-mile earth orbit. The SLBM system would be the most obvious choice if Japan decides to have an independent nuclear force, because, unlike the USA, the USSR, China and India, Japan cannot afford a land-based nuclear deterrence. It just does not have enough land for the purpose of surviving the nuclear first strike. Assured second-strike capability with land-based missiles is almost impossible in the case of Japan.

Even if Japan does not develop a nuclear force, the Japanese navy has begun to acquire a conventional naval capability, which is expected to play an important role in the Pacific and in South-East Asia. Whether Japan would be willing to play a naval role in the Indian Ocean still remains to be seen because the Japanese navy is not yet equipped for long-range operations. Japan does not have aircraft-carriers or bases in the area which would be needed to provide air-cover to its fleet on the high seas in these far-away places. Japan would, however, be vitally interested in the freedom to navigate through the Straits of Malacca, which is the eastern gateway to the Indian Ocean. Since the Japanese have not as yet got entangled in the local conflicts in the Indian Ocean area, they would, in all probability, avoid venturing into the area as a naval power.

Foreign Interests and their Protection

The Indian Ocean and its littoral have gone through several phases of big power interests and commitments. Several European powers tried to establish their supremacy over there. Of them, Great Britain, thanks to its naval supremacy, succeeded to a large extent in consolidating its position. Others, like France, Portugal and the Netherlands, could not achieve the same predominance and had to be content with minor shares. The post-World War II era saw a decline in the presence of these established European powers, which gradually withdrew from the area, both politically and militarily. But their residual presence still obtains, especially in the economic field, and continues to affect their political and military thinking *vis-a-vis* this area.

The partial withdrawal of these traditional European powers was accompanied by the influx of new forces, both from outside the area and from within. The Cold War conflict brought the presence of the two Super Powers into this area, from which they had been absent till recently. Also, local powers like India, Australia, South Africa, Pakistan and Iran began asserting their role. The presence of all these powers, a natural result of the gradual evolution of regional and global balance of power, poses several challenges, not only to the outside powers which are operating there, but also to local powers which are caught in the web of international rivalries that very often have no roots in the Indian Ocean area.

The Western Powers argue that they have great economic stakes in the area, both on the high seas and in the littoral. There is no doubt that a large part of the trade and commerce, including the oil resources of this area is, directly or indirectly, controlled by them. This is partly due to the continuation of the pattern of trade which developed during the colonial era. To the extent such a trade benefits the countries of the area, it is welcomed. But the Western monopoly over this trade is being challenged by others like the Soviet Union, China, Japan and even India. In such a situation, guaranteeing the freedom of navigation on the high seas—an argument used by the Western powers to justify their

enhanced presence in the Indian Ocean—becomes an international responsibility and not the Western prerogative alone. By their logic every powerful maritime nation would be justified in patrolling all the oceans. The Russians and the Japanese, by using the Western argument, can justify their patrolling of the sea-lanes in the Atlantic, the Pacific or the Mediterranean. No power on earth has the capacity to implement such a policy, especially in peace times, or need do so, because freedom of navigation on the high seas is not only guaranteed under international law but is also accepted by all the nations as a valid concept. Piracy on the high seas is almost dead. Even the hijacking of a merchant vessel is a rare thing and whenever such events have occurred there have been specific reasons. Till a situation develops when the high seas become dangerous, the naval presence of outside powers only leads to enhanced tension and increased international rivalry. Also, if the piracy on the high seas is to be prevented, it can best be done by the littoral states and not by the outside powers.

Apart from normal trade and commerce, the Western powers are also interested in protecting their investments in the area. Of these investments, the oil investment is considered to be the most important, not only because it represents a substantial monetary investment but also because of the impact of oil on the industrial and military power of the West. The Western bloc countries have invested billions of dollars (the exact figure has never been totalled correctly) in the exploration, production, procuring, transportation and selling of oil from this region. Oil resources of Indonesia and the Persian Gulf area are being extensively exploited by them, though recently the Soviet and the Japanese oil firms have also shown a willingness to join in these ventures. A new trend is also developing. Some local powers have shown a willingness to enter into the exploration, processing and selling of oil. India, Indonesia, Iran and Iraq are the pioneers in this field.

No one doubts that the Western powers have an interest in the oil resources of this area. But it is also true, that whenever it has been necessary and possible, the local powers have not only done their best to protect these interests but have also encouraged them if they were beneficial to themselves. There were cases when local powers, which felt that their natural resources were being exploited by foreigners without payment of adequate compensation, nationalized the oil companies, as was done by Iran in 1952. In other cases, local powers took away a part of the territory of the concessions area, as was done by Iraq in 1960. The Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) itself has now been nationalized. But, by and large, no effort has been made to oust the Western companies, if they have been following a policy which can be considered as reasonable. There is no doubt that the oil-rich countries demand a greater share in the oil profit, but such disputes can be, and often are, settled peacefully and to the mutual advantage of the oil-

producing countries and the oil companies.

It should not be forgotten that the oil-rich countries of the region also have an interest in the continuation of oil production by these Western oil companies, because very often not only their economy but also their national reconstruction programmes depend upon their oil revenues. They are primarily oil-exporting countries and not oil-consuming countries. They want not only to produce but also to sell their oil products. Therefore, this mutuality of interest is perhaps the biggest protection the West has regarding its oil investment and oil production in the area. It is interesting to note that despite the Arab oil blockade following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, oil states like Saudi Arabia or the Gulf sheikhdoms have not nationalized foreign oil companies. Iran has not even joined in the oil blockade.

These oil investments and oil interests, therefore, do not need a Western military presence for their protection. Events have proved that even the Western military presence could not prevent a 'revolutionary' regime from coming into power. Neither the British bases in Iraq and Iraq's membership of the Baghdad Pact could prevent the 14 July 1958 *coup d'etat*, nor could the presence of British and American bases in Libya halt the anti-Idris *coup d'etat* in that country in September 1969. Thus, the best way for the West to protect its oil interests in the region is to treat it as a commercial venture. It need neither be used to threaten the oil-producing states with gun-boat diplomacy nor used as a pawn in the Cold War rivalry. Till now the Soviet Union has not shown any inclination to control the local oil resources. Instead, it is entering into a commercial competition with the West. Such an attitude not only puts the oil question in its proper perspective but also benefits the local states in the long run.

Apart from free navigation and protection of economic investments another argument, used by the Western powers for retaining or enhancing their presence in the area, is their desire to 'contain communism' politically, by establishing and maintaining pro-Western regimes, and militarily, by creating pro-Western alliances with the help of those regimes. Such a policy, in the past, not only entangled the area in Cold War rivalries but also involved some of the countries into direct military confrontation on behalf of the Super Powers. Moreover, since these local pacts were directed against the USSR, the Soviet activities in the area were given respectability under 'legitimate self-defence'. It would not be wrong to say that direct Western political and military involvement indirectly benefited the Soviet and the Chinese presence in the area after 1955. Now, when the Americans are operating their *Polaris* submarines in the Indian Ocean, the Soviets have also acquired a 'valid' reason to enhance their naval presence to counter the nuclear threat to their mainland from that quarter.

Moves and counter-moves of the Super Powers do provide 'legitimacy'

to each other's actions and reactions in a given area, but the fall-out of their Cold War rivalry either creates new conflict-situations or accentuates those that already exist in the area. After a passage of time Cold War rivalry and the local disputes become a part of a vicious circle, or of a chain reaction, which keeps the area constantly under high pressure as it does in a pressure-cooker. Occasionally, when the tension touches a high point, the lid is blown off and the world is faced with a breach of international peace and security—a shooting match between local powers under the umpireship of the Super Powers. The greater the Super Power involvement, the higher would be the number of local conflict-situations in a given area. The Indian Ocean area is no exception.

3

Conflict Situations in the Indian Ocean Area and Big Power Involvements

IT HAS BEEN the tragic history of the Indian Ocean area that foreign penetration of the littoral has very often been facilitated by local and regional conflicts. In the 15th century, the local rivalries in the Malabar Coast in India favoured the Portuguese in their efforts to contain the powers of the Zamorin of Calicut. In the 18th century, the local rivalry, between the Marathas on the one hand and the Moghuls and the Sidis on the other, helped the English in containing the emerging Maratha navy. These internal rivalries, by permitting outside powers to pursue a policy of divide and rule, are once again favouring foreign penetration in the Indian Ocean area. Under the pretence of trying to help a local power against its neighbour, the foreign powers even today seek to dominate it and to use its economic and military potentials to secure their local or strategic objectives. Despite the long history of colonial exploitation, the Third World still persists in letting itself being exploited by outside powers. It is indeed surprising, that the lessons of history have not been learnt as yet.

The Indian Ocean littoral has great economic potentials. Also the importance of the littoral states, in the context of the big power rivalry and their strategic interests, has increased much more since the introduction of the ocean-based weapon system as a basis of the new strategic deterrence. Since the control of the littoral would be essential, both for the successful operation of this system as well as for the neutralization of the possible threat from such a system, these big powers would like either to control as large a part of the littoral as possible or to deny it to their rival. That would not only give these powers some strategic advantages, but it would also enable them to protect their local political and economic interests. Thus, the strategic and the local interests

of the big powers are inter-locked in the Indian Ocean area.

These local conflicts have another dimension also. Whereas the Super Powers cannot resort to armed conflict for fear of unleashing a total war (the Berlin and the Cuban crises are examples of Super Power restraints), they have very often directly or indirectly allowed the local conflicts to flare up every now and then. The Korean War, the Indo-Pakistani wars and the Arab-Israeli wars could have been avoided. The war in Vietnam could have ended long ago. Several minor border skirmishes should not have taken place at all. A great deal of bloodshed in the Third World could have been avoided, to a large extent, if the big powers would have refrained from interfering in the local problems and from exploiting it to serve their own national objectives. These recurring armed conflicts not only widened the chasm between the states of the Third World, prevented the emergence of a unified Afro-Asian group and posed serious threats to international peace and security, but also chained the local states to big powers and Super Powers for their military supplies, thus making it much more difficult for them to break the cordon around them.

Roots of a majority of the present conflicts in the Indian Ocean area can be partly traced to the colonial legacies. Moreover, disputes like the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, the Indo-Pak conflict, the frontier questions in West Asia and north-east Africa, and the racial and colonial problems in southern Africa developed partly because of the direct or surreptitious foreign involvements. It is possible that at least some of them would have been amicably settled if the foreign powers had not attempted to play the game of divide and rule, and instead had left the local states alone. The ending of the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia and the settlements of the Yemeni dispute are the examples of conflict-resolution by local powers outside the context of the big power involvements. Such instances are, therefore, very reassuring to the people of the Third World.

South and South-East Asia

Many of the local disputes in the Indian Ocean area, which had started with the attainment of independence by these states, continue even today. Only one of them, the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia, has subsided. But, while it lasted, the British backing the Malaysians and the Chinese backing the Indonesians had created a tense situation in South-East Asia, during the period 1963–1966, which could have turned as explosive as that of Vietnam. It not only pushed Malaysia further in the orbit of the Western bloc but also posed a serious threat to the internal security of Indonesia. It offered Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand opportunities for stationing troops in Malaysia and Singapore. Easing of the tension between the two countries, following the *de facto coup d'etat* against Sukarno and the local communists in 1966, has resulted

in a greater collaboration between Malaysia and Indonesia, so much so that the Malaysian leaders are now thinking in terms of neutralization of the whole area—a great achievement towards conflict-resolution if one compares it with the confrontation period. In other areas conflict situations continue to persist.

Conflicts in South Asia mainly revolve around the colonial legacies following the artificial division of a homogenous subcontinent into four parts: West Pakistan, East Pakistan (the present-day Bangladesh), India, and the princely states. Such a division on the basis of religion and outdated legal treaties created artificial units. While the world was

progressing towards democracy, secularism, socialism and internationalism, an existing state was not only fragmented on the basis of religion but the division was also condoned by big powers as a *fait accompli*. The liberation of Bangladesh from its artificial links with West Pakistan not only proved the fallacy of partitioning the Indian subcontinent on the basis of an outmoded concept like religion, but also established that though religion could become a basis for nationalism in a politically underdeveloped country, it could not be used as the sole justification for creating artificial political entities which ignored historical, cultural, economic and political factors. It is but natural that the events in Bangladesh have led to a rethinking on the so-called 'two-nation' theory, both in India and Pakistan.

The other problem confronting the Indian sub-continent is the so-called Kashmir dispute. The issue arose out of the Pakistani aggression upon an Indian state which had legally merged itself with India and whose people over the period of more than two decades have not only constantly reaffirmed their faith in democracy, secularism and socialism but have also actively participated in the politics of India. Pakistan, having failed to occupy the whole of Kashmir by military means, used slogans like 'Islamic solidarity' and 'democratic right of self-determination' to acquire the remaining part of Kashmir. Twice, in 1965 and in 1971, it launched armed attacks so as to occupy more of the Kashmiri territory. The Pakistani dream of militarily occupying the whole of Kashmir remains unfulfilled till today. Even the Pakistani slogans of Islamic solidarity and self-determination have been buried by the Pakistani Army in the mass graves in Bangladesh. Yet, despite the fact that the people of Kashmir and of Bangladesh have rejected the concept of Islamic solidarity and Islamic nationalism, one of the basic factors of the partition of the Indian subcontinent, the Pakistani regime persists in its old propaganda, not so much to acquire Kashmir or regain control over Bangladesh, which it cannot hope to do, but to maintain the basis of its confrontation with India.

Pakistan has been consistently supported by several foreign powers *vis-a-vis* India. Even when it was known that Pakistan's membership of the Baghdad Pact (the CENTO) and the SEATO was directed not so much against the USSR or China as against India, the Western powers continued to grant military aid to that country thus creating a massive arms race in the sub-continent. Valuable economic resources and scarce foreign exchange were invested by India for arms procurement. One can understand the Western game in the subcontinent, which is based on the policy of divide and rule. It is also interesting to note that a Super Power like the USA has also joined hands with China to support the aggressive policies of the dictatorial regimes in Pakistan. The events of 1971 were a dramatic eye-opener for the people of South Asia, when they found a 'democratic' country and a 'revolutionary' country combining with the army

junta in Pakistan, in suppressing the revolutionary democratic movement in Bangladesh, and trying to intimidate India from preventing the people there from being massacred by the Pakistani Army and the *mujahids*. There is no doubt that the people of the Afro-Asian world, and especially the leaders of the 'liberation' movements, would note this collusion and draw their own conclusions from it.

The Sino-American collusion and support to Pakistan against India continues. It would create more tensions in the Indian sub-continent by boosting Pakistan's intransigence. There are distinct possibilities that the two powers might not only help Pakistan make good its losses in military hardware but also strengthen it still further. It should be noted that the Pakistani military strength was almost doubled after the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict. Pakistani armed forces have been further strengthened after the December 1971 conflict also. Such a policy would compel India also to invest more and more in its defence, at a serious cost to its economic development. It might even pose serious challenges to its policy of non-alignment. In return for their support to Pakistan, the USA and China hope to obtain facilities which would permit them to operate more freely in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean and to balance the increasing presence of India in the region. China, which maintains a direct road-link with Pakistan through the occupied Kashmir, might also seek military advantages against India in the western Himalayan region. There are possibilities that the ruling military-bureaucratic super-structure in Pakistan might even be propped up to enable these two powers to operate through it. Such a policy would further suppress the re-awakened democratic trends in Pakistan and would lead to a greater internal crisis in that country. Such a situation would make it all the more difficult for India to resolve its differences with Pakistan. Thanks to the big power involvement in South Asia the chances of a lasting Indo-Pak detente seem remote.

Persian Gulf and South Arabian Coast

Further West, the Persian Gulf area is faced with problems which are not only as intense as faced by the people of South Asia, but are also equally complicated. Several issues, often interconnected, are involved in this small area. Apart from the Super Powers and the big powers other forces involved in the Persian Gulf area are Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, several small but oil-rich sheikhdoms, and the liberation movements based in Aden and Oman. Internal instability, and the quest for political and military supremacy, have created an explosive situation in this region. Main disputes which have created conflict situations in the region are: the Iran-Iraq dispute on the *Shatt-al-Arab*, Iran's claims on Bahrain and three small islands in the Persian Gulf, the question of jurisdiction over the continental shelf which has rich oil resources, and the threats posed to the existing regimes by the liberation movements operating in the Gulf region and especially in Oman. Some of these disputes like Iran's


THE PERSIAN GULF
IRAN
KUWAIT
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
QATAR
FEDERATION OF ARAB EMIRATES
GULF OF OMAN
OMAN
THE SHATT AL-ARAB
OIL FIELD
OIL PIPE LINE
AIR FIELD
BUSHIRE
KHARG IS.
KEZERUR
SHIRAZ
FIROZABAD
JAHROM
LAR
BASTAK
BANDAR-E-LENGEH
BANDAR ABBAS
HORMUZ
QESHM
JASK
CHAH BAHAR
SAIDABAD
BAM
NEYRIZ
KUWAIT
MINA AL-AHMADI
MINA SAUD
KHAFQI
CYRUS
RAS AL-SAFFANIYAH
AL-PARSI
AL-ARABI
MANIFA
ABU SA FAH
RAS TANNURAH
BAHRAIN
BANDAR
AL-HUFUF
DOHA
ID AL-SHARQI
SASAN
UMM SHAIF
ZAKUM
ABU DHABI
BR ABU NUAYR
DUBAI
SHARJAH
AL-AJMAN
UMM AL-Q.
AL-FUJAYRAH
SUHAR
BURAIMI
MUSCAT
IBRI
NIZWA
RASAL-HADD
MASIRAH IS.
BANI FURUR
SURI
ABU MUSA
TUMB IS.
RAS AL-KHAIMA
UMM AL-QASR
BASRA
RUMAILA OIL FIELDS
ABADAN
KHOR AL-AMAYA OIL TERMINAL
MINA AL-AHMADI
MINA SAUD
KUWAIT
KILOMETRES
MILES

claims over Bahrain and the question of defining boundaries in the continental shelf between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have already been settled. Iran has also occupied the three islands in the Gulf which it claimed were a part of Iran. But, other questions are still unresolved and are likely to pose some problems in the future. They are liable to be exploited, either by the local powers or by outside powers, to create instability in one of the most important corners of the Arabian Sea.

Iran-Iraq Disputes

The July 1958 *coup d'etat* in Iraq, which overthrew the pro-Western regime and replaced it by a 'radical' regime, also led to a friction between Iraq and Iran. Tension, based on mutual fear, built up gradually over a decade and exploded in 1969 over the question of navigation in the *Shatt al-Arab*. On 19 April 1969 Iran denounced the 1937 treaty, which governed navigation in that international river. That treaty had fixed the low-water mark on the eastern (the Iranian) side of the *Shatt al-Arab* as the border between the two countries, thus giving Iraq sovereignty over most of the water-way. In some short stretches near the Iranian ports of Khorramshahr and Abadan, the boundary was fixed at the median line to enable Iran to control the shipping at its ports. The treaty also stipulated that all the ships in the *Shatt al-Arab* must fly the Iraqi flag and have Iraqi pilots, except in the vicinity of the Iranian ports. But that treaty was not a final document and was to be replaced by a more comprehensive agreement concerning navigation, pilotage etc.

Iran, while denouncing the 1937 treaty, based its stand upon the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus*. It claimed that the treaty had been concluded for the convenience of British vessels and said that it deviated from the accepted practice in international law which stipulates that the median line should be the basis of boundary in international rivers. It also accused Iraq of not complying with the terms of the treaty, which had stipulated that a more comprehensive agreement should be signed between the two riparian powers. Iran also accused Iraq of unilaterally collecting tolls on the *Shatt al-Arab* and not sharing it with Iran. It announced that its vessels would neither pay the toll nor fly the Iraqi flag while on the *Shatt al-Arab*. Iraq threatened to prevent the Iranian vessels violating the 1937 treaty from using the water-ways. There were military mobilizations on both the sides, and the naval and air forces of both the states were placed on full alert. As a test case Iran sent its cargo ship, escorted by its naval vessels and aircraft, in the *Shatt al-Arab*. No action was taken by Iraq.

Iraq, having failed to intimidate Iran militarily, initiated political and economic moves against it. Thousands of Iranians living in Iraq were expelled. Iran accused the Iraqi authorities of torturing them and sent a note to the Security Council, on 12 May 1969, protesting against the ill-treatment of Iranians in Iraq. Iraq also tried to create an Arab bloc

against Iran. In July 1970, President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr proposed an all-Arab defence organization to replace Great Britain in the Gulf region after the British withdrawal from the east of the Suez. Iraq suggested that the vacuum created by the British withdrawal be filled solely by the Arab people of the region. President Bakr rejected any non-Arab (Iranian) claim of sovereignty over any part of the Gulf. Even the name of the gulf was changed from the Persian Gulf to the Arab Gulf.

Iraq's bid to champion the cause of the Arab people of the Gulf was designed to create an Arab bloc in the region which it could lead in its confrontation with Iran. The concept of an Arab sovereignty over the whole of the gulf was also designed to deny any right to Iran to exploit the oil resources in the continental shelf in the region. Even though Iran and Saudi Arabia had reached an agreement on the continental shelf the agreement with Kuwait was still pending. Iraq had stated that it would not accept any agreement which might be reached between Iran and Kuwait. Iraq feared that an agreement between Iran and Kuwait would not protect its legitimate interests in the oil resources of the continental shelf. Iran protested strongly against Iraq's claims that the Gulf was an Arab gulf and should be under Arab sovereignty.

Iraq was not in a position to gain the total support of other Arab regimes in the region, against Iran. The 'radicalism' of the Iraqi regime was feared by several of the local traditional Arab regimes, which sought their over-all security, or in other words a *status quo*, by exploiting the Iran-Iraq rivalry. Iran also made a determined bid to come closer to the Arab regimes in the Gulf area so as to isolate Iraq. The result was that Iraq could not gain more than a token support from the Arab world in its confrontation with Iran, the token support being the acceptance of the change in the name from Persian Gulf to Arab Gulf. The Arab-Iranian Cold War on the question of the name of the Gulf is an index of how a local economic issue, which could have been settled through peaceful negotations and through the application of accepted principles of international law, was twisted to assume the shape of an international and even a racial conflict—Arab vs Iranian, or Semitic vs Aryan.

The other point of conflict between Iran and Iraq is about the Kurds, a regional minority inhabiting parts of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey and the Soviet Union. The Kurdish revolt against the Iraqi regime has been going off and on for about half a century. Several attempts to settle the problem have failed, the latest being the 15-Point Peace Plan agreed on 11 March 1970 between the Iraqi Government and the Kurdish leaders. The plan offered local autonomy to the Kurds within the Iraqi Republic. But no agreement was reached over the exact delimitation of the two areas, Kurdish and Arab, in Iraq. The point of conflict was Kirkuk, which is a major oil-producing area in Iraq and which is claimed by the Kurds as falling within the Kurdish zone. The issue was to be decided

by a plebiscite on 26 October 1970, but it was postponed. Iraq has been using its armed forces to suppress the Kurdish movement but without much success. It accused Iran of supporting the Kurds with arms. Iran has, however, denied it but has accepted that it has rendered humanitarian aid—food and medical aid—to the Kurds. Iraq also accused Iran, on 21 January 1970, of trying to overthrow the Baathi regime in Iraq. It led to the recall of diplomatic personnel of both the sides. The two problems, the *Shatt al-Arab* dispute and the problem of Kurdish minority would continue to disturb the Iraq-Iran relations in the near future also.

Problems of the Gulf

Other problems involving Iran and the Arab countries were the Iranian claims over Bahrain, the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf among the littoral states and the question of sovereignty over the disputed islands in the Gulf. Iranian claims on Bahrain were pressed vigorously, following the declaration by the British Government that it would withdraw its presence from the east of the Suez by 1971. Iran claimed that historically Bahrain belonged to Iran, and that it should return to Iran after the British withdrawal from the region. The Pan-Iranist party led by Mohsen Pezhekpur, also organized demonstrations in favour of Iran's claims over Bahrain. The Iranian claim was opposed by the ruling elite in Bahrain. The ruler of Bahrain, Sheikh Issa ben Salman al-Khalifa, drew closer to Saudi Arabia. It was announced on 17 January 1968 that Bahrain would be connected with a causeway to Saudi Arabia, a dramatic way of physically linking the island of Bahrain to the Arab mainland. Bahrain also tried at that time to have closer links with the proposed federation of the Gulf sheikhdoms. Iran, on 1 April 1968, protested to Great Britain against the inclusion of Bahrain in that federation.

The question of Bahrain had an adverse effect upon Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and upon the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf which was being discussed between them at that time. The question of Bahrain was finally solved following the intervention of the United Nations. The Sheikh of Bahrain stated in London, on 21 September 1969, that a UN Commission should ascertain the wishes of the people of Bahrain. The Shah of Iran showed his willingness to accept the solution of the question on the basis of the 'will of the people' during his press conference in Delhi on 4 January 1970. After long diplomatic negotiations, Iran requested U Thant on 7 March to use his good offices to settle the Bahrain question. Great Britain also gave its concurrence on 20 March. On 28 March, U Thant agreed to use his good offices and appointed Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, Under Secretary and Director-General of the UN office at Geneva, as his Personal Representative. The UN Fact-finding Mission visited Bahrain for the period

30 March to 18 April 1970. On the basis of its recommendations, submitted to U Thant on 2 May, the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution on 11 May recommending that Bahrain should become a sovereign independent state. Iran accepted the UN resolution and gave up its claims over Bahrain, thus averting a regional crisis.

The question of equitable distribution of oil resources in the shallow waters of the Gulf has been posing problems, since huge oil deposits have been discovered there. The matter was complicated because that small gulf, which is about 120 miles (nautical) long and between 95 to 135 miles broad, is very shallow, the depth being never more than 250 feet. Very often it is much less. The presence of several islands in the Gulf, whose sovereignty was often a matter of dispute, complicates the problem still further. The presence of about 12 or 13 states, big and small, which were divided amongst themselves, and the competition among oil companies which have obtained off-shore oil concessions from those states, has made the task of reaching an understanding even more difficult. As yet only five continental shelf agreements have been signed : between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran and Bahrain, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, Iran and Qatar, and Abu Dhabi and Qatar.

Iran and Saudi Arabia initiated talks on that question, in the early 1960s, and a tentative agreement based on the median-line principle was reached in December 1965. But the final settlement was delayed because of the dispute over two small islands, al-Arabi and al-Farsi. Iranian claims over Bahrain also delayed the matter further because Iran was asserting its right over Bahrain, which is very near the Saudi coast. But, the threat from Iraq was potent enough, both for Iran and Saudi Arabia, to bridge the gap between the two monarchies. The Shah of Iran and King Faisel of Saudi Arabia devoted their energies to the solution of their boundary question. An agreement was signed on 24 October 1968. It entered into force on 29 January 1969.[1] It was based on the principle of the median-line boundary in the continental shelf. Of the two disputed islands, al-Arabi was given to Saudi Arabia. Iran obtained al-Farsi.

Agreement was also reached between Iran and Bahrain in June 1971, on the basis of the median-line principle. Earlier, in 1958, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia had signed an agreement on the continental shelf between them, using the median line as the basis. Agreements between Abu Dhabi and Qatar were signed on 20 March 1969, and between Iran and Qatar on 20 September 1969. Thus five agreements have already been signed among the littoral states. Iran and Kuwait had also started negotiations, but no settlement was reached between them. Kuwait did not want to sign an agreement with Iran to which Iraq was also not a party. Since 1967, Kuwait has been coming closer to the anti-Iranian Arab bloc. Also, Kuwait and many of the Arab states are not happy about the way in which Iran had occupied the three islands in the Persian

Gulf. It is possible that the Arab-Iranian disputes would hinder the settlement of the continental shelf question in the Gulf and keep alive another point of tension in the region.

The dispute over the sovereignty over three small islands in the Persian Gulf—Abu Musa, the Little Tumb and the Big Tumb – has also created tension in the region. Iran claimed that these three islands commanding the entrance to the Persian Gulf belonged to Iran, and announced that it would occupy them after the British presence was withdrawn from the Gulf by the end of 1971. Iranian Foreign Minister, Ardeshir Zahedi, in his speech in Bahrain on 21 June 1971, said that unless Iran was allowed to occupy them, it would not recognize the proposed federation of the Trucial Coast sheikhdoms. Iranian leaders, including the Shah of Iran, had time and again threatened to use force to occupy these islands. They argued that these three islands historically belonged to Iran, were not thickly populated and, if left alone, might become a threat to international shipping and a base of operations of the 'nihilist' groups, which could even sink a huge oil tanker in the shallow gulf and thus create serious pollution problems, harming the region as a whole. The Shah was also perturbed by the growing strength of the 'liberation movements' in Oman.

Great Britain, which controlled these islands because of its treaty relations with Ras al-Khaimah, which claimed sovereignty over the two Tumb islands, and with Sharjah, which claimed Abu Musa, maintained silence over the Iranian claims. So also did Saudi Arabia. Iraq, and to some extent Kuwait, opposed the Iranian claims. Iraq pleaded for an Arab front against Iran. The Arabs, as usual, were disunited. Finally, Iran occupied these islands on the eve of Britain's departure. It had entered into an agreement with Sharjah about the future of Abu Musa, but since no agreement was contemplated by Ras al-Khaimah, Iran occupied the two Tumb islands by force. Though the occupation was denounced by the Arabs, no Arab state opposed it. There may be some truth in the speculation that an understanding had been reached to the effect that Iran would relinquish its claims over Bahrain in return for these three strategic islands which also promise to have huge oil resources. Britain, which was responsible for protecting the rights of the Trucial States, ignored the whole episode under its policy of withdrawal from the east of Suez. Britain, however, did not escape without paying some penalty. Libya showed its wrath by nationalizing the British oil interests in Libya—a curious way of opposing Iran's occupation of 'Arab' islands.

Future of the Trucial Coast

The British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf also created the problem of giving some viable, independent shape to seven small sheikhdoms on the Arab side of the Gulf. These sheikhdoms—Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai,

Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm al-Quwain—had been under British protection since the middle of the 19th century. Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar were also the British protectorates in the region. Of these protectorates, Kuwait was declared independent in 1961. Bahrain and Qatar followed suit in 1971. All the three are members of the United Nations. Regarding the remaining sheikhdoms, which are a part of the Trucial Coast, it was suggested that they should from a federation so that their economy, foreign policy and defence could be coordinated. Some of them like Ajman, Fujairah, Umm al-Quwain and Ras al-Khaimah are very small and poor and lack the financial resources to be viable state units. Left alone, they might have become a source of tension for other rich sheikhdoms like Abu Dhabi and Dubai which have surplus economic resources. It was, therefore, decided to federate those sheikhdoms.

Representatives of the seven Trucial sheikhdoms, and those of Bahrain and Qatar, which had not become independent till then, met in February 1968 to discuss the federation plan. Before the meeting was held, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the two richest states of that group, had already agreed, on 19 February 1968, to federate under a common flag and to have a joint foreign policy. Representatives of these nine states, agreed upon the principle of forming a federation. The rulers of these nine states were to form a Supreme Council, whose presidency would be held by each state by rotation for a period of one year. The Council was to be responsible for foreign affairs, defence and economic policy of the federation. It would also have a budget to which individual states would contribute their shares. The decision of the Council had to be by a unanimous vote. It was decided to implement the plan by 30 March 1968.

To remove the disparity in the income and population of these sheikhdoms and to overcome mutual suspicions and rivalries among the sheikhs and thereby reconcile them to the concept of unanimity of decision, was a very difficult task. The time limit set for the British withdrawal from the area, and the opposition of the 'liberation' movements to the formation of such a federation, also posed serious problems. The *Tass*, on 3 March 1968, while expressing its opposition to the federation plan, described it as a military bloc under the aegis of Great Britain and the USA, which were accused of pursuing their 'neo-colonialist' aims and preserving and strengthening their 'capitalist oil monopolies' at the cost of the local national liberation movements.

Moreover, not all the nine sheikhdoms were interested in federating. Bahrain wanted to join it to gain support against the Iranian claims on its sovereignty. Therefore, when the Iranians gave up their claims, it opted out of it. Abu Dhabi and Dubai were also not very happy with the prospects of Bahrain joining the federation. Bahrain's population of 200,000 (two-thirds of which is less than 30 years of age) was more than the combined population of all the other sheikhdoms, which totals only 150,000. Bahrain was also a fairly modernized island

which might have exerted an influence that could be called 'radical' in the context of the Trucial Coast. Also, Bahrain was a poor cousin with a large family. Its population was increasing and its oil reserves were dwindling. Thus, probably everyone was happy when Bahrain became an independent state. Qatar, an oil-rich country, was viable enough and quite isolated in its peninsula to wish to join the explosive federation of the Trucial sheikhdoms. Consequently, both Bahrain and Qatar became independent on 15 August and 1 September 1971, respectively. Both have since then become members of the Arab League and the United Nations.

The formation of the federation of these Arab emirates progressed by stages. The implementation of the Charter of the Federation of Arab Emirates, which was scheduled on 30 March 1968, was postponed. Meetings were held in May, July and November 1968. Differences, mainly on the question of sharing of power and the oil wealth, persisted. Discussions continued in 1969 and 1970. The Conservative Party's endorsement of the Labour Party's policy and the British decision to withdraw by the end of 1971 accelerated the process of unity. Finally, on 18 July 1971, it was announced that six Trucial states had agreed to form the federation. This federation of Arab emirates, formally known as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), was formally declared as a new state in August 1971, and has since then joined the UN. Ras al-Khaimah, which had decided to remain out of it, changed its mind and joined it in February 1972.

The newly-formed UAE would be dominated by Abu Dhabi and Dubai, both politically and economically. Between them they have an annual oil income of over £ 150 million which is rising very fast thanks to the steep rise in the oil prices since 1972. The two states have about 70 per cent of the total population of the new federation. The other five states, Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah, Umm al-Quwain and Ras al-Khaimah, are small sheikhdoms which were earlier dependent upon Britain and now would depend upon the oil-rich sheikhdoms. Ras al-Khaimah, which delayed its merger with the federation, was closer to Iraq and hoped to receive some help from that country. Probably it was disillusioned.

There is no doubt that the British Government was deeply interested in the formation of the federation so that some pro-British regime could replace the British presence in the area. Sir William Luce, who was intimately connected with the Gulf for years, and Geoffrey Arthur, the British Political Resident in the area, were deeply involved in the formation of the federation. These Arab sheikhdoms had assumed increased importance following the British withdrawal from Aden. The British already maintained troops and bases in Bahrain. After 1966, a big military base was constructed in Sharjah with the object of providing an alternative to the Aden base by 1968. Also, the Trucial Oman Scouts, which were trained, commanded and maintained by the British, were also based at Sharjah.

Britain is interested in maintaining some presence in this vital area which is not only an oil-producing zone but also acts as a buffer between the oil-producing areas further north and the 'national liberation movements' operating in Oman and some areas in the Trucial Coast. Local rulers are also afraid of the threat to their power and oil wealth, and are willing to cooperate with Great Britain. They have shown a willingness to depend upon the British help in organizing their defence. At their request Major-General Sir John Willoughby who was the GOC, Middle-East Land Forces 1965-67, supported by a team of experts, helped the local rulers in creating their local forces. Though his report is supposed to be kept secret, it was leaked out that the British experts had suggested that the Trucial states should develop counter-insurgency capacity rather than go in for heavy weapons for conventional warfare. To that effect, they had suggested that the Trucial Oman Scouts, a force of about 1600, should be incorporated in the new defence forces. It was also said that the British officers would continue to help in the development of the armed forces in the Gulf area and in the sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Though Britain might withdraw the bulk of its troops in view of its policy of partial withdrawal, it would still like to retain some presence in the region, especially in the Trucial Coast and in Oman. Britain had signed treaties of friendship with Bahrain and Qatar when they were declared independent. Full details of these treaties have not been revealed as yet. There is no doubt that Britain will continue to maintain its presence in the region till it feels that the liberation movements have been contained or that the regional powers are able to handle them effectively.

The Liberation Movements

The next crisis area in the south Arabian coast and the Persian Gulf region are Muscat and Oman, where the liberation movements have been active since June 1965. The Oman (Dhofar) Liberation Front held a congress in 1964 in which it adopted the programme of armed struggle. In September 1968, it held its second congress in Wadi Khamrin where it not only reiterated its earlier anti-British stand and the need for armed struggle, but also emphasized the urgency of bringing about social, economic and cultural reforms in the region. The name of the group was also changed from Oman Liberation Front to Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), thus not only widening its programme but also extending its area of action from Oman to the Arab Gulf. That change coincided with three new factors : British withdrawal from Aden, British decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf by 1971 and the new oil boom in the Trucial Coast, especially in Abu Dhabi and Qatar.

Recently, in the summer of 1970, another group was formed. It is called the Democratic National Front for the Liberation of Oman and

the Arabian Gulf (DNFLOAG). PFLOAG normally operates in the Dhofar region near Aden and DNFLOAG operates in the Djebel Akhadar area, which is near the Trucial Coast. Both the groups profess to follow Marxism-Leninism. It is believed that the two groups are planning to come closer. It was reported that the DNFLOAG attended the Third Congress of the PFLOAG which was held at Rakhyut in Dhofar in June 1971. It is reported that Chinese as well as Russians are trying to influence these liberation movements, though neither of them has as yet been able to gain an upper hand. Two other groups are also involved in the region—Omani Liberation Movement and Dhofar Liberation Front—both reportedly seeking support from Algeria and Libya respectively.

The presence of these liberation movements poses serious challenges not only to the traditional regimes in the region but also to the Western powers which have oil interests there. It should be noted that rebellion against established authority is nothing new in this region, though today it has been given respectability under the garb of 'liberation movements'. The history of the region is full of such local rebellions. In modern times, the local tribes had revolted in 1955 against the Sultan and had made Djebel Akhdar their base of operations. British troops and aircraft were used to suppress it, but without much success. As a part of the British involvement in the region, the British Government signed an agreement, in 1958, with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, under which it agreed to pay £ 1.25 million per year to the Sultan for strengthening his armed forces. In return, the Sultan offered the island of Masirah, near the Oman coast, to Britain on a 99-year lease. Today the island of Masirah boasts of an air base capable of operating the strategic V bombers. Britain would continue to retain control over that island even after the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf region.

The British Government maintains a fairly strong military presence in Muscat and Oman, which is used on behalf of the Sultan to contain the local dissidence. It is reported that in 1971 there were four infantry regiments supported by armoured cars and artillery units. The air force included one ground-support squadron, one transport squadron and one helicopter squadron. These forces were specially trained in counter-insurgency operations. The British also coordinated their activities with those of the Trucial Oman Scouts which operate from Sharjah. Besides the British forces, the Sultan has his own army which is commanded by British and Pakistani officers and NCOs. But, even with all these efforts the local ruler and the British troops have not been able to contain the growing influence of these liberation movements.

The future of the security of the local rulers in the area and that of the Western oil investments there, would pose some challenges, especially after the British withdrawal. Alternative arrangements have been contemplated. It was suggested that the root cause of the current unrest

in the area was the lack of socio-economic reforms, misuse of oil wealth, a very conservative leadership at the top and dissensions among the local rulers. It was, therefore, thought that a change in the top hierarchy which would replace the 'old' conservative leadership with the young blood, might bring about a change for the better. It remains to be seen whether the 'new' conservative regimes would deliver the goods. However, the new policy orientation led to a series of palace *coups d'etat*. Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi of Sharjah was deposed by his family in June 1965. The new Sheikh was assassinated in January 1972. Sheikh Shakbut of Abu Dhabi was also deposed by his family in August 1966. On 23 July 1970, the old Sultan of Muscat and Oman, Said ben Timur, was deposed by his son, Qaboos ben Said. The ex-Sultan, who was wounded, was immediately flown to Bahrain and from there to London by the RAF. Since then he has been enjoying British hospitality.

The young Sultan of Muscat and Oman, who was educated in Pakistan and Great Britain and had his military training at Sandhurst, has announced new socio-economic reforms and has started new development projects. But the bulk of the state revenue is spent in containing the liberation movements and not much remains for the rapid socio-economic modernization of the country. It is still too early to predict whether Oman, which is now an independent state and a member of the United Nations, would be able to contain the liberation movements and act as a buffer between the 'radical' regime at Aden and the sheikhdoms of the Gulf region.

There are two other major sources of regional tension. Ras al-Khaimah, which is reportedly nearer to Iraq than to other Arab states in the region, has not given up its claim over the two islands of Tumb which were occupied by Iran in December 1971. The dispute over the Buraimi Oasis is another source of regional tension. The oasis is claimed not only by Saudi Arabia but also by Oman and Abu Dhabi. In July 1970, just before the palace *coup* in Oman, Saudi Arabia reiterated its claim over the oil-rich Buraimi Oasis. That dispute, for some time to come, would continue to divide these three regimes which they can ill afford, especially in view of the common danger they face from the liberation movements operating in that area which maintain their links with China and the USSR, either directly or via Aden, Syria and Iraq.

Local Military Capabilities and Iran's Place in the Gulf

Iranians are projecting themselves as a Gulf power which would like to participate in the maintenance of stability in the region, after the British withdrawal. Arabs even accuse Iran of seeking to replace Great Britain in its historical role. Undoubtedly, Iran is the most powerful local state and would like to assert its position. It has even offered conditional support to Oman to contain the liberation move-

ments operating there. The Shah of Iran, in his interview with Alvin J. Cottrell, Director of Research, Centre for strategic and International Affairs, Georgetown University, Washington DC,[2] on 8 March 1971, said, that talks were held with the Sultan of Oman about establishing some joint naval defence in the area. This joint cooperation has not been institutionalized as yet. Iran has plans to expand its navy and to construct naval bases at Bandar Abbas, Chah Bahr and Jask. The base at Bandar Abbas would dominate the Gulf-side of the Strait of Homruz, and the proposed bases at Jask and Chah Bahr would dominate the Arabian Sea side of that strait on the Gulf of Oman. Such a move would project Iran's naval presence beyond the Gulf into the Arabian Sea. The Shah did not make any comment on the Indo-Pakistan littoral during that interview, but it should be noted that Iran and Pakistan are members of the CENTO and they had cooperated with each other during the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965. The new naval and air base at Chah Bahr which is being constructed by Iran near the Pakistani base of Gwadar, which itself was purchased by Pakistan from Oman in 1958, would prove useful to Iran if it decides to operate in the Arabian Sea in cooperation with its CENTO partner.

The Shah of Iran is not so much concerned, at the moment, with the Indo-Pakistan littoral, as with the South Arabian coast and the Horn of Africa. Probably he feels that the South Arabian coast and Somalia pose a source of potential danger to Iran. The regime in Aden is especially hostile to the traditional regimes in the Gulf. Moreover, Aden also controls the islands of Kuria Muria to the south of Oman and Perim in *Bab al-Mandeb*. Any hostile group which has access to these islands can pose a threat to free navigation, especially of oil tankers, in the area. Some times back an oil tanker was attacked by a speed-boat which fired bazooka shells against it. This is apart from the growing Soviet and Chinese presence in the area which may not be welcomed by the pro-Western oil-producing states in the region. If Iran, which is rapidly developing its naval capabilities, wishes to have a presence in that part of the Arabian Sea it has to have very close relations with Oman which is a South Arabian state and where the regime is actively engaged in counter-insurgency warfare on its own.

There are also reports that Iranians are reluctant to rely upon their traditional Arab friends, like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Kuwait is already getting closer to the anti-Iranian bloc in the Arab world. It had taken a hard line or the question of Iran's occupation of the islands in the Gulf in December 1971. Saudi Arabia, according to the Iranians, is not a dependable ally. Some Iranians even complain about the Saudi 'inactivity'.[3] The Shah of Iran, in his interview with Alvin J. Cottrell, was also pessimistic about the future of the present leadership in the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia.[4] Moreover, these traditional pro-Iranian Arab states can hardly contribute to the naval defence of the area. Both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, though rich, have hardly any naval capability.

Abu Dhabi is the weakest state in the region. Its navy comprises nine small patrol crafts. Its air force has 10 refurbished *Hunter* fighter /bombers. Kuwait is slightly better off. It has about 12 *Lightning* supersonic fighters and six *BAC-169 Strikemaster* jet trainers which can be armed. Orders have been placed for 50 *Vickers* 37-ton tanks (akin to the Indian *Vijayanta* tanks), two patrol boats, six launches and six helicopters.

Saudi Arabia started modernizing its defences following the Saudi-UAR confrontation in Yemen. In December 1965, the Saudi Government placed orders for an integrated air defence system with Great Britain and the USA. The £100-million arms deal with Great Britain provided for two squadrons of *Lightning* jet fighters (about 35 aircraft), about 25 *Provost* or *Strikemaster* jet trainers which can be armed, a complete radar net-work and *Thunderbird* surface-to-air missiles. The £25 million arms deal for the *Hawk* anti-aircraft missiles was also signed with the USA. These integrated air defences covered the Saudi borders with Yemen. It is not known whether these weapons can be or have been shifted to the Persian Gulf area. Saudi Arabia also possesses a few *Hunters*, and *Sabre-jets* and transport aircraft. It was reported that some *Sabre-jets* had been handed over to Pakistan after the Indo-Pak conflict of December 1971. Recently, Saudi Arabia has acquired about 24 helicopters from Italy and six from France. It has also some medium and light tanks and about 220 French *Panhard AML-90* armoured cars. Orders for *AMX-30* French tanks have been placed. Saudi Arabia has drawn a plan to invest £60 million in acquiring some naval vessels. Orders have been placed for one torpedo boat and an unspecified number of patrol boats. One torpedo boat has already been acquired from Germany. One PT boat was gifted by the USA in 1960. But, the small Saudi Arabian navy can hardly patrol the long coastline of that country which is isolated into two parts: in the Red Sea including the Gulf of Aqaba which is dominated by Israel and the Persian Gulf which is dominated by Iran.

Iran is the most powerful local power in the area. It has a well-balanced army with the total strength of about 200,000, which is equipped with tanks and APCs. Recently, Iran has placed an order for 700 *Chieftain* tanks with Great Britain, at a total estimated cost of £80–£100 million. The *Chieftain*, weighing 52 tons and mounting a 120-mm gun, is supposed to be one of the most powerful tanks in the world. Iran has also the most powerful navy and air force in the region. It was the first country in Asia to acquire (or to be delivered) the *F-4E Phantoms*. The deal for one squadron of these highly sophisticated planes was confirmed by the end of 1966. Even Israel and Japan did not possess these planes at that time. It is reported that at the moment Iran has more than 80 *Phantoms*. Beside these sophisticated planes, Iran also possesses five squadrons of *F-5A* and about 50 old *F-86 Sabres*. It has also an adequate quantity of transport aircraft. Orders for about 166 helicopters were placed in 1959 and they might be

available in the near future. The Iranian air defence is also strengthened by the *Tiger-cat* and the *Rapier* missiles which were ordered in 1969-1970 for about £47 million.

The Iranian navy is also growing in strength and sophistication. Before 1955, Iran possessed one old destroyer, one escort-minesweeper and some patrol boats. Since then Iran obtained from the USA, mostly under the Military Aid Programme (MAP), four corvettes, six coastal and in-shore mine sweepers, four patrol boats, four landing craft, one repair ship, one water-tanker and one tug. Besides these, Iran has recently acquired three destroyers. All of them carry the *Sea-cat* surface-to-air missile. Two of them carry two drone helicopters each, for anti-submarine warfare. Iran has also acquired four *SAAM*-class frigates, which have been equipped with the *Sea-killer MK2* surface-to-surface anti-shipping missiles as well as the *Sea-cat* SAM missiles. Iran has also acquired 12 hovercrafts. More are to be acquired. Iran also plans to buy shore-based anti-submarine aircraft. The Iranian navy is being gradually built up as a powerful force, not only for the Gulf but also for the Arabian Sea area.

The naval weapons acquired by Iran, combined with its powerful air force, would enable Iran to play a significant role in the defence of the Gulf area and also in some parts of the Arabian Sea. Corvettes, patrol boats, coast-guard cutters, hovercraft and helicopters (possibly armed with surface-to-air *SS-12* missiles) would enable it to patrol the shallow waters of the Gulf. Heavier vessels and long-range *Phantoms* would permit Iran to operate in the Arabian Sea also. Iranian navy possesses an oiler and a water-tanker which would enable the heavier vessels of the Iranian Navy to operate on the high seas for a longer period.

Iran has plans to double its navy in the near future. It has already acquired sufficient vessels. The acquisition of four guided missile frigates and two heavy hovercrafts, for which orders have already been placed, would greatly increase Iranian naval capacity. Iran is developing Bandar Abbas, Chah Bahr and Jask as new naval bases. It already operates its flotilla of hovercraft from Khosrowabad, south of Abadan. In November 1970, the Iranian navy and air force held manoeuvres in the Persian Gulf in which invasion and occupation techniques were practised on a small island called Beni Farur in the Straits of Hormuz, and on Siri. That demonstration of the Iranian naval capability at Beni Farur, which is only 35 miles from the disputed island of Abu Musa, was probably not lost upon the Arab states in the region and demonstrated to them, and may be to big powers also, Iran's ability to control the Gulf after the British withdrawal from there—something which the Iranians had been claiming since 1967–68.

It will be interesting to note how the local Arab states and the big powers react in future to Iran's claims to control the Gulf. Iran's army, navy and air force have been strengthened by Great Britain and the USA. Iran is a member of the CENTO and has close relations with Pakistan which is also a CENTO partner. The USA, which has bilateral pacts with both these

states, also maintained a small naval presence at Bahrain. After the British withdrawal from Bahrain, the USA had regularized its naval presence there by signing an agreement with the ruler. The details of the new agreement were not made public. The USA has been asked by Bahrain after the October 1973 conflict to leave that base. Till now, Iran has been against the presence of any foreign power in the Gulf but there can always be temptations. Last year, there were rumours that the USA was willing to offer $1 billion in military aid to Iran. After the debacle in Pakistan, the USA might like to invest in a more stable country and its offers might prove very tempting for Iran. Events unfold gradually.

Of late, the Iranians have been talking about extending their so-called security perimeter. The Shah of Iran, speaking on 5 November 1972, at the newly established naval base in the Kharg island, said that Iran must think in terms of a security perimeter beyond her land frontiers. Before 1965, Iran was more concerned with the security problems arising out of its land confrontation with Iraq. With the British decision to withdraw from the east of Suez, Iran began to think in terms of a naval supremacy in the Gulf. Subsequently, the Iranians made a common cause with Oman to extend their security perimeter beyond it, deep into the Indian Ocean. It is reported that Iran is also keen to come to some understanding with Australia and the NATO powers, to define the future role of Iran in this area. In this connection, the statement of Prime Minister Ramghoolam, on 5 December 1972, that Mauritius would offer naval facilities to Iran, acquires a deeper significance, especially if one links it up with Iran's growing aspirations, its arms procurement programme, its links with the West, and the NATO Political Committee's suggestion for extending NATO's influence into the Indian Ocean.

There are possibilities that Iran's increasing military potential (as well as pretensions), its links with the CENTO, and the continuing Anglo-American presence in the Persian Gulf may not be appreciated, either by the USSR or by some of the local states like Iraq which are in conflict with Iran. At the moment, Iraq is not a naval power though it possesses some capacity for a land confrontation. Iraq has three small ex-USSR submarine chasers, 12 *P-6* PT boats and about ten small patrol boats. Politically also, Iraq was isolated in the Arab world and had been neglected by China and the USSR. But things are changing very fast. It is reported that Iraq may be supplied with a few fast patrol boats equipped with surface to surface missiles to counter the SAAM-class frigates acquired by Iran.

Before 1958, Iraq's weapons were mostly of the British or American origin. After the *coup d'etat*, Iraq began to acquire Soviet arms and gradually built up a substantial land force and an air-arm. It has about 800 medium tanks, 45 *PT-76* light amphibious tanks and about 200 armoured cars and APC. It has 220 combat aircraft which include sophisticated planes like *SU-7*, *MiG-21* and *TU-16* and *Il-28*. Iraq, however, remained a

land force and did not seek to develop its naval wing. The Soviet-Iraqi differences over the Palestinian problem put a temporary halt to Iraq's arms acquisition programme from the USSR, and Iraq placed an order for *Mirage III* planes with France. By 1971, Iraq and the Soviet Union sank their differences. The two were already collaborating on oil exploration in Iraq. The growing Soviet-Iraqi collaboration was further cemented on 9 April 1972 when the two countries signed the 15-year Friendship Treaty. It is interesting to note that the treaty was signed when Kosygin had come to Iraq to inaugurate the oil production in the Iraqi oil fields in north Rumeilah.

Articles 8 and 9 of that treaty deal with the question of military co-operation between the two states. Article 8 stipulates that, in case of the emergence of conditions that threaten the peace of either of the two parties or pose a threat to peace, the two signatories would immediately hold contacts in order to coordinate their stands to eliminate the danger and restore peace. Article 9 says that in the interest of security of the two countries, the two signatories would continue to develop cooperation for consolidating the defence capability of each other.

Even though the tone of the Friendship Treaty was mild and only Israel was attacked in it, yet two factors, which were given publicity during the visit of Kosygin, deserve to be noted. First, while the treaty was being signed the NLF (National Liberation Front) delegation from Aden, led by its Secretary-General, Mr Ismail, was in Baghdad. It might mean, either a close cooperation between Iraq and Aden in the future which would have its repurcussions in the Persian Gulf area, especially upon the liberation movements there, or, it can mean that the USSR and Aden may also sign a friendship treaty in the near future. The second factor, which especially deserves to be noted, was the announcement made on 11 April that the Soviet naval vessels would be calling at the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. The Soviets were interested in confronting the American presence in Bahrain. The Soviet entry into the politics of the Arab Gulf might disturb the detente which the USSR had been able to achieve with Iran. It seems that the Persian Gulf region, which by the end of 1971 had seemed to have reached a state of regional stability by 1972–73 had once again become a conflict area, with the consolidation of the American influence in Bahrain and of the Soviet influence in Iraq.

At the moment two distinct groups have emerged in the Persian Gulf region. The first group comprises Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the oil sheikhdoms supported by Great Britain and America. The other group, a smaller one, comprises Iraq, Aden, and the liberation movements, and is supported by the Soviet Union. One can expect that the new bipolarization would intensify the local conflicts still further. There were reports of renewed border clashes on the Iraq-Iran frontier soon after the signing of the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty.

A deeper Soviet involvement in the area, either on its own, or, on

behalf of its local supporters, would have serious consequences. It would draw the traditional Arab regimes still closer to the West and would offer a justification for an enhanced Western naval presence in the Persian Gulf. It might also compel Iran to have second thoughts about its earlier stand, that the Gulf should be free from the big power presence, which at that time meant an end to British dominance and beginning of the Iranian presence. The intense Super Power rivalry, which would inevitably result from the American and the Soviet presence in the Gulf, would also be against the oft-repeated stand of the Indian Ocean states that the vacuum created by the British withdrawal should be filled by the local states themselves.

THE BAB AL-MANDEB AREA

Further west, the littoral around the *Bab al-Mandeb* is also a conflict area. That area can broadly be divided into two parts : the Asian littoral and the African littoral. The Asian littoral is engulfed in the struggle for supremacy between Saudi Arabia, north Yemen and south Yemen (Aden). The African side is engrossed in two conflict situations: the demand for Greater Somalia and the Eritrean problem. Both these situations are not only inter-connected, but they also have links with events on the Asian shores of the *Bab al-Mandeb*.

The Asian Littoral : 'Radicals', Past and Present*

The triangular conflict between Saudi Arabia and the two Yemens has its roots in the army *coup d'etat* which overthrew the rule of the Imam of Yemen, in September 1962. The Imam's government-in-exile supported by the Saudi regime, was opposed by the republican regime in Yemen and its supporters, like the UAR. Yemen also came closer, at that time to the USSR and China. The Yemeni war of 1962-1968 involved not only the UAR, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but also Aden, because the 'progressive' regime in Yemen and its supporters abroad extended support to the 'anti-imperialist' movement in Aden also, and Yemen became the base of operation of the radical nationalists of Aden.

Even though Yemeni and Adeni leaders, in the initial stages, had depended upon the support of the UAR, they had second thoughts when President Nasser began thinking in terms of achieving a detente with the Saudi regime, which would have enabled him to extricate the Egyptian troops from Yemen. The first move was made in September 1964, and though it proved to be an abortive one, it impressed upon the local leaders the need to have an alternate basis of support. The Jeddah Agreement of 24 August

*It is interesting to note that the Saudi regime, which is considered to be a reactionary regime today, was the most radical amongst the Islamic regimes during the early days of *Wahabism*, so much so that the Ottoman Sultan had to send military expeditions to curb its activities. The Republic of Yemen was also considered to be one of the most radical Arab states till 1968. Now Aden or the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen, as the new state is called, claims that status. Old order changeth yielding place to new...lest one good custom should corrupt the world !

1965, was another attempt made by Egypt and Saudi Arabia to put a halt to the civil war in Yemen. Although that agreement could not be implemented due to mutual suspicion and hindrances from the Republican as well as the Royalist supporters of both the parties, it alienated the radical leaders in Yemen and Aden from the UAR and brought them closer to the USSR and China.

Following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Yemeni question was once again discussed between President Nasser and King Faisal at the time of the Khartoum Conference and an agreement was reached between the two on the question of the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from Yemen. The final agreement was signed on 31 August. The Egyptian troops withdrew from Yemen by the end of 1967. The agreement alienated the UAR still further from Yemen. In August, a Yemeni delegation visited Moscow for military and economic aid. In November 1967 President Sallal, who was supposed to be pro-UAR, was removed from his office by a *coup d'etat*. A new regime which was more radical came to power in Yemen. Abdul Rahman al-Iriani became the new President and Muhsin al-Aini the new Premier.

Changes in Yemen were also reflected in Aden. The Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY), which was operating from Yemen and which was supposed to be close to the UAR, suffered a set-back due to Nasser's policy of bringing about a detente with Saudi Arabia. Instead, the more radical group, National Liberation Front (NLF), which had been formed in 1963, gained greater support. It also obtained more arms and succeeded in liquidating the FLOSY from its position of preeminence in Aden with the result that on the eve of independence the NLF was the most powerful group in Aden.

Though the leadership in Yemen and Aden appeared to be radical in 1967, both of them had to work under different compulsions. By 1968, Aden had become an independent state. The British had withdrawn completely and the way was open for the NLF to consolidate its power over the whole of South Yemen. But the Republican regime in Yemen still had to face the royalist movement which continued to get Saudi support. The withdrawal of the Egyptian troops had created a serious military imbalance in Yemen and the new regime was finding it difficult to fill that gap. Moreover, the Yemeni rulers were also facing challenges from more 'radical' groups in Yemen. Three 'left-wing' *coups* were crushed between March 1968 and January 1969. It was alleged that those groups, which had succeeded in creating a Popular Resistance Force in December 1967, were being supported by the NLF of Aden. Local, tribal and religious factions were also involved in those abortive *coups*. The end result was that relations between Yemen and Aden began to deteriorate by 1969.

Threatened by the 'radical' leadership in Aden and by its supporters in Yemen, the Republican regime of Yemen and the Saudi regime decided to settle problems created by the civil war. One of the results of the Saudi-Yemeni detente was that the Saudi help, economic as well as military, to the Yemeni royalists began to decline gradually after 1969. Saudi Arabia also put pressure upon the Royalists to come to a settlement with the Republicans. Accordingly, negotiations between the Royalists and the Republicans began in Jedda in March 1970. The venue of the talks itself indicated the new trend in the Saudi-Yemeni relationship. An understanding was reached between the two groups under which the Republicans agreed to include some Royalists in the cabinet, the National Assembly and the administration. It was also agreed that al-Badr, the ex-Imam of Yemen, who was heading the Royalist regime-in-exile, would not be allowed to return to Yemen. The new change led to the recognition of Yemen by Saudi on 23 July 1970. The Saudi Government also promised to have economic cooperation with Yemen. Kuwait also followed suit.

The detente between Yemen and Saudi Arabia isolated Aden still further. Ideological differences divide Aden from its neighbours. The question of national boundaries, which are not delimited as yet, would pose difficulties in future. Border conflicts are reported now and then

between Yemen and Aden, and Saudi Arabia and Aden. FLOSY, which was liquidated by NLF in Aden, continues to remain active in Yemen. Saudi Arabia is reported to be supporting the tribal sheikhs, who were ruling in the Aden Protectorate prior to its independence and who were ousted by the new radical regime from there. Even within Aden, there are reports of abortive *coups*. The south-western corner of the Arabian peninsula remains a disturbed area. The present political and economic isolation might compel Aden to assume an even more radical posture. It is, however, difficult to say for how long it can maintain that stance with its limited resources. Aden does, however, rely upon its radicalism and its strategic location to obtain support from interested powers outside the region. It is following that policy fairly successfully at the moment, but it remains to be seen to what extent it can involve those powers to solve its internal and regional difficulties.

THE AFRICAN LITTORAL

Greater Somalia Plan

The Horn of Africa has also got its thorny problems. The two main issues involved are, the demand for Greater Somalia and the insurgency in Eritrea. The demand for Greater Somalia goes back to July 1960, when the state of Somalia was created following the unification of the British Somaliland Protectorate and the UN Trust Territory of Somalia, which was formerly an Italian colony. It was estimated at that time, that there were about 500,000 people of Somali origin in Ethiopia, about 20,000 in the French Somaliland and about 80,000 in Kenya. Most of them belonged to nomadic tribes which seasonally migrated from one area to another, across international borders. Somalia claimed that the area of their migration should belong to Somalia. Greater Somalia covered substantial areas in eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. Somalia's claims led to several border violations, both by the armed forces of the countries involved and by local Somali armed groups known as *Shiftas*. They assumed an alarming proportion following the acquisition of Soviet arms by Somalia in 1964. In some of those clashes armour and aircraft were also used. U Thant as well as the OAU intervened in February 1964, to halt the inter-African dispute. President Aboud of Sudan offered his good offices, in March 1964, to settle the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia and a partial disengagement of troops was brought about. The main question, however, remained unresolved.

Somali-Kenyan relations also began to deteriorate on the eve of Kenya's independence. On 8 September 1961, leaders of the Northern People's Progressive Party and the Northern People's Democratic Party, both representing the people of Somali origin living in the northern part of Kenya, cabled their demands to Sir Patrick Renison, the British Governor of Kenya. They demanded that the Northern Frontier District of Kenya

be permitted to join Somalia and, pending that merger, the Kenyan troops and policemen there be replaced by the Somalis. The British Government delayed its decision on its matter and finally washed its hands of the problem by saying that the question should be settled by the Africans amongst themselves. The area claimed by Somalia continued to be a part of Kenya, after Kenya's independence.

There were several incidents on the Kenya-Somalia border in 1963 and 1964. Most of them were inspired by the activities of the *Shiftas*. It was estimated at that time, that the number of members belonging to the *Shifta* groups was about 2,000. The British rendered help to the Government of Kenya against those raids with the result that Somalia broke off its diplomatic relations with Great Britain in March 1963. Despite Kenyatta's offer of amnesty, the *Shifta* raids continued in 1964-65. In December 1965, talks were held between President Kenyatta and Premier Osman of Somalia, on the initiative of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. But, Premier Osman insisted that Kenya should recognize the territorial claims of Somalia as a pre-condition for the normalization of Kenya-Somalia relations. Talks broke down and the *Shifta* raids continued. Kenya, in retaliation, broke-off relations with Somalia in June 1966.

Renewed attempts were made during the Fifth Assembly of the Heads of the State of the OAU, at Kinshasha in September 1967, to arrange a rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia. Subsequently, President Kenyatta and Premier Mohammad Ibrahim Egal met at Arusha in Tanzania. President Kuanda of Zambia acted as the meditator. A memorandum of agreement, normalizing relations between the two countries, was signed on 28 October. That agreement was, however, strongly criticized by a section of the ruling party, the Somali Youth League, and by its Secretary-General, A.H. Hussein, though the Somali Parliament endorsed Egal's endeavours to settle outstanding problems between Somalia and its neighbours.

It seemed that the Government of Somalia would curb the *Shifta* raids and work for good neighbourly relations with Kenya and Ethiopia. But that did not happen. President Shermarke of Somalia, who commanded great respect in that country and who could have enforced such a policy, was assassinated on 15 October 1969. Five days later the police and the army led a *coup d'etat* which dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution. General Mohammed Siyad Barreh became the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. The new regime promised to work for 'the unification of the Somali people'. Premier Egal became the target of criticism. Prospects of a peaceful settlement of the border problem receded in the background.

Somali intransigence brought Kenya and Ethiopia still closer. They signed a joint defence pact on 22 November 1963, which stipulated mutual aid if any one of them was attacked by a third party. In 1966, when the *Shifta* raids had intensified, Dr Mungai, the Defence Minister

of Kenya, visited Ethiopia. On 18 July, he announced that the Ethiopian Government had agreed to assist Kenya in the application of tougher measures to eliminate the *Shiftas*. On 9 June 1970, Kenya and Ethiopia signed a border treaty delimiting their frontiers.

Under the Greater Somalia Plan, the Somali Government laid claims to the French Somaliland in 1965. In August 1966, on the eve of the visit by General de Gaulle, there were riots in Djibouti. Following those disturbances, a large number of Somalis were alleged to have been driven out of the French Somaliland on the eve of the referendum arranged by the French Government to decide about the future of that colony. The referendum was organized on 19 March 1967, with the help of the French police and the army. Somalia opposed it on the ground that many Somalis were excluded from participating in it. The Somali Government requested the OAU and the UN, that the referendum be held under international supervision. There was no response from either of these organizations. The two Somali parties in the French Somaliland, *Parti du Mouvement Populaire* (PMP) and the *Union Democratique Issa* (UDI), formed a front in January 1967 to oppose the referendum, but failed to influence the outcome. Yet it should be noted, that despite the expulsion of many people of the Somali origin and the disqualification of others because they, being nomadic people, could not fulfil the qualification of a continuous residence of three years, 14,660 people voted 'No' in that referendum. The 'Yes' votes totalled only 22,555. In Djibouti, only 2,798 voted 'Yes' and 6,820 voted 'No'. The Somali Government refused to accept the validity of the referendum and still maintains that the French Somaliland rightfully belongs to Somalia.

The 'Yes' vote in the referendum meant that the people of the French Somaliland had opted to remain a part of Metropolitan France. The name of the French Somaliland was subsequently changed to the French Territory of Afars and Issas (the two major tribes living there). It is governed by a French High Commissioner who retains total control over the former French colony. The French now seem to favour the Afars who are in a minority and are distinct from Issas who claim to be of Somali origin.

The French presence in the area which has vital strategic and economic importance, is bound to involve France in the regional conflict. Ethiopia is interested in either acquiring the French Somaliland for itself or allowing it to remain in 'neutral' (i.e. French) hands. With Somalia on one side and the insurgency-torn Eritrea on the other, the French territory has acquired strategic significance for Ethiopia. Djibouti is Ethiopia's only rail-link with the outside world and with the sea. Both France and Ethiopia, therefore, have vital stakes in denying that area to Somalia. Situated opposite Aden, it is also important strategically. Any ship using the *Bab al-Mandeb* will have to pass not only Aden but also Djibouti. The French are taking a considerable interest in that area and have stationed

sufficient troops, (estimated to be about 4,500),[5] to protect it. There is no doubt that Djibouti would play an important role in the new naval policy in the Indian Ocean, as planned by France.

The Eritrean Problem

The Eritrean problem is the side-effect of the Italian colonial rule in the region. In 1941, Great Britain took over the administration of that area from Italy. For almost a decade, the future of that colony vacillated between three choices; independence, a link with Ethiopia or with Italy. The UN discussed the question in 1950, and finally it was decided to make Eritrea an autonomous state federated with Ethiopia. The area is not a homogenous cultural unit. Almost half of its population living in the highlands belongs to the Ethiopian stock and speaks 'Tigrings', which is also spoken in Ethiopia. The other half, which lives in the lowland, is predominantly Muslim and has links with tribes living in Sudan. During that period, there were two major parties in Eritrea: the Unionist Party which was pro-Ethiopian and the Muslim League.

The federal structure of the Province of Eritrea gradually eroded over a decade. The Central Government began to assume more and more powers. Finally, in 1962, the Eritrean Assembly voted to end its existence and to merge Eritrea with Ethiopia. That merger gave Ethiopia—which was a land-locked country—a direct access to Red Sea. But the merger was opposed by the Muslim population of Eritrea. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was formed as early as 1956, to retain the exclusive character of Eritrea and to oppose its merger with Ethiopia. It intensified its activities after 1962. By 1967 it was a fairly active organization. Till recently it operated from the Sudan-Ethiopian frontier. It had its headquarter in Kassala in Sudan. Several hundreds of its volunteers were armed with modern arms, mostly of the East European origin, which were obtained from Syria and Iraq. Radio Damascus and Radio Baghdad covered the activities of the ELF during the peak of its operations, and broadcast over-rated claims of its military victories.

Activities of the ELF slowed down following the Arab defeat in the June 1967 war, but were revived soon after. A rift was also reported between the pro-Iraqi and pro-Syrian groups in the ELF in 1969, but the differences were subsequently resolved. The ELF also developed close contact with the Palestine guerrilla organizations like *al Fatah* and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is led by George Habbash and is known for its ideological radicalism. Probably the ELF got its inspiration for hijacking of aircraft from the Habbash group. The ELF destroyed an Ethiopian Airways *Boeing 707* airliner at Frankfurt on 11 March 1969. On 18 June, three members of the same group opened fire at another *Boeing 707* at Karachi airport. Again, on 13 September, an Ethiopian *DC-6* airliner was hijacked to Aden. Several acts of sabotage were also reported from Eritrea.

The Eritrean movement is not only backed by the Muslims in Ethiopia, but also by several Islamic states like Saudi Arabia and Libya and by some Islamic organizations. It is also supported by the so-called 'radical' Arab states like Syria, Iraq and south Yemen. But, despite the Arab and Islamic support, the leadership of the ELF takes pains to maintain a secular Eritrean identity. Its 10-member Revolutionary Council includes one Christian, Tadla Bairu who was the leader of the pro-Ethiopian Unionist Party of the early 1950s. Idris Mohammad Adun is the nominal Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. Osman Saleh Sabbe is its Secretary-General.

Beside the ELF, the Eritrean problem has two other dimensions, the Ethiopian anti-insurgency operations and the American strategic involvements. Ethiopia is deeply disturbed by the insurgency which is directed by the ELF. About 1,500-2,000 active ELF guerrillas have tied down about 5,000 troops of the Ethiopian army and about 4,000 of the police commandos, in counter-insurgency operations. Despite the number of troops involved, Ethiopia has not been able to make much of a headway. The ELF commands a large part of the area and the roads are not safe after dark. In November 1970, the ELF guerrillas successfully ambushed and killed General Teshome Erghotu, Commander of the Second Division. A state of emergency was declared in Eritrea after that. Also, a six-mile strip along the coast and the frontiers with Sudan has been declared a prohibited zone by the Ethiopian Government, so that it can prevent the guerrillas from being reinforced from that side.

As a result of the insurgency, there was a massive exodus of the Muslim population from Eritrea. Many sought refuge in Sudan. The insurgency seriously harmed relations between Ethiopia and Sudan though there were signs in 1973 that the two states might come to an understanding ou the Eritrean problem. Both have the capacity to harm each other. When the Eritreans were allowed to operate from Sudan, the south Sudanese found a sanctuary, in Ethiopia and Uganda, from the pressure put on them by the Sudanese army. Earlier efforts to normalize relations between Ethiopia and its Arab neighbours failed. Instead, Ethiopia came closer to Israel. Israel has trained the Ethiopian troops (as well as troops in Uganda) in counter-insurgency warfare. It was also reported that Ethiopia and Israel were coming closer in the naval field. Both felt threatened by the radical regime in Aden, which had openly declared its intention to close the *Bab al-Mandeb* to hostile shipping. There were reports that Israel was permitted by Ethiopia to operate from the Eritrean coast or from one of the Ethiopian islands in Red Sea. Any entry of Israel in the southern part of Red Sea would have complicated the situation still further, and would have involved the *Bab al-Mandeb* not only in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but possibly in the Super Power conflict also. It should not be forgotten that France retains its direct presence in Djibouti; China is developing close contacts with Ethiopia, Sudan,

Somalia and Aden; the Soviet Union has a strong influence in Yemen, Aden and Somalia; and the USA maintains a communication base at Asmara which is of vital strategic significance in the context of the Indian Ocean.

The American communication base at Kagnew near Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, dates back to 1942, when it was established during the Second World War to maintain communication links with the American ships and submarines operating in the Indian Ocean. Situated 7,500 feet above sea-level and hardly 50 miles from the coast, it was considered to be an ideal place for the communication base. In 1953, the USA signed an agreement with Ethiopia under which the USA could operate that base for 25 years. About 2,000 US military personnel, including technicians, man that low-frequency communication base which, along with the US communication base in Australia, directs the American naval vessels, especially the submarines, operating in the Indian Ocean. The base has come in for serious criticism. It is quite possible that after the expiry of the treaty, the USA might like to discontinue the Kagnew base which, being situated in the heart of the insurgency area in Eritrea, is a security risk. It is expected that the American communication base at Diego Garcia may become fully operational by the time the agreement on the Kagnew base expires. But, till then the USA has a vital interest in that base. The USA has been giving military and economic aid to Ethiopia to strengthen it *vis-a-vis* the ELF guerrillas. It is reasonable to expect that the USA would continue to back Ethiopia as long as the communication base is maintained in Eritrea. In all probability, the area would continue to be a point of tension for some time to come.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Power and Politics of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency

The other conflict area along the shores of Indian Ocean is Southern Africa, where the situation is made complex by the inter-relationship of two explosive forces, the anti-apartheid movement and anti-colonialism, which dominate the region. Two local groups have been formed which are being backed by outside powers. The one comprising South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal is directly or indirectly supported by the Western powers. Also, some of the local states like Malagasy and Malawi, which are either afraid of the whites because of their close proximity to South Africa, or are following a pro-French policy, are willing to come to some understanding with the 'white' regimes. The other group comprises Tanzania and Zambia. They are backed by the eastern bloc countries and China and are also actively supported by several Afro-Asian countries which are opposed to racialism and colonialism. The OAU is also extending valuable support to them in their struggle. For a long time the people of South Africa, Rhodesia,

Mozambique and Angola conducted a peaceful political struggle to solve problems arising out of racialism and colonialism. Subsequent to the failure of these political efforts they decided to resort to armed struggle to gain their political, economic and social rights. The struggle has become intense during the last decade.

The new phase coincided with the emergence of several independent states in Africa, the formation of the OAU and with the intensification of the Cold War rivalry in Africa. During the last decade, several 'liberation movements' were launched against the regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal. The anti-colonial liberation movements directed against Portugal were the first to be organized. These movements were organized simultaneously in Mozambique, Angola and the Portuguese Guinea. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands (*Partido Africano da Independencia de Guine e Cabo Verde* : PAIGCV) operates under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral, and seeks support from Guinea. In Angola, the struggle is led by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular de Liberacao de Angola* : MPLA) under the presidentship of Dr Agostinho Neto. It celebrated the tenth anniversary of its struggle in February 1971. It claims to have control over one-third of Angola.

Frente de Liberacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) is the most important movement in Mozambique. Its leader, Dr Edwardo Mondlane organized the National Union of Mozambique Students (UNFMO) in Dar as-Salaam in 1961. In 1962, three small nationalist groups united to form the FRELIMO under the leadership of Dr Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santos. Armed struggle was launched in September 1964. Beside the FRELIMO, there are two other organizations : UNAR and COREMO. The COREMO, which is stated to be pro-Peking, was founded in 1965 by Paulo Gumane. It is based in Lusaka. There have been inter-group rivalries and also rivalries within the FRELIMO. Dr Mondlane was assassinated on 3 February 1969 and the leadership of the FRELIMO is now split and one of the groups, led by Rev Uria Simango, is pro-Peking. The others are either pro-USSR or neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Other groups operate in Rhodesia and South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) operates in South Africa. The Zimbabwe African People's Party (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) operate in Rhodesia. The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) operates in south west Africa. These organizations are still weak and not very effective. The regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia have warned Zambia, from where the guerrillas are reported to infiltrate into these states, of the consequences of encouraging their activities. Recently, the Liberation Committee of the OAU, at its meeting held at Addis Ababa in February-March 1970, decided to launch a 'liberation movement' in Comoro Islands in the Straits of Madagascar. These Islands, which are a part of the French Overseas Territories, have

a predominantly Muslim population. Though France offered internal autonomy to these Islands on 21 December 1961, it retains control over their foreign affairs and defence. It can be expected that with the intensification of armed struggle in southern Africa and with an enhanced Chinese involvement in the region, the Comoro Islands, which are near Tanzania, may also become involved in the local conflict. That may partly explain the growing French naval presence in the western Indian Ocean area.

Till recently, international support for these guerrilla movements was not encouraged publicly. Now the Afro-Asian bodies and even the United Nations have passed resolutions giving public support to these movements and recommending that they should be rendered material help, including arms aid, to enable them to continue their struggle. The OAU has even created a special African Liberation Committee (ALC) to look after their interests. The eastern and central African states, in their final communique, after the Khartoum Summit in June 1970, recognized armed struggle as an effective means of winning freedom for the people of southern Africa, and declared that increased military and financial aid should be given to the liberation movements operating there. Similarly the Eighth Assembly of the Heads of the State and Governments of the OAU which met at Addis Ababa, from 1 to 3 September 1970, also supported such a move. Earlier, in August, the 11-member ALC of the OAU had voted for material aid to African liberation movements. The Non-aligned Summit held at Lusaka in September 1970 also criticized the apartheid policy and declared that more material aid should be made available to the African liberation movements through the OAU and its African Liberation Committee.

The question of armed struggle against the racial policy of South Africa and Rhodesia and against Portuguese colonialism, has been debated in the United Nations for a long time. The General Assembly of the United Nations also discussed the twin questions in its Twenty-fifth Session in 1970. Besides condemning those policies, it also passed a resolution (Resolution 2646) affirming the legitimacy of the struggle of the people living under colonial and alien domination. It not only upheld the right of self-determination, but also the right of a people to restore to themselves that right by *any means* at their disposal, as well as their right to seek and receive all kinds of *moral and material* assistance to achieve their objective. On 8 December 1970, the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly adopted a very specific resolution (Resolution 2671-B) appealing to *Governments and individuals* to contribute generously moral, material and political assistance to the national movements of the oppressed people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle against apartheid. Such open support not only legitimizes these guerrilla movements on an international level, but also permits those, who were helping them secretly, to support them openly.

Arms and material aid are received by these liberation movements from several sources. Some of these movements are able to arrange for some help on their own. The liberation movements in the Portuguese African colonies, coordinate their activities abroad through an organization called the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (*Conferencia das Organizacoes Nationalistas das Colonias Portugesas* : CONCP). Some aid is given by the Western institutions like the Joseph Rowntree Social Trust and the Lutheran World Federation. But these aids are given mostly on humanitarian grounds. Some African states support these movements either directly or through the ALC. Military aid from the Communist bloc countries is often routed through the ALC, so that direct involvement of these countries in the liberation movements could be minimised. There is also a great deal of 'host-country' involvement. Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Tanzania and Zambia provide bases, training facilities and also material help to these organizations.

African liberation movements have been caught in the web of Sino-Soviet rivalry despite efforts made by many of their leaders, as well as by the OAU, to prevent it. The Chinese are increasingly competing with the Soviet Union, not only in the supply of arms and the training of guerrillas but also in seeking to influence these movements ideologically. They have even tried to capture the leadership of some of these organizations. The assassination of Dr Mondlane and the bid by Rev Uria Simango to assume the leadership of the FRELIMO in 1969-70 was an interesting example of the Chinese bid to take over one of the most powerful liberation movements in southern Africa. The two colleagues of Dr Mondlane, Senhor Marcelino dos Santos and Senhor Samora Moises Machel, have foiled the efforts of the Chinese and of Rev Simango. But with the growing Chinese presence in Tanzania and Zambia, it is doubtful if they would be able to stem the growing Chinese influence in the liberation movements in southern Africa. At the moment, the FRELIMO, which receives a considerable amount of aid from China and the Soviet Union, has managed to isolate itself from both of them by arranging to have their aid directed through the ALC.

While discussing the question of Sino-Soviet controversy and its impact upon the liberation movements the attitude of the 'host countries' becomes very important. Tanzania and Zambia are the regional 'host countries' involved in this confrontation. Close contacts between these two countries and China give an added advantage to China to influence these movements. The Chinese have also tried to encourage if not create some rival organizations like the COREMO in Mozambique and ZANU in Rhodesia. Any division in the ranks of African freedom fighters is not going to benefit the Africans despite any amount of ideological white-washing done by the pro-Peking supporters. In spite of the radical posture adopted by China at present, it cannot be maintained with any measure of certainty that the Chinese would really involve themselves in the struggle

if it hurts their long-term interests. Their record in that respect has been very pragmatic. They permitted the Indonesian Communists, many of whom were people of Chinese origin, to be murdered without taking any effective steps against the Indonesian Government. When the Chinese oil interests became dominant, they came closer to Iran and Kuwait at the cost of liberation movements in the Gulf region. When they wanted to neutralize Ethiopia and win over Sudan, they came close to those countries and sacrificed the Eritrean nationalist movement. Their record in Bangladesh, when the army junta was butchering the Bangalis with American arms, is also far from encouraging to the liberation movements. Africans know that the southern African countries are massively equipped with Western arms and are capable of behaving towards them just as the Pakistanis behaved towards the people of Bangladesh. Moreover, the recent Sino-American *entente*, during the period when Americans were intensifying their bombardment of Vietnam, should also help in clearing the image of China in some of the Afro-Asian countries. Another interesting part of the Chinese anti-colonialism is, that though China fully and actively supports anti-colonial movements in Africa it has not seriously threatened the Portuguese in Macao or the British in Hongkong. It is rather amusing that no respectable African leader has even seriously questioned the Chinese bona fides to lead the anti-colonial struggle in Africa.

The Chinese, despite their dubious record of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, are able to maintain their influence over these liberation movements and over the regimes in the 'host countries' because of their massive economic, political and military aid which enables them to retain the capacity to radicalize the movement and, if they wish, to intensify its activities. Thousands of guerrillas have already been trained, militarily and ideologically. Many more are being trained. When the time comes, they would be pushed into the neighbouring countries to launch guerrilla attacks. How many of them would succeed in returning alive is anybody's guess. Chinese have been fighting the liberation wars by proxy for a long time now. They had declared their intention to fight the war in Vietnam to the last Vietnamese (while simultaneously arranging a detente with the Americans). They may also plan to fight the liberation struggle in Africa to the last African. Some day the Africans would stand up and tell the Chinese to liberate Macao and Hongkong (if not Korea and Vietnam), before leading the African liberation movements against the British and Portuguese colonialism and neo-colonialism.

The liberation movement in southern Africa is moving into a very critical stage. It is gathering momentum from several sources and has started posing a serious challenge to the existing regimes in southern Africa. They, in turn, have started strengthening their counter-insurgency capability to contain the threat posed by these liberation movements. South Africa and Portugal, and to some extent Rhodesia, have increased their military strength since 1965. Even a casual analysis of their weapon system

would reveal that their arms acquisition is not only aimed at the conventional type of warfare but also for the counter-insurgency operations.

Rhodesia, which is the weakest of the three southern African countries, has a total armed strength of 4,600. The army is equipped with *Ferret* scout cars and with artillery. The air force has 55 combat aircraft including *Canberra* light bombers, *Hunter* and *Vampire* fighter/bombers and one squadron of *T-52 Provost* jet trainers which can be used as a light strike aircraft. Rhodesia has a para-military force of 6,400 and about 28,500 reservists. By itself, Rhodesia may not be militarily equipped to face the liberation movements but it draws support from two other southern African powers, Portugal and South Africa.

Of late, Portugal has been under heavy strain to maintain its hold over its African colonies. In 1962-63, Portugal had employed 36,000 troops in Africa out of a total army strength of 58,000. Of them, 25,000 were employed in Angola and 10,000 in Mozambique. In 1965-66 the number of troops deployed in Africa suddenly shot up to about 100,000 out of the total of 160,000 troops. Of them 50,000 troops were stationed in Angola and 30,000 in Mozambique. The figure showed a further increase in 1971-72. Today, almost half of the Portuguese Army, which totals 218,000, is stationed in southern Africa; 60,000 in Angola and 45,000 in Mozambique. The Portuguese soldiers are equipped with medium and light tanks, armoured cars and half-tracks.

This force is also supported by an adequate air force and navy especially tailored for counter-insurgency warfare. Portugal has no supersonic jets. The fastest aircraft possessed by it are *F-84 G* (one squadron) and *F-86 Sabre-jet* (one squadron). Portugal has also acquired two squadrons of *B-26 Invader* from the USA. These Second World War light bombers have been converted by the USA to suit the counter-insurgency warfare (COIN). Its modified version, the *MKB-26 K Counter-Invader*, mounts 14 machine guns and has eight external pylons for extra loads under the wing beside the usual load in the bomb-bay. It is capable of operating from rough air-strips and can fly with an armament load of 11,000 lbs. Portugal has also acquired smaller COIN aircraft, mostly converted trainer planes, which are inexpensive and capable of operating from rough airfields. They are able to carry light anti-personnel weapons like machine guns, rockets, napalm bombs and small fragmentation bombs. Portugal has about 70 American jet-trainer aircraft, like *T-33* and *T-37*, which have been converted to light-strike role. Recently Portugal has acquired two squadrons of *Fiat G-91* jet trainer of the Italian design, which have been converted to light strike role. *G-91* is manufactured under licence in West Germany, and Portugal has acquired them from Germany. *G-91*, about the size of the *Gnat* which serves the Indian Air Force, carries two 30 mm cannons and has four underwing pylons for carrying bombs, rockets, napalms or gun-pods. One of these *C-91* squadrons is stationed in Mozambique. Portugal has also about 100 helicopters and more than

60 transport planes. Two parachute regiments are stationed in its colonies in southern Africa. The Portuguese navy, with 11 frigates, six corvettes, 14 coastal patrol vessels, 41 patrol launches, 65 landing ships and 58 small landing craft, has a good counter-insurgency capability and can effectively patrol its coast against possible infiltrations.

The weapon systems of South Africa are also specifically tailored for counter-insurgency operations. The South African anti-insurgency capability is not apparent from the strength of its regular army but from its Citizen's Force, the *Kommandos* and the police who have undergone special anti-terrorist training. Moreover the South African forces are all-white and the Africans do not have an entry in it.

South Africa's Army increased from 19,000 in 1965 to 28,000 in 1968 and totalled 32,000 in 1971-72. It is divided into two parts, the regular army and the Citizen's Force. The regular army is the hard core and the Citizen's Force rotates every year. Thus every year thousands of white Africans are trained in the Citizen's Force and passed on to form the reservists and the *Kommandos*. In 1971-72, out of the total army of 32,000, the regulars numbered only 10,000 whereas 22,000 belonged to the Citizen's Force. Another thing which is to be noted about South Africa's army is, that it is overweighted with armour. South Africa has about 240 medium tanks (*Centurion*, *Sherman* and *Comet*), 500 armoured cars (*AML-60* and *AML-90*), 50 *M-3* APC and 200 *Ferret* and *Saraeen* scout cars and APCs. The mobility, protection and fire-power offered by these light-armoured vehicles, especially the APCs and the armoured cars, make them ideal counter-insurgency weapons. It should be noted that *AML-60* and *AML-90* are manufactured under licence in South Africa.

The air force of South Africa is also specially equipped for counter-insurgency operations. Beside one squadron each of *Canberra* and *Buccaneer* light bombers it possesses two squadrons each of *Mirage-III*, *Sabre-jets* and *Vampires*. It also has about 250 *Harvard* trainers which have been equipped for COIN operations and can carry either eight 19 lb. fragmentation bombs, or rockets. These old planes are being replaced by *Impala* (South African name for the Italian *Macchi MB-326* jet trainer) which is designed for a ground-support role. Both *Mirage-III* and *Macchi* are being produced under licence in South Africa. It is reported that over 300 of these jet-trainers would be manufactured in South Africa. They would progressively augment the counter-insurgency capacity of the Citizen's Force which is at the moment equipped with *Harvards*, *Vampires*, and *Sabres*. South Africa also possesses about 140 helicopters, of which about 100 are *Alouette II/III*. These helicopters can be equipped with 20 mm cannon or two pods containing 36 rockets or with mini-gun pods. They can also be equipped with wire-guided air-to-surface *SS-12* missiles. South Africa also possesses more than 60 transport planes. It is also reported that the *Kommandos* operate about 250 privately-owned small aircraft.

Thus, a survey of the weapon systems and the quantity of the weapons possessed by these three southern African states very clearly reveals the frantic efforts made by them to maintain their hold against the pressure which is bound to be generated by the local Africans against them. Portugal, on its own, cannot contribute militarily any more. It has already committed $0.4 billion out of the total GNP of $6.1 billion to its armed forces. Though it is a very conservative estimate, yet it amounts to about 6.6 per cent of the GNP and this is a heavy load for a backward state like Portugal. There are indications that both France and Germany have been helping Portugal militarily and might continue to do so in future also. In December 1971, the USA signed an agreement with Portugal under which it offered $436.5 million to Portugal. In return, Portugal would permit the USA to have naval bases in Azores. It is also reported that the USA may also be offered base facilities in Mozambique.

Unlike Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa still retain the capacity to invest much more in defence. They are spending only 1.7 and 2.6 per cent of their GNP, respectively, on defence. Thus, South Africa and Rhodesia still retain a capacity to double their defence expenditure without feeling any undue hardship. The South African Defence Minister, P.W. Botha, disclosed in the South African Parliament that the government had plans to invest £1 billion in its Five Year Defence Plan. Such an expenditure would greatly enhance South Africa's military capabilities. It should be noted that counter-insurgency weapons are neither costly nor highly sophisticated, and since these weapons are locally manufactured, South Africa is not dependent upon foreign markets for their acquisition.

Counter-insurgency capability of these southern African states was clearly demonstrated during the Cabora Basse Dam issue. This dam, which is being built across the Zambezi River in Mozambique, is a hydro-electric-cum-irrigation project and is designed to supply electricity to South Africa and to release enough water to settle about one million whites in the Zambezi valley in Mozambique. Not only the OAU, but also the United Nations had opposed the project. The Plenary Session of the General Assembly passed a resolution on 14 December 1970, condemning the dam as an example of foreign economic interests and said that it would impede the independence of the colonial people. Business firms from the USA, Great Britain, Italy and Sweden have refrained from participating in that project. But the French and the West German firms are investing in that project. The liberation movements in Mozambique did make a bid to deny the dam-site to those firms but the Portuguese troops launched a determined counter-insurgency offensive, with the help of *Alouette* helicopters and *G-91* jets, and have succeeded in limiting the activities of the liberation movements in that part of Mozambique.

Leaders of the African liberation movement would have to be very cautious. A lop-sided development and a rigid ideological stand might progressively alienate the movement from many of its supporters both in

the developed as well as in the developing worlds. An adventurist acceleration of the activities of the liberation movement, without adequate military preparation and groundwork for local and international support, would seriously undermine not only the anti-colonial and anti-racial movement, but also the African unity movement. An increased communist influence, especially Chinese influence, is causing disquiet among some African states, and the fear of a possible Chinese-inspired intervention in their states has even inspired some of them to repeat the Western and South African offer of a 'dialogue' between the whites and the Africans.

The Western countries, despite their polite condemnation of the *apartheid* policy, have never ceased to support the Southern African states, politically, economically and militarily. The British stand on the Rhodesian and the South African questions equates the whites and the Africans. Britain has even suggested that these two people should settle their differences between themselves, as was clear from the speech of the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, at the Lord Mayor's banquet on 16 November 1970. He firmly rejected the use of force, which he thought would start a racial war in southern Africa. He also rejected the policy of isolating South Africa. France has also been advocating an identical policy. The Western stand, fear of the possible Chinese involvement and the offer of the southern African governments to have bilateral relations with African states, have encouraged some of the African governments to suggest that a dialogue should be started with the South African regime.

The new trend began with the visit of Prime Minister Voster to Malawi in May 1970. It was the first time a South African Prime Minister visited an African state. On 15 September 1970, Voster announced in Parliament in Cape Town that his government was willing to enter into non-aggression pacts with other African countries. At the same time, he also said that South Africa would fight 'communist-inspired terrorism' in any country which might appeal to South Africa for help. The South African offer was discussed in the Sixth Conference of the Heads of the State of the OCAMM (Organization of African States, Malagasy and Mauritius), which was held at Fort Lamy in Chad in January 1971. In that conference, Ivory Coast suggested that the African states should enter into a 'dialogue' with South Africa. Earlier, on 4 November 1970, President Houphonet-Boigny of Ivory Coast had announced that the problem of *apartheid* could not be solved by force and that the African states should enter into direct talks with the government of South Africa.

The suggestion of a dialogue with South Africa was welcomed by President Tsiranana of Malagasy, President Bongo of Gabon, President Maga of Dahomy, President Bokass of the Central African Republic and others. Kofi Busia, the Prime Minister of Ghana, also said that it was a more rational approach than a bloodbath. But the idea of a dialogue was violently opposed by several other members of the OAU including Zambia,

Tanzania, Ethiopia, Somalia, Cameroon, Senegal, Congo (Brazzaville), etc. Thus, at this crucial moment, an impression is being created that the Africans are disunited in their anti-racial and anti-colonial struggle. This is a very harmful trend and, if left unchecked, would weaken the movement still further. One method by which this deviation can be corrected, is by breaking away from the adventurist trends suggested by some interested parties and their local supporters, by reassuring the local African states of non-interference in their internal affairs, and by achieving a *de facto* and an authentic internationalization of the African liberation movement. Only such a policy can unite the African states and frustrate the policy of divide and rule, by which the southern African states and their Western supporters are trying to maintain their stranglehold over this region.

BIG POWER INVOLVEMENT AND CONFLICT-RESOLUTION

Local conflicts in the Indian Oceon area were used by the big powers to spread their presence to suit their local as well as strategic interests. Very often these interested outside powers, by backing one side or the other, with their political support and economic and military aid programmes, accentuated the conflict and forced the other party, either to sacrifice its legitimate national interests or to seek temporary security by coming closer to the rival big power which wished to maintain or increase its presence in the region. The Malaysian-Indonesian confrontation, Indo-Pak conflicts, Persian Gulf disputes, problems of the *Bab al-Mandeb* area and the anti-racial and anti-colonial conflicts in southern Africa are some examples of these artificially stimulated local conflicts which have benefited the big powers in the past and whose continuance can be exploited by them to strengthen their presence in the area in the future also.

What do these big powers gain by accentuating these conflict situations? The USA which had hardly any presence in the Indian Ocean before the Second World War is today the strongest power in the area. It maintains its influence in Australia, Thailand, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and South Africa. During the last decade when Great Britain was planning a partial withdrawal from the Indian Ocean area, the USA acquired from it base facilities in Diego Garcia. After the British withdrawal from Bahrain, it entered into an agreement with the Sheikh of Bahrain, not only for the continuation but also for the expansion of the US naval base in that island. The American presence which increased in proportion to the growing intensity of local conflicts, like those between India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, Ethiopia and Somalia, and the anti-racial and anti-colonial conflict in southern Africa, serves America's local as well as strategic interests. The USA is able to intimidate India by building up Pakistan's war machine, maintain Iran's isolation by intensifying rivalry between Iran and some Arab states, maintain its base in Asmara and draw Ethiopia closer to it by taking advantage of the

Somalia-Ethiopia border dispute and the Eritrean problem, and keep the Suez Canal, the shortest route from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean, closed, by encouraging Israeli intransigence *vis-a-vis* the Arabs.

The American support to these states not only enables the USA to keep the area divided, but also permits it to use some shore facilities to maintain its naval presence in the area. This naval presence can be used for following a gun-boat diplomacy like the sending of the American task force headed by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the *Enterprise*, in the Bay of the Bengal and the Arabian Sea in December 1971, or for the maintenance of the strategic *Polaris* submarines in the area. The communication base at Asmara and the proposed base at Diego Garcia would prove indispensable for the operation of these submarines in the area.

Great Britain is a declining power and its presence has gradually eroded during the last two decades. Instead, the USA, the USSR and sometimes the local powers like Indonesia, Malaysia, India and Iran have sought to fill the gap. Yet, during this period of the British naval retreat from the Indian Ocean area, it had the opportunity of maintaining a limited presence, thanks to local conflicts. Britain was able to utilize the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia to continue to maintain its presence in Singapore and in the Straits of Malacca. It still retains a nominal presence in South-East Asia. In the Arabian Sea area, conflicts in the Persian Gulf region, like the dispute between Kuwait and Iraq, enabled Great Britain to justify its military presence in that region. The present confrontation between the liberation movements and the local sheikhdoms is once again enabling Great Britain to maintain its base in the island of Mesirah, and to have close military collaboration with these sheikhdoms.

Great Britain has washed its hands of the commitments in the *Bab al-Mandeb* region and is maintaining a very low posture in East Africa. It is also shy of offering total support to southern African states for fear of alienating the Commonwealth members still further. It, however, continues to have close economic and commercial links with them. Of late, Great Britain has retreated from the littoral to the Indian Ocean islands, but even there its presence is limited. Undoubtedly, it still controls several strategically placed islands like the Maladives, the Chagos Archipelago, the Seychelles and the Farquhar groups of islands; but in the absence of a forward defence policy these islands would be used more by the USA than by Great Britain. One can hardly imagine that the VLF communication base at Diego Garcia would be used by three or four British *Polaris*-type submarines in the 1980s to pose a threat to the Soviet Union. Great Britain is destined to play the second fiddle to the American global policy. Such a policy would neither serve British interests nor endear it to the local powers.

France is a new entrant into the politics of the Indian Ocean. It has not

got itself inextricably involved in the regional conflicts as yet. In fact, it has a fairly clean record as far as the Asian littoral is concerned. But France is concerned more with the African littoral. It is very close to South Africa and the Portuguese Africa and is investing very heavily there. It is also supplying them with arms. France also controls a small but strategically placed corner in Somaliland, and several islands in the western Indian Ocean, like the islands of Reunion, Tromelin, the Glorieuses islands and the Comora islands. France also has treaty relations with Malagasy. The French strategic interest in the area are not clear as yet, but France would like to increase its naval presence, first to buttress its local presence in these islands and possibly to fill the vacuum created by the absence of any local African naval power and a relatively low Anglo-American presence in the western Indian Ocean region.

On 20 November 1972, it was reported that the Political Committee of the Atlantic Assembly, meeting at Bonn, had urged the extension of the NATO naval protection beyond its present limit of the Tropic of Cancer to the Indian Ocean, ostensibly to protect the oil supply line and to counter the growing Soviet presence there. This committee, though only an advisory body, constitutes a very influential group. Almost 200 legislators from 14 countries, including some important Senators from the USA, are its members.

The Soviet presence in the area does not warrant such a large-scale extension of the NATO, which is basically a Europe and Atlantic oriented organization, over an area as far removed as the Indian Ocean. The existing naval presence of the Western powers and their local supporters is more than sufficient to off-set the Soviet presence in this part of the world. One can, however, not overlook the possibility that Germany might like to establish its naval and political presence in the Indian Ocean and in the South Atlantic, under the protection of the NATO. It should be remembered that Germany had been trying hard, even prior to the First World War, to establish some sort of presence in this region, especially in the Persian Gulf.

It is also possible that the Russian presence may be once again used as a pretext to pump more NATO or Western bloc arms in the area. South Africa and Portugal already depend, to a large extent, upon the arms supplied to them by France and Germany. It is quite possible that these countries may also try to pass on some naval equipments to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. Pakistan already operates the *Daphne*-class French submarine. Saudi Arabia has placed orders for a number of small boats from Germany. Iran is reportedly looking for submarines. Both Germany and France are capable of meeting the limited naval requirements of these developing powers. Germany and France are collaborating in the construction of missile boats armed with *Exocet* surface-to-surface missiles. These boats would be in great demand in the small states of the Indian Ocean area. One can expect Germany and France to increase

their influence in the Indian Ocean area and even replace Great Britain as the source of naval equipment. These powers can relieve the USA of the task of tactical neutralization of the Soviet influence in the area. There is no reason why the USA should have any objection to it. After all one should not forget that the British decision to withdraw from the east of the Suez was not appreciated in America. The USA also knows that neither France nor Germany can challenge its supremacy in terms of strategic utilization of this area.

Regional conflicts have also indirectly helped the Soviet Union in increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean area. But it should be noted that the USSR was, for a long time, the second choice of the Afro-Asian states. They went to the Soviet Union only after the West closed its doors to them. Even if we take the question of the arms deal, we find that the countries like Egypt, India and Indonesia opted for the Soviet arms only when they could not get their requirements from their traditional sources. Thus, India went for the *MiG-21* when it could not get a comparable aircraft from the West. So also was the case with submarines. In the economic field also, the reluctance of the Western countries to help finance heavy industries or to encourage the public sector was a major reason why several Afro-Asian countries opted for the Soviet aid. The intransigence of the Western bloc countries and their efforts to intensify the local conflicts closed the gap between the non-aligned countries and the USSR still further. At the moment the USSR is very close to Bangladesh, India, Iraq, the two Yemens, Somalia and Tanzania and maintains good relations even with Iran which is a member of the CENTO. That helps the Soviet union in furthering its local interests in the area which include trade and commerce, and also enables it to deny that area to the West. The Soviet presence in some states like Somalia and Yemen also enables it to maintain a modest naval presence in the area. This is especially true of the Arabian Sea which has a great strategic value. But the non-aligned states would rather prefer to see an end to local conflicts and would want to develop close contacts with both the blocs, a policy in keeping with the avowed aims of non-alignment, than to become willingly or unwillingly a part of the bi-polar system which is tending to emerge in the Indian Ocean area.

China is another power which has gained a substantial presence in the area, during the last decade. It has not only utilized the local conflicts but has even accentuated them so as to serve its purpose. By encouraging Sukarno against Malaysia, China created an artificial confrontation in South-East Asia. In South Asia, China has been inciting Pakistan and furnishing it with arms so as to heighten the Indo-Pak controversy. In the Persian Gulf area and in southern Africa, it has encouraged liberation movements. China is not only competing with the West but also with the Soviet Union. It would not be wrong to say that the Soviet Union is the primary target of the Chinese offensive in these areas. China has succeeded

in replacing the Soviet influence in Pakistan and Sudan, and there is a tug-of-war going on between the two communist powers for predominance in Ceylon, the two Yemens, Somalia, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Mauritius. The Chinese are developing economic and political interests in the area. They have no strategic interests as yet, but the economic and political base created during this decade may prove useful in the coming decade when China may be able to construct its own *Polaris*-type submarines. The Indian Ocean area would be strategically as useful to the Chinese then as it is to the Americans today, especially if the Sino-Soviet rift continues to widen at the present rate. The Chinese naval presence in the coming decade can also be used against the emerging local powers like India, which by that time, would have acquired a good conventional naval capability.

The Indian Ocean states do not gain any substantial advantage from these local confrontations. Instead, an end of their confrontation offers them several advantages. Rapprochement between Indonesia and Malaysia is a unique case which needs to be studied in depth by the Indian Ocean community. The detente has not only brought about peace and stability in the region, but has also enabled the two neighbouring states to coordinate their policies in the political and naval fields. The joint oceanographic survey of the Straits of Malacca, the declaration of the Straits of Malacca as a closed sea, and the proposed joint naval cooperation in the area would have been impossible before 1965.

Whereas the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation has ended, the confrontation in the Indian sub-continent, which began with the partition of India in 1947, shows no sign of coming to an end. The so-called Kashmir question was made the basis of an anti-Indian campaign. Pakistan armed by the USA, posed serious security threats to India in 1965 and 1971. Bangladesh was made an issue, not of the genocide committed by the Pakistani regime, but of national integrity of Pakistan. Humanism was sacrificed at the altar of the vested political and military interests. And, when Pakistan, which was fighting a losing war in Bangladesh, attacked India on 3 December 1971, some big powers threatened to intervene to salvage the discredited Pakistani regime. India was accused of wanting to destroy Pakistan. Votes were mobilized in the United Nations not only to save Pakistan, but also to permit it to continue its genocide in Bangladesh. No votes were mobilized when hundreds of thousands of men, women and children of Bangladesh were being murdered and dishonoured. But when India stood up in defence of humanism, it was branded as an aggressor. As if that was not sufficient, when India unilaterally announced a ceasefire, it was given out by responsible spokesmen of the US Government that India had done so only because the Americans had pressurized the Soviet Union to stop the march of the Indian troops in Pakistan. Treating India as a stooge of the USSR was not only an insult to India, but also a shrewd political move to justify future American acti-

vities in the Indian sub-continent. Any containment of India, according to that logic, would be a containment of the Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean. Hence, the USA devised a political platform which could justify its future anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani policies. China, whose objectives coincided with those of the USA, joined it.

Such a policy would probably lead to further intensification of the Indo-Pak confrontation, unless the leadership of Pakistan learns the necessary lessons from the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation and normalizes Pakistan's relations with India and with Bangladesh. Any instability in the Indian sub-continent would have its impact upon the politics in the Indian Ocean area. It would greatly restrict India's as well as Pakistan's participation in the peace efforts in the Indian Ocean area. If their relations are normalized, the Indian sub-continent, with its vast political and economic resources, would act as a bridge between the two halves of the Indian Ocean and help in the creation of a unified Indian Ocean community.

The conflicts in the Persian Gulf area are still in their infancy. The question of the *Shatt al-Arab* is basically a question of delimitation of the boundary of an international river. Several such disputes have been peacefully settled. It should not be difficult for Iran and Iraq, which have co-ordinated their oil policies to find a peaceful settlement of that problem also. Similarly, the question of off-shore boundaries can also be settled peacefully by the local powers themselves. The continuing confrontation between Iraq and Iran, especially after the signing of the friendship treaty between Iraq and USSR, would intensify the Cold War in the region. Iran may be a strong regional power today, but it would not profit in the long run either by offering her patronage to the local powers, or by posing a threat to them. Such a policy may lead to an Arab-Iranian confrontation and start an arms race in the region. The conflicts in the Persian Gulf region are still in a low key, and conflict-resolution would be a relatively easy task at this moment if the local powers so desire.

Conflicts in the *Bab al-Mandeb* area are more complicated, though not so intense. The presence of five outside powers, the USA, the USSR, France, China and Israel and their different stakes in the region, make the task of their resolution more difficult. The USA is interested in the area because of the communication base at Asmara. The USSR is interested not only in neutralizing the area around the Asmara base, but also in controlling the southern gate of the Red Sea to enable it to operate freely from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea. Though the Suez route is closed now, the Soviet presence in Somalia and the two Yemens permits it to operate in the Red Sea and the Arabian sea. France has possible interests in the Red Sea mineral resources. China is busy competing with the Soviet Union and has succeeded in establishing good relations with the two Yemens, Somalia, Ethiopia and the Sudan—something which neither the USA nor the USSR has been able to achieve.

Israel had come very close to Ethiopia and had sought to maintain a naval and air presence in the area to neutralize the Arab threat of the blockade of *Bab al-Mandeb*. The presence of these outside forces would intensify the local conflicts still further when the Suez Canal is reopened.

Somalia-Ethiopian border dispute as well as the Eritrian question can be solved peacefully. It is worth noting that two such problems have been successfully handled by the African states themselves without any outside interference. The Greater Morocco scheme, under which Morocco claimed Mauritania and parts of the Algerian Sahara, and which led to a border conflict in 1963, was discarded by Morocco in 1969, following an OAU mediation. Since then, Morocco began to draw closer to other Maghreb countries. Maghreb unity has brought several advantages to the North African states, like regional cooperation in the exploitation of the mineral resources of the Sahara, greater regional trade and commerce, joint communication network, etc. Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya also can benefit greatly if similar arrangements are made, and the right of the people of the Somali origin to migrate periodically to their traditional pastures in Ethiopia and Kenya are conceded.

The Eritrian question also can be peacefully settled. Sudan was faced with a similar problem after its independence. Recently, the Sudanese government and the *Anyanya*, the military wing of the liberation movement in South Sudan, have finally agreed upon a federal formula for South Sudan. The Eritrian question, which arose out of the gradual erosion of regional autonomy of Eritrea, can also be solved if the principles of federalism and regional autonomy are reintroduced there and accepted by the parties interested in solving that conflict. Sudan, which is deeply involved in that conflict and which has already settled its South Sudan problem on similar lines, can be reasonably expected to help Ethiopia in the settlement of the Eritrian problem also. If these two basic problems are solved, that would lead to a greater regional stability and cooperation and would lessen the chances of foreign power involvement in that sensitive area.

Conflicts in southern Africa, revolving around two interconnected issues, the policy of *apartheid* and the European colonial dominance, have intensified during the last decade due to African resurgence, as manifested in the emergence of several national liberation movements. In the context of the new weapon system and the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean for the Super Powers, the Western presence in southern Africa would assume an added importance. The southern African coast and the Western bases, like the one in Diego Garcia, dominate the western Indian Ocean. South Africa offers the additional advantage of commanding the route, via the Cape of Good Hope, which connects the Atlantic with the Indian Ocean. It can, therefore, be presumed that despite the verbal condemnation of the Portuguese colonialism and of the policy of

apartheid, the Western powers would continue to back South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia. There are chances of further intensification of conflicts in the area, especially in view of the growing Chinese presence there that would give one more reason to the West to intervene openly under the garb of protecting the Africans from the dangers of communism. Some of the African states have already fallen a prey to that slogan and are advocating that the Africans should come to an understanding with South Africa.

Thus, the regional conflicts have come in very handy to both the blocs for strengthening their presence in the Indian Ocean area. The big power rivalry and their involvement on behalf of local states, especially during the last decade, has increased outside presence in the area, several times more than what it was at the time of the Second World War. If the tempo of the big power involvement is maintained at the current pace, the Indian Ocean area which till recently was comparatively peaceful, would become a conflict zone; not a very happy situation for the people living there. A reduction in the big power presence in the littoral would not only reduce tension in the area and help in the conflict resolution but would also help in reducing the big power presence on the high seas and thus furthering the chances of the creation of a nuclear-free peace zone in the Indian Ocean.

4

Future Confrontations

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN

THE INDIAN OCEAN became strategically more important for the West, and particularly for the USA, after the weapon system based upon nuclear propulsion and submarine-launehed ballistic missile (SLBM) was perfected in the 1960s. The earlier version of the *Polaris* missile (*A-1*), which had a range of about 1200 miles (nautical), became operational in November 1960. Submarines armed with these missiles were first deployed in the Atlantic Ocean. The improved version of the *Polaris* missile (*A-2*), with a range of 1,500 to 1,800 miles (though some claim that it has a range of up to 2,200 miles), was perfected in June 1952. *A*-2 was first deployed in the Indian Ocean in 1965 but was subsequently replaced by *A-3* missiles. *A-3* version of the *Polaris* missile, with a range of more than 2,500 miles, was first deployed in September 1964 in the Atlantic Ocean, and then in the Pacific and the Indian oceans. The longer range of *A-3* permitted the US *Polaris* submarines to reach targets deep inside the Soviet Union from the Indian Ocean area especially from the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea.

The USA has constructed 41 *Polaris* submarines in all. Of these, 28 were armed with *A-3*, and 13 with *A-2* missiles. Some of these submarines are being converted to carry the newly-perfected *Poseidon* missiles. The *Polaris* missile carries one megaton warhead and each submarine carries 16 missiles. Thus, 13 *Polaris* submarines carrying *A-2* missiles would be carrying 208 nuclear warheads. The remaining 28 *Polaris* submarines carrying *A-3* missiles, would carry 448 warheads in all. But, if the report that some *A-3* missile have MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) capability is correct, then the number of warheads would increase much more. If it is assumed that even half of the *A-3* missiles carry three warheads each, then the number of warheads carri-

ed by these *A-3 Polaris* submarines increases to 896. The number would increase to 1344 if all the *A-3* missiles carry three warheads each. Thus the number of warheads carried by these *Polaris* submarines would range between the conservative assumption of 656, a moderate assumption of 1,104 and a maximum assumption of 1,552. These figures are only tentative in view of the introduction of the *Poseidon* missile.

These *Polaris* submarines are normally maintained on a two-month patrol without any external assistance or support and are continuously ready to launch their missiles during that period. After the two-month patrol they return to the base for one month for replenishment, refitting and change of crew. Thus, at any given time, two-thirds of the *Polaris* submarine fleet are constantly on patrol. Another fact which should be taken into account while discussing the magnitude of the threat from these submarines is, that no area on earth is more than 1,700 nautical miles away from the coast. Thus, the *Polaris* submarine need not always stay near the littoral to keep the target within the range of its missiles. Hence, these submarines have hundreds of thousands of square miles of sea-room to operate, hide, manoeuvre, evade detection and yet retain the capacity to take effective offensive measures. Unlike the conventionally-powered submarines, they do not have to come to the surface to charge their batteries for submerged operations. Their sustained submerged operation, normally up to the depth of 1,000 feet (they can submerge up to depth of 2,000 feet and more) makes their detection, even with sophisticated submarine detection methods, very difficult.

The *Polaris* missile, in terms of the weapon system, is only a first generation weapon. Efforts are being made to make the system more sophisticated. As a first step in that direction, the existing *A-3 Polaris* missile has been improved by giving it a MIRV capability. But work is progressing on two other weapons, the *Poseidon* and the under-sea long-range missile system (ULMS). The *Poseidon* would replace the *Polaris* in the 1970s and the ULMS would probably become operational in the 1980s.

The *Poseidon* missile, which is already in operation, weighs 65,000 lbs., almost twice the weight of *A-3 Polaris* missile. It is designed to carry double the pay-load of *A-3*, probably at a slightly longer range. It would also be more accurate. It is reported that its CEP (circular error probable) would be only half that of *A-3*, which itself is considered to be a very accurate missile. Thus the CEP of the *Poseidon* would compare with that of the land-based *Minuteman II*, which is half a mile. *Poseidon* is designed to carry MIRV. Reports about the number of warheads which would be carried by the *Poseidon* vary from 10 to 14. Even if the minimum is placed at five warheads, with enough room left for increased range, decoys, penetration aids etc, the *Poseidon* would be a much better weapon than the *Polaris*.

It is reported that 31 out of 41 *Polaris* submarines would be converted by 1975 to carry *Poseidon* missiles. Thus, by 1975, the number

of warheads carried by 10 submarines, each carrying 16 *A-3* missiles with three war-heads (MIRV) each, would be 480. 31 submarines, with 16 *Poseidon* missiles each, would carry 6,944 warheads with 14 warheads per missile, 4,960 warheads with 10 warheads per missile and 2,480 with five warheads per missile.

Thus, the total number of warheads carried by these nuclear-powered submarines would be 7,422 by maximum assumption, 5,440 by moderate assumption and 2,960 by conservative assumption. It is reported that the change-over from the *Polaris* to the *Poseidon* would represent an eight-fold increase in the performance of the system because of the accuracy, greater pay-load and the multiplication of the warheads.

There are also plans to create the ULMS (under-sea long-range missile system). Work on this project started in the last decade. The Advanced Sea-Based Deterrent Study Group of the US Navy completed its study on the project in 1964. Suggestions were made that medium-to-long range ballistic missile system be based in the ocean, in specially designed submersible vessels capable of carrying more than 20 missiles with MIRV capabilities and operating in depths ranging from 1,000-11,000 feet. The maximum range of the missile is estimated to be about 7,000 miles. It is possible that the range may be reduced in favour of a flat trajectory, thus making it much more difficult to counter with anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.

Several suggestions were made about the type of vessel to be employed in the new system. The suggestion that these missiles be launched from vessels moored at fixed points was rejected as involving security risks. Moreover, the UN was discussing a plan to ban the use of the sea-bed outside the continental shelf for nuclear weapons. In all probability, it would be accepted by the big powers. The other suggestion which is under active consideration is to have a low-powered bottom crawler-type submersible which could be shifted from place to place to avoid detection. One reason in favour of such a vessel is that proximity to the ocean-bottom, at sufficient depth, would make its detection very difficult, even with long-range active sonar. There is always the possibility that these new long-range missiles may be placed in especially designed nuclear-powered submarines. At the moment, the USA does not have submarines capable of launching these long-range missiles though experiments are being carried out in that direction. It is expected that the new replacement of the *Polaris* submarine, the *Trident*, may become operational in 1978. The *Trident's* missile would have a range of more than 4,000 miles with MIRV capabilities. Experiments with the missile as well as the submarine are in progress.

NR-1, a nuclear-powered ocean engineering and research vehicle costing $99.2 million, was launched by the USA in January 1969. It is also fitted with wheels beneath the hull to permit 'bottom crawling'. The *NR-I*, which weighs 400 tons submerged, is powered by a nuclear power plant and is equipped with oceanographic equipment and sensors. Several other

deep submersible research vessels are being perfected, both for military purposes and for commercial exploitation of the ocean-bed. These researches are interconnected.

There is a possibility that when the ULMS is perfected it might replace the current weapon system based on *Polaris* and subsequently *Poseidon* submarines. If that happens, then the USA might not rely upon its present weapon system and might even be willing to withdraw its submarines from the ocean just as it is gradually withdrawing its land bases from the periphery of the Communist bloc countries. To that extent it might also lead to a detente in the Indian Ocean But, such a withdrawal would have to be the part of a global withdrawal because the American naval presence in the Indian Ocean is a part of its global strategy.

The American naval presence in the Indian Ocean has several advantages for that country. Undoubtedly, the US *Polaris* fleet operates in the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and in the Mediterranean Sea. but it has to face a greater challenge from the Soviet naval capability in those waters. These areas are nearer to the Soviet Union and the Soviet fleets can operate more efficiently in these waters. These are also the areas where the USSR operates its own version of the *Polaris* submarines. According to experts the Soviet Union would achieve parity with the USA in that field by the middle of this decade. Thus, the Soviet Union, by deploying its fleet in the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, not only can counter the American naval presence there but can also simultaneously support its ballistic missile submarines operating in those waters. But it cannot afford to maintain a similar naval pressure in the Indian Ocean at the moment for three main reasons, namely, lack of adequate naval capability, the distance involved, and the fact that the submarines of the Soviet Union operating in the Indian Ocean cannot hit the targets in the USA from the Indian Ocean area. The situation might improve if the Suez Canal is reopened or if the Soviet Union is able to launch long-range missiles from its submarines. But none of these things seem possible in the near future. Even though it is reported that the USSR has perfected a SLBM with a range of about 4,000 miles, even that missile cannot reach the targets in the USA from the Indian Ocean area. Thus, American submarines operating in the Indian Ocean, especially those in the Arabian Sea, enjoy an added advantage over those operating in other oceans. They can not only cover a large part of the Soviet Union but will do that also with lesser risk.

There is no doubt that over the years great progress has been made in the field of anti-submarine warfare and under-water surveillance system. But water still poses problems for the scientists. Equipments based upon electromagnetic principles like radar, magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) and laser-beams or infrared devices, cannot be used successfully for underwater detection because of the low penetration of the electromagnetic energy in water. Consequently, these methods which are very useful to detect vessels on or near the surface are not useful in detecting deep-submerged

submarines. As compared to electromagnetic waves, sound waves have a greater capacity to penetrate the water barrier and equipments based upon acoustics are normally employed to detect submarines which are submerged.

Sonar (short form for sound, navigation and ranging) instruments are most commonly used to detect such vessels. Others can also be detected. Sonars are of two types, passive and active. The passive sonar simply listens to sounds created by the propulsion machinery of the vessel as well as by its movement through the water. This sonar has certain advantages. First, it can have a range of more than 100 miles. Secondly, its location is not detected by the other side. But it has its disadvantages also. Though it can detect noises over fairly long distances, it cannot determine the distance of the object with any great accuracy.

The active sonar, on the other hand, sends out high-energy sound waves which strike underwater objects and return echoes to the listening instruments. This sonar, therefore, has the advantage over passive sonar, that it does not have to depend upon the noise created by the target. Moreover, since it can calculate the time required for the echo to return, it can detect not only the distance of the target but also its movements. Active sonar, however, has two main disadvantages. First, the sound impulses created by it can reveal the presence of the sonar transmitter over an area far greater that its own zone of detection. Secondly, its range is not more than 10 to 15 miles, though there are reports that a range up to 30 miles has been achieved by the USA.

These sonar devices can be placed in fixed positions or can be mounted on vessels. Fixed passive sonars have been installed by the USA in its continental shelf to listen to the under-water sounds, but neither the USA nor the USSR can claim a continental shelf of its own in the Indian Ocean, where they may install such instruments. Moreover, to be effective, these instruments have to be fixed at a distance of about 200 miles all-along the Indian Ocean littoral, to cover a sea-belt hardly hundred miles away from the coast. Thus, it is not practical to rely solely upon passive sonars. Therefore, passive sonar is used along with active sonar. That combination is mounted on a surface vessel, a submarine, or can be lowered from a helicopter to keep the high seas under surveillance.

Sonabuoys, instruments based upon acoustics, are also used to detect submarines. They can be placed in the ocean where they listen to the under-water sounds and transmit the data by radio to the data-collecting centres like the aircraft, surface vessel or even the satellites. Small sonabuoys can also be dropped from anti-submarine aircraft to pinpoint the location of the submarine in a given area. It should, however, be remembered, that because of the limited range of the sonar instruments, only a large number of vessels and aircraft which are constantly on patrol, can maintain a given area under some surveillance. At the moment, it is almost impossible for the Soviet Union, with its limited naval capabilities,

to keep the entire Indian Ocean under constant surveillance.

Even when the Soviet navy is able to locate and identify an American submarine in the Indian Ocean, it is still faced with the problem of neutralizing it in peace-time, and of destroying it in war-time. The *Polaris* is a very fast submarine which can, if necessary, go as deep as 2,000 feet and continue to operate at that depth for a long period. Under such conditions, to keep it tracked constantly would be almost impossible. One way the *Polaris* submarine could be neutralized by the USSR is, by constantly keeping in contact with it and by keeping its anti-submarine weapons in close proximity of the submarine so that, if and when necessary, it could be eliminated.

The USSR can do this by stationing a sufficient force consisting of anti-submarine carriers (the Soviet Union is developing vessels like *Moskova* and *Leningrad*), destroyers, frigates, hunter-killer submarines, anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters in the Indian Ocean. Since the Soviet bases are too far away the Soviet Union would be faced with great difficulties in detaching and maintaining a large part of its naval fleet in the Indian Ocean to neutralize American submarines operating in that area. It can operate better if it supplements its ocean-fleet with air and naval bases in some parts of the Indian Ocean. The growing Soviet presence in the *Bab al-Mandeb* area may partly be explained by these strategic considerations. Operating from there, the Soviet Union can hope to neutralize the American naval presence in the Arabian Sea and in the Red Sea because the chances of American submarines operating in these areas are more in view of the proximity of the communication base at Asmara and the larger area in the USSR which can be brought within the range of the *Polaris* and the *Poseidon* missiles from there.

It is possible that there may be a marked increase in the American naval presence in the Indian Ocean in the 1970s. Its location, which is far off not only from the American coast but also from the areas of intense Soviet naval and air activities, and the presence of pro-American states on the littoral, ranging from Australia on one side to southern African countries on the other, and countries like Bahrain, Pakistan, Iran and Ethiopia with which the USA has either a defence treaty or a base agreement, makes the Indian Ocean a happy hunting ground for American submarines.

But even *Polaris* submarines cannot operate in a political or military vacuum. There is no doubt that when these submarines were introduced into the Indian Ocean there was no Soviet naval presence in the area. But, the Soviet naval vessels started operating in the Indian Ocean since 1968. With the passage of time, not only their number but also the overall anti-submarine capabilities of the Soviet Union would increase and then the *Polaris* submarine may not have a free run in the Indian Ocean. The Western powers are already worried about the growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. There are chances that, taking advantage of the growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, they may increase the

number of their submarines as well as their surface vessels in the area. It is possible that the present policy of periodic cruises of the US task force in the Indian Ocean may be given up and the USA may maintain a permanent fleet in the Indian Ocean, as it does in the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans and in the Mediterranean Sea.

The USA had been planning for such an eventuality since the last decade. Its close cooperation with Australia, the construction of the second largest American VLF communication base with one megawatt peak pulse at Northwest Cape, north of Perth, (the other one is in Maine, USA), construction of another VLF communication base at Diego Garcia, modernization of defence capabilities of Australia, South Africa, Pakistan and Iran by the Western powers and the agreement with Bahrain about the continuation of the US naval base on that island, all go to prove that the USA has every intention of maintaining and even increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean for some time to come even at the cost of displeasing some of the local powers. Attempts to achieve further sophistication not only in the field of submarines but also surface vessels also point towards a greater reliance upon the use of sea-power as a major source of deterrence for some time to come.

In the last decade emphasis was placed upon the construction of nuclear-powered submarines armed with *Polaris* missiles. In that decade the *Polaris* was perfected and a superior missile, *Poseidon*, was also built. However, the decade did not witness a corresponding increase in the nuclear-powered surface vessels. Only one aircraft carrier, the *Enterprise*, one cruiser, the *Long Beach*, and two frigates, the *Bain Bridge* and the *Truxtun*, were constructed. The emphasis was still on the construction of diesel-powered surface vessels. Two aircraft-carriers, the *America* and the *John F. Kennedy*, which were proposed to be nuclear-powered, were subsequently constructed as diesel-powered vessels. But of late, there is a growing awareness in America of the need to construct more nuclear-powered surface vessels which would keep pace with nuclear-powered submarines. In 1967, construction of the *Nimitz*, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, was sanctioned. It was expected to be ready by 1973. In 1968, work on another such aircraft-carrier, the *Dwight D. Eisenhower*, was sanctioned. It is reported that it would be ready by 1974. There are also plans to construct one more CVAN (carrier vehicle aircraft nuclear) by the end of the decade. Thus, by the end of this decade, the USA may be operating four CVANs. This CVAN programme is also supported by a corresponding increase in the number of small nuclear-powered surface vessel like frigates. The USA is constructing four of them to escort the new CVANS. There are reports that the number of these escort vessels may be increased still further.

Along with an increase in the nuclear-powered surface vessels, the USA also plans to increase its nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine fleet. It already possessed about 20 such submarines in 1967. But these types of submarines had to face serious competition in their construction pro-

gramme from *Polaris* submarines which had been given top priority. By 1967, the *Polaris* submarine programme had almost fulfilled its target and hence an added emphasis was placed upon the construction of nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines. In 1967, construction began on the *Sturgeon*-class submarine. Thirty-seven of them were planned. Work is also going on the construction of a quiet submarine. It is said that it would be using the turbine-electric drive powered by a nuclear reactor. It is expected to be ready by 1974. The USA also proposes to construct 25 submarines of a high-speed design during the period 1970-1975.

Thus the USA plans to increase its nuclear-powered surface vessels to include at least three aircraft carriers, one cruiser, more than six frigates and about 62 hunter-killer submarines of advanced designs by 1975. They would, therefore, be able to protect the 41 *Polaris* and *Poseidon* submarines, operating on the high seas, against any possible counter-measures which the USSR might plan against them. These nuclear-powered vessels can either act independently or in coordination with the conventionally-powered vessels of the US navy. In either case they would represent a manifold advantage to America, especially when the Soviet Union has no comparable surface vessels.

If the reports that the USSR would catch up with the USA in the SLBM programme by 1975 are correct, than the emphasis would shift from the overall threat posed by them to their protection from the anti-submarine devices of the other party. The USA with its new flotilla of nuclear-powered surface ships and hunter-killer submarines would still retain an edge over the Soviet Union in that respect. Vice-Admiral H. G. Rickover, who has been arguing for the construction of the nuclear-powered aircraft-carrier and escort vessels, while testifying before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the US Congress in March 1970, said:

> The nuclear carriers and their nuclear escorts will constitute a major striking force of the US Navy. That will be what you could call our battle-force. It will be the most powerful group of ships that ever has been assembled. It will be a force that can be sent anywhere in the world on short notice and in a short time. And in view of the limitations there may be on our having advanced bases overseas, and our relations with other countries, this may be a very, very important thing at that time. The existence of such a force will free us from much logistic support, and will enable us to operate swiftly and surely, without dependence on foreign agreements or foreign bases.[1]

Thus the proposed naval build-up of the USA, with an emphasis upon nuclear-powered surface vessels and hunter-killer submarines, would enable the USA to operate more freely even in the far-away Indian Ocean in support of its *Polaris* and *Poseidon* submarines in this decade and also in support of its *Trident* submarines during the next decade.

If the naval capabilities of the two Super Powers are compared in the Indian Ocean area, one finds that the USA has several advantages over the

USSR. It possesses not only aircraft-carriers but also two important communication bases in Ethiopia and Australia. The third one is under construction in Diego Garcia. These communication bases greatly facilitate the operations of deep-submerged vessels in the area. There are no reports that the Soviet Union has been able to establish such communication facilities in the Indian Ocean as yet. Even in terms of the facilities of land-based operation, the USA enjoys an advantage over the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union can, at the most, operate from Somalia and the two Yemens, which are in one corner of the Indian Ocean. The USA, on the other hand, in cooperation with its allies, has the freedom to operate from various points all along the Indian Ocean—Australia, Thailand, the Maldives, Pakistan, Iran, Bahrain, Messirah, Ethiopia, South Africa and the British Indian Ocean islands. From these areas it can continue to have a much better control over the Indian Ocean area than the Soviet Union can hope to achieve in the near future.

The US naval presence may not be limited to countering whatever naval presence the Soviet Union may build up in this part of the world but it may well be used to intimidate the littoral powers themselves. The dispatch of the US task force headed by the nuclear-powered aircraft-carrier, the *Enterprise*, in December 1971, first to the Bay of Bengal and then to the Arabian Sea has set the new pattern for the use of the American navy in the Indian Ocean area.

Thus, to the threat of a nuclear confrontation between the Super Powers would be added the possible dangers of Super Power interventions in local conflicts. Such a confrontation in which the naval forces of the Super Powers would be ranged against each other, albeit in support of their regional friends, would not help in the resolution of conflict in the Indian Ocean area. It may even lead to the hardening of the conflict. The Arab-Israeli conflict is a very good example of such an eventuality. In 1956, when direct Super Power confrontation in that area was on a relatively low pitch, the problem could be solved. Israeli troops were forced to retreat to the previous ceasefire line. But the situation changed in one decade and the Super Power confrontation stratified the Arab-Israeli conflict. All efforts to persuade Israel to go back to the pre-June 1967 line had been frustrated. Instead, the Arab Israeli conflict has been further intensified. The lessons of the Arab-Israeli conflict have been learnt at least by some of the states in the Indian Ocean area. They are aware of the dangers inherent in the Super Power presence in the Indian Ocean and have been working to eliminate it.

EMERGENCE OF AN INDIAN OCEAN COMMUNITY CONSCIOUSNESS

The Desire for a Nuclear-Free Peace Zone

The reactions of the Indian Ocean states to the growing Super Power rivalry in the area was in keeping with their traditional policies.

Those countries which were aligned to either of the Super Powers, or had treaty relations with any of the big powers were, *ipso facto*, in favour of the continuation of the old alliances. Some of them even want a step further and began to strengthen their relations with the Western powers. Thus, Australia came closer to the USA. South Africa began to develop close relations with France and West Germany, the two European countries which were not only trying to develop roots in South Africa but were also trying to replace Great Britain as the dominant power in that region.

While these white regimes in the Indian Ocean came closer to the Western powers, the erstwhile 'committed' Afro-Asian states had undergone a significant change during the middle of the last decade. Gradual military disengagement of the West owing to the change in the weapon systems and the parallel Soviet drive to win more friends had brought about a marked change in the attitude of these states. Though some of them continued to be members of the SEATO and the CENTO or to honour their commitments under the mutual security agreements, they began to follow a more independent foreign policy which, in content, came very close to the policy of non-alignment.

The Cold War rivalry and the consequent political and military fall-out in the Third World was opposed by several local leaders as being detrimental not only to world peace but also to local peace, security and unity. The policy of non-alignment, evolved to counter the ill-effects of the Cold War rivalry in the Third World, however, remained a theoretical proposition till the area was invaded by the Western powers by their offers of military and economic aid and regional defence pacts. The SEATO and the Baghdad Pact were opposed by the non-aligned states not only because they brought the Cold War to a relatively low-tension area, but also because the leaders of the non-aligned world felt that the massive military support by one bloc, to a few countries in the Third World, would intensify regional disputes and pose serious difficulties in their peaceful solution. They also felt that military imbalance created by massive military aid to a few countries would trigger-off an arms race which would divert the scarce financial resources of the arms receiving countries, as well as their non-aligned neighbours, towards acquiring and maintaining armed forces out of all proportion to their national resources, and that would, in turn, seriously jeopardize their economic development programmes. What these leaders had feared came true. The consequences of the Cold War rivalries divided the non-communist Afro-Asian World into two camps, the pro-Western and the non-aligned, and the local arms-race seriously undermined their economic progress.

The entry of the US task force in 1964 in the region was a continuation of the Super Power confrontation and the non-aligned countries reacted to it as they had reacted to similar situations earlier. For them, the US presence in the Indian Ocean did not mean a radical departure from its previous presence on the littoral. It was a continuation

of the old Cold War confrontation. They realized that the American naval presence in the Indian Ocean would also invite the Soviet presence, and the Cold War rivalry would be carried to the high seas where the littoral countries would have even less chances of influencing it. Thus, the non-aligned countries began demanding as early as 1964 that the big power presence should be removed from the Indian Ocean and the area should be denuclearized.

Mrs Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, took the lead in that matter. In her speech on 8 October 1964 at the Second Non-aligned Nations' Conference at Cairo, she forcefully argued that the concept of a nuclear-free zone should be applied to the oceans also, especially to oceans like the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic which had remained free from nuclear weapons till then. She also said that Ceylon had closed its sea-ports and airfields to ships and aircraft which either carried nuclear weapons or were equipped for nuclear warfare. She recommended that other non-aligned countries should also follow that principle. Mrs Bandaranaike's suggestions were subsequently incorporated in the declaration of the Cairo conference, which is also known as the Programme for Peace and International Cooperation. Part VII of that programme dealt with disarmament, denuclearization and the establishment of nuclear-free zones. Part VIII condemned the expressed intention of the big powers to establish bases in the Indian Ocean as a "calculated attempt to intimidate the emerging countries of Africa and Asia and an unwarranted extension of the policy of neo-colonialism and imperialism".

In keeping with their earlier stand, the non-aligned countries took strong exception to the plan to construct Anglo-American bases in the Indian Ocean islands, especially in Diego Garcia. Mr Dinesh Singh, the then Deputy Minister for External Affairs, said as early as on 18 November 1965 that the Indian Government strongly opposed the construction of foreign bases in Indian Ocean. He said that India would do everything possible to resist the establishment of an Anglo-American base in the Chagos archipelago. Several other states in the Indian Ocean area were also critical of such arrangements. The British and the American Governments tried to pacify the Indian Ocean states by suggesting that the proposed base at Diego Garcia was not a military base in the sense that it would not be a naval or an air base but would be only a communication base. Hardly anyone was taken in by their arguments.

The VLF communication base in Diego Garcia fulfils a vital strategic requirement as concerns the weapon system the USA and the UK want to deploy in the Indian Ocean area. Through the facilities available at that base, the USA will be able to command *Polaris* and *Poseidon* submarines operating in Indian Ocean. No one envisaged there a huge base, which would be a vulnerable target for the Soviet ICBM system. But, without the VLF communication base in Diego Garcia, the US submarines would find it very difficult to operate in the Indian Ocean,

especially in western Indian Ocean, in the next decade. The agreement for the communication base at Asmara in Ethiopia expires in 1978 and Ethiopia might not renew its lease. Therefore, Diego Garcia would be the only VLF communication base available to the USA in that part of the Indian Ocean. A similar base in Australia would be too far away. No wonder, therefore, that despite the opposition of the Indian Ocean states, the West is going ahead with its plan to have the base in Diego Garcia—a source of future tension in the area.

Another interesting argument used to justify the continuing Western presence in the Indian Ocean area was based upon the so-called 'vacuum' theory. The decision of the British Government to curtail their commitments about the east of the Suez was projected as a move which might create a power vacuum in the area which, if the Americans did not rush to fill, would be filled by the USSR. The argument gained some weight because of the dramatic entry of the small Soviet naval task force in Indian Ocean in 1968, which coincided with the British decision of partial withdrawal from the area.

The two moves were parallel but not interconnected. The growing American nuclear presence in the Indian Ocean was threatening the southern flank of the Soviet Union, which was exposed to any attack launched from there by *Polaris* submarines. The Soviet Union was concerned with it, especially after the closure of the Suez Canal since June 1967 which effectively blocked the direct line of communication from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean, and prevented the Soviet Union from putting enough naval force to counter the growing American presence in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union would have attempted to counter that threat even if Britain had decided not to withdraw from the area. Gradual withdrawal by Britain from the area was, on the other hand, due to its shrinking economic and military capacity to pursue a Super Power role and the growing local opposition to its presence in the area. Sooner or later, Britain would have had to cut down its overseas commitments. But it would be wrong to assume that Britain is withdrawing completely. It is not only maintaining its presence, though a reduced one, in South-East Asia, the Persian Gulf and in the British territories in the Indian Ocean but has also entered into an alliance with the USA to operate jointly in the Indian Ocean by strengthening their presence in the islands in the Indian Ocean which are either occupied or controlled by Britain. Thus, the supporters of the vacuum theory were wrongly correlating two parallel events when they were trying to justify the increased American presence in the area.

The Indian Government, as also others, strongly objected to the so-called vacuum theory. Mrs Gandhi emphasized that point during her tour of the South-East Asian countries in May 1966. In her press conferences in Singapore, Canberra, Wellington and Kuala Lumpur she repeatedly emphasized the fact that the withdrawal of the British forces

from the area would not create any vacuum, and if any vacuum was created it ought to be filled by the local powers themselves and not by outside powers. She pointed out that the entry of outside forces would not only create more tensions but also accentuate those which already prevailed in the area. In her press conference in Singapore on 20 May, she rejected the idea that India should fill the gap left by the British. Mr Baliram Bhagat, Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs, elaborated the point further, in the debate in Rajya Sabha on 25 July 1968. He said, "We believe that the security of the countries in the region must rest ultimately on their own national strength, and on their willing cooperation between one another as sovereign independent states." Indian leaders also argued that the best way to replace the British presence was by a rapid economic development of the regional states so that sufficient local resources could be developed to resist any foreign threat to their local security.

India was not alone in advocating such a policy. In the Persian Gulf, the British decision to withdraw from the area had created a near panic among some of the Sheikhs, who had till then totally relied upon the British presence for their protection. Some of them were even willing to pay for the continuation of the British presence in the Gulf. But other local states were against it. They were against the entry of any other foreign power in the area. The joint *communique* issued after the visit of the Shah of Iran to India in January 1969 categorically affirmed that the preservation of peace and stability in the Persian Gulf was the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states and there should be no interference by outside powers. The Shah also discussed with the Indian leaders the consequences of the proposed British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971.

Thus, India as well as several other Indian Ocean states maintained the distinction between the question posed by the proposed British withdrawal from the area and the possible threat of a nuclear confrontation between the two Super Powers in the Indian Ocean. They suggested that the local powers should fill any vacuum that might be created by the British withdrawal. The nuclear confrontation was sought to be averted by making a concerted effort to denuclearize the Indian Ocean and to maintain it as an area of peace and cooperation. This fact was reiterated in the joint *communiques* issued after Mrs Gandhi's visit to Singapore on 20 May 1968 and after the visit of Dr Ramgoolam, the Prime Minister of Mauritius, to India on 16 December 1969. The Third Non-aligned Nations' Summit Conference at Lusaka, in September 1970, also discussed the question. The declaration adopted by that conference, among other things, called upon all states :

> to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great-power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition—either army, navy or air force bases—are excluded. The area should also be free of nuclear weapons.

Mrs Bandaranaike, who had been actively pursuing a policy aimed at bringing about the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean, continued to press the issue. At the Commonwealth Conference held at Singapore in January 1971, she proposed that the Indian Ocean be converted into a peace zone and a nuclear-free zone. Ceylon also submitted, at that conference, a memorandum which expressed concern at the increasing presence of the Soviet and the American fleets carrying nuclear weapons in the area and said that they were becoming part of the strategic defence system of the world powers and were thereby leading to a militarization of the Indian Ocean. The memorandum said that the increase in the Super Powers' naval presence in the area would intensify the Cold War politics in the area and blur the colonial and racial issues. Ceylon requested these powers to refrain from making that area a war zone either by a mutual agreement, or by unilaterally keeping away from it, thereby leading to the creation of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. Ceylon's point of view was supported by several Commonwealth members. Great Britain and Australia, however, refused to be convinced of the need to have a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. Mrs Bandaranaike continued to work for the idea and mentioned it in her speech in the General Assembly of the United Nations in October 1971.

The matter was debated in the General Assembly and finally the Ceylonese resolution, as adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1971, declared that the Indian Ocean should be an area of peace. It was the culmination of the political efforts of the Indian Ocean states to limit the Super Power presence in the area. Sixty states voted for the resolution, 55 abstained and none voted against it. The resolution called upon the big powers to negotiate with the Indian Ocean states for the elimination of military installations, nuclear weapons and great power rivalry in the zone. Politically, it was a great victory, but in reality it was no better than the pious resolutions adopted at the Cairo Conference or the Lusaka Conference because all the marine powers had abstained from voting on it. The resolution was passed by a simple majority and, therefore, had no teeth in it. However, one encouraging fact which became clear from the voting pattern was the willingness of many local states, which are partners in the Western defence pacts, to opt for a peacezone in the area. Japan, Pakistan and Iran voted for the resolution. On the other hand, Malagasy, which is aligned by a defence agreement with France and which is drawing closer to South Africa, Thailand and Australia (all members of the SEATO, that are deeply involved in the events in South-East Asia), abstained. China voted for the resolution. Thus, except for Malagasy and Thailand, all the Afro-Asian states of the Indian Ocean area voted for the resolution—a very encouraging trend showing the growing Afro-Asian unity of approach to global problems. It is interesting to note that Australia, Thailand and Malagasy changed their stand and voted in favour of a resolution passed by the

Political Committee of the General Assembly on 5 December 1972 under which a committee was set up to study the implications of the December 1971 Resolution.

When the December 1971 resolution was being debated and voted upon, the urgency of keeping the Indian Ocean free from Super Power rivalry was visibly demonstrated by the dispatch of the American task force headed by the nuclear-powered aircraft-carrier, the *Enterprise*, first to the Bay of Bengal and then to the Arabian Sea. The American task force was shadowed by the Russian vessels. While the resolution was being passed in the General Assembly, both the fleets were manoeuvring in the Indian Ocean. Fortunately, the tension in the Indian sub-continent eased following the liberation of Bangladesh and the acceptance of the Indian ceasefire offer by Pakistan before the American fleet could reach Bangladesh. But an explosive situation was fast developing which might have led to a direct confrontation either between India and the USA or between the USSR and the USA. In either case, the results would have been catastrophic for peace in the Indian Ocean. It is quite possible that the events in the Indian sub-continent brought home the need for an urgency to convert the Indian Ocean area into a peace zone.

Can the Desire be Fulfilled ?

How can the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the Indian Ocean states be implemented ? Mere resolutions cannot bring peace to this area. The December 1971 resolution on the Indian Ocean should be the beginning rather than the end of the struggle of the local powers to free themselves from the clutches of the Super Powers and their nuclear confrontation in the area. For that purpose a concerted effort on the part of the local powers will have to be made to achieve their objective. It will not be an easy task. Even a glance at the voting pattern of that resolution shows that the division was not based on ideology but on the basis of the 'haves' or the marine powers and their close supporters, and the 'have-nots'. Marine powers like the USA, Great Britain, France, and their close allies like Australia and South Africa, as well as the USSR, abstained from voting on the resolution. Such a division is unfortunate because it places the small powers at a great disadvantage.

But the Afro-Asian states of the Indian Ocean can still make their presence felt if they decide to face the foreign powers on the basis of a unity of approach. There is already an awareness of the feeling of an Indian Ocean community, as seen from the resolutions passed at the Cairo and Lusaka conferences, and the December 1971 resolution of the UN General Assembly on the question of the denuclearization of Indian Ocean. Such a community approach has to be further consolidated because the littoral powers have everything to gain, not only through the creation of a peace-zone by limiting the presence of the foreign powers in the area but also by coming together to defend their marine interests against the

possible inroads which are being planned under the garb of keeping the ocean and the ocean-bed free for 'humanity'.

What are the ways open to the littoral states to create a peace-zone in the Indian Ocean ? They can deny facilities to the big powers to operate their nuclear weapon system in the Indian Ocean. But, even that would not be very effective. The *Polaris* or the *Poseidon* submarines do not depend upon local shore installations and normally operate in the Indian Ocean from far-off bases. Even conventionally-powered fleets can be maintained on the high seas through a chain of supply ships and tankers. Thus, the denial of shore facilities to marine powers by the littoral states, even when all are united on it, may pose some difficulties for those powers but would not seriously threaten their presence in the Indian Ocean.

Similarly, the threat of economic boycott would not be effective for two major reasons. First, the Indian Ocean area has no monopoly over items without which the big powers cannot function. Secondly, the economy of the littoral states depends upon their trade with these big powers. Copper from Zambia or oil from the Gulf is though important for the big powers but not absolutely essential because there are alternative sources available. However, the sale of these items is of vital national interest to the local powers because their economy depends upon it. Arabs have tried the tactics of using oil-boycott as a political weapon and have failed in the past to make it effective. There are, however, reasons to hope for a better result in the future. It should not be forgotten that at least one of the main actors in naval confrontation in the Indian Ocean, the USA, depends upon West Asian oil for its economic survival, especially in view of the energy crisis.

As long as the Indian Ocean states lump together the Super Power presence as one unit and wish to get rid of all the Super Powers and the big powers at the same time, they will have to face tremendous odds. But if they study these powers individually, analyse their global as well as regional requirements and study the inner contradictions among the members belonging to the different Cold War groups, then containing foreign presence in the area can become manageable.

If we limit ourselves to strategic considerations, because they pose the greatest threat in terms of a possible nuclear confrontation in the Indian Ocean area, it can be easily perceived that the Super Power conflict in the Indian Ocean became more acute with the introduction of the American nuclear submarines in the area, after 1964-65. The Soviet vessels came in 1968 and their primary task was to contain the threat posed by the US submarines. The Soviet presence, including its anti-submarine capability, in the Indian Ocean area is still marginal. But it can be reasonably expected that it would increase during the coming years if no effort is made to denuclearize the Indian Ocean. At the moment, the Soviet naval activities are hampered because of the distance involved, lack of adequate sophisticated bases in the area and the overall shortage of anti-submarine

warfare weapons, especially hunter-killer submarines and aircraft carriers. At the moment the Soviet Union cannot keep the whole of the Indian Ocean area under effective surveillance. Moreover, the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans are its priority areas. But, when the Suez Canal is opened, or when the increased Soviet naval capacity enables it to put more ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean, the tension would become more acute. Also, when both the Super Powers would reach a stage of near saturation in a given area, they would develop a stake in their continued presence and would be more difficult to get rid of. It is comparatively easy now, when the Soviet presence is inadequate and the American presence is still being developed, to put a halt to it by reversing the gear.

Thus, before the Soviet Union is asked to leave the area, where it came in response to the American challenge, it would be necessary to limit and finally to exclude the American nuclear presence in the Indian Ocean. That would be a tall order even for a united Indian Ocean community as and when it emerges, but it will not be an impossible target if the littoral states are determined to denuclearize the area and thereby to reduce the tension generated by the Cold War rivalries. The unified stand by the littoral states, especially the Afro-Asian states, against the US nuclear presence would be useful. Also, the denial of communiction facilities, such as are available to the Americans in Asmara, would help a great deal in denying strategic facilities to the US submarines in a given area. It was unfortunate, in this context, that even after the General Assembly had passed the resolution urging the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean, the Government of Bahrain signed an agreement with the USA, on 23 December 1971, permitting it to continue to occupy a part of the British base after the British withdrawal.

Another important factor, which the littoral states have to keep in mind and benefit from, is the serious internal contradictions among the members of the Western bloc and their possible impact upon the question of denuclearization of the area. The littoral states have understood and, to some extent, have taken advantage of the inner contradictions among the Communist powers, but they have not seriously contemplated playing the classical game of 'divide and rule' with the Western powers. It is incorrect to lump all the Western countries together and to consider the West as a monolithic bloc.

In the Indian Ocean area the three important Western powers—the USA, Great Britain, and France (and Japan also if it is treated as a Western power)—have different interests. These interests do not always coincide. The USA puts a greater emphasis upon its strategic and economic interest in the area. Others do not have the some strategic interests as the Americans have, and would like to maintain their presence to preserve their maritime, economic and political interests in the region. The post-World War II conditions left them no option but to continue to depend upon the USA for political, economic and military support and to follow

the American lead. They have not always gained by their close association with America. The French realized it much earlier and decided to limit their alignment with the USA. The Japanese have started realizing of late that the friendship of a Super Power is conditional upon the interests of the Super Power rather than that of the dependent power. Great Britain too has lost a great deal of its influence in the Indian Ocean area in return for a dubious security against the possible Soviet attack in Europe. Its close contacts with the USA—and it was Great Britain which had introduced the USA in this area—has cost Great Britain its dominant position in Australia, the Indian sub-continent and in the Arabian Sea littoral. It would be a matter of surprise if Great Britain is not piqued at the erosion of its once dominant political, economic and strategic position in the area.

Thus, if the inner contradictions among the Western powers are utilized by the littoral states it would not be difficult to elicit the support of some of these powers in favour of the denuclearization of Indian Ocean. In fact, France is actively pursuing a policy of creating a Mediterranean consciousness as a counter-weight to the bi-polarity created by the presence of the Soviet and the American fleets in that part of the world. It has succeeded in its efforts to some extent. It would not be surprising if in the near future, countries like Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Lebanon, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, France and even Great Britain and Italy may come together to oppose the Super Powers' presence in the Mediterranean. A settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute would still further erode the influence of the Super Powers. The creation of a Mediterranean consciousness is thus a good example of the possibilities of creating a regional force by taking advantage of the inner contradictions within the Western bloc. The lessons of the Mediterranean politics can very well be used to influence the politics of the Indian Ocean as well.

Assuming that the interests of the big powers in the Indian Ocean do not coincide with those of the Super Powers on strategic, political and economic levels, some of the big powers can be persuaded to detach themselves from the regional policies of the Super Powers if the regional powers assure them that their legitimate political and economic interests in the area would be guaranteed. Thus, the two big powers, Great Britain and France, whose support is crucial for the maintenance of the American presence in the Indian Ocean, can be persuaded to follow a policy which would support the denuclearization policy of the Indian Ocean states. It should be noted in this connection, that the gradual withdrawal into the Indian Ocean brought about by the weapon system based upon the SLBM demands a chain of bases deep in the Indian Ocean, especially for the communication facilities. The USA does not possess any island in the Indian Ocean and if Great Britain and France are persuaded to detach themselves from the USA, it could be denied effective means of VLF communication facilities especially in the western Indian Ocean. Thus, if Great Britain can be persuaded to go slow on the construction of the VLF base at Diego Garcia and if Ethio-

pia does not renew the lease of the base at Asmara, the USA would find it very difficult to maintain its nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean after 1978. It might even lead to an appreciable decline in the American naval presence in the area. Such a situation would greatly facilitate the littoral states in the Indian Ocean in persuading the Soviet Union also to withdraw its naval presence from the area.

Recent events reveal that the big powers in the Western bloc have been pursuing a contradictory policy in the Indian Ocean area. The events in the Indian sub-continent during 1971 have shown that Great Britain and France have not followed the American line. Instead, they have gone out of their way to undermine the American influence in this crucial area. Britain has vital interests in Australia and in the Indian sub-continent and maintains a presence in South-East Asia, the Persian Gulf, East Africa and in the islands in the Indian Ocean. That offers a chance to the Indian Ocean community to try to persuade Great Britain to join them in an effort to denuclearize the Indian Ocean and thereby to help in neutralizing the Super Power presence in the area. Such a cooperation might also enable the local states and Britain to solve the difficult problems of southern Africa.

Britain is no longer a power which has to be feared. If isolated from the Western bloc in this area, it can be useful to the emerging states in their attempt to break away from the bi-polarity created by the two Super Powers. The political awakening in the Third World and the growing solidarity among the developing countries would check any possible trend toward neo-colonialism by these big powers. After all, the developing countries would need the help of some small but developed state to enable them to reach the take-off stage. It is infinitely much better to have relations with Great Britain or France, which are far off and are militarily weak, than to depend wholly upon Super Powers. It might even be easier to shake-off the former than the latter.

Possibilities of a Community Approach

No amount of dependence upon the big powers, even if they can be won over to the idea of a denuclearized Indian Ocean, would be useful unless the regional powers come together, in some form or the other, to give shape to and regulate their Indian Ocean policy. Unfortunately, such a community approach is at all lacking. Local powers seem to be unwilling to take any initiative in this matter despite their commitments, both within the United Nations and outside it, to bring about the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean and to fill the vacuum supposed to have been created by the partial withdrawal of Great Britain from the area. It is interesting that the local powers as well as the USA, the USSR and Great Britain have suggested that the local states themselves should fill the vacuum, but no one has clearly spelt out how it should be done and what shape it should take.

The USA has its treaty commitments and is a member of the SEATO. Yet, President Nixon, while addressing a press conference in Guam on 25 July 1969, expressed the hope that the USA would not be involved in any more Vietnam-type conflicts. He said that the USA expected its Asian allies to rely upon themselves for their security in a non-nuclear confrontation. Maybe that was an indication of the American desire to have a partial withdrawal of their own under the pressure of three factors: limitations of Super Powers to get involved in regional conflicts all over the world, desire to disengage from the possible Vietnam-type commitments as in South Korea and Taiwan, and the impact of the new SLBM weapon system.

The USSR too is reluctant to enter into military alliance with Asian countries. Instead, it has suggested an Asian collective security scheme. The idea was advocated by Brezhnev during the international meeting of Communist parties, which was held at Moscow in June 1969. He said :

> The burning problems of the current international situation do not conceal from our view longer-term tasks, namely, the area of concentrated danger of another world war, of armed conflicts. Such a system is the best replacement for the existing military political groups...We are of the opinion that the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia.[2]

This vague idea was also commented upon by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Gromyko, during his speech in the Supreme Soviet on 10 July1969. He said that the whole question called for due discussion and consultations among the interested states on the subject of finding mutually acceptable solutions. He also said that the Soviet Union (as an Asian power) would be ready during such consultations to voice its specific views.

The Asian collective security plan, which vaguely hinted at the elimination of foreign (Western) bases and the creation of purely local regional groupings that would enable the local powers to protect themselves by coordinating their efforts to attain economic and political stability, attracted some attention among the Asian countries. India also was interested in understanding the new concept more thoroughly. During his Moscow visit on 15 September Mr Dinesh Singh discussed it with the Soviet leaders. According to him, the Soviet plan did not envisage a defence pact but a system based upon Asian cooperation and renunciation of the use of force. He said that as these ideals were also in line with India's policy, India supported them. Malaysia was another Asian country which supported the Soviet move, probably with the hope of securing the Soviet support for the Malaysian plan for neutralization of South-East Asia.

The Soviet plan was looked upon with suspicion by several local powers because of four main reasons. Firstly, they saw it as a manifestation of the growing Soviet presence in the area. Secondly, they linked it with the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty, and thirdly, they felt that it was one of the several moves made by the Soviet Union to contain the grow-

ing Chinese influence in the Third World. Above all, those who were already linked with the Western bloc saw no urgency in breaking away from it, and the rest, who were following a policy of non-alignment, refused to have anything to do with any regional grouping that had any security overtones. Countries like India were also reluctant to take the lead in the formation of any group lest it be construed that India, the strongest regional power, was seeking to dominate other regional powers.

The idea of an Asian collective security was reiterated by Premier Kosygin in March 1972. Things had changed during the preceding three years. Bangladesh had emerged as a new entity and it had close relations with India as well as with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had also come closer to Iraq. But in the absence of any regional understanding, it is too early to say if the Soviet plan would be acceptable to a sufficient number of Asian states to become the basis of a new experiment in the Indian Ocean area.

Following the crisis in the Indian sub-continent in 1971, the then British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Doughlas-Home, suggested in a press conference in New Delhi on 8 February 1972 that the littoral states in the Indian Ocean should group themselves together. His idea of an Asian collective security hinged upon the lead which might be taken by India which he thought had emerged as a strong regional power. Though Sir Alec Doughlas-Home's recommendations were highly flattering, India, with its policy of discouraging military pacts, would not like to initiate such a move. There are no reasons to believe that the British plan to project India as the regional big power was appreciated either by the Indian Government or by the governments of other littoral states in the Indian Ocean.

The very concept of national security is being re-examined nowadays. The validity of the old concept of security based upon military pacts is being increasingly questioned because, first, it limits the scope of national security to a very narrow field of military security only, and secondly, because such an attitude presupposes a continuing confrontation and ignores the possibilities of reaching a detente. National security is a much wider concept. It includes political (internal) security or a reasonable guarantee that the institutions of the country would continue to survive; economic security, which means putting a stop to such exploitation of the economic resources of the country as is harmful to its national growth; social security and military security. Military security is only one of the components of this comprehensive national security, because military security, even granting that it can be achieved, alone cannot guarantee political, economic and social security of a given state.

It has been the experience of the Asian states that the concept of military security, while benefiting the foreign powers, has not only harmed the overall security interests of the local powers but has also created artificial divisions among them. It is increasingly felt that the emphasis upon

military security was misplaced and national security can best be promoted by arranging a detente among the local states and by promoting a policy of regional cooperation in social and economic fields and possibly, in political and military field also in future. But such a change can be brought about only if the concerned states give up their traditional military security concept and work towards a regional community approach and to achieve that they work for a detente on the principle of give and take.

Such a concept of national and regional security may appear to be a rehashed version of *Panch Sheel*, but it is not so. It is, in fact, a continuation of that concept. It is unfortunate that the concept of *Panch Sheel* got equated with an isolationist approach in inter-state relationship : You leave me alone and I will leave you alone. It prevented the Afro-Asian countries from coming closer and chalking out a policy which would suit their national interests and preserve their national and regional security. The result was that they remained isolated. By equating security with military security only they became pawns in the chess-board of Super Power politics, something which has seriously harmed the security of the members of the Third World. The new concept of collective security, therefore, demands active cooperation of states in regional matters and at the same time retains the basic principles of *Panch Sheel.*

If the Indian Ocean states desire to reduce the Super Power and the big power presence in the area they have to shed a part of their inhibition and come closer and coordinate their policies, especially those dealing with marine, maritime and naval affairs. They have two major options. They can work either for the neutralization of the area, or they can seek some form of regional naval cooperation among the littoral states which can be linked up with the United Nations under the December 1971 resolution dealing with the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean.

At present, there are moves to neutralize South-East Asia. The Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, presented a plan during the Sixth South-East Asian Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of South-East Asia, held at Kuala Lumpur in May 1971, in which he called for the neutralization of South-East Asia. The neutrality of the area was to be jointly guaranteed by the USA, the USSR and China. Tun Abdul Razak said that the South-East Asian states should give notice to the Super Powers (China was included as one by Malaysia) of their intention to chart their own future and determine their own destinies, that they would have no part in the world power game, and that they would not be used willingly or otherwise as pawns, they must have the right to maintain strict neutrality in the internal struggle for influence and political game. He said that the neutralization of the area was the best way to extricate the countries of the region from the present international dilemma. It would also help the big powers to solve many of their conflicts in the region. The plan was once again discussed and accepted at the ASEAN Conference in November 1971. It was also supported by President Podgorny during his speech at a

mass rally on 5 October 1971 in North Vietnam. The Chinese and the Americans, the two other Super Powers which are supposed to guarantee the neutralization of the region, have, however, remained silent.

The question of neutralization of a given region in times of peace poses several problems. In times of war, the question of neutrality is governed by well-established rules of international law and a state can declare its neutrality and hope that its wishes are respected by the belligerent states. But neutrality in the context of Cold War is a political question and not subject to any well-defined principles of international law. In the absence of the local or regional solidarity, any neutralization of South-East Asia would depend merely upon the will of the foreign powers. If the question was to be settled between two Super Powers there would at least be a chance of their reaching some agreement, but in the context of South-East Asia, where three Super Powers and at least two big powers, Britain and Japan, are deeply involved, such a chance is infinitesimal. Even if some arrangement is agreed upon for the neutrality of that region, who would guarantee that these Super Powers would respect their assurances ? Such a guarantee cannot come from outside, not even from the United Nations. Only the local powers, by achieving regional coordination, can hope to restrain the Super Powers, and hence it is much more profitable in the long run to work for a regional coordination rather than seek neutrality under a dubious guarantee of the Super Powers. Another important point which should be noted while evaluating the Malaysian plan is that it is a land-oriented, not an ocean-oriented, policy, and it is influenced by the current crisis in Vietnam and the old confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. It does not really deal with the Super Powers' naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean.

Feelers sent out by Indonesia in 1969, however, were more appropriate to the situation arising out of the naval confrontation in the Indian Ocean. The *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi) of 28 April 1969, quoting the *Sun* (Colombo) of 27 April, said that the Indonesian Government had invited the Ceylonese Government to join a six-nation defence set-up to police the Indian Ocean against intrusion by the big powers. The paper reported that the idea, as mooted by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, envisaged pooling of naval and other resources of Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Singapore for that purpose. The feelers from Indonesia followed the decision of the British Government on the policy of partial withdrawal from the area. The Indonesian plan, in a way, envisaged the coordinated efforts by the regional powers to fill the possible vacuum which might be created by the proposed British withdrawal.

These feelers were not received with enthusiasm by some regional powers, like India. The Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Surendra Pal Singh, speaking in the Lok Sabha on 1 May 1969, said that the Government of India had not been approached by the Government of Indonesia with any

concrete proposal regarding joint naval action in the Indian Ocean. He also took the opportunity to reiterate India's position in the matter. He said :

> This Government's policy regarding joint defence pact is very well known to the House. We are against such pacts because we feel that a military pact has a snow-balling effect, i.e. one pact leads to another pact. We are against it. The ultimate responsiblity of defending our shores and our country depends on us and it is up to us to strengthen our navy and other armed forces.

This spirit of individualism in India's naval policy in the Indian Ocean is not difficult to explain. Apart from the ideological commitment to non-alignment and an aversion to defence pacts, India was not in a position to coordinate her naval policies with countries like Pakistan, which were included in the Indonesian plan. India was also reluctant to thrust itself upon its neighbours. Some of these neighbouring countries like Burma, Ceylon, Malaysia and Singapore were militarily weak and could not contribute effectively to the difficult task of the naval defence of the area. Naval strength of India would have created suspicion in these smaller states. The Indian Defence Minister, Swaran Singh, while speaking in the Rajya Sabha on 8 May 1969, dismissed an idea based on the lines of the Indonesian proposal, which was suggested in a working paper by some Indian officers, and warned of the possible anti-Indian feelings in these smaller states if India sought to project itself as a local naval power. Also, till recently, the capabilities of the Indian Navy had not been fully tested and there were doubts about its capacity to take effective action. Above all, there were the limitations under international law. India did not want to question the allegedly sacrosanct nature of the freedom of the high seas. It was a double-edged weapon which had to be used carefully, especially in times of peace. Therefore, India supported the idea of regional economic cooperation, as a better way of preventing the incursions of foreign powers in the area. Military or naval cooperation was a taboo. The Minister of State for Defence, L. N. Mishra, replying to a question in the Lok Sabha on 19 December 1969, emphatically rejected even the idea of joint patrolling of the area and said that India would do her own patrolling.

But, what seemed to be a sound policy in 1969 need not be valid in 1974. Today, the Indian Navy has proved itself capable of fulfilling its task effectively. The Pakistani presence (and with it the Chinese presence) has been eliminated to a large extent from the Bay of Bengal. Instead, the emergence of Bangladesh has brought a new factor in the politics of South and South-East Asia. South-East Asian countries have also shown a greater willingness to take measures to protect their national interests from the possible big power interference. Recently, Indonesia and Malaysia declared the Straits of Malacca as a closed sea. In such a situation, it would be more profitable to coordinate the naval policies of the regional powers than to let each state initiate a policy which might clash

with that of its neighbouring state. Time is, therefore, very opportune for the states bordering the Bay of Bengal—Ceylon, India, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia—to initiate discussions to coordinate their naval and maritime activities in the region. If possible they can even think of neutralizing the area and the neutrality can be guaranteed not by the Super Powers as envisaged in the Malaysian proposal about South-East Asia, but by the coordinated naval and other policies of the littoral states. The Bay of Bengal is almost a closed sea and the littoral countries, even with their limited resources, can maintain an effective surveillance over it. Such a policy would not only reduce the big power presence in the region, but would also ultimately lead to a better political and economic cooperation among the littoral states.

Whereas it is possible to think in terms of planning in a spirit of cooperation in the Bay of Bengal, it is difficult, at least for some time to to come, to envisage such a policy in the Arabian Sea area. Tensions created by confrontations between India and Pakistan, Iran and some Arab States, Somalia and Ethiopia, the presence of liberation movements and the enhanced Super Power rivalry because of the naval presence of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and even France, have made the Arabian Sea littoral a potentially more explosive region. Moreover, the huge tapped and untapped petroleum reserves add fuel to the fire and complicate the situation still further. Strategically also, the area is much more important, both to the USA and to the USSR, than the Bay of Bengal. American submarines operating from the region can command a large part of the USSR, can rely upon the VLF communication facilities from Asmara and from Diego Garcia and need not come near any coast to accomplish their mission. Unlike the Bay of Bengal, which is hemmed in by land from three sides and dominated by the islands of Andaman and Nicobar, the Arabian Sea is, physically, an open sea whose entrance is too wide to be blocked by the regional powers, even if they wish to do so. Also, unlike the littoral states in the Bay of Bengal, which by and large follow a policy of non-alignment (Thailand being an exception), most of the littoral states in the Arabian Sea are committed to one bloc or the other. Pakistan and Iran are active members of the CENTO and Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Ethiopia have very close military links with the USA. The Arab Sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf still retain their close links with Great Britain. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has very close relations with Iraq, Somalia and the two Yemens. Thus, it is very difficult to envisage a situation under which these littoral states would sink their local differences and coordinate their activities to oppose the foreign presence in the area.

India, Pakistan and Iran are the three regional powers which have some naval capability. If a way can be found to coordinate their activities, then some headway can be made in reaching an understanding with other littoral states also. It is difficult to envisage an early normalization of

Indo-Pakistani relations or Iraq-Iran relations, but one can anticipate some coordination between India and Iran. Iran was very careful in not overtly supporting Pakistan during the Indo-Pak conflict of 1971. Since then no large-scale transfer of Iranian military hardware to Pakistan has been reported. Iran did not even threaten to put an embargo on oil export to India. Since India depends to a large extent on Iranian oil, such a step would have caused some difficulties for India. In 1965, there were reports that some Iranian naval vessels had helped the Pakistani navy against India. This time there was no such cooperation, despite the fact that the Indian Navy raided as far away as Gwadar, a Pakistani port near Iran which is within easy reach of the Iranian *Phantoms*.

Iran was handling the delicate Indo-Pak question very carefully and was seeking to maintain strict neutrality and this must have seriously disturbed Pakistan which is not only Iran's partner in the RCD but also in the CENTO. The Iranian dilemma was aptly underlined by Hossein Amirsadeghi in his article in the *New Middle East*.[3] He said that Iran needed the active cooperation of India if she was going to formulate a viable Indian Ocean policy for the foreseeable future, but any hope of such a cooperation would be destroyed in the event of Iran actively supporting the Pakistanis if war were to break out between India and Pakistan. He added, "Iran's future strategy, therefore, is to endeavour to establish some form of cooperation between those two nations on the Indian sub-continent, to ensure that Iran can enjoy active military cooperation with both, without openly alienating either India or Pakistan."[4] From hindsight, it would not be wrong to say that during the Indo-Pak confrontation in 1971, Iran, by following a policy of guarded neutrality, was sacrificing its short-term gains by not supporting its unstable, highly volatile and potentially weaker partner, and was aiming to gain long-term advantages to be obtained by seeking India's cooperation in its Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean policies.

Iran is deeply involved in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea affairs. Hoping to emerge as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf after the British withdrawal, Iran has been violently opposing any foreign presence in the region. It is not likely to look with favour either upon the residual British or American presence in the Gulf Sheikhdoms, or in Bahrain, because any continuation of the Western presence would invite Russian presence in the area, as can be seen from the Soviet-Iraq treaty. Thus, Iran would like to support the Indian line on the question of declaring the Indian Ocean as a peace zone. Iran may even be useful in restraining Pakistan from following a policy which might increase tension in the region. One cannot rule out the possibilities of an Indo-Iranian detente which might pave the way for a wider cooperation among the littoral states of the Arabian Sea region.

Further west, the problem of ensuring cooperation among the littoral states around the *Bab al-Mandeb* is still more difficult. The Americans have a vested interest in retaining their communication base at Asmara in

Ethiopia and would not leave it till an alternative base is ready at Diego Garcia. The Soviets have also reportedly established themselves nearby in Yemen, Socotra and Somalia, which enables them to keep an eye upon the possible American movements in the area. None of the local powers is strong enough to shake off the Super Power presence in that corner. The growing Chinese presence in the region complicates the situation still further. But there are trends that Ethiopia and its neighbours, Sudan and Somalia, might patch up their differences. If that happens, the Super Powers would not be able to maintain their presence by playing the game of divide and rule. Rapprochement between these three local states and the diplomatic support by other Indian Ocean states might help them to extricate themselves from the present situation.

Further south, the east African countries would willingly support the denuclearization plan. They are not giving any worthwhile support to either of the Super Powers in maintaining their nuclear presence in the area. The question of southern Africa is a ticklish one, for it is a combination of racialism, neo-colonialism and Western imperialism. To win over the support of countries like South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia, to an active policy of denuclearization of the Indian Ocean would be almost impossible, at least under the circumstances which are prevailing today or as they can be envisaged in the near future.

Even if the Afro-Asian states in the Indian Ocean area are not able to obtain the support of the 'white' regimes in Australia and southern Africa, they can, if they come together and coordinate their policies, make a substantial headway in limiting the nuclear presence of the Super Powers in the area, especially in the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and along the coast of East Africa. The best way they can achieve their goal would be by forming small regional groups which would finally come together to form the wider Indian Ocean community. Undoubtedly, it would take time, but any step in that direction not only would mean a positive step towards the implementation of the December 1971 resolution of the General Assembly on the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean, but would also enable them to withstand the big power pressures in other matters connected with the Indian Ocean, like a state's jurisdiction over its territorial waters and the continental shelf, fishing rights and the legal problems connected with the exploitation of the mineral resources in the deep seas. At the moment, the big powers are making a determined bid to corner the largest chunk of marine belt for their own benefit. Their efforts can only be frustrated by a coordinated and organized opposition by the developing nations in the Indian Ocean area as well as elsewhere. If the littoral states come together to protect themselves from the Cold War rivalries of the Super Powers and succeed in putting a halt to the big power scramble for 'international control' over the widest possible marine belt, they will succeeded in laying a firm foundation for a workable Indian Ocean community and a prosperous, tension-free peace zone in this area.

RESOURCES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE NEED FOR A COMMUNITY APPROACH

The world community today is deeply engrossed in the problem of codifying the law of the sea. In the context it is necessary that the developing countries should coordinate their policies to see that the law that emerges finally does not bind them to a position of prepetual disadvantage *vis-a-vis* the developed countries, which are also marine powers. Increasing sophistication in the techniques of the exploitation of resources of the high seas, the sea-bed and the sub-soil thereof, would enable the vast oceanic resources to become the future target of a new type of neo-colonialism of marine powers. Under the pressure of the Afro-Asian resistance, traditional colonialism is withdrawing from the land mass, only to consolidate itself in the seas.

The developing nations faced with this new challenge are seeking ways and means to deny these marine powers the opportunity to exploit the marine resources available in their areas by increasing the limits of their fishing zones, or by demanding a more liberal interpretation of the laws dealing with the continental shelf. Such isolated attempts would hamper rather then bynefit the interests of the developing states in the long run. They would lead to increased inter-state rivalries amongst the members of the Third World, which would be used by marine powers to impose serious restrictions upon the marine interests of the developing states. A coordinated effort by the developing states would, therefore, be necessary, if they have to safeguard their legitimate interests and to project a unified front against the pressure which would be brought to bear upon them by marine powers.

International Control over the Resources of the Sea-bed : The Pardo Plan

Efforts have already been initiated to bring as large an area as is possible under the authority of the United Nations, so that the marine powers, which have a dominant voice in that organization, can continue to exploit the marine resources. The developing nations in the Indian Ocean area would not be able to hinder the marine powers from exploiting the resources near their coast because these powers would be working under the UN. Simultaneously, an effort is being made to intimidate these littoral states into accepting a narrow continental shelf. As a salve to their injured pride, it is suggested that the profits accruing to the UN out of these sea-ventures would be used for the benefit of the developing countries. If one studies this proposal, one can easily see that the motivatations of the marine powers are not entirely altruistic.

The question was formally introduced in the General Assembly of the United Nations on 1 November 1967 by the Maltese delegate, Arvid Pardo. In his long speech, he proposed that a new treaty should be drafted to prevent national appropriation of the sea-bed and ocean floor, to reserve those areas exclusively for peaceful purposes, to use the sea-bed assets

primarily to benefit the developing countries and to restrict the limits of the continental shelf. These goals could best be carried out by creating a new international agency on the lines of the World Bank to handle the problems of the oceans. The matter has been regularly debated in the UN since then. On 21 December 1968, the First Committee of the General Assembly passed a resolution [2467 (XVIII) A] establishing a committee on the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. It is commonly known as the Sea-bed Committee. The General Assembly also passed a resolution in its Twenty-fourth Session [Resolution 2574 (XXIV) of 15 December 1969] which acknowledged the existence of 'an area of the sea-bed and ocean-floor and the sub-soil thereof which lies beyond the limits of national jurisdiction'. Almost identical resolutions were passed in 1970 and 1971 [Resolutions 2749 and 2750 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 and 2881 (XXVI) of 21 December 1971]. A decision has not been taken as yet on the limits of the national jurisdiction or about the nature, powers and functions of the proposed UN agency which would regulate the exploitation of the resources of the no-man's area. Also, there has been no agreement as to how the profits, if any, from such ventures, would be calculated and utilized by the UN for the benefit of mankind.

The developing states have, more or less, accepted the idea that control over the ocean-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction should be vested in the hands of an international body. The Non-aligned Nations, Conference in September 1970, at Lusaka, in its declaration on the Sea-bed, said that the area should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that the potential wealth of the area and its resources should be developed and used for the benefit of mankind as a whole. It emphasized that the resources of the area should be treated as the common heritage of mankind and no state should exercise or claim sovereign rights over any part thereof. It also said that the exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources should be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of the states, whether land-locked or littoral, and should take into account the special needs and interests of the developing countries. The declaration insisted that an appropriate international machinery should be established by an international treaty to provide for an orderly development and rational management of the area and its resources, and ensure the equitable sharing by the international community of the benefits derived therefrom. It also recommended that the international agency which would be established, should make adequate provisions to minimise any fluctuations in the prices of minerals and raw materials available on land that might result from the exploitation of the marine resources.

The Lusaka declaration laid down the guiding principles which might influence the policies of most of the Afro-Asian states in this respect. Obviously, the delegates at the Lusaka Conference were charmed by the

prospects of benefiting from the huge profits which the international agency might obtain from the marine resources not only from the sea-beds near their own coasts but also from the area near the coast of the marine powers. The total area would, therefore, cover nearly 60 per cent of the earth's surface. These states also hoped to control the marine powers through the United Nations. Such a desire, even though it may seem impossible to attain, is understandable. What is difficult to understand is the enthusiasm with which some of the marine powers seem to encourage this idea which, on the face of it, seems to go against their economic interests.

President Nixon, in his statement on 23 May 1970, advocated that nations should renounce all national claims over the sea-bed beyond the depth of 200 metres (about 100 fathoms) and said that the profits from the international sea-bed should benefit the developing countries. He also advocated the establishment of an international agency to look after the exploitation of those resources and distribute the profits and, probably in his hurry to benefit 'mankind as a whole', suggested that firms should be immediately allowed to explore and exploit the sea-bed beyond the 200-metre isobath and their investments should be protected by the international agency, if and when it is created.

Why this urgency to delimit the international sea-bed and to establish an agency to regulate its exploitation ? Thanks to an intensive oceanographic survey and rapid advances in the perfection of deep-submersibles, both of which are the off-shoots of the emergence of the new naval weapon system, it is now within the reach of marine powers to tap the resources of the sea-bed and the sub-soil thereof. Surveys have also revealed huge mineral deposits of strategic significance in the marine belt. Since most of these areas, under the present customary international law, do not come under the national jurisdiction of any single state, their exploitation poses legal difficulties. Marine powers are, therefore, making efforts to overcome these legal difficulties so as to exploit those mineral resources under the protective umbrella of the UN.

Deep-sea Research and Possibilities of Exploitation of the Sea-bed Resources

Research dealing with the deep-diving under-sea vehicles in the USA was partly linked with problems connected with the nuclear-powered submarine and the SLBM programme. France had already pioneered work on deep-diving vehicles under its oceanographic research programme. The French bathyscaphe, *Archimede*, constructed in 1961, had a designed depth of 9,000 metres. The USA also began an intensive research in this field in the 1960s and, in the initial stages, borrowed heavily from the French expertize. Its first major deep-sea vehicle, *Aluminant*, was built in 1955. It could submerge up to 5,000 metres, carry three to four persons and move within a range of 96 nautical miles at a speed between two and

four knots per hour. The same year the US navy constructed *Trieste II*, an improved version of the French bathyscaphe, *Trieste I*, which could dive deeper than 6,500 meters. The *NR-I*, a bottom-crawler-cum-submarine, powered by a nuclear reactor and capable of operating up to 60 days with a crew of seven, was completed in 1969. Another vehicle, *Deep Star II*, which can also dive up to 6,500 metres, has probably become operational.

Apart from France and the USA, Japan and the USSR have also shown great interest in the construction of under-sea vehicles. In 1964, Japan constructed the *Yomirri*, which could dive up to 300 metres and move within a range of 24 nautical miles, with a crew of six. Another deep-diving vehicle, which is expected to go as deep as 6,500 meters, is nearing completion. The Soviet Union constructed the *Sever I* in 1959. It could dive up to a depth of 600 metres. Another vehicle, *Sever II*, was completed in 1965. It can dive up to 2,000 metres. Great Britain is also interested in the deep-sea programme but does not, as yet, possess vehicles which can dive very deep.

These deep-diving vehicles have also been used for military purposes. The hydrogen bomb jettisoned off Palomares, Spain, by an American SAC bomber in January 1966, was located by one of these vehicles. Also, the wreckage of the American nuclear-powered submarine of the *Thresher*-class, which was lost in the deep sea at a depth of about 2,700 metres, about 200 miles off the New England coast on 10 April 1963, was discovered by the deep-diving French vehicle, *Trieste*, in 1964. The wreckage of another American nuclear-powered attack submarine, *Scorpion*, of the *Skipjack*-class, which was lost in deep waters in May 1968, was also located by one of these deep-diving vehicles. These vehicles have their non-military uses also. They have been used for the exploration of the sea-bed. In 1967, the *Aluminant* explored for minerals off the Atlantic coast of America, at depths ranging from 2,000 to 3,000 metres.

Surveys have revealed important mineral deposits in the deep-seas but their commercial exploitation poses several difficulties. At the moment, four techniques are being discussed in connection with the exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed and the sub-soil thereof: deep-sea dredging or suction for the minerals available on the sea-bed, pumping for the hot-brine mineral solutions in the Red Sea area and drilling for oil and natural gas. Each of these techniques poses serious difficulties, but, scientists and mining companies are trying to perfect these techniques to tap these huge resources. Great interest is being shown in the manganese nodules which cover large areas of the ocean-floor. It is reported that one square mile of the sea-bed, where these nodules are found, may be covered with 70,000 tons of minerals which would yield about 30,000 tons of manganese, 3,600 tons of aluminium, 2,300 tons of cadmium, 17,000 tons of iron, 400 tons of cobalt, 1,200 tons of nickel and 650 tons of copper. The value of the manganese nodules alone can be as high as

£40,000 per square mile.[5] The Deepsea Ventures, a subsidiary of Tonneco (US), and the large West German mining firm, Metallgesellschaft of Frankfurt, are involved in a multimillion dollar project to perfect deep-sea dredging technology to exploit these manganese nodules. Their plan envisages dredging of 25,000 tons of manganese nodules, at a depth of about 6,000 metres (six k.m. deep), off the coast of California, by 1974.

The following two important deposits of manganese nodules have been discovered lately : the Black Plateau, where they are avilable at a depth of only 300 metres but whose copper, nickel and cobalt contents are poor; and the deep-sea source in the Pacific Ocean off the Californian coast where they are available at a depth of about 4,000 metres which contain a higher percentage of copper, nickel and cobalt. An underwater mining ship, designed to collect these nodules at depths up to 4,000 metres, has probably been completed. Apart from the manganese nodules, gold deposits have been discovered off the coast of Alaska. Small quantities of commercial diamonds have already been tapped from the sea-bed off the South African coast. Deep-sea mining is still in the preliminary stage and there is no doubt that more and more mineral deposits would be revealed in the near future and techniques perfected to exploit them.

Another source of important deep-sea deposits which is within the Indian Ocean area, and which is much talked about, is the precipitate from the brine-bearing thermal sea-floor springs and the concentrated solutions or hot-brines emitting from the sea-floor springs in the Red Sea. This area, approximately 40 square miles, lies between latitude 21°27.0″ North and 21°16.0″ North and longitude 38°1.0″ East and 38°.5″ East. It is approximately 57.5 nautical miles due west from the Saudi Arabian coast and 46.5 nautical miles due east from the Sudanese coast—almost half way between Jeddah and Port Sudan. These deposits are at the depth of about 2,000 metres. They are in the nature of sediments, about nine metres thick, and also as fine particles which remain suspended in the hot-brine solution at the bottom. It is, therefore, possible to pump them out. This process is easier than dredging for the manganese nodules. The Red Sea deposits are rich in several minerals. According to one author they contain zinc (4.6 per cent), copper (1.8 per cent), lead (0.14 per cent), and gold and silver in smaller quantities. The value of these deposits is estimated to be about $2 billion, copper constituting half the value.[6]

An American firm, Crawford Marine Specialists, Inc., finding that these deposits were in an area over which no state had proclaimed its jurisdiction, requested the Secretary-General of the UN on 2 February 1968 for a concession to exploit the mineral deposits there. The Secretary-General, in his reply of 5 March, stated that the UN was not in a position to issue the licence for the exploitation of the resources of the deep seas. It is reported that the firm then approached the Government of

Saudi Arabia which subsequently laid claims to those deposits. In the meantime, Sudan also claimed them. Sudan has a stronger claim over them on the basis of the median line principle, because they are nearer to the Sudanese shore than to the Saudi Arabian shore. The question of the exploitation of the Red Sea deposits is still in a state of animated suspension.

It is expected that the Red Sea deposits are not confined to that area alone, but might also be found in other places in the deep trough in the Red Sea area extending down to *Bab al-Mandeb*. In that case, not only Sudan and Saudi Arbia but also the UAR, Ethiopia, Yemen and France (which controls the French Somaliland) would be involved. The French have also shown an interest in the mineral resources in the Red Sea. In 1963 the French deep-sea diving team, under Commandant J. Y. Cousteau, conducted some operations in that area. One possible reason why the French are holding on to the French Somaliland can be that they are interested in the Red Sea minerals. Proper exploitation of the Red Sea minerals would, therefore, need active cooperation among all the littoral powers if conflicts are to be avoided. This is possible only on the basis of regional understanding and positive inter-state collaboration.

With the world consumption of oil and natural gas nearly doubling every two decades and the slow change-over from oil to nuclear power, the oil-gap would have to be filled by exploiting the oil resources in the sea-bed. At the moment, it is confined mostly to the shallow sea near the shore. But huge oil deposits have been discovered in the deep seas. In 1968, the deep-drilling ship, *Glomar Challenger*, found oil formations in the Sigsbee Knolls in the Gulf of Mexico, at a depth of about 4,000 metres. Similar deposits are found in South-East Asia and in the China Seas. The *Glomar Challenger* has also conducted deep-drilling in the Arabian Sea in 1972. Techniques are being perfected which would enable oil exploitation up-to a depth of 500 metres by 1974-75 and 2,000 metres by the end of the decade. It is estimated, that the off-shore oil production, which was 16 per cent of the total oil production in 1968, may go up to 35 per cent by 1980. These off-shore explorations may be conducted with the help of stationary installations on the sea-bed, by unmanned vehicles or by manned instrument platforms.

Since off-shore oil exploration is already a well-established industry, there is the possibility of a conflict of interests between the oil and the mining industries on the question of control of the sea-bed by the UN. Oil interests would like to have a longer and a deeper continental shelf so that they could continue operating in the area where, over several decades, they have developed workable relationship with the regimes in power. The UN is still an unknown factor for them. This is specially true of the oil interests on the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, the American coast and the North Sea. Another reason why they favour a longer and deeper

continental shelf boundary is that most of the known under-sea oil resources are supposed to be situated near the shore and not in the abyssal depths in the ocean. Mining industry, on the other hand, is concerned with the exploitation of the deep sea-bed, which is relatively away from the coast. Even if it is not, it would prefer to have a shorter continental shelf boundary so that it can exploit the deposits even when they are nearer the shore, as in the Red Sea. Undoubtedly, these two interest groups would seek to influence the codification of the law of the sea when the UN takes up the matter in 1974. There is no doubt that the delimitation of the continental shelf would be the most hotly-debated issue in the coming years.

Limits of the State Jurisdiction over the Sea-bed

At the moment there is no accepted limit to a state's jurisdiction over its continental shelf. Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 29 April 1958, which defines the extent of the continental shelf, says that it extends up to the sea-bed and sub-soil of the submarine areas adjacent to territorial sea, to the depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superadjacent waters admit of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said area and to the sea-bed and sub-soil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. Thus, except for the term 'adjacent to a coastal state' there is no other legal limitation on the extent of the continental shelf. The exploitability test gives flexibility to the extent of the continental shelf because with the development of new techniques, the sea-bed up to 4,000 metres can now be exploited with contemporary resources. That limit would go up with further advances in that field.

Some states even object to the term 'adjacent', because countries like Norway and Chile have no continental shelf in the accepted geographical sense of the term. Norway has a deep trough near its coast but the sea becomes shallow after a few miles. Norway would like to extend her jurisdiction to the shallow sea beyond the deep trough near its coast. Norway and Great Britain have already signed an agreement on the question of delimitation of their continental shelf boundary on 3 March 1964. The agreement was based on the median-line principle, thus ignoring the existence of the deep trough near the coast of Norway while defining the continental shelf.

Another agreement, which is similar to the agreement between Norway and Great Britain, was signed between Indonesia and Australia on 18 May 1972. It came into force on 9 October of the same year. It delineated the continental shelf boundary between those two states in the Timor Sea. Like Norway, Indonesia too has a trench adjacent to the island of Timor. Australia, on the other hand, has a gradual slope extending up to that trench. For some time, Australia was claiming the whole of that slope as its continental shelf. But under the agreement it has recognized

the Indonesian claim over this slope even beyond the trench. Under the agreement the boundary has been fixed at a distance of 200 miles from the Australian coast and 160 miles from the Indonesian coast. Thus, though the median-line principle has not been followed *in toto*, yet a nation's right to claim the continental shelf beyond the trench has been accepted. This is going to be an important precedent while defining the continental shelf in future.

Several other agreements dealing with the delimitation of the continental shelf have been signed among the Indian Ocean states. Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Iran, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have signed agreements defining their respective zones. This delimitation of the sea-bed was important because of the intensive exploitation of the off-shore oil resources in that region. The whole of the Persian Gulf is practically dotted with oil-rigs. Though these five countries have signed agreements, there are others like Iraq and Kuwait which have not come to any understanding on this question with other littoral states. This is a potential tension-generating point which those who are interested in the area would always have to keep in mind. In South-East Asia, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have also signed agreements delimiting their continental shelves.

The sea-mounts, ridges and shallows near the coast, but beyond the limits of the territorial sea, would also pose problems while defining the question of national or international jurisdiction. The Indian Ocean is full of such anomalies. The Indian Ocean has three main ridges: the East-Indian Ridge, the Mid-Indian Ridge, and the Carlsberg Ridge which connects the Chagos Archipelago to the island of Socotra and which extending southwards is called the West-Indian Ridge. There are other smaller ridges like the Amsterdam-Naturalist Ridge west of Australia, the Scychelles-Mauritius Ridge and the South Mozambique Rise. These ridges are in relatively shallow waters and very often their peaks are projected above the sea-level as islands. Islands in the Laccadive and Maldive and of the Chagos Archipelago are the peaks in the Mid-Indian Ridge.

Apart from these ridges, the Indian Ocean has several sea-mounts, some of which project above the sea-level as islands. Cocos island, south of Indonesia, and Tromelin island, east of Madagascar, belong to that category. Also, in some areas the sea is shallow in the mid-ocean. Saye de Malha, in the western part of the Indian Ocean, was discovered long ago. In 1957, a shallow sea, known as the Hall Bank, was discovered between Madagascar and Mozambique. Recently another one, called the Genista Bank, was discovered a few miles south-west of Ras Jagir in the southern coast of Arabia. As there is no law defining jurisdiction over these areas which are not deep and which can be exploited for mineral resources or for military purposes, their future would have to be debated by the international community.

In the absence of any universally accepted principle, the delimitation of the continental shelf or, in other words, that of jurisdiction over the sea-bed between the littoral states and the proposed international agency, would have to be decided after taking into account not only the criteria like contiguity and exploitability which have been accepted under the Geneva Convention of 1958, but also several geological, geographical, and economic factors. Coming years would witness a tug-of-war between the marine powers like the USA and the developing states, over the question of the limits of a state's jurisdiction over the sea-bed. Not only the developing states but also the European states have signed agreements which go beyond the limits acceptable to the USA. Agreements delimiting the North Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Timor Sea, etc. are but a few examples where the littoral states have divided practically the whole of the sea-bed adjacent to them amongst themselves and have left nothing for the international agency to exploit. It is interesting to note that all the agreements have been reached to facilitate the exploitation of the oil resources which are available there. It is possible that such agreements may also be reached in East Asia where off-shore oil deposits have been found in large quantities.

Limits of a state jurisdiction over the sea-bed and the exploitation of that area are interconnected. The marine powers may be in a position to exploit the resources of the abyssal depths in the next millennium, but at least for the coming two decades, the continental margin would offer a better chance of exploitation. Some scholars even doubt if the abyssal depths can compete with the continental margin in biological and mineral resources, in view of the fact that the cost of exploitation of the resources from the abyssal depth would be very high.[7] Thus, in view of the fact that the continental margin offers better prospects, the marine powers which have the capacity to exploit these resources would prefer to have only a small part of the sea-bed under the jurisdiction of the developing states so that the bulk of the continental margin could be made available for exploitation under an international agency. An international sea-bed agency, left with control over the international sea-bed outside a general 200-mile limit from the coast, as claimed by some states, would be left with potentially substantial but actually limited exploitable resources. But the marine powers are not in a mood to wait. They would prefer to exploit the continental margin today and the abyssal depth in the future and would, therefore, do their best to limit the extent of state's sovereignty over the sea-bed.

At the moment only persuasion is being used to prevent the developing states from claiming a wider continental shelf, though veiled threats are not altogether excluded. John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser to the US Government, speaking before the Philadelphia World Affairs Council and the Philadelphia Bar Association on 18 February 1970, concluded his speech on international law and the ocean by saying :

The promise of an international regime for the sea-bed and the bold experiment in providing international revenues for international community purposes will be shattered unless the nations of the world, acting as a unit, decide to protect their common interest from a chaotic pattern of coastal state claims.

The community of nations thus have before it a set of fundamental decisions regarding well over half of the world. It must decide whether the clear rule of law rather than the force of arms will govern international relations on the seas. It must decide whether international cooperation for the benefit of all mankind or mystic national pride will dominate the oceans. In a most fundamental sense it must decide whether the order of the day is an accommodation of legitimate interests or a clash of positions.

The United Nations is prepared to lead the way towards a true internationalism in the oceans. We do this not only because of our ideals but because it is clear that this is the only way to assure that our own interests and the interests of all other nations are adequately accommodated...[8]

The Legal Adviser to the US Government used very high-sounding phrases, not only to justify the need for an international agency but also to let it have as wide a sea-bed as possible. He advocated rule of law rather than the force of arms, as if the developing countries are capable of using force against marine powers. While condemning the 'mystic national pride' in the Third World and advocating international cooperation, he simultaneously threatened small states with a clash of position if marine powers' interests were not adequately accommodated. His speech, which alternately cajoled and threatened, has to be taken seriously by the Third World because it is the fore-runner of the American policy on this question in future. Since the American position as a marine power coincides with that of others like Britain, France, Japan and even the Soviet Union, the Third World would be hard pressed to resist their combined pressure unless they come together to protect their common interests against the new type of marine imperialism which threatens to take away from the Third World a substantial part of the sea-bed adjacent to their shores and over whose exploitation they would have only marginal control.

Beside cajoling and threatening, the marine powers also propose to bribe the Third World into surrendering their claims over the sea-bed. The advocate of the international agency plan, the Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo, proposed the creation of that agency under the UN and claimed that it would receive five billion dollars net by 1975, which could be used for the benefit of the developing world. These figures are overestimated unless the international agency is allowed control over the oil resources in the shallow seas as well. Deep-sea mining is a new field. Though experimental dives of vehicles to the deepest parts of the ocean

have been given a great deal of publicity, these exploratory experiments give a deceptively encouraging picture of the ease of operation in the depths for commercial purposes. If the mining firms decide to exploit the deep-sea resources they will have to invest huge sums on research and the manufacture of new equipments. These firms would like to cover the high cost of exploitation, as also that of research and new tools, before they hand over a part of their profit to the international agency. One can even expect that those responsible for maintatning the balance-sheet of accounts of these firms would tend to show loss rather than profits on these ventures, at least for some years to come.

Another point which should be noted while calculating the benefits from the deep-sea ventures to the international agency is the possible ill-effect on the price structure of similar minerals obtained from the land resources. Because of the huge capital investments involved in the deep-sea mining, the firms will have to have a large recovery to offset the cost involved. "It has been estimated that at medium levels of output the amount of manganese thrown on the market by a single firm would be so large that the price might drop from 90 cents per unit to 50 cents per unit; the price of cobalt might drop from $ 1.50 per pound to $ 1.00; and that of nickel from 70 cents to 65 cents."[9] Another point to be noted is that the ratio of other minerals in these manganese nodules is not in proportion to their demand in the world market. Thus, if these nodules are mined for their copper contents alone, nickel and cobalt obtained from them would flood the market and seriously jeopardize the price-structure of those commodities in international market.

The glut in the world market, due to an extensive exploitation of deep-sea resources, would also affect the international price structure of those minerals which are mined on land. It would, in turn, have a serious impact upon the economy of several of the developing states which are also mineral-exporting countries. Zambia, which depends on its copper export, would be in serious difficulties if the manganese nodules or the Red Sea deposits are exploited for their copper content. All the countries which export manganese ore would be seriously affected because of the world surplus in manganese, which would occur even when these nodules are mined in commercial quantities for their copper, nickel and cobalt contents. If the international agency succeeds in obtaining control over the shallow seas as well, then the oil producing countries in Asia and Latin America would also be affected. Almost all the countries in the Indian Ocean area have granted off-shore concessions, and more are being granted every day. Another interesting fact which is not noticed is that, of late, some of the Afro-Asian countries like India and Iran have started taking an active interest in the field of off-shore oil exploitation. Now when the developing countries are getting ready to exploit their off-shore oil resources, to restrict states' jurisdiction over the sea-bed adjacent to their coast, and to throw that area open to big oil

monopolies would indeed be cruel.

Thus, the exploitation of the sea-bed would not only make the developed countries self-sufficient in mineral resources of strategic significance, like copper, cobalt and nickel, but would also seriously affect the economy of those developing countries which depend or hope to depend upon the export of their mineral resources to increase their GNP. No amount of charity doles passed on by the international agency can repair the national losses—economic as well as socio-political—which might be suffered by these countries of the Third World if the sea-bed adjacent to their coast is exploited by the developed nations under the UN protection.

The developing countries have already committed themselves to the idea of an international agency, probably with the hope that they might be able to control the marine powers through that body. But they will have to exercise all their caution to see that they are not forced to surrender their legitimate national interests in the sea-bed adjacent to their coast, and that they effectively control the exploration, use and exploitation of the deep-sea mineral resources. They must see to it that they do not fall prey to a neo-marine imperialism disguised in catchy phrases like the peaceful use of the sea-bed, international cooperation for ocean exploration, the rule of law and the common heritage of mankind. After all, it should not be forgotten that most of these powers were till recently carrying on their 'white man's burden' to benefit the Third World.

Fishery Rights

Another aspect connected with the high seas, which is becoming increasingly important for the developing countries, is the question of the fishery rights and the possible threat of unrestricted exploitation of the marine biological resources in the high seas, adjacent to the shores of these countries, by foreign powers having long-range fishing capabilities. Till recently, the Indian Ocean area was relatively free from the presence of these states. The distance involved and the lack of data about the marine life hindered many of them. But with the increasing sophistication in fishing techniques and the use of a chain of supply ships, a large number of fishing trawlers, accompanied by factory ships, can be maintained in far-off places. Large-scale fishing in the Indian Ocean by foreign powers has, therefore, become an economic proposition.

Researches done in the field of naval warfare, especially in anti-submarine warfare, have also been put to civilian use. Submarine detection devices, like the depth-finder, the sonar, those based upon the infra-red principle and electromagnetic anomaly, and the satellite surveillance system, are being increasingly used to detect the schools of fish which are subsequently netted by using the flotilla fishing technique, i.e. by using a large number of trawlers working together as if they were frigates and destroyers engaged in anti-submarine operations. Also, the idea of the

factory ship which either processes the catch or deep-freezes it while operating with the trawlers in far-away seas, and the chain of supply ships linking the fishing fleet to the main base, reminds one of the techniques used by naval powers to maintain their far-flung fleets, more or less permanently, on the high seas.

Sometimes, fishing vessels equipped with the latest electronic and sonar devices also serve the purpose of intelligence-gathering ships. The Soviet Union utilizes them to keep a watch on the American naval vessels. They are cheap and inconspicuous and, with their civilian status, can even seek harbour facility in a given area without creating political problems for the littoral states. The Soviet Union has fishing agreements with several states in the Indian Ocean, including Mauritius and Ceylon. Based on these two extreme points the Soviet trawlers can, if they wish, cover the whole of the Arabian Sea in their capacity as intelligence-gathering vessels and yet, pay their way by pursuing their legitimate function of catching fish. Few instruments, designed for gathering enemy intelligence, can be so innocent looking and at the same time self-supporting or even financially beneficial to a marine power, as these vessels.

Under the compulsions of the Cold War naval confrontation, not only the Soviet naval activities but also their fishing activities have increased in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet fishing fleet is the largest in the area and provides for about two million ton catch per year, which is almost one-third of the total Soviet catch. It is feared that the Soviet fishing presence may be maintained and expanded even after the detente in the Super Power naval confrontation, if and when it is brought about. Such a continued presence of a major fishing state in that area would hardly benefit the littoral states, which desire to expand their fishing industry to supplement their low protein diet with locally available marine products.

Another sophistication achieved in fishing on the high seas is the use of particular sound frequencies to attract fishes. Research was conducted to determine the reaction of different varieties of fish to different sound frequencies. It was discovered that a given variety of fish could be attracted by a sound wave of a particular frequency. Sonar-based fish-herding equipments based on that theory can, therefore, attract a particular kind of fish in a given area, which can either be collected in a net and hauled up the trawler or brought to the mouth of big pipe-lines near the shore and pumped directly to the factory on the shore for processing. It is reported that Marine Resource Consultants, Inc., of Santa Monica, California, in cooperation with an Australian firm, plan to use that technique to fish in the Admiralty Gulf in North-West Australia Such 'Pied-piper' techniques would create havoc and make nonsense, even of the 12-mile territorial sea fishing zone, because trawlers equipped with these devices, even while remaining outside that limit, can lure the fish from those exclusive fishing zones into the so-called high seas and net them there. Developing countries, which are still struggling to switch over from the

dug-out canoes, and small sailing craft to powered launches, cannot hope to compete with fishing states employing such highly sophisticated techniques. Protection and not competition has to be their watchword.

Till recently, freedom of the high seas, which also meant freedom of fishing on the high seas, had come to mean a virtual *laissez-faire*. Such a situation is highly disadvantageous to the coastal states, especially in the Third World. They cannot compete with the advanced fishing states because of the technological advances in method of catching, storing and deep-freezing the catch. As a reaction to this, many states have extended the limit of their exclusive fishing zones to 100, or even 200 miles. Several Latin American states like Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay have claimed 200-mile fishing zone under the Santiago Convention. Guinea has a special fishing zone of 130 miles. Ceylon, Ghana, India and Pakistan have an extra fishing zone of 100 miles beyond the 12-mile limit of the territorial sea. The traditional fishing states have protested against such extension of state jurisdiction over the marine resources of the so-called high seas. But the fishing interests of the littoral states are being gradually recognized.

The Conference on Fisheries, convened by the UN in consultation with the FAO in Rome in 1955, accepted the legitimacy of the claims of the littoral states for a better deal. The Report of the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, Rome, 10 May 1955, among other things, pointed out that when formulating the conservation programmes, account should be taken of the special interests of the coastal state in maintaining the productivity of the resources of the high seas near its coast.

The special interests of the coastal states were also recognized by the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Geneva, 29 April 1958. Article 6 (1) of that convention stated that a coastal state had a special interest in the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea. Article 6(2) entitles a coastal state to take part, on an equal footing, in any system of research and regulation for purposes of conservation of the living resources of the high seas in that area, even though its nationals may not be carrying on fishing there. Article 6(3) enjoins upon the state whose nationals are engaged in fishing in any area of the high seas, adjacent to the territorial sea of a coastal state, to enter into negotiations, if requested to by the coastal state, with a view to prescribing by agreement the measures necessary for conservation of the living resources of the high seas in that area. Article 9 prescribes the methods to resolve the conflicts arising out of these disputes. Under that article, the dispute can be submitted for settlement to a special commission of five members, or else, the parties can agree to seek a solution by other methods of peaceful settlement, as provided by Article 33 of the UN Charter. Resolution 2413 (XXIII) of 17 December 1968 of the General Assembly,

on the exploitation and conservation of the living marine resources on the high seas also shows an awareness of the grave danger of an over-exploitation and depletion of these resources because of the rapid progress in fishery technology, and suggests greater international cooperation to ensure a rational exploitation of these resources.

The extent of the freedom to fish on the high seas will have to be reassessed and redefined in the light of the requirements of the undernourished population in the Third World. Those who insist that the high seas are a common property might have difficulties in explaining why individual nations can appropriate the fish that belong to all. Fish on the high seas may be common property, but the fish caught is fish kept. The attitude of the Third World towards this question was rather bluntly presented by the Indian representative, Dr Panikkar, in the Sub-committee II of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean-floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction on 17 July 1971. He said :

> The countries surrounding the Indian Ocean are inhabited by nearly one quarter of the world's population, yet, according to FAO statistics, only one-twentieth of world sea-fish production was available to them. The question arose, therefore, whether it was just that the fishery resources of the Indian Ocean should be used by distant nations to augment the calorie and protein intakes of their already well-fed population.[10]

The European powers and other fishing states, like Japan and the USA, have already come to settlement on several problems arising out of the question of conservation and optimum fishing on the high seas near their shores or in their areas of interest, but no attempt has been made even to initiate any such programme for the Indian Ocean area. This is an area where foreign fishing states are entering in a big way. It is high time that the littoral states come to an understanding among themselves on the question of fishing in this region and try to safeguard one of the rich sources of protein available to them before these newcomers start claiming 'historical rights' to fish in the area. This is all the more important because there is an inter-relationship between fishing on the high seas and in the territorial sea, especially for the developing states. If fishes like the sardine and the tuna are overfished on the high seas, their catch in the territorial waters is bound to suffer. Since fishing in a given area is basically a regional problem, it is imperative that the littoral states of the Indian Ocean first come to an agreement among themselves before they seek to limit the activities of the outside fishing states. Probably the whole of the Indian Ocean area is too vast for the littoral states to evolve a unified fishing policy, but regional understanding among the littoral states in South-East Asia, the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and in the Persian Gulf should be comparatively easy to achieve and efforts should be made in that direction.

The 'Security Zone' Concept

Another thing which agitates the Third World is the threat posed to their national security from the high seas. It has been their experience that, during the last five centuries, most of them were subjected to colonialism or were brought under domination of foreign powers which came to this area via the high seas. Even today the freedom and national security of these states are being threatened from the high seas. The presence of a naval fleet, which not only carries a punch but also represents the might of a big power, has a high intimidation potential. The concept of 'gun-boat' diplomacy which enabled Great Britain to rule the Indian Ocean for more than a hundred years, is relevant even today. The British fleet off the Iranian coast in 1952 during the oil crisis, the presence of the American VI Fleet in the Mediterranean, of the VII Fleet in the Pacific Ocean near the Chinese coast and the dispatch of the American task force of the VII Fleet to the Bay of Bengal in December 1971and the Arabian Sea in 1973, are examples of the current gun-boat diplomacy. For the states in the Third World, freedom of the high seas does not necessarily mean freedom from threat posed from the high seas. Very often, it means that the naval powers have the freedom to threaten them and to intimidate them from the high seas whose 'freedom' they seek to protect.

In such a case the narrow 12-mile territorial waters limit (even that is not recognized by some marine powers like the USA) does not offer any protection to the small states. In the past, the limits of the territorial sea were justified in terms of the security interests of the states involved. The 'cannon-shot' doctrine was suggested to signify the limit to which the state can protect its security from a sea-power by the use of cannons mounted on the shore installations. Inversely, it also recognized the limit to which a sea-power could legitimately send its naval vessels near the coast of another state. This security angle of the territorial water limit was subsequently lost sight of and three miles, which was also the range of a cannon shot those days, was accepted as the limit of the territorial water. Subsequently, the territorial water limit, which was primarily a security limit, was linked up with non-security matters like fishing rights, the right of innocent passage and the freedom of the high seas. Since the extension of the limits of the territorial waters, in the light of developing weapons technology, would have been misconstrued as an effort to increase the state's jurisdiction over the non-security matters on the high seas like fishing, the issue remained unresolved and the three-mile limit, which had no justification in the context of the developing weapon system, was maintained.

Such a definition suited the marine powers in their relations *vis-a-vis* the small states and since the marine powers had the strength to formulate and regulate the law of the sea, they continued to insist upon the narrow limits of the territorial waters. Such a limited definition does not suit the smaller states, especially since it does not safeguard their security interests. It is, therefore, necessary, that when the new law of the sea is discussed,

the security limits of the states on the high-seas adjacent to the coast should be taken into account and these states should be legally protected from the pressure tactics of the gun-boat diplomacy employed by the marine powers.

The concept of territorial waters should be redefined to delimit the two zones : the economic zone and the security zone. The economic zone can be further delimited into the fishing zone and the mining zone. Such a delimitation would free the security aspect from other aspects and would, therefore, pose less difficulties to the littoral states if they wish to extend their security zone beyond their territorial waters. It would permit them to regulate the movement of foreign naval vessels and support ships so that they are kept at a relatively safe distance. If such laws are simultaneously enacted by the littoral states in a given area, they can, to a great extent, deny a large portion of the so-called high seas near their coast to the naval vessels of the big powers.

This is not a new or unique suggestion. During the Second World War, several states had established neutrality zones, extending upto several hundred miles, from which they sought to bar any hostile act by the belligerent nations. In the post-World War II period, at the height of the Cold War, the USA and Canada had established air defence identification zones extending over several hundred miles out in the sea. Pilots of foreign aircraft, heading for the USA or Canada, were required to identify themselves and to comply with security regulations while flying through those zones. Surely, the developing states are also entitled to this courtesy. Not only their security but also the safety of the world may depend upon this arrangement.

Under the present law of the sea any power can have access to any part of the high seas. Its naval vessels, including submarines, have complete freedom of the high seas. In the present context, it means that the Indian Ocean is open to five powers who have the capacity to launch nuclear missile from the submarines. In the context of the Super Power confrontation, one tends to underestimate the mischief that can be done by a big power that might be having only one conventional submarine capable of firing even three nuclear missiles. At the height of a Cold War confrontation, like a renewed Arab-Israeli War, even three missiles fired by an unknown submarine from the Bay of Bengal or from the Arabian Sea and targeted at the Soviet Union, are, despite the Hot Line, capable of unleashing a nuclear war which would devastate the best part of the world, and probably, leave the power that had fired the missiles free to pursue its policies uninterruptedly. Such a possibility is quite practical and not only the Super Powers but also the small powers would have to devise means to protect themselves against it. The creation of a security zone well beyond the territorial waters where the coastal states can regulate the movements of vessels from outside the area (they need not ban them), would prove useful both for the small states as well as for the big

powers. At the moment many of the littoral states, even though they have the capacity, feel no obligation to take steps to prevent any mischief which can be committed by a foreign power on the high seas adjacent to their coast. They have a moral as well as a political obligation to patrol that area and see that it is not misused to threaten world peace and security.

The question of delimiting the security zone of a littoral power can be based upon the following two broad principles. Firstly, no fixed limit can be laid down for all the vessels. The limit will have to be in accordance with the threat posed by the particular type of naval vessel and the armaments that it normally carries. Thus, surface vessels, which mount only conventional guns having a limited range, as well as the logistic ships, can be permitted to come nearer the coast whereas vessels like aircraft-carriers and nuclear as well as conventional submarines must be kept at a reasonable distance. The details can be worked out by the naval experts of the countries of the region and the whole question of regional naval security can be discussed and finalized in regional or Afro-Asian conferences. The second principle which should be kept in mind is that such an arrangement would have to take into account the naval interests and capabilities of the local powers. Many of them have aircraft-carriers and submarines and others may acquire them in future. It should be seen that the navy of the local powers is not hampered in fulfilling its legitimate function of national defence. The littoral states may even evolve an organization which can coordinate their activities like keeping a watch over the movement of foreign naval vessels in their respective security zones. The security zone concept does not totally debar foreign powers from making friendly visits and goodwill tours of the area. But they must come as friends and not as unwanted intruders. Nor does the security zone concept affect the right of innocent passage through that area, as defined under Article 14(4) of the Geneva Convention of April 1958 on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which says, "The passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state."

Such a concept of security zone may give rise to a situation which would be akin to the closed-sea concept. The Straits of Malacca have already been declared a closed-sea by Indonesia and Malaysia. The Bay of Bengal, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea can also be converted into security zones by the littoral states. The Arabian Sea, being very wide and open from the south, cannot be completely closed, but a large part of that area can be converted into security zones and can be made free from Super Power naval confrontation. The security zone concept would thus be in keeping, not only with the spirit of the resolutions adopted at the non-aligned nations' conferences in Cairo in 1964, Lusaka in 1970 and George Town in 1972, but also with the December 1971 Resolution of the General Assembly of the UN on the question of denuclearization of the Indian Ocean. Another positive advantage of such a concept would be that it would permit the Super Powers to operate in the distant parts of the

Indian Ocean and yet, deny them the opportunity to use gun-boat diplomacy to intimidate the local states. Since the concept of the security zone would most likely be opposed by the marine powers, it can be pushed through only if the littoral powers come together and work out a community approach towards the whole problem.

The regional states will have to rise above their narrow local disputes and come together to safeguard their long-term national interests by keeping the foreign powers as far away from their shores as possible. Such a security zone concept would have been premature a decade earlier when some of these littoral states were active members of defence pacts like the CENTO and the SEATO, but of late many of them, realizing that foreign pacts not only do not provide real support during a local conflict but also tend to increase regional tensions, are following policies which are substantially akin to non-alignment. Now-a-days the Super Powers are also relying more upon their sophisticated deterrents like the ICBM and SLBM and seem to be discarding the outmoded concept of military pacts. These new changes, therefore, give an altogether new perspective to the concept of a security zone and increase the chances of its acceptance, not only by non-aligned states but also by those states which are members of the regional pacts.

If the littoral states can come to an understanding on their regional naval problems and accept the security zone concept, several other advantages would follow from the spirit of regional cooperation that might flow from it. Regional states can coordinate their activities in joint patrolling of a given area in the operations directed against smuggling and illegal immigration. Almost all the littoral states are faced with these problems. Efforts by individual states fail to be effective because the anti-social elements can take advantage of the shortcoming in the existing international law and escape into the territorial waters of another state, where they are safe from pursuit. In this connection, the regional powers can coordinate their naval and customs activities and even modify the concept of the right of hot-pursuit so that the pursuing state can continue the chase in the territorial waters of another state also. Legal procedures can be drawn under which the culprits can be tried, either in the territory where they are caught, or by the state of which they are the nationals, or by the state which catches them.

Another advantage of the regional naval cooperation and of regional coordination in the patrolling of the area would be the deterrence posed to piracy on the high seas, or to attacks on maritime vessels by unidentified craft. Undoubtedly, piracy as such has been suppressed and no case of piracy has been recorded for decades; but hijacking poses potential threats. Hijacking of aircraft has already led to serious hardships. Hijacking of cargo vessels, tankers or passenger liners would increase the risk much more. Even though no attempt has been made so far to hijack a ship in the Indian Ocean area, there are two cases of attack on ships on

the high seas. A Portuguese ship, *S.S. Agnoche*, which was operating off the Mozambique coast, was found drifting in the area in April 1970. It had suffered extensive damages and all the hands were missing. It was alleged that it was a case of sabotage but no one has been able to find out anything about the missing crew. The second case was the bazooka attack by a speed boat upon a tanker, *S.S. Coral Sea*, registered in Liberia, in the *Bab al-Mandeb* area. The tanker did not suffer any serious damage.

The Indian Ocean area was a hotbed of piracy till the last century, and traditions die hard. Hijacking, or the present-day version of piracy, despite the fact that it has succeeded in gaining some political legitimacy because of its association with 'liberation movements', still remains an international menace. Like piracy, it has its financial implications also. Hijacking of aircraft has sometimes fetched substantial amounts of money to several liberation movements. Hijacking on the high seas has not been undertaken by the liberation movements so far, but if they decide to indulge in it they do have the equipment for it. A tanker or a cargo vessel is vulnerable to the threat posed by a boat armed with even one recoilless gun. If the liberation movements decide to use terror tactics they can even sink a tanker in a shallow sea, like the Persian Gulf or the Straits of Malacca. Such a thing would create serious pollution problems apart from the political and economic tensions that might be generated in the region. Regional coordination in naval patrolling and joint operations directed against smuggling or illegal immigration would go a long way in frustrating such attempts. It would also ensure free navigation for all commercial vessels and invalidate one of the arguments used by the marine powers to justify their naval presence in the area.

Naval Capabilities of the Indian Ocean States

Do the Indian Ocean littoral states have the naval capacity to maintain an effective surveillance over their security zones and coordinate their activities to ensure free navigation and prevent smuggling and illegal immigration ? There is no doubt that these countries cannot be called naval powers. Even those states which have a naval arm worth the name, cannot compete, either in the number of naval vessels or in the degree of sophistication in the weapon system, with any of the major naval powers. But while evaluating the naval capabilities of the small states a few facts should be borne in mind. First, the navies of the big powers and the Super Powers are spread all over the world due to strategic considerations, the Cold War confrontation and overseas naval commitments and, consequently, only a fraction of their naval strength can be deployed at a given time at a given place. Secondly, in any major naval confrontation between a big power and a small state, the big power will have to reckon with the Cold War politics. The small state is not always alone or lonely. Thirdly, the navy of the small state is generally equipped with the weapons of big power or Super Power origin, and not all

of them are outdated. In fact, the navies of many of the Afro-Asian states are equipped with fairly modern vessels and more are being acquired to suit their particular needs. It should also be noted that at least four Afro-Asian states in the Indian Ocean area—Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Iran—have a sizeable naval capacity. These are besides countries like Australia, South Africa, and Portugal whose policies tend to run contrary to the aspirations of the Third World.

The chart given at the end of this book (Appendix II) clearly shows the naval strength of the littoral states in the Indian Ocean and the type of vessels they have. The Indonesian navy seems to be very big in size, but it is reported that the Indonesian economy does not permit the maintenance of such a big navy. Consequently, the number of heavy vessels, like submarines and destroyers in active service has been reduced to less than 50 per cent of the total strength. Following the end of the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation and the Indonesian-Dutch conflict over West Irian there is also no justification for the huge naval expenditure. The Indonesian navy is, therefore, geared to protect its national security, which demands a large number of small vessels to exercise effective control over the innumerable islands of Indonesia. The other major naval power in the area is India, but its navy is hardly adequate to handle its security problems in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. Iran and Pakistan are also other naval powers. Iran is building up its naval strength but it is still in the formative stage. Pakistan will take some time to recover from the losses suffered during the December 1971 conflict. It is doubtful if Pakistan can build a powerful navy, even with the help of China, and sustain the extra pressure upon it already over-stretched financial resources. Thus, no local power is in such a strong position as to dominate the Indian Ocean. In a way, that should reassure the littoral states and reduce their reluctance, if any, in evolving a policy to coordinate their naval activities.

Another point which emerges from the study of the naval capacity of the littoral states is, that many of them are fairly well-equipped with vessels designed for shore defence and for patrolling. A glance at the table would show that almost all the littoral states have medium and small-seized vessels like frigates, corvettes, submarine-chasers, torpedo-boats and coastal defence craft. The Iranian navy has ten hovercraft. India has one hovercraft with its Customs Department. Others like Saudi Arabia may also acquire them in the future. Indonesia, Iran and India have missile-firing boats and Pakistan and Malaysia are going to acquire them. It is reported that China may supply a limited number of such boats to Pakistan.

Though there is a fairly wide range in the displacement and the armament of these vessels they have been grouped together because their primary function, especially in the context of the small navies of the Third World, can be broadly generalized as shore defence. None of these can

become the nucleus of an ocean fleet. These small states, with their small navies can therefore, play a significant role in regional security if they coordinate their activities. In that case, they can acquire the capacity to keep their security zone under surveillance, ensure freedom of innocent passage and cooperate in the regional drive against smuggling and illegal immigration.

This effort can also be supplemented, to some extent, by the air-force of the local powers, especially by their naval air-arms. Indonesia has five *Albatross* (*Hu-16*) and *PBY-5A* anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. Its naval air-arm is also strengthened with 20 *MiG-19* and *MiG-21* aircraft and 12 helicopters. It has 22 *Tu-16* long-range bombers. Some of them can be armed with the *Kennel*, an air-to-surface missile with a range of about 50 kms. The missile has an anti-ship role and is guided by radar and radio command signals. The Indonesian air force possesses several *Il-28* light-bombers, jet interceptors and helicopters which can be used for naval security and surveillance. Thailand possesses one maritime air squadron of *Albatross* and *Tracker* anti-submarine aircraft. About thirty *Sabre-jets* and *F-5* fighter-bombers of the Thai Air Force can also supplement its naval defence programme. Singapore, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Ceylon do not, as yet, possess a naval air arm though their small air force, in cooperation with their light naval vessels, can deter unauthorized intrusions into their security zones.

India is another local power which has a limited naval air capability. It has one aircraft-carrier, *INS Vikrant*. It is basically an anti-submarine aircraft-carrier, though it was used for shore bombardment in the December 1971 conflict. It is doubtful if it would have been effective had the Pakistani air force not been fully neutralised in the Bay of Bengal area. *Vikrant*, which normally carries 10 *Sea Hawks*, four or five *Alizes* (ASW) and two *Alouette III* helicopters, dominates the Indian naval air-arm. India also possesses one maritime reconnaissance squadron of *Super-Constellations*, but it has no shore-based ASW aircraft, a serious deficiency which India will have to rectify if it has to balance its naval capabilities in two zones, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The three squadrons of long-range *Canberra* light bombers and several squadrons of interceptors and ground attack planes, as well as helicopters of the Indian Air Force can also be useful.

Pakistan does not possess any naval air-arm but has four squadrons of long-range *Il-28* and *B-57B*, two squadrons of *Mirage III* and several squadrons of *Saber-jets*, *Starfighters*, *MiG-19* and helicopters. Iran also does not possess, as yet, a naval air-arm but about 80 *Phantoms* and five squadrons of *F-5* give Iran a fair capacity to influence the naval activities in the Persian Gulf and parts of the Arabian Sea, Ethiopia possesses one squadron of *Canberra* light bombers and a few *F-5*s and *Sabre-jets*. The Iraqi air force, which is fairly well-equipped, remains

too far away to play an active part in the Indian Ocean. The Iraq-Iran confrontation also distracts Iraq from playing a positive role in the Indian Ocean politics. Saudi Arabia, the two Yemens, the Persian Gulf states, Somalia and Kenya have limited naval capabilities. Saudi Arabia has a fairly strong air force, but since Saudi Arabia is physically isolated from the Arabian Sea it does not pursue an active Indian Ocean policy. Moreover, the Saudis, being desert oriented, do not have a naval or a maritime tradition.

Thus, a survey of the naval vessels, the naval air-arm and the air force of the Indian Ocean states brings out two facts very clearly. First, it reveals that no single state has a capacity either to confront the big powers single-handedly, or to influence the politics of the Indian Ocean. Even the Indian Navy, which, probably, is the best-trained local force, does not, at the moment, possess the capacity to operate even a small Indian Ocean fleet without seriously jeopardizing its main task of safeguarding the security of its coast and the islands. The second fact which is revealed is that most of the littoral states possess the capacity to keep the sea near their coast under some sort of surveillance. Undoubtedly, each of these states conducts these operations separately but if these littoral states coordinate their activities their task would not only be made easier and more efficient but they can also project a united front against the pressures that might be brought to bear upon them by the outside powers. This is especially true now when the law of the sea is being codified.

Possibilities of Regional Cooperation

Now, when the Third World is on the point of regaining its lost freedom, it should take a fresh look at the law of the sea and find out if the customary international law, which has evolved over centuries in Europe, protects their national interest. Since the law of the sea is still in the process of being codified it is imparative that the Third World should not take any hasty step which would bind it to a legal system which may be to its disadvantage. Countries of the Third World do not as yet have sufficient knowledge of the marine environment to formulate their national policies on a sound basis. The immediate need for them is to initiate a thorough study of the various aspects connected with the ocean—geographical, geological, oceanographic, economic, political and naval—before they even begin codifying the law of the sea. These are framed for a long future. They should not be made too fast or too early.

Marine powers are pressing for laws which would permit them to exploit the marine resources in the future. In this legal scramble for the control of the high seas, the sea-bed and the sub-soil thereof, the rich nations which have the tools and the financial resources to exploit the ocean, would profit to the detriment of their poor cousins in the Third World which would be left higd and dry in the open competition on the

high seas. The Third World needs protection till it is capable of equal participation in the exploitation of the marine resources. Otherwise the cumulative effect of such an open competition would be that the developed nations would go on becoming more and more powerful at the cost of the developing nations which would be placed in a permanently disadvantageous position.

The marine powers are using the concept of state sovereignty over the territorial waters, as well as that of freedom over the high seas, as a means to keeping the nations of the Third World divided. The concept of the freedom of the high seas is also projected as a sovereign right of each state, big or small, to exploit the potentials of the high seas. The result is, that whereas the small states feel flattered of their sovereign equality, the rich countries and the big states reap the benefits. As long as the small states quarrel amongst themselves over the 12-mile limit of the territorial waters, a 200-mile fishing zones or the delimitation of their continental shelf, they would remain isolated and leave the big powers free to come and exploit the marine resources in their areas. It is not the sovereign independent state approach but a regional or a community approach that can protect their interest *vis-a-vis* the big powers now and in the future.

At the moment there is a conflict between two opposite concepts : nationalization vs. internationalization of the marine belt around the earth. But there can also be a third alternative. The control over the marine belt can be shared among the littoral states, the regional community and the world community. Also, the need of the present time is to evolve a new system whereby control over the marine belt would be determined by economic and security considerations primarily of the local powers and not of the foreign powers. Such a variable concept of state, regional community and world community control over the resources of the marine belt can become a basis for redefining the law of the sea.

There is no doubt that with the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean area, whether in the political and strategic fields or in the commercial fields like shipping, fishing and exploitation of the sea-bed resources, the littoral states would be subjected to increasing pressures from the marine powers. The dispute over the Straits of Malacca is a case in point. Both Japan and the Soviet Union have objected to that area being declared a closed-sea, by the littoral powers. *Bab al-Mandeb* would become another point of conflict if and when the Suez Canal is reopened. Also, the Straits of Hormuz might pose problems if Iran and Oman decide to enact laws to control the passage of ships through those narrow waterways. Besides, shipping, fishing and the exploitation of the sea-bed resources would create confrontation. Several local states have enacted laws extending their fishing zones up to 100 miles. But, as yet, no agreement has been reached to delimit the fishing zones of these states. The delimitation of

the fishing zone and of the continental shelf would be essential if regional confrontations have to be avoided.

In the context of the naval and air capabilities of the local powers and the feasibility of regional coordination in matters related to the high sea, the Indian Ocean area can be broadly divided into two zones : the eastern zone and the western zone. The eastern zone would comprise Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, Bangladesh, India and Ceylon. The western zone would include Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Iran, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, the two Yemens, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Madagascar. It is too early to include South Africa and Portugal among the Afro-Asian states because they have shown a marked anti-Third World bias. Australia's position is slightly better. Australia has already started taking an active part in the regional developments in South-East Asia. But, Australia, as also Great Britain and France, will have to follow a policy which would assure the Third World before they can be fully trusted by it.

The eastern zone offers a greater possibility of regional coordination. The Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation has ended and these two states have come closer. The emergence of Bangladesh has created a new state which has roots in the region and which would strive to coordinate its policies with the regional powers. India can also play a modest role in this area without having to explain its actions *vis-a-vis* Pakistan. Moreover, some of the countries of the region have already begun discussing the question of the neutralization of South-East Asia. Indonesia and Malaysia have even gone to the extent of declaring the Straits of Malacca a closed-sea.

Prospects of greater cooperation among the countries of the eastern zone are brighter and efforts should be made to ensure coordination in matters dealing with the law of the sea, like those dealing with the extent of the security zone, maritime navigation, fishing zone and efforts to prevent smuggling. Efforts in that direction would not only prevent the emergence of conflict situations but would also create a community consciousness which would come in handy when these states are confronted with marine powers.

There is no denying the fact that potential conflict situations do exist in this zone also. Both, India and Ceylon have declared that their fishing zones extend up to 100 miles. Ceylon and India will have to negotiate some day on the delimitation of their fishing zones. India will also have to negotiate on the same question with Bangladesh, Burma, Thailand and Indonesia. In fact, it would be much better if the states in this zone coordinate their policies on the question of fishing so as to evolve a regional rather than a national approach to this problem. Such an approach can also be extended to other problems connected with the state's jurisdiction over the sea and the sea-bed near the shore. There is a distinct possibility that in due course an eastern Indian Ocean community can emerge which

would play the role *vis-a-vis* the sea-resources that ECAFE plays *vis-a-vis* the land resources.

Prospects of regional cooperation in the western zone are, at least in the present context, slightly dim. The Indo-Pakistani confrontation would continue to influence the attitudes of Iran and several Arab states to the problems of the Indian subcontinent. Iran has also problems with some of its Arab neighbours. Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia have not resolved their frontier problems as yet. These conflict-situations would adversely affect the chances of regional cooperation. Another factor which would create further complications is the presence of big powers in the area. The eastern zone is comparatively free from their presence. In the western zone Americans have their bases in Baharain and Asmara and the French control a part of Somaliland near *Bab al-Mandeb*. The Russians and Chinese are also active in that area. Recently, the USSR has acquired a presence in Iraq. Great Britain still retains a hold over the Sheikhs in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, this zone has great strategic value in the context of the Super Power nuclear confrontation. Some of the states, like Iran and Pakistan, are still members of the CENTO. The oil wealth in the region also increases its strategic, commercial and political importance.

But the littoral states in the western zone can still make efforts to come to an understanding on matters which affect their regional interests without sacrificing their national interests. They can discuss the extent of their fishing zone, the security zone and the extent of a state's jurisdiction over the sea-bed. They can even coordinate their activities to ensure maritime navigation and to checks smuggling. If all the regional states find it difficult to coordinate their activities simultaneously, bilateral or multilateral negotiations can be initiated and efforts can be made to widen the sphere gradually. For example, Iran, Oman and India can start discussions on the ways and means to check smuggling. Other countries like Pakistan and the Arab states in the Persian Gulf can also join in it, if and when they wish. Similarly, these states can coordinate their policy regarding the exploitation of the sea-bed and fishing in the region. Other regional states can also come together to coordinate their local policies, as in the Persian Gulf and in the Red Sea. Thus, over a period of time, a more or less uniform sea-policy can emerge whose defence would bind the littoral states *vis-a-vis* the outside powers and thus reinforce the community bargaining power. There is no reason to believe that the local oil producing and exporting states, which ignore their political rivalries to seek a better deal with the oil companies would also not come together to protect their economic and security interests in their marine belt. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has shown the advantages of community bargaining for the countries of the Third World.

An awareness of the power of community bargaining needs to be created in the Third World, especially among the countries in and around the

Indian Ocean, if they have to protect themselves from the long-range ill-effects of the big power presence in the area. Their united stand on the question of denuclearization of the Indian Ocean was laudable, but they must also translate their stand into concrete action and find out ways and means by which they can contain the efforts of the marine powers to exploit the Indian Ocean for its strategic and political advantages and for its economic resources. This is only possible by developing a community approach to the broader problems connected with the Indian Ocean because, in the long run, there is every possibility that they would develop as a part of the overall confrontation between the Third World and the big powers. If the littoral states take positive steps towards an the evolution of the Indian Ocean community, they would not only pave the way for the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean and the creation of a peace zone but would also lay the foundation of mutual cooperation and economic prosperity in this vital and sensitive area.

5

The Growing Importance of Diego Garcia

THE POLITICS OF the Indian Ocean area have taken a new turn, following the October 1973 conflict and the oil crisis. These two factors have already considerably affected, and would probably do so much more in future, the big power position in the area, both in regard to their strategic presence and their interventionist capabilities, either designed to protect their oil supplies on the high seas or to ensure their control over the oil and the oil investments in the littoral. Often, these two facets of the Western politico-military presence cannot be separated. It is very difficult to say whether the dispatch of the US task force to *Bab al-Mandeb* area immediately after the October 1973 war was designed to buttress the US strategic capacity in that region or was supposed to project an interventionist force in that sensitive area, something comparable to the dispatch of the US task force, headed by the nuclear aircraft-carrier *Enterprise*, during the Bangladesh conflict of December 1971. Probably it was designed to serve both the ends. The recent Anglo-American agreement to enlarge the Diego Garcia base for strategic as well as interventionist role should be seen in the context of these new developments.

There is no doubt that the October 1973 war and its political consequences would seriously affect the US strategic interests in the area. The US naval base at Bahrain is to be closed. The decision was taken by Bahrain on 21 October 1973 following the massive US military aid to Israel which enabled it to launch the successful military breakthrough operation across the Suez Canal north of the Bitter Lake. The denial of the base facilities in Bahrain would affect the US naval presence in the sensitive Gulf area, especially in view of the growing oil crisis.

The US presence in the Red Sea area has also been threatened. It was reported by *Baghdad Observer* of 17 August 1973 that Saudi Arabia had

offered port facilities to the US navy at a Red Sea port near the coast of of Yemen Arab Republic or North Yemen. There is no doubt that this facility would have been withdrawn after the October 1973 conflict and the Saudi oil blockade of the USA.

The US position in this area was also affected by the deterioration in the relations between Israel and Ethiopia, as well as between Ethiopia and the USA. Ethiopia had earlier offered some naval facilities to Israel on Haleb, an island north of *Bab al-Mandeb*. These facilities have been withdrawn following the detente between Ethiopia and Sudan. Ethiopia even broke off its diplomatic relations with Israel on 23 October 1973. The Israeli withdrawal from this sensitive area has not helped the USA.

There are also reports that Ethiopia may also ask the USA to wind up the Kagnew communication base near Asmara. Even otherwise, that base which is near the Red Sea coast is vulnerable to an attack by long-range cruise missiles like *Shaddock* which are armed with nuclear warheads and which can be fired by a submarine or a guided missile destroyer. The neutralization of that base would probably jeopardize the operation of the US submarines armed with *Polaris* or *Poseidon* missiles from the area. It is possible that the US task force was sent there to neutralize such a threat. It should be remembered that its dispatch coincided with the call for alert given by the US President during the October 1973 conflict.

Till the long-range SLBM programme of the USA does not materialize, the USA would depend heavily upon the area around *Bab al-Mandeb*, the Red Sea and the northern part of the Arabian Sea for the most effective use of its *Polaris* and *Poseidon* missiles. The Diego Garcia base facilities are not yet fully capable of maintaining communication with submerged submarines in this area. Thus the USA not only has to depend upon the base near Asmara but also has to deploy a task force capable of protecting that base. In the eventuality of the USA being denied the use of that base, this task force can also take up the task of maintaining communication with the US submarines operating in that area.

Though the USSR has successfully fired its long-range SLBM, which is supposed to have a range of about 4,000 miles, USA is not ready with its long-range SLBMs under the *Trident* programme. It is said that the *Trident* would become operational by 1978. The Diego Garcia base is supposed to become fully operational even before. Thus, if the *Trident* becomes operational in the Indian Ocean, then, in all probability, the USA need not maintain its strategic presence in the Red Sea and the northern part of the Arabian Sea but can operate from areas near Diego Garcia and the southern half of the Indian Ocean.

Thus, one may hope that once the *Trident* system becomes operational, the focal point of the Super Power rivalry, revolving around their strategic first-strike and second-strike capabilities, may move away from the northern littoral of the Indian Ocean. There is, however, no reason to believe that these Super Powers have any intention of leaving the northern

part of the Indian Ocean in the near future. In this context it should be of interest to note that the question of keeping the Indian Ocean as a peace zone was again discussed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. It passed a resolution on 6 December 1973 reiterating its earlier stand that the area be considered a peace zone. The Super Powers, as usual, abstained from voting on it. Not only that, when the General Assembly was discussing the question, the USA was dispatching a second task force to the area. This utter disregard of the UN resolution was almost a repeat performance of the entry of the *Enterprise* in December 1971 which was sent to this area at a time when the General Assembly was passing a similar resolution.

Another possible impact of the October 1973 war is the possibility of the reopening of the Suez Canal. The reopening of the Suez Canal would have not only a decisive economic but also a politico-military influence over this area. It would reopen Europe's direct links with the Orient. France has already started mending its fences and is developing very close all-round ties with the Arabs. It has also a military base in French Somaliland. There is no reason why the French as well as other European states should not seek to strengthen their position still further as a result of the opening of the canal.

The USSR would also benefit a great deal from the opening of the Suez Canal. It would permit the USSR to use the shortest possible sea-route from its Black Sea ports to the Indian Ocean, something which was denied to it since June 1967. It would not only enhance the Soviet maritime presence but also its naval presence in the area, which would strengthen its capabilities *vis-a-vis* the US naval units operating in this area.

There are reports that the USSR has been able to improve its presence in Somalia. According to the *Military Review* of August 1973 (page 93) the naval units of the USSR have started using the harbour facilities of Berbera which are being rapidly modernized and expanded. It is also reported that the USSR is developing Birokao harbour, about 137 miles east of Berbera, as a submarine base. If these reports are true it means that the USSR is taking steps to strengthen its naval presence in the *Bab al-Mandeb* area. Such a step would not only put a counterpose to the US naval presence in this narrow passage dominating the sea-lane from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean but also would limit the US capability to launch strategic offensive from that quarter.

Another aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict of October 1973 which would affect the whole world is connected with the recent oil crisis, which itself is related to the wider energy crisis. It is calculated by experts that the Western world, as also the non-oil-producing Third World, would be faced with a drastic energy shortage in the years to come and hence would have to depend more and more upon the oil from the Arab and Iranian sources. The energy crisis has, therefore, projected oil, or the fossil fuel as it is now called, as one item of great importance. This

region, as a major source of oil resources has, therefore, assumed added economic, political and military importance not only for the Western world but also for others which depend upon the oil from this region.

The present oil crisis has three main characteristics: the desire of several oil producing countries to curtail their oil production to conserve their dwindling oil assets, increase in the oil price, and the use of oil as a political weapon. Also, since oil is going to became a scarce commodity the question of the free-flow of oil not only through narrow straits like the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca and *Bab al-Mandeb*, and on the high seas, but also from the oil wells to the oil terminal would assume special importance.

The most important thing about the oil crisis is the rapid price-hike. This trend is not primarily a result of the October 1973 conflict though that conflict was used to confuse the issue and to reduce the amount of criticism especially from the non-oil producing countries in the Third World. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had been working for the price-rise since 1971. The oil consumers have protested against the price-rise but are reconciled to adjusting their future socio-economic life to suit the demands of the OPEC members. This price-hike may ultimately prove to be a blessing in disguise for the industrially advanced countries by compelling them to develop nuclear power as the new source of energy. The worst sufferers would be the non-oil-producing states in the developing world which would have to surrender all their exportable surplus to keep their economy going at a reduced rate. They would not be able to continue at that rate for long without bringing a socio-economic and political chaos. There is no doubt that such a development is bound to affect global peace and security.

The other two aspects of the oil crisis, the threat of under-production of oil and the use of oil as a political weapon, are closely inter-connected. Both were used by the Arabs during and after the October 1973 war. They reduced their total oil production and increased the oil price. They also successfully used the oil blockade of pro-Israel states not only to gain political support against Israel but also to isolate the USA and Israel in the Western bloc and in the Third World. They are also entering into oil for weapon deal with European states, notably France. While there is no doubt that it might break the bi-polarity as far as the arms supply is concerned, it may not further the chances of conflict resolution. One feels that it may even prove to be counter-productive.

Thanks to this new oil diplomacy, some countries are entering the area in a big way under this oil-for-weapon deal. France is probably going to sell sophisticated weapons to several Arab states. Pakistan is being projected as a new spring-board for the French armament industry in this area. Naturally it has alarmed not only India but also Iran. No one wants an intensification of the arms-race which is possible due to

the increased oil revenue now available to the oil kingdoms. It is reported that their annual oil revenue from 1974 onwards may total $50 billion. Even if one-tenth of that money is put into weapons acquisition programme, it would lead to an enhanced tension in the area.

The oil-for-weapon deal would be the easiest way for the West not only to pay for their oil but also to finance, to a large extent, their future R & D (research and developmert) in the sophisticated weaponry without even passing on the benefit to the oil states. Moreover, the uncontrolled influx of arms in the area might create a vested interest not only in perpetuating the old conflicts but also in creating new tensions, and occasionally, conflicts, in the area so that these states can continue to sell their weapons for oil. The oil-for-weapon deal, a part of the overall Arab strategy to use oil as a politico-military weapon, therefore, is the most dangerous of the aspects of the so-called oil crisis and is ultimately bound to hurt the local interests most.

The influx of more arms in the area is going to complicate the question of free-flow of oil especially from three bottlenecks, the Straits of Malacca, of Hormuz and *Bab al-Mandeb*. They are not only important strategically but, under the new rule of 12-mile territorial waters limit, fall within the national jurisdiction of one or two states which are threatening to use their sovereign right to block those waterways for naval and maritime vessels of a particular type.

The question of free navigation through the Straits of Malacca is a very complicated case. This waterway which is 21 miles wide at its narrowest neck was officially declared a part of the territorial waters of Malaysia and Indonesia on 16 November 1971. In March 1972 both these states made it clear that they claimed the right of prior consultation from foreign governments wishing to use the waterway for the passage of naval vessels. On 17 April 1972, Admiral R. Sudomo, Chief of the Staff of the Indonesian navy, was reported to have said that the Indonesian naval vessels would attack foreign submarines entering the Indonesian waters without obtaining prior permission. Both Indonesia and Malaysia have also sought to ban the passage of tankers, of more than 200,000 tons dead-weight, on grounds of maritime safety and anti-pollution. Singapore does not support the stand taken by these two states. Till today, neither state has used force to protect its rights but they do hold an important lever in their hands.

The Straits of Hormuz is a narrow neck connecting the oil rich Gulf to the Arabian Sea. It is reported that one oil tanker crosses it every ten or twelve minutes. These tankers carry about one-third of the total oil for the world. Iran has shown an inclination to patrol that bottleneck and has sought the help of Oman, which controls the Arab coast of that strait, in that matter. It is reported that Iran would like to initiate safety and pollution checks on the tankers using this sea-lane. Oil tankers entering the shallow Gulf would be asked to flush their tanks

before they cross the strait. It remains to be seen how the Arabs would respond to these safety and anti-pollution checks.

Bab al-Mandeb is the third bottleneck, controlling the sea-lanes from the Indian Ocean. It would become more important once the Suez Canal is reopened or the pipelines from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean via either Israel or Egypt start functioning. It is reported that the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) had imposed a naval blockade of Isreal in this region during the October 1973 conflict. How that country, which is the most active supporter of the insurgency movements in Dhofar and the Gulf area, would react in future to the free-flow of oil from the non-revolutionary oil kingdoms of the Gulf to Europe and America, is difficult to say. There is no doubt that when the Suez Canal is reopened, this region would once again regain its past strategic importance for the European states. How they would seek to maintain their presence there remains to be seen. France has an advantage because of its presence in Franch Somaliland and its growing contacts with the Arabs based on the oil-for-weapon deal.

There are three ways of settling the problem of free flow of oil through these bottlenecks. The one is by evolving principles of international law which are acceptable to all. The conference on the laws of the sea, which was to be held in 1973 and was postponed for 1974, may discuss this question and produce some tangible results. The other is by the creation of political and economic understanding among the local states and the oil consumers to evolve ways and means whereby the legitimate interests of all the parties may be preserved. As far as the Straits of Malacca is concerned, Indonesia may have a valid reason for restricting traffic of heavy oil tankers in the shallow waterways, but the solution is not a confrontation between Indonesia and Japan but either an alternate sea-route or a canal across the Kra isthmus. It is reported that the Thai government has already contacted two US firms for a feasibility survey of that scheme. Also, the Iranian suggestion of anti-pollution control over vessels entering the Gulf instead of dividing the Gulf states should become the basis of further co-operation among the littoral states and the maritime states.

The third way of ensuring the free flow of oil through these waterway is by strengthening one or more local states to act as the local policemen. Indonesia is already a naval power, thanks to its weapons acquisition programme during its earlier confrontation period. Iran was also projected as the local strong power. In this case Iran's desire to increase its capacity for self-defence coincided with the Western, especially the US, policy in the region. Iran has already spent $3 billion on acquiring new and sophisticated weapons and would spend about $2 billion more in the years to come.

It is alleged that the US policy of strengthening Iran went a step further than merely equipping it to ensure the flow of oil from the Gulf but also envisaged using Iran to control the very source of the oil and to ensure its free flow to the West. Even responsible American statesmen had openly

advocated that policy. Senator Fulbright, while speaking in the US Senate on the question of energy crisis, on 21 May 1973, advocated using Iran and Israel as surrogates to do the job of protecting the US oil interests in the Gulf. The Israeli performance during the October 1973 conflict has proved that it would not have proved capable of fulfilling the task assigned to it by Senator Fulbright. The USA is now relying upon its own capability to force a decision in this field. The dispatch of the US task force to the area after the latest Arab-Israeli war and the threatening statements of responsible US leaders like the statement of 6 January 1974 by the US Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger, that the US might be compelled to use force to break the oil embargo, may point to the possibility of the USA using direct gunboat diplomacy in the area in future.

One doubts if the USA would be able to follow such a policy. It is isolated. Europe is making independent arrangements to ensure its oil supplies and may not support the US policy of intimidating the Arab states. One can even say that the present position is the 1956 crisis in reverse. In the case of the evolution of a triangular configuration between the USA, USSR and Europe, the Arabs would be sure to get the support of the USSR and European states against the USA and thus would be able to neutralize any interventionist attempts from that quarter, despite the presence of the US task force in the area.

Thus, while evaluating the future of the big power interaction in the Indian Ocean area and the local response to it, the possible consequences of the October 1973 conflict and the energy crisis must be borne in mind. Israel has ceased to be the sheet anchor of the US policy in West Asia. It would also affect the US policies in the Gulf where not only Iran is isolated but the US presence too has suffered a serious setback due to Arab oil blockade and the loss of the naval base at Bahrain. On the other hand, the USSR has gained advantages. It has improved its position in tho Arab world and would benefit immensely if and when the Suez Canal reopens. The Canal would once again bring the European influence in an area where they were traditionally interested. It would mean the end of the bi-polarity. The triangular configuration might provide more options to the Indian Ocean states which would help in reducing tension and the intensity of conflicts in the area and may ultimately prove to be beneficial to the Indian Ocean states.

Appendix I

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SLBM AND RELATED WEAPONS CAPABILITIES OF BIG POWERS



Appendix II

THE INTERVENTIONIST CAPABILITIES OF THE BIG AND MEDIUM POWERS INTERESTED IN INDIAN OCEAN

Name of the Countries	*Large Aircraft-carrier Nuclear-powered*	*Large Aircraft-carrier Conventionally-powered*	*Light Aircraft-carrier*	*Escort-carriers, Helicopter-carriers, Commando-carriers*	*Command Ships, Communication Ships*	*Submarine Nuclear-powered*	*Submarine Conventionally-powered*	*Cruiser, Nuclear-powered*	*Cruiser, Conventionally-powered*	*Destroyer and Frigates, Nuclear-powered*	*Destroyers and Frigates, Conventionally-powered*	*Ocean Minesweepers*	*Coastal Minesweepers*	*Landing Ships*	*Landing Craft*	*Survey Ships*	*Depot Ships, Repair ships, Maintenance Ships*	*Supply Ships*	*Oilers*
Australia			1	1			4				14		6			6		2	
China							43[1]				28	21	26	29	25	85	1	8	
France			3	1		2	20		2		49	14	61	7	14	13	8	23	9
India			1				4		2		27		4	1	2	4	4		4
Indonesia							10				13	6	20	8	9	4	5		9
Japan							14				44		39	7	48		2		1
Pakistan							3		1		6		7			1			2
Portugal[2]							4				8	16			58	7	1	1	1
South Africa							3				9		10			1		1	
United Kingdom		1		2		11	23		14		164		38	9[3]	24	10	5	10	25
U S A	1	14		7	12	101	33	1	9	2	223	25	11	58	100	46	28	93	53
U S S R		1[4]		2		111	305		33		162	195	125	11	60	116	53	120	46

[1] Of these, one is capable of firing a ballistic missile.

[2] Portugal also has 19 corvettes which can be useful in Mozambique.

[3] Two of them are assault ships.

[4] About to be launched, probably to be equipped with VTOL aircraft.

(Based upon *Jane's Fighting Ships* 1972-73 and 1973-74)

Appendix III

SURVEILLANCE OF THE SECURITY ZONES
NAVAL CAPABILITIES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN STATES

Countries	*Aircraft-carrier*	*Submarines*	*Cruisers*	*Destroyers and Frigates*	*Gunboats, Corvettes and Patrol Vessels*	*Missile Boats*	*Patrol Boats and Craft—more than 60 tons*	*Patrol Boats and Craft—less than 60 tons*	*Minesweepers*	*Hovercraft*
Abu Dhabi								9		
Australia	2[1]	4		14			20		6	
Bangladesh[2]							1			
Burma[2]				2	6		17	7		
Ceylon				1				31		
Ethiopia				1[3]			5	4	1	
India	1	4	2	27		8 Osa-class	17	4	8	
Indonesia		10		1	18	12 Komar-class	51	35	26	
Iran				7[4]	4		10	6	6	12
Iraq					3		12	6		
Kenya							3			
Kuwait								10		
Malagasy				1			2	5		
Malaysia				2		4[5]	42		6	
Oman					1		3			
Pakistan		3	1	6			7	2	7	
Portugal		4		8	27[6]		12	24	16	
Saudi Arabia							3	30		8
Singapore							11	4		
Somalia							6	4		
South Africa		3		9			5		10	
South Yemen								15	3	
Sudan							6			
Tanzania							6	4		
Thailand				10	14		22	15	6	

[1] One of them converted to transport/helicopter carrier.
[2] River gunboats not included.
[3] One US sea-plane tender used as training ship.
[4] Some of them are armed with *Seacat/Seakiller* SAMs and SSMs.
[5] These boats, armed with *Exocet* SSMs, are expected to join in 1974.
[6] Includes armed survey ships and fishery protection vessels.

(Based on *Jane's Fighting Ships*, 1973-74).

Appendix IV

OIL RESOURCES OF THE GULF AREA

Country	1960			1965			1970			1971		1972	
	Crude Oil Production *	*Oil Reserves* *	*Oil Income* †	*Crude Oil Production*	*Oil Reserves*	*Oil Income*	*Crude Oil Production*	*Oil Reserves*	*Oil Income*	*Crude Oil Production*	*Oil Income (estimated)*	*Crude Oil Production (estimated)*	*Oil Income (estimated)*
Abu Dhabi				13.56			33.46			40.79	431.0	50.0	543
Bahrain	2.25			2.84			3.82			3.72	25.0	3.51	25
Dubai							4.29			6.25	60.0	7,5	60
Iran	52.06	4,733	285	93.82	5,413	532	191.15	9,590	938	227.34	1,870	254.0	2,000
Iraq	47.48	3,642	266	64.36	3,354	368	76.63	4,384	483	84.0	840	67 0	927.5
Kuwait	81.86	8,541	465	108.73	8,582	636	137.46	9,193	812	146.78	1,395	152.2	1,577.6
Neutral Zone	7.27	875		18.95	1,810		26.46	3,521		29.11		30.3	
Oman							16.54			14.1	115	13.6	155.4
Qatar	8.21	325		11.00	391		17.15	589		20.2	198	23.3	225.7
Saudi Arabia	61.08	6,667	355	100.95	8,188	639	176.94	17,604	1,008	223.51	2,160	285.5	2,316.9
Total	264.32	24,956	1,442	422.61	29,703	2,295	712.50	47,823	3,673	755.01	7,104	886.7	7,831.9
	24% of the world's total	60% of the world's total		26% of the world's total	60 % of the world's total		29% of the world's total	57% of the world's total					

* Crude Oil Production and * Oil Reserves in 000,000 metric tons † Oil Income in US $ million.

References

INTRODUCTION

1. Ballard, G. A., *Rulers of the Indian Ocean,* New York, 1928, p. 2.
2. Two of his books deserve special mention; *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783*, Boston, 1890, and *Naval Strategy,* Boston, 1911. Other writers have further elaborated the theme and written on the topic. Some of these works are H. W. Richmont, *Sea-Power in the Modern World*, London, 1934 and S. W. Roskill, *The Strategy of Sea Power, Its Development and Application*, Ontario, 1962.

1

1. Hilton Richard, *The Thirteenth Power,* London, 1958, pp. 178-9.
2. Stebbins, Richard P. and others, *The United States in World Affairs 1951*, published for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1952, p. 625. Henceforth this series would be referred to as *The United States in World Affairs.*
3. *The United States in World Affairs, 1952*, p. 241.
4. *Bulletin*, Department of State, 28 (729), 15 June 1953, p. 835.
5. *The United States in World Affairs 1953,* p. 308, quoting Richard and Clayde Hardness "America's Secret Agents: The Mysterious Doings of CIA", *Saturday Evening Post*, 6 November 1954. pp. 66, 68 and *New York Times*, 9 April 1955.
6. *The United States in World Affairs 1955,* pp. 333-34.
7. Text given in *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955,* Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1956, pp. 342-44.
8. *The Times* (London) and *New York Times*, 3 September 1954.
9. For details on Eden-Eisenhower talks, see *Bulletin*, Department of State, 34 (868), 13 February 1956. p. 223. For Molotov's statement of 13 February 1956, see *New York Times* and *The Times* (London), 14 February 1956.
10. The Soviet Union sent a note to the USA, UK and France. It was based upon the Shepilov Plan. The text of the Soviet note, see *Bulletin,* Department of State, 36 (927), 1 April 1957, pp. 524-26. The American reply, *ibid.* pp. 523-24.
11. Text, *ibid.*, 38 (999), 18 August 1958, pp. 272-73.
12. Khrushchev's speech, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 10(4), 8 March 1958, pp. 15-22.

13. *Ibid.*, 10 (44), 10 December 1958, p. 17.
14. *Ibid.*, 11 (6-7), 18 March 1959, pp. 24-26.
15. *Bulletin*, Department of State, 40 (1030), 23 March 1959, pp. 416-18.
16. *The Hindu*, 22 February 1964.

2

1. One nautical mile=6,000 feet or about 1.14 statute miles.
2. The agreement, which is valid for 50 years, was effected by exchange of notes in London on 30 December 1966. Reference in *Bulletin*, Department of State, 56 (1441), 6 February 1967, p. 225.
3. *Military Review*, (51) 3 March 1971, p. 102.
4. *The United States in World Affairs, 1959*, p. 249.
5. *Bulletin*, Department of State 44 (1133), 13 March 1961, p. 376.
6. *United States—South African Relations*, Hearings before the sub-committee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, Second Session, March 1966, Part I, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1966, p. 5.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 106-08.
8. For details, see Davis, Jennifer, "Allies in Empire, US Economic Investment", *Africa Today*, 11 (4), July-August 1970, pp. 1-15.
9. *United States–South African Relations*, n. 6, p. 10.
10. Exchange of letters between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, June 1955, HMSO, London, *Cmd. 9520.*
11. Hottinger, Arnold, Ferment in the Persian Gulf", *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, 20 (11), February 1971, p. 15.
12. Landis, Lincoln, "Soviet Interest in Middle East Oil", *New Middle East*, (3), December 1968, pp, 16—20, (also see pp. 21—23); Yodfat, A. Y., "Russia's other Middle East Pasture, Iraq", *ibid*, (38), November 1971, p. 26 and de Nezza, Major E. J., "The Soviet Need for Middle East Oil", *Air Force Review*, 22 (4), May-June 1971, pp. 52-7.
13. *Keyhan International* (Tehran), 14 January 1969.
14. Minter, Williams, "Allies in Empire—Part II, US Military Involvement", *Africa Report*, 17 (4), July-August 1970, pp. 28-32.
15. Vasilyev, A., "Rebels against Slavery", *New Times*, (38), September 1971, p. 29.
16. Carlson, Sevinc, "China's Urgent Need for Stability in the Middle East", *New Middle East*, (36), September 1971, pp. 25-31.
17. Carlson, Sevinc, "Japan's Entry into the Middle East Oil Contest", *New Middle East*, (22), July 1970, pp. 14-17.
18. Matsuura, Col. Noborn, "Japan's Defense Force", *Military Review*, 51 (2), Feb-, ruary 1971, p. 54; "Military Awakening in Japan", *Army*, 21 (3), March 1971 p, 14; Sekino, Hideo, "Japan and her Maritime Naval Defence", *Proceedings*, United States Naval Institute, 97 (819), May 1971, pp. 98-121.

3

1. Young, Richard, "Equitable Solution for Off-shore Boundaries: the 1968 Saudi-Iranian Agreement", *American Journal of International Law*, 64 (1), January 1970, pp. 152-57. Text of the agreement and map in *International Legal Material*, 8 (3), May 1969, pp. 493-96.
2. "Shah of Iran Concerned over Saudi Arabia's Future", an exclusive interview with Alvin J. Cottrell, *New Middle East*, (31), April 1971, pp. 21-23.
3. Amirsadeghi, Hossein, "Iran's New Outward Look", *New Middle East*, (31), August 1971, p. 9.

4. *New Middle East*, n. 2, pp. 21-22.
5. Campbell, J.F., "The Red Sea: Points of Conflict", *Survival*, 13 (8), August 1971, p. 271.

4

1. *Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 1970;* Hearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, Ninty-first Congress, Second Session on Nuclear Propulsion Program, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1970, p. 93.
2. *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, Moscow, 1969, Peace and Socialism Publications, Prague, 1969, p. 171.
3. Amirsadeghi, Hossein, "Iran's New Outward Look", *New Middle East*, (31), August 1971, pp. 9-10.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
5. Medford, R.D., "Marine Mining in Britain", *Mining Magazine*, December 1969, p. 274, quoted in F.M. Auburn, "The International Sea-bed Area" *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 20 (2), April 1971, p. 176.
6. Gullion, E.A., (Ed.), *Uses of the Seas*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliff, N.J., 1968, p. 49.
7. Friedmann, Wolfgang, "Selden, Redivivus—towards a Partitioning of the Sea ?" *American Journal of International Law*, 65 (4), October 1971, pp. 761-62.
8. *Bulletin*, Department of State, 62 (1603), 16 March 1970, pp 342-43.
9. Andrassy, J., *International Law and the Resources of the Sea*, New York, 1970, pp. 18-19.
10. Quoted in *Indian Journal of International Law*, 11 (3), July 1971, p. 545.

Bibliography

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND WEAPON TECHNOLOGY

Books :

Alperovitz, Gar, *Atomic Diplomacy : Hiroshima and Potsdam;* the use of the atomic bomb and the American confrontation with Soviet Power, New York, 1965.

Aron, Raymond, *On War : Atomic Weapons and Global Diplomacy*, Tr. by Terence Kilmartin, London, 1958.

Brodie, Bernard, *Sea-Power in the Machine Age*, Princeton University Press, 1941.

Brodie, Bernard, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, Rand Corporation, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1959.

Brown, Neville, *Strategic Moblity*, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1963.

Dinerstein, H.S., *War and the Soviet Union, Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking*, Rand Corporation, New York, 1959. (Revised Edition, 1962.)

Dietchman, Seymour J., *Limited War and American Defence Policy* : Building and using military power in a world at large, M.I.T. Press, Edn. 2, 1969.

Englebardt, Stanley L., *Strategic Defenses*, New York, 1966.

Erickson, John, Ed., *The Military-Technical Revolution : Its Impact on Strategy and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1966.

Feld, B.T. and others, Ed., *Impact of New Techniques of New Technologies on the Arms Race*, Tenth Pugwash Symposium Proceedings, London, 1971.

Gallois, Pierre, *The Balance of Terror : Strategy for the Nuclear Age*, Tr. by Richard Howard, Boston, 1961.

Garthoff, Raymond L., *Soviet Military Policy*, London, 1966.

Garthoff, Raymond L., *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, London, 1958.

Goldstein, Walter, *The Dilemma of British Defense* : The imbalance between commitments and resources, Ohio State University Press, 1966.

Graham, Gerald S., *The Politics of Naval Supremacy : Studies in British Maritime Ascendancy*, London, 1965.

Gretton, Peter, *Maritime Strategy* : A study of British defence problems, London, 1964.

Hadley Guy, *CENTO the Forgotten Alliance*, Institute for the Study of International Organization, University of Sussex, 1971.

Herrick, Robert Waring, *Soviet Naval Strategy* : Fifty years of theory and practice, US Navel Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, 1968.

Horelick, Arnold L. and Rush, Myron, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, University of Chicago Press, New York, 1966.

Huck, Arthur, *The Security of China* : Chinese approaches to problems of war and strategy, London, 1970.

Hunt, Kenneth, *The Requirement of Military Technology in the 1970s*, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1967.

Indian Council of World Affairs, *Defence and Security in the Indian Ocean Areas*, New Delhi, 1958.

Indian Council of World Affairs, *Seminar on American Arms to Pakistan and the Implications for India's Security*, New Delhi, 1970, (Mimeo).

Jane's All the World's Aircraft, London. (Annual publication giving types of aircraft, missiles and engines manufactured in the world as well as their performance).

Jane's Fighting Ships, London. (Annual publication giving details of the naval capabilities of all the littoral states. The foreward is a useful summary of the naval developments of the year and the possible trends in the future.)

Jane's Weapon Systems, London. (Annual Publication giving details about the latest developments in the evolution of new or superior weapons.)

Kahn, Herman, *On Thermo-nuclear War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1960.

Kavic, Lorne J., *India's Quest for Security : Defence Policies, 1947-1965*, University of California Press, 1967.

Kingston-McCloughry, E.J., *Global Strategy*, New York, 1957.

Kintner, William R. and Scott, Harriet Fast, Trs. and Eds., *The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1968.

Kissinger, Henry A., *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1957. (Published by the Council on Foreign Relations, USA.)

Lapp, Ralph E., *The Weapons Culture*, New York, 1968.

Lapp, Ralph E., *Arms beyond doubt* : the tyranny of weapon technology, New York, 1970.

Martin, L.W., *The Sea in Modern Strategy*, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1967.

Martin L.W., *British Defence Policy ;* the long recessional, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1969 (Adelphi Paper No. 61.)

McNamara, Robert S., *The Essence of Security*, London, 1968.

Miksche, F.O., *The Failure of Atomic Strategy and a New Proposal for the Defence of the West*, London, 1959.

Military Balance (Annual Publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. It gives the military capabilities of individual states).

Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, 1970, Hearings before the joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, Ninety first Congress, Second Session on Naval Propulsion Program, March 1970, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1970.

Parson, Nels A., *Missiles and the Revolution in Warfare*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1962.

Peeters, Paul, *Massive Retaliation ;* the policy and its critics, Chicago, 1959.

Pokrovsky, G.I., *Science and Technology in Contemporary War*, London, 1959.

Quester, George H., *Nuclear Diplomacy : The First Twenty-five Years*, New York, 1970.

Rosecrance, R.N., Ed., *The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, Strategy and Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1964.

Roskill, S.W., *The Strategy of Sea Power : Its Development and Application*, London, 1962.

Sarwar, Hasan K., *The Strategic Interests of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1954.
Saundby, Robert, *Air Bombardment* : The Story of its development, London, 1961.
Schwarz, Urs, *American Strategy : A New Perspective;* the growth of politics-military thinking in the US, New York, 1967.
de Seversky, Alexander P., *Air Power : Key to Survival*, London, 1952,
Sipri Year Book of World Armament and Disarmament (Annual Publication of International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm. It deals with specific problems which have a bearing upon peace and disarmament.)
Smith III, Mark E. and John Jr., Claude J., Eds., *American Defence Policy*, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Edn. 2, 1968.
Sokolovskii, V.D., Ed. *Soviet Military Strategy*, Rand Corporation, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963.
Space Weapons, edited by the editors of Airforce Magazine, New, York, 1959.
Stambuk, George, *American Military Forces Abroad*, Ohio State University Press, 1963.
Stockwell. Richard E., *Soviet Air Power*, New York, 1956.
Strategic Survey (Annual Publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, dealing with problems of international security and big power military rivalry.)
Wolfe, Thomas W., *Soviet Strategy at the Cross-roads*, Rand Corporation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964.
Wood, David, *The Middle East and the Arab World : The Military Context*, Adelphi Papers 20, 1965.

Articles :

Allen, Wing-commander H.R., "The Importance of Mauritius", *Navy*, 74(10), October 1969, pp. 360-61.
Baldwin, Hanson W., "Strategy of the Middle East", *Foreign Affairs*, 35(4), July 1957, pp. 655-65.
Basu, Bikash B., "Military Evaluation of Seas and Oceans and the Geographic Basis of Sea Power," *USI Journal* (New Delhi), 97(409), October-December 1967, pp. 355-70.
Beasley, R.D., "The Willoughby Report for Gulf Defence", *New Middle East*, (19) April 1970, p. 8.
Bindra, Captain A.S., "The Indian Ocean as Seen by an Indian", *Proceeding*, US Naval Institute, 96(807), May 1970 (*Naval Review 1970*), pp. 178-203.
Brittin, Capt. Burdick H., "Piracy-A Modern Conceptus" *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 91 (5), May 1965, pp. 71-81.
Brown, Neville, "Soviet Naval Expansion as a Factor in the New Power Politics", *New Middle East*, (30), March 1971, pp. 17-21.
Brown, Neville, "Deterrence from the Sea", *Survival*, 12 (6), June 1970, pp, 194-198.
Burns, A.L. "Military Technology and International Politics", *Year Books of World Affairs 1961*, pp. 185-203.
Buzzard, Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony, "Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence", *World Politics*, 8(2), January 1956, pp. 228-37.
Carlisle, Capt. Geoffrey E., Three-Mile Limit—Obsolete Concept ? *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 93(2), February 1967, pp. 24-33.
Carter W., "The Middle East in Modern Strategy", *Brassey's Annual 1962*, pp. 115-24.
Carter, W., "Iran—Key Point of Free World Defence", *Brassey's Annual 1963*, pp. 119-29.
Chopra, Wg. Cdr. M.K., "Indian Ocean", *Military Review*, 45(5), May 1965, pp, 85-95.
Colvin, Commander Roberr D., "US Navy, Aftermath of the *Elaith*, *Proceeding*, US Naval Institute, 95(800), October 1969, pp. 60-67.

Cox, Lt. Commander David R., "Sea-power and Soviet Foreign Policy", *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 95(6), June 1969, pp. 32-44.

Davidson, Basil, "Arms and the Portuguese," *Africa Report*, 15 (5), May 1970, pp. 10-11.

Desai, Ashok V., "India's Growing Military Problems : Reaching out to the Soviet Union", *Round Table*, (228), October 1967, pp. 369-79.

Dudley, P.G., "The Future Role of Soviet Sea Power", *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 92 (5), May 1966, pp. 39-49.

Eliot, George Fielding, "Strategic Problems of the Middle East", *Middle East Affairs*, 4 (10), October 1953, pp. 313-23.

Franklin, William D., "Sea-power as a Weapon of War", *Military Review*, 50 (2), February 1970, pp. 64-70.

Gerasimov, G., "The First-strike Theory", *International Affairs* (Moscow) (3) March 1965, pp. 39-45.

Gibert, Stephen P., "Soviet-American Military Aid Competition in the Third World", *Orbis*, 13 (4), Winter 1970, pp. 1117-37.

Hankinson, Commander David K., "HMS Centaur at Dar es Salaam" ,*Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 95 (11) November 1969, pp. 55-6,

Harrigan, Anthony, "Aden : Strategic Crossroads", *Military Review*, 47 (10), October 1967, pp. 43-7.

Harrigan, Anthony, "India's Maritime Posture", *Military Review*, 49 (4), April 1969, pp. 24-30

Henderson, Loy W., "American Political and Strategic Interests in the Middle East and South East Europe", *Bulletin*, Department of State, 17 (438), 23 November 1947, pp. 996-1000.

Hezlet, Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur, "Polaris—Ethics, Politics and Effectiveness", *Navy*, 72 (6), June 1967, pp. 175-77, 191.

Hilsman, Roger, "Australia's Strategic Position", *Bulletin*, Department of State, 50 (1286), 17 February 1964; pp. 243-50.

Horan, H.E. "The Navy of the Soviet Union", *Brassey's Annual* 1960, pp. 124-32.

Hull, E.W. Seabrook, "New Dimension in ASW", *Ordinance*, 53 (292), January-February 1969, pp. 404-407. (*P-3C Orin* ASW aircraft.)

Kemp, Geoffrey, "Arms Sales and Arms Control in the Developing Countries", *World Today*, 22 (9), September 1966, pp. 386-95.

Kemp, Geoffrey, "Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts", *International Conciliation*, (577), March 1970, pp. 5-80.

Kissinger, Henry A., "Military Policy and Defence of the Grey Areas", *Foreign Affairs*, 33 (3), April 1955, pp. 416-28.

Kissinger, Henery A., "Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age", *Foreign Affairs*, 34 (3), April 1956, pp. 346-66.

Lapp, Ralph E., "SALT, MIRV and First Strike", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 28 (3), March 1972, pp. 21-6.

Leontyev, A., "Foreign Bases in the Third World", *New Times*, (49), 7 December 1966, pp. 6-9.

Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony, "Air-power in the Middle East", *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (299), May 1955, pp. 109-17.

Lyon, Peter, "SEATO in Perspective", *Year Book of World Affairs 1965* (London), pp. 113-36.

Lyon, Peter, "Substitute for SEATO?" *International Journal*, 24 (1), Winter 1968/69, pp. 35-46.

Magnus, Ralph H. "US Political-Strategic Interests in Middle East", *Military Review*, 49 (3), March 1969, pp. 47-55.

Martin, Lt. Gen. Glen W., "Our Strategic Forces", *Ordinance*, 55 (303), November-December 1970, pp. 260-65.

Matsuura, Col. Noboru, "Japan's Defence Forces", *Military Review* 51 (2), February 1971, pp, 48-55.

McArdle, John F., "CENTO—The Forgotten Barricade", *Military Review*, 48 (9), September 1968, pp, 84-90.

MccGwire, Commander M.K., "The Background to Russian Naval Policy", *Brassey's Annual 1968*, pp. 141-58.

Mertens, Rene, "The Soviet Fleet in Arab Politics", *New Middle East*, (14), November 1969, pp. 21-5.

Miller, Commander Roger J., "Is SEATO Obsolete ?", *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 94 (11), November 1968, pp. 56-63.

Minter, William, "Allies in Empire", Part II—US Military Involvement, *Africa Report*, 17 (4), July-August 1970, pp. 28-32. (Southern Africa).

Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., "Challenge of Sea Power", *Ordinance*, 55 (301), July-August 1970, pp.41-4.

Murthy, P.A. Narasimha, "The Self-Defence Force of Japan", *The Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis Journal*, 4 (2), October 1971, pp. 222-39.

Hitz, Paul H., "Atoms, Strategy and Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, 34 (2), January 1956, pp. 187-98.

Nuechterlein, Donnld E., "Future Security Arrangements for South East Asia", *Military Review*, 49 (3), March 1969, pp. 79-83.

O'Ballance, Major Edgar, "The Megatonnage and Missile Gaps", *Military Review*, 49 (3), March 1969, pp. 65-70.

Okumiya, Lt. Gen Masatake, "Japan's Self-Defence Forces", *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 91 (12), December 1965, pp. 26-35.

Qppenheimer, J. Robert, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, 31 (4), July 1953, pp. 525-35.

Palmer, Col. Joe M., ' SEATO Re-examined", *Military Review*, 47 (2), February 1967, pp. 82-91.

Palmer, Norman D., "The Defense of South Asia", *Orbis*, 9 (4), Winter 1966, pp. 898-929.

Palmer, Norman D., "Building the United States' Fleet, 1947-1967", *Brassey's Annual, 1966*, pp. 68-81.

Paolucci, Capt. Dominic A., "Poseidon and Minuteman", *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 49 (8), August 1969, pp. 46-58.

Paolucci, Capt. Dominic A., "The Development of Navy Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems", *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 99 (807), May 1970, pp. 204-23.

Paone, Rocco M., "The Soviet Threat in the Indian Ocean", *Military Review*, 50 (12), December 1970, pp. 48-55.

Ratsimbazafy, Aristide, "The Indian Ocean : New Strategic Role", *Review of International Affairs*, 18 (421), 20 October 1967, pp. 18-19.

Rippon, Geodfrey, "South Africa and Naval Strategy : The Importance of South Africa", *Round Table*, (239), July 1970, pp. 303-9.

Roucek, Joseph S., "Yemen in Global Geopolitics", *United Asia*, 18 (3), May-June 1966, pp. 143-51.

Ruhe, Capt. W.J., "Sea-Power in the Seventies", *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 96 (4) April 1970, pp. 26-31.

Schneider, Mark Bernard, "SABMIS and the Future of Strategic Warfare", *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 95 (7), July 1969, pp. 27-34. (SAMBIS—Sea Based Anti-Ballistic Missile Intercept System).

Schofield, B.B., "Russian Naval Policy", *Brassey's Annual*, 1960, pp. 25-31.

Schofield, B.B., "The Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile System", *Bressey's Annual 196*, pp. 188-96.

Sekino, Hideo, "Japan and Her Maritime Defenese," *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 97 (5), May 1971 *(Naval Review, 1971)*, pp. 98-121.

Shatalov, I., "South East Asia in the Military Strategic Plans of Imperialism", *International Affairs*, (Moscow, (4), April 1967, pp. 48-55.

Sibsurum, T., "Diego Garcia and Mauritius". *Review of International Affairs*, 22 (502), 5 March 1971, pp. 35-6.

Simon, Sheldon W., "A System Approach to Security in the Indian Ocean Area," *Orbis*, 14 (5), Summer 1970, pp, 401-42.

Soedjatmoko, "Southeast Asia and Security", *Military Review*, 50 (7), July 1970, pp. 40-48.

Sokol, A.E. "Sea Power Today", *Brassey's Annual, 1956*, pp. 196-206.

Som Dutt, D., "Foreign Military Aid and Defence Strength and Politics of India and Pakistan : A Comparative Study", *International Studies*, 8, (1/3), July-October 1966, pp, 64-72.

Som Dutt, D., "Security and Defence of South and South-East Asia" *India Quarterly*, 25 (1), January-March 1969, pp. 3-20.

Spain, James W.,"Middle East Defence : A New Approach',, *Middle East Journal*, 8 (3), Summer 1954, pp. 251-66.

Spence, J.E., "South Africa and the Defence of the West : Liability or Asset to the Free World ?", *Round Table*, (241), January 1971, pp. 15-23.

Subrahmanyam, K. "Ebb and Flow of Power in the Indian Ocean Area", *' USI Journal*, 98 (410), January-March 1968, pp. 3-16.

Sweitzer, Capt. H.B., "Sovereignty and the SLBM", *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 92(9), September 1966, pp. 32-41.

Syed, Anwar, "China and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965", *Orbis*, 10(3), Fabruary 1966, pp. 859-80.

Tarr Jr., Cedric W., "Weapons in Search of a Strategy", *Military Review*, 44(9), September 1964, pp. 49-55.

Taylor, J.W.R., "US Air-Power in the Sixties", *Brassey's Annual 1960*, pp. 163-71.

Taylor, J.W.R. "The Future of Air Power", *Brassey's Annual 1963*, pp. 34-42.

Teplinsky, B., "Some Aspects of US Global Strategy", *International Affairs* (Moscow), (5), May 1970, pp. 70-5.

Timofeyev, K., "The Role of Navies in Imperialist Policy", *International Affairs*, (Moscow), (11), November 1969, pp. 40-4. (The *Polaris* Threat).'

Thompson, James M., "Soviet Goals and Strategy in the Middle East", *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, 98(1), April 1969, pp. 75-83.

Ulsmer, Edgar E., "New Dimension in a Nuclear Deterrence", *Air Force and Space Digest*, 52 (12), December 1969, pp. 65-72. (About SRAM Missiles).

Venkataramani, M.S. and Arya, H.C., "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan : The Evolution and course of an Uneasy Partnership", *International Studies*, 8 (1-2), July-October 1966, pp. 73·125.

Wall, Patric, "The Missile in Sea Warfare", *Brassey's Annual 1968*, pp. 159-67.

Watt, D.C., "The Continuing Strategic Importance of Simonstown", *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 95 (800), October 1969, pp. 51-54.

Watt, D.C., "Piracy on the Highseas : A New Kind of Warfare ?", *New Middle East*, (40), January 1972, pp. 21-4.

Wattern, Desmond, "Britain's New Defence Policy, Its Significance to the Royal NAVY", *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 92 (11), November 1966, pp. 60-9.

William, F.A. "The Changing Airforce : Advent of Missiles", *Brassey's Annual 1962*, pp. 12-18,

Withrow, John E., "Needed a Credible Presence", *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, 92 (3), March 1966, pp. 52-61.

Zagoria, Donald S., "Who Fears the Damino Theory ?", *Survival*, 10 (6), June 1968, pp. 184-92.

"Soviets in the Indian Ocean", *US News and World Report*, 13 September 1971, pp. 72-75. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwatt, Jr., US Chief of Naval Operations, Interview.

"Submarine and Anti-submarine Warfare", *Brassey's Annual 1962*, pp. 144-52.

"Pakistan : America in the Indian Ocean", *Round Table*, (214), March 1964, pp. 175-9.

"Arabia Felix and the Indian Ocean : A Study of Political Strategy", *Round Table*, (216), September 1964, pp. 243-51.

"US Military Commitments in Asia", (Series of Articles) *Current History*, 57 (336), August 1969, pp. 65-118.

"USSR and the Indian Ocean", *Current Affairs Bulletin*, 45 (10), 6 April 1970, pp. 147-60.

"Aftermath of a Withdrawal : Soviet Build-up in Aden", *Navy*, 75 (6), June 1970, p. 172.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Books :

Activities of Nations in Ocean Space, Hearing, before the sub-Committee on Ocean Space of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, July 1969, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1969.

Andrassy, J., *International Law and the Resources of the Seas*, London, 1970.

Apthekar, Herbert, *American Foreign Policy and the Cold War*, New York, 1962.

Bell, Coral, *The Debatable Alliance : An Essay in Anglo-American Relations*, London, 1964. (Chatham House Essays, 3).

Beloff. Max, *The Future of British Foreign Policy*, London, 1969.

Bowett. D.W., *The Law of the Seas*, Manchester University Press, 1967.

Burke, William T., *Towards a better Use of the Ocean* : Contemporary Legal Problems in Ocean Development, A Sipri Monograph, Stockholm, 1969.

Burnell, Elaine H. and von Simons, Piers, Ed., *Pacem in Maribus, Ocean Enterprises*, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, 1970.

Campbell, John C., *Defence of the Middle East*, Council for Foreign Relations, New York, 1958.

Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University *Japans Future in Southest Asia*, 1966.

Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Gulf : Implications of British Withdrawal*, Georgetown University, Washington, 1969.

Chatham House Study Group, *British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East: A Report*, London, 1958.

Clark, Gregory, *In Fear of China*, London, 1968. (China, Asia and Australia).

Documents on American Foreign Relations (Annual Publication of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, giving the text of relevant documents of that year.)

Documents on International Affairs (Annual Publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, giving the texts or excerpts of important documents of that year.

Dulles, Eleanor Lansing and Crane, Robert Dickson, Eds., *Detent: Cold War Strategies in Transition*, Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, 1965.

Emerson, Rupert, *Africa and United State Policy*, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967.

Finer, Herman, *Dulles Over Suez*: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy, London, 1964.

Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, *The Role of Middle Power and World Politics*, Bonn, 1969.

Gordon, Bernard K., *Toward Disengagement in Asia* : A strategy for American Foreign Policy, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliff, N.J., 1969.

Greene, Fred, *US Policy and the Security of Asia*, London, 1968.

Gross, Feliks, *World Politics and Tension Areas*, New York University Press, 1966.

Gullion, E.A., Ed., *The Uses of the Seas*, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliff, N.J., 1968.

Gupta, Sisir, *India and Regional Integration in Asia*, Bombay, 1964.

Hayter, William, *Russia and the World : A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy*, London, 1970.

Hevi, Emmanuel John. *The Dragon's Embrace, the Chinese Communists and Africa*, London, 1967.

Hinton, Harold C., *Communist China in World Politics*, London, 1966.

Hoskyns, Catherine, Ed., *The Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya Dispute, 1960-67*, Dar es-Salaam, 1969.

Humbaraci, Arslan, *Middle East Indictment*, London, 1958.

Hunter, Robert E., *The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East*, Part I, Problems of Commitment, Part II, Oil and the Persian Gulf, Adelphi Papers 59, 60, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1969.

Institute for Strategic Studies, *Source of Conflict in the Middle East*, London, 1966.

Jansen, G.H., *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, London, 1966.

Joshua, Wynfred, *Soviet Penetration into the Middle East*, National Strategy Information Centre, Inc, New York, 1971, (Revised Ed.) (Pamphlet).

Kaushik, Devendra, *The Indian Ocean*, New York, 1971.

Kennan, George F., *Realities of American Foreign Politics*, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., 1954,

Kirkwood, Kenneth, *Britain and Africa*, London, 1965.

Laqueur, Walter, *The Struggle for the Middle East : The Soviet Union and the Middle East*, London, 1969.

Mackintosh, J.M., *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, London, 1962.

Maclean, Donald, *British Foreign Policy Since Suez, 1956-1968*, London, 1970.

Magnus, Ralph H., Ed., *United States Interests in the Middle East*, Washington, D.C., 1969.

Marlowe, John, *The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century*, London, 1962.

Mayall, James, *Africa : The Cold War and After*, London, 1971.

Morison, David, *The USSR and Africa*, Institute of Race Relations, London, 1964.

Neuhauser, Charles, *Third World Politics : China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization 1957-1967*, Harvard East Asian Monograph, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968.

Nicholas, Herbert, *Britain and the USA*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963.

Nutting, Anthony, *I saw for Myself : The Aftermath of Suez*, London, 1958.

Oda, Shigeru, *The International Law of the Ocean Development : Basic Documents*, Leiden, 1972.

Osgood, Robert E., *Alliance and American Foreign Policy*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968.

Pannikar, K.M., *India and the Indian Ocean*, An Essay on the Influence of Sea-power on Indian History, London, 1946.

Ra'anan, Uri, *The USSR Arms The Third World :* Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1969,

Rapoport, Anatol, *The Big Two : Soviet American Perceptions of Foreign Policy*, New York, 1971.

Rivkin, Arnold, *Africa and the West*, London, 1962.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmed and others, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan : An Analysis*, Karachi, 1964.

Spector, Ivar, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World 1917-1956*, University of Washington Press, Washington, 1956.

Spielman, William, Carl, *The United States in the Middle East : A Study of American Policy*, New York, 1959.

Stein, Arthur, *India and the Soviet Union : The Nehru Era*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969.

Survay of International Affairs (Annual Publication of the Royal Institute of International Affiairs, London. It discusses in details the main international events of that particular year).

Sztucki, Jerzy, *Symposium on the International Regime of the Sea-bed*, Proceedings, Rome, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1970.

Toussaint, A., *History of the Indian Ocean*. London, 1966.

Tucker, Robert C., *A Preface to US Policy Toward Russia*, Rand Corporation, 1958, (Mimeographed).

United Nations, *National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone and Continental Shelf, the High Seas and to Fishing and Conservation of the Sea*, United Nations, Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER. B/15 New York, 1970.

The United State in World Affairs (An annual publication of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, covering the events of that year.)

Weinstein, Franklin B., *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation* : an Inquiry into the Functions of Indonesian Foreign Policy, Cronell University South East Asia Programe, 1969.

Wolf, Jr., Charles, *United States Policy and the Third World :* Problems and Analysis, Boston and Toronto, 1967,

Wolfers, Arnold, Ed., *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1959.

Articles :

Allen, Philip M., "Self-determination in the Western Indian Ocean", *International Conciliation*, (560), November 1966. (The whole issue is devoted to that topic.)

Amery, Julian, "East of Suez up for Grabs", *Reporter*, 35(9), 1 December 1969, pp. 16-21.

Amirsadeghi, Hossein, "Iran's New Out-ward Look", *New Middle East*, (35), August 1971, pp. 9-10.

Anand, J.P., "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in the Indian Ocean Area", *Journal*, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 3 (4), April 1971, pp. 550-81.

Appadorai, Dr. A., "The Bandung Conference", *India Quarterly*, 11 (3), July-September 1955, pp. 207-35.

Arkadyev, N., "South East Asia : Alliance with a Double Bottom", *International Affairs* (Moscow), (11), November 1968, pp. 87-8.

Auburn, F.M., "The International Sea-bed Area", *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 20 (2), April 1971, pp. 173-94.

Bains, J.S,, "The Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean", *Indian Journal of International Law*, 4(2), April 1964, pp. 329-35.

Barclay, Brig. C.N., "Britain's Role in Southeast Asia", *Military Review*, 49(6), June 1969, pp. 69-76.

Baskin, Victory, "Marine Resources Development, Foreign Policy and the Spectrum of Choice" *Orbis*, 12 (1), Spring 1968, pp. 39-72.

Bayne, E.A., The Issue of Greater Somalia," *American Universities Field Staff Report Service* (Northeast Africa Series), 13(1). February 1966, pp. 1-6 and 13(2), February 1966, pp. 1-14.

Berreby, Jean-Jacques, "Growing Oil Needs Influence Soviet Policy", *New Middle East*, (15), December 1969, pp. 44-5.

Berreby, Jean-Jacques, "Does America Need Arab Oil?", *New Middle* East, (19), April 1970, pp. 9-11,

Bessmenov, A., "US Diplomacy : A Prisoner of Military Strategy" *International Affairs* (Moscow), (8), August, 1969, pp. 57-62.

Bondarevskiy, Prof. G.L., The Continuing Western Interests in Oman—as Seen from Moscow", *New Middle East*, (35), August 1971 pp, 11-15.

Boyd, R.G., "Soviet and Chinese Involvement in Southern Asia", *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 12(2), Summer 1970, pp. 175-94.

Brands, William J., "Moscow and South Asia", *Problem of Communism*, 21(3), May-June 1972, pp. 12-31.

Brewer, William D., "Yesterday and Tomorrow in the Persian Gulf", *Middle East Journal*, 23(2), Spring 1969, pp. 149-51.

Brown, E.D., "Deep-Sea Mining : The Legal Regime of Inner Space", *Year Book of World Affairs 1968*, pp. 165-190.

Buchan, Alstair, "Britain in the Indian Ocean", *International Affairs*, 42(2), April 1966, pp. 184-93.

Buchan, Alstair, "An Asian Balance of Power", *Australian Journal of Politics and His'ory*, 12(2), August 1966, pp. 271-81.

Burke, S.M. "Sino-Pakistani Relations," *Orbis*, 8(2), Summer 1964, pp. 391-404.

Campbell, J.F., "Rumblings along the Red Sea : The Eritrean Question", *Foreign Affairs*, 48(3), April 1970, pp. 537-48.

Campbell, J.F., "Background to the Eritrean Conflict", *Africa Report*, 16(5), May, 1971, pp. 19-20.

Carlson, Sevince, "Japan's Entry into the Middle East Oil Contest", *New Middle East*, (22), July 1970, pp. 14-70.

Carlson, Sevinc, "The Explosion of the Myth—China, the Soviet Union and the Middle East", *New Middle East*, (27), December 1970. pp. 32-40.

Carlson, Sevinc, "China's Urgent Need for Stability in the Middle East", *New Middle East*, (36), September 1971, pp. 25-31.

Catlin, George, E. Gordon, "India's Place in the Balance of World Power", *Asian Review*, 59(219), July 1963, pp. 142-52.

Chaudhari, Mohammed Ahsen, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union", *Asian Survey*, 6(9), September 1966, pp. 492-500.

Cheever, Daniel S., "Marine Science and Ocean Politics", *Bulletin* of the Atomic Scientists, 26(2), February 1970, pp. 22, 29-34. (Also see pp. 35-40.)

Chintamani, C., "Soviet Proposal for Collective Security for Asia, Asian Reaction", *China Report*, 6(3), May-June 1970, pp. 49-55.

Condese, Antomo Jose, "Ten Years of Armed Strnggle in Angola", *Review of International Affairs*, 22 (501), 20 February 1971, pp. 19-21.

Cottrell, Alvin J., "British Withdrawal from the Persian Gulf", *Military Review*, 50 (6), June 1970, pp. 14-21.

Cottrell, Alvin J., "Interview with the Shah of Iran", *New Middle East*, (31), April 1971, pp. 21-23.

Cottrel, Alvin J., "Implications of Reopening of the Canal for the Area East and South of Suez", *New Middle East*, (34), July 1971, pp. 29-32.

Darling, Frank C., "America and Thailand", *Asian Survey*, 7 (4), April 1967, pp. 213-25.

Das, Narayan, "Sino-Ceylonese Relations (1950-1967)", *China Report*, 5 (5), September-October 1969, pp. 1-8.

Davis, Jennifer, "Allies in Empire : US Economic Involvement" *Africa Today*, 13 (4), July-August 1970, pp-15. (Southern Africa)

Delius, Antony, "Communist China's New Diplomatic Strategy in Africa", *Optima*, 21 (2), June 1971, pp. 54-58.

Derkach, Nadia, "The Soviet Policy Towards Indonesia in the West Irian and the Malaysian Dispute", *Asian Survey*, 5 (11), November 1965, pp. 566-71.

Drambyantz, G., "The Persian Gulf: Twixt the Past and the Future", *International Affairs* (Moscow), (10), October 1970, pp. 66-71.

Drambyantz, G., "The Gulf Federation", *New Times*, (34), August 1971, pp. 13-14.

Fessler, Loren and Yee, Min S., "Chinese Interests in Africa", *China Main-land Review*, 1 (2), September 1965, pp. 10·23 and 1 (3), December 1965, pp. 24-37.

Finlay, Luke W., "The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf", *American Journal of International Law*, 64 (1), January 1970, pp. 42-72.

Frankel, J., "East of Suez: The Aftermath," *Year Book of World Affairs 1969*, pp. 20-34.

Gann, Lewis H., "Southern Africa, No Hope for Violent Liberation", *Africa Report*, 17 (2), February 1972, pp. 15-9.

Geremaw, Taye, "Rebellion in Eritrea—Who is behind it; what are Its Aims ?", *New Middle East*, (31), April 1971, pp. 24-28.

Girling, J.L.S., "The Guam Doctrine", *International Affairs*, 46 (1), January 1970, pp. 48-62.

Green, Marshall, "A Look at Asian Regionalism", *Bulletin*, Department of State, 61 (1587), 24 November 1969, pp. 445-48.

Grundy, Kenneth W., "Host Countries and the Southern African Liberation Struggle" *Africa Quarterly*, 10 (1), April/June 1970, pp. 15-24.

La Guma, Alex, "Dialogue, a Gross Betrayal", *Africa Report*, 17 (2), February 1972, pp. 24-5.

Gupta, Sisir, "The Need for a Strong India: Confusion in Western Policy", *Round Table*, (225), January 1967, pp. 61-67.

Gupta, Sisir, "The Power Structure in South Asia", *Round Table*, (238), April 1970, pp. 129-44.

Hatta, Mohammad, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, 31 (3), April 1953, pp. 441-52.

Hindley, Donald, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives", *Asian Survey*, 4 (6), June 1964, pp. 904-13,

Honig, F., "Cold War as an Instrument of Policy", *The Year Book of World Affairs*, 1953, pp. 45-70.

Hoskins, Halford L., "Soviet Economic Penetration in the Middle East", *Orbis*, 3 (4), Winter 1960, pp. 458-68.

Hottinger, Arnold, "The Palace Revolution in Muscat and Oman", *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, 20 (6), September 1970, p. 20,

Howard, Harry N., "US Interest in the Middle East", *Military Review*, 50 (1), January 1970, pp. 64-70.

Howard Peter, "Soviet Policies in Southeast Asia", *International Journal*, 23 (3), Summer 1968, pp. 435-55.

Howard, Peter, "A System of Collective Security", *Mizan*, 11 (4), July-Angnst 1969 pp, 199-204.

Ignatyev, O., "Frelimo—Seven Years", *New Times*, (39), October 1971, pp. 26-27.

Jo, Yung-hwan, "Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia and Japan's Role", *Journal of Politics*, 30 (3), August 1968, pp. 780-97.

Jordon, Jr., Amos A·, "Military Assistance and National Policy", *Orbis*, 2 (2), Summer 1958, pp. 236-52.

Kamat, D.A., "Recent Development in the Law Relating to the Sea-bed", *Indian Journal of International Law*, 11 (1), January 1971, pp. 9-19.

Kapitsa, M., "National Liberation and the Mao Group's Splitting Activity'., *International Affairs* (Moscow), (7), July 1968, pp. 10-17.

Kelly, J.B., "The Buraimi Oasis Dispute'', *Anternational Affairs*, 32 (3) July 1956, pp. 318-26.

Khan, Mohammed Ayub., "The Pakistan-American Alliance : Stresses and Strains", *Foreign Affairs* 42 (2) January 1964, pp. 195-209,

Khan, Mohammed Ayub., "We Have Legitimate Cause for Complaint Against US", *US News and World Repot*, 54 (19), 13 May 1963, 82-3. (Also see pp. 80-82).

Kennedy, D.E., "The Scope for Collective Security in Southern Asia", *World Today*, 20 (10), October 1964, pp. 440-8.

Khaduri, M., "Iran's Claims to the Sovereignty of Bahrayn", *American Journal of International Law*, 45 (4), October 1951, pp. 631-47.

Kirsch, Marian P., "Soviet Security Objectives in Asia", *International Organization*, 24 (3), Summer 1960, pp. 451-78.

Klinghoffer, Arthur Jay, "Israel in Africa : The Strategy of Aid", *Africa Report*, 17 (4), April 1972, pp. 12-14.

Landis, Lincoln, "Soviet Interest in Middle East Oil", *New Middle East*, (3), December 1968, pp. 16-20. (Also see pp. 21-3)

Lenczowski, George, "Evolution of Soviet Policy Towards the Middle East", *Journal of Politics*, 20 (1), February 1958, pp. 162-86.

Liefer, Michael, "Anglo-American Differences Over Malaysia", *World Today*, 20 (4), April 1964, pp. 156-67.

Maximov, E., "The Evil Theory", *New Times*, (42), October 1969, pp. 15-17.

Miller, J.D.B., "Australia and Southeast Asia : National Interests in the 1970s", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 11 (1), March 1971, pp. 32-7.

De Nezza, Major E.J., "The Soviet Need for Middle East Oil", *Air Force Review*, 22 (4), May-June 1971, pp. 52-7.

Nuechterlein, Donald E., "US National Interests in Southeast Asia : A Reappraisal", *Asian Survey*, 11 (11), November 1971, pp. 1054-70.

Onishi, Akira, "Japanese Interests in South East Asia : A Japanese View", *Asian Survey*, 11 (4), April 1971, pp. 413-21.

Orestov, O., "East of the Suez Policy Fails", *International Affairs* (Moscow), (8), August 1966, pp. 23-31.

Pa'il, Meir, "Who Won in Pakistan", *New Outlook*, 15 (1), January 1972, pp. 33-38,

Pardo, Arvid, "Who will Control the Sea-bed", *Foreign Affairs*, 47 (1), October 1968, pp. 123-37.

Pardo, Arvid, "Sovereignty Under the Sea-The Threat of National Occupation", *Round Table*, (232), October 1968, pp. 341-55.

Pauker, Guy J., "Towards a New Order in Indonesia": *Foreign Affairs*, 45 (3), April 1967, pp. 503-19

Pavlovsky, V., "Problems of Regionalism in Asia", *Internaitonal Affairs* (Moscow), (4), April 1969, pp. 46-51.

Pertiz, Rene, "American-Malaysian Relations : Substance and Shadow", *Orbis*, 11 (2), Summer 1967, pp. 532-50.

Robinson, David, "The Three-cornered Conflict in Northeastern Africa", *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, 20 (11), February 1971, pp. 17-19.

Rountree, William M., "The US Interest in the Middle East", *Bulletin*, Department of State, 40 (1029), March 1959, pp. 363-67.

Rummey, Mason P., "The View from Iran", *Military Review*, 52(1), January 1972, pp. 68-74.

Sien-Chong, Niu, "China's Petroleum Industry", *Military Review*, 49 (11), November 1969, pp. 23-30.

Singh, Vishal, "Soekarno and the New Regime in Indonesia", *India Quarterly*, 23 (4), Otcobe-December 1967, pp. 325-37.

Smolansky, O.M., "Soviet Policy in the Arab East 1945-1957", *Journal of International Affairs*, 13 (2), 1959, pp. 126-40.

Soedjatmoko, H.E., "South East Asia and Security", *Survival*, 11 (10), October 1969, pp. 302-6.

Stevenson, John P., "International Law and Oceans", *Bulletin*, Department of States, 62 (1603), 16 March 1970, pp. 339-43.

Sylvester, Anthony, "South Yemen—the Revolution Tightens Its Grip", *New Middle East*, (28), January 1971, pp. 32-35.

Sylvester, Anthony, "Turn of the Tide in Yemen", *New Middle East*, (29), February 1971, pp. 41-43.

Trager, Frank N., "Sino-Burmese Relations : The End of the Pauk Phaw Era", *Orbis*, 11 (4), Winter 1968, pp. 1034-54.

U Thant, "A Burmese View of World Tensions", Annals of the Academy of Political Science, (318), July 1958, pp. 34-42.

Van der Kroef, Justus M., "The West New Guinea Settlement : Its Origins and Implications", *Orbis*, 7 (1), Spring 1963, pp. 120-49.

Van der Kroef, Justus M., "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership", *Orbis*, 8 (2), Summer 1964, pp. 332-56.

Van der Kroef, Justus M., "The Sino-Indonesian Rupture", *China Quarterly*, (33), January-March 1968, pp. 17-46,

Van der Kroef, Justus M., "The Gorton Manner, Australia, Southeast Asia and the USA", *The Pacific Affairs*, 42 (3), Fall 1969, pp. 311-33.

Vasilyev, A., "Rebels Against Slavery", *New Times*, (38), September 1971, pp. 27-30.

Venkataraman, S., "The Indian Ocean and the Cold War Politics", *Estern Journal of International Law*, 3 (2), July 1971, pp. 145-58.

Vicker, Ray, "Russia Looks Beyond the Middle East", *Air Force and Space Digest*, 53 (10), October 1970, pp. 58-59.

Volgin, A., "Africa in Peking's Foreign Policy", *International Affairs* (Moscow), (9), September 1969, pp. 26-32.

Watt, D.C., "The Decision to Withdraw from the Gulf", *Political Quarterly*, 30 (3), July/September 1968, pp. 310-21.

Watt, D.C., "The Arabs, the Heath Government and the Future of the Gulf", *New Middle East*, (30), March 1971, pp. 25-27.

Watt, D.C., "Britain and the Indian Ocean", *Political Quarterly*, 42 (3), July-September 1971, pp. 306-15.

Watt, D.C., "The Persian Gulf—Cradle of Conflict ?", *Problems of Communism*, (21) (3), May-June 1972, pp. 32-40.

Whitaker, Paul M., "The Revolutionaries of Portuguese Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 8(1), April 1970, pp. 15-35.

Whitaker, Paul M., "Arms and the Nationalists", *Africa Report* 15(5), 1970, pp. 12-13.

Wilcox, Wayne, "Regional Security in South Asia", *American Review*, 9(2), January 1965, pp. 55-60.

Woronoff, Jon, "The Case for an African Defence Organization", *Africa Report*, 16(6) June 1971, pp. 23-25.

Yodfat, Aryeh Y., "The People's Republic of South Yeman—Its Instability and Change," *New Outlook*, 14(2), March 1971, pp. 43-48.

Yodfat, Aryeh Y. "Russia's Other Middle East Pasture—Iraq" *New Middle East* (38) November 1971, pp. 26-28.

Young, Richard, "Equitable Solution for Off-Shore Boundaries: The 1968 Saudi Arabia-Iran Agreement", *American Journal of International Law* 64(1), January 1970, pp. 152-57.

Yu, G.T, "China in Africa", *Year Book of World Affairs 1970*, pp. 125-37.

Zagoria, Donald S. "Russia's New Asian Offensive", *New Leader*, 4(2) 17 January 1966, pp. 4-7.

105 S0201 38 00


KS-219-023